EP2436566B1 - Procédés et agencement pour effectuer une vérification d'identité de conducteur - Google Patents

Procédés et agencement pour effectuer une vérification d'identité de conducteur Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2436566B1
EP2436566B1 EP11005752A EP11005752A EP2436566B1 EP 2436566 B1 EP2436566 B1 EP 2436566B1 EP 11005752 A EP11005752 A EP 11005752A EP 11005752 A EP11005752 A EP 11005752A EP 2436566 B1 EP2436566 B1 EP 2436566B1
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Prior art keywords
verification
driver
operator
vehicle
test
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EP11005752A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP2436566A1 (fr
Inventor
Petter Larsson
Andreas Hagemann
Hanna BJÖRK
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Volvo Technology AB
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Volvo Technology AB
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/25—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using biometry
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/25—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using biometry
    • B60R25/252—Fingerprint recognition
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/25—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using biometry
    • B60R25/257—Voice recognition
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R2325/00—Indexing scheme relating to vehicle anti-theft devices
    • B60R2325/10—Communication protocols, communication systems of vehicle anti-theft devices
    • B60R2325/105—Radio frequency identification data [RFID]

Definitions

  • the invention relates to methods and an arrangement for performing driver identity verification.
  • DE 43 26 514 A1 discloses an electronic anti-theft device for vehicles which gradually makes a motor vehicle with electronic engine control inoperative if a theft, robbery or attack takes place, if the driver cannot prove his use authorisation by keying in a personal identification number (PIN).
  • PIN personal identification number
  • the inquiry controlled by the electronic security system in order to prove identification takes place at suitable determined intervals in the travel time or along the route while the vehicle is being used.
  • the speed of the vehicle is incremently throttled till it comes to a standstill without endangering traffic by intervening in the electronic engine control and then as soon as it is stationary the vehicle is blocked against being driven away or towed away by intervening in the brake system, and further drive train electronic systems if they are present.
  • Biometric data of the operator to be verified are determined before and/or during driving the vehicle and compared to reference data. If no match is found between the measured biometric data and the reference data, an autonomously operating control system takes over the control of the vehicle.
  • US 2004078118 A1 relates to a device for controlling an appliance, which cooperates with a human operator, wherein the appliance comprises an appliance-side safety device, which can interact with an enabling element provided with memory means and associated with a particular, authorized human operator, the appliance being operable only after interaction with the enabling element.
  • the occurrences to be watched can be stored in the memory means of the enabling element, for example for watching motor vehicles with regard to unacceptably long driving times of a particular driver.
  • the control means of aircraft are watched to ensure that the aircraft can be flown only by an authorized pilot.
  • Invariable body characteristics of the driver or pilot for example a finger print, are stored in the enabling element.
  • the real body characteristics are detected by sensors and are compared with the stored ones.
  • the vehicle or aircraft can only be used, if detected and stored body characteristics are identical.
  • US 5,686,765 A provides a system for use with an automotive vehicle having a normally disabled ignition system.
  • the system includes a reader, such as a fingerprint reader or retina reader, to identify the driver.
  • the output from the reader is compared to corresponding physiological data stored in memory to determine if the driver is authorized to operate the vehicle.
  • a timer is employed to permit operation of the vehicle only during preset prescribed time periods.
  • US 2002/0048391 A1 discloses a fingerprint identification system for a motor vehicle which includes an ignition mode setting unit, a matching board and an engine control unit.
  • the ignition mode setting unit identifies an ignition mode, scans and reads an input fingerprint, and sets and deletes a registered fingerprint.
  • the matching board stores the registered fingerprint and compares the input fingerprint with the registered fingerprint to output an output signal.
  • the engine control unit receives the output signal to output a control signal for controlling a key lock/release and a steering wheel lock/release.
  • Document FR-A-2820384 shows a multimodal identification system according to the preamble of claim 1.
  • An object of the invention is to provide flexible, easy-to-use, non-intrusive, imposture-safe methods and systems for truck driver verification.
  • a further object is to provide similar verification and/or identification methods and systems.
  • the invention has two purposes. One is to find appropriate methods for driver verification and build a prototype of a verification system which can be used for testing and further development. The other is to study how truck drivers perceive such a system and how their conception goes along with the growing demand for higher security.
  • the invention focuses on the transport industry.
  • One embodiment takes the form of a method for assuring that the operator of a vehicle is an authorized driver. This is accomplished through the utilization of an onboard, multi-mode driver identification system used to ascertain whether an operator is an authorized driver.
  • a first driver identification procedure is performed on the operator in the vehicle and it is determined whether or not he or she is an authorized or unauthorized driver of the vehicle. Normally the test will only be to confirm whether the person being evaluated is an authorized driver. If the identification procedure fails to confirm that he or she is authorized, it will be assumed and acted upon as if it has been confirmed that they are unauthorized.
  • a second driver identification procedure is subsequently performed on the operator and it is again attempted to determine whether he or she is an authorized or unauthorized driver.
  • the first and second driver identification procedures are performed with a time interval therebetween, and this time interval is dependent upon the nature of the work being performed by the operator. As an example, the interval between identification confirmations will be different for urban delivery drivers making frequent stops and entrances/exits to and from the vehicle as compared to long-haul drivers making only a few stops during the day and presenting far fewer opportunities for unauthorized operators to slip behind the wheel of the vehicle.
  • remedial (remedying) measures will be exercised in order to avert potentially negative impact when the present operator of the vehicle is determined to be an unauthorized driver based upon at least one of the performed identification procedures. While the truck will normally not be brought to an immediate stop based on a failure to ID the operator as an authorized driver, such things as notifications to the home office may be telematically affected or the vehicle prevented from restarting after the next driver-made stop.
  • driver identification procedures can be different from one another, or alike.
  • the second driver identification may be initiated immediately following a determination that the operator is an unauthorized driver in the first driver identification procedure.
  • the second driver identification procedure may be performed only when it cannot be determined that the operator is an authorized driver based on performance of the first driver identification procedure.
  • one of the identification procedures is a passive identification test that does not require conscious interaction by the operator in association with the performance of the driver identification procedures.
  • the passive identification test comprises a scan of a physical characteristic of the operator from which an image is compared to a set of control images representative of authorized drivers of the vehicle.
  • At least one of the first and second driver identification procedures is an active identification test that requires conscious interaction by the operator in association with the performance of the at least one of the driver identification procedures.
  • the active identification test can include issuing a request to the operator to input a personal identification number into the system identifying the operator as an authorized driver.
  • Another form of an active identification test comprises reading hard-coded identification information on an identification card presented by the operator. The system then may request that the operator input a personal identification number into the system that corresponds to a hard-coded identification number read from the identification card.
  • the active identification test can comprise issuing a command to the operator to speak a prescribed phrase, recording the spoken phrase as a speech pattern and comparing that pattern to a set of control speech patterns of authorized drivers of the vehicle.
  • the first and second identification procedures are of two different types from one another and they are performed with random time intervals therebetween.
  • an automated verification system appreciates that one of the issues human factors experts struggle with in this area is when and how should a driver be verified. Since the use of commercial vehicles differs depending on the application, some drivers might leave and enter their vehicle twenty times a day while some driver do the same only two to three times per day. In order to maintain a high enough security level without the system becoming annoying to the driver, several different strategies can be used. One of them is to perform automatic verification while driving. For instance, a face recognition (verification) can be performed during driving, without the driver being aware of it. If it fails the driver can be prompted to input his PIN-code or to use another method. The verification can be performed with random intervals.
  • a vehicle is equipped with several verification methods the driver can be prompted with different methods at different times. If the choice of method and time is randomized the driver will have no way of knowing when or how to verify himself. Implementing this kind of unpredictability in the system increases the security level since an imposture would never know when or in which way he would have to verify himself.
  • biometric systems it is not the measured biometric (image) itself that is verified (matched), but rather a template of the biometric; that is, a template is extracted from the measured biometric and compared to an existing template in the database.
  • a template is extracted from the measured biometric and compared to an existing template in the database.
  • One of the problems with matching against a stored template is the fact that a person's biometrics might change over time while the stored template does not. For instance, a person's fingerprint might change due to a scar or a spoken password due to illness or age.
  • One solution to this problem is to update the template automatically.
  • the invention proposes an automatic update that can be achieved in a multi-modal verification system; that is, a verification system using more than one biometric/PIN-code/smart card.
  • One or more verification methods can then be used to verify the driver while one of the methods not used updates its template (if the verification process was a success).
  • the driver enters his vehicle and is prompted to verify himself using PIN-code, fingerprint and face recognition.
  • the system verifies him using PIN-code and face recognition and uses the fingerprint biometric to update the fingerprint template in the database.
  • a crucial issue is where to store the template.
  • a database in the truck e.g., a database in the back-office (requires real-time communication between the vehicle and the back-office; and/or (interconnection) a database that the driver carries with him such as a smart card.
  • a database in the truck e.g., a database in the back-office
  • a database in the back-office requires real-time communication between the vehicle and the back-office
  • a database that the driver carries with him e.g., a database that the driver carries with him
  • a smart card e.g., a database that the driver carries with him
  • the digital Tachograph driver's card e.g., a database that the driver carries with him
  • the card is a smart card and thus suitable for this kind storage, but more importantly, it is something that the driver is enforced to use by law (at least in Europe) and is thus always carried with the driver.
  • redundancy is instituted in appreciation of the uncertainty typically related to known identification verification systems.
  • the performance of a face recognition method might for example be affected by lighting conditions.
  • redundancy is achieved in the system. For example, a driver is driving down the road and a scheduled automatic facial recognition is performed and it fails for some reason (lighting conditions may be bad or the like). The driver is then asked to verify himself using fingerprint and PIN-code.
  • the verification system can report/receive information and the like to/from, a back-office or a security network on a company/national/international level.
  • ex-convicts can be prevented from driving hazardous goods by verifying their detected biometric data against a national/international database on criminals.
  • This invention combines two different competences and results in a test of possible techniques that might be suitable for driver verification, but also in an evaluation of the drivers' opinions of the system. Interviews and inquiries will map the drivers' opinions before and after testing a prototype. A comparison between what security means to the interested party/the manufacturers and how it goes along with the drivers' conception of usability, safety and privacy will also be performed.
  • Trucks are used for various purposes. Thus a flexible system, which can fit in sundry situations, is required. Therefore many different challenges arise when it comes to design such a system. It is desirable to meet as many demands as possible, even though it is impossible to build an all-purpose system. A few various situations when a driver verification system could be beneficial are illustrated below.
  • a verification system could allow a haulage contractor to make sure that the driver is not previously sentenced for traffic related misdemeanor. To store the information about the drivers a database would be required. If that database were connected to the authorities, a file check could be done almost in real-time.
  • a haulage contractor who has both driver verification and a vehicle mounted alcohol interlock device could receive a "trusted driver mark". Customers would then be assured that their goods are transported by a "trusted” driver. Cooperation with the national road association and the insurance companies might result in reduced vehicle insurance costs.
  • a bonus for the use of a verification system could be that, trusted, verified drivers could be privileged to pass weighing stations or road tolls. This would ease the job for the drivers and make transporting more efficient.
  • a verification that associates the recorded parameters to a specific driver could control whether somebody drives for longer than the legislated 4.5 hours (European legislation) without a break. In that case a warning could be sent to the driver as well as to the haulage contractor.
  • the Swedish customs has a process called "Servicetrappan” (the service stair) in order to simplify the customs procedure for trusted companies.
  • the process consists of a number of ranking steps. The higher ranking the company, the smoother passage through customs.
  • a driver verification system could be a part of this process, offering haulage contractors with verified and trusted drivers a higher rank and thus more efficient customs clearance.
  • the driver could benefit from it, as it would be possible to automatically adjust the settings in the driver environment according to the driver's personal preferences. As example, settings for driver seat, climate control and stereo could be automatically adjusted. This is however beyond focus of this invention.
  • GUI was developed to facilitate the communication between the verification system and the user.
  • no theory about user ability and design will be mentioned since the author who developed the GUI already possessed this knowledge beforehand. Besides it is the system, not the GUI that is in focus for the invention.
  • a verification system in a vehicle opens up many possibilities to enhance security. Some of the questions that will be looked upon are which type of verification to use and whom such a system would benefit. However, the security issue is not the only issue to consider when constructing such a verification system. The driver's privacy and conceptions of safety should also be taken into account. These different views lead to separate approaches to the problem, the various perspectives of security, safety and privacy are therefore explained here. This is also to clarify what these terms stand for here and to show why they are important for this invention.
  • the main purpose with a verification system is to increase the level of security.
  • One way to do that is to use biometric methods.
  • the problem is that they themselves are a threat, as they might intrude upon a person's privacy. Hence the user's privacy is another issue that will be considered herein.
  • Safety can be defined as when, or where, a person can do something, without being afraid that something undue is going to happen. Good security can thus result in perceived safety.
  • One general advantage for all these methods is that the user has to pause his present task in order to carry out the verification. This increases his risk awareness and might influence him to be more attentive and careful.
  • biometry has its origin in Latin and can be translated into "measuring life". Biometry usually refers to statistical studies of the characteristics, of living organisms, that can be measured. Biometrics on the other hand, is rather used for analysis to identify humans by measuring their characteristics. Biometric methods have been used for identification and verification purposes since the late 19th century. When referred to biometric verification/identification methods in this invention, it means methods that analyze one or more of a person's unique body characteristics, such as hands, face or eyes.
  • the most appropriate verification method varies depending on where and for what reason, it will be used. However there are three fundamental demands one should endeavor to fulfill when deciding which method to use. To achieve the ideal method for verification the feature to be measured should be unique, that means something characteristic for that individual; permanent, which means it should not change over time and finally it should also be universal, which means everybody should have it. The acceptability as well as the accessibility of the characteristics analyzed by a method should also be considered. A biometric feature is acceptable if it is not perceived as intrusive by the user to measure it. If a characteristic is easy to present to a sensor, that characteristic is referred to as accessible.
  • This invention will focus on verification since the driver is supposed to be known to the company.
  • the system is thus only used to verify that it is really the expected driver who is behind the steering wheel.
  • biometric characteristics cannot be forgotten; physical attributes cannot be misplaced; physical attributes are harder to fake than identity cards; fingerprint patterns and other biometric characteristics cannot be guessed or revealed as easily as for instance a password.
  • biometric security systems One problem with biometric security systems is the extent of the damage it can cause in case somebody actually manages to steal the identity information. If a person looses a credit card, or if someone else finds out the secret PIN to turn off the burglar alarm, it is always possible to get a new card, or change the code. However, if a person's fingerprints are copied it is impossible to get new ones. The person would no longer be able to use the prints for verification since there would always be a risk that someone else claims to be him.
  • a biometric verification system can be equipped with vitality detection to assure that the retrieved sample is from a human being. The vitality detection has to suit the verification method. How vitality detection can be implemented for each method is thus presented herein
  • Fingerprints are probably the most well-known and widespread biometric identification method. During the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century several different types of identification methods were developed. Normally these methods do some kind of overarching classification regarding a few main patterns. Looking at the fingerprint, the ridges and valleys form a pattern, which is characterized by irregular and incoherent lines. The scanners of today are very fast and accurate and the method is starting to become accepted for everyday use (See Fig. 2 ).
  • the automatic search systems of today are usually done using data algorithms to classify and compare a fresh template, encoded from the scanned fingerprint, with a stored collection of templates.
  • the fingerprint scanners are mostly optical or capacitive even though other technologies exist: such as radio frequency (RF), ultrasound or silicon scanners.
  • RF radio frequency
  • ultrasound ultrasound or silicon scanners.
  • An optical scanner is basically a small digital camera, which usually takes an inverted picture of the fingerprint, making the ridges darker on the picture. Before comparing the image, the scanner processor performs a series of tests to determine whether the image is good enough.
  • the scanner automatically changes exposure time to let in more or less light before it takes a new image.
  • a capacitive scanner uses an array of small plates, each smaller than the width of a ridge and connected to an inverting amplifier.
  • the finger When the finger is placed on the scanner the finger and the plates form a simple capacitor.
  • a reference charge is sent out to the plates, causing the capacitors to charge up.
  • the corresponding amplifier will present a different voltage.
  • These voltages form the "image" of the fingerprint. This makes it harder to use a simple paper, with a black and white image of the print, to deceive the capacitive scanner.
  • the capacitive scanners can be made smaller than the optical ones (See Fig. 4 ).
  • a recently developed fingerprint scanning technology is RF scanning which uses a low-energy radio signal to scan the print.
  • RF has the advantage that it scans the print below the actual surface of the fingertip and is hence less sensitive to dirt, damages and defects (See Fig. 5 ).
  • the subject may place the finger askew on the sensor.
  • Most scanners do not tolerate a larger rotational angle than 20-30 degrees.
  • Sensors cost per area unit.
  • the sensor area on a sweep scanner can be made smaller and hence less expensive.
  • the sweep scanner is not a perfect solution either.
  • the major issues are that it usually takes some time to acquire a correct sweeping technique and that the slices must be reconstructed to a fingerprint, which can be time consuming. There are thus many different parameters to be considered when choosing a scanner for specific circumstances. Which sensor technique to use is therefore an important issue.
  • An optical scanner can be deceived by a picture of the print, a capacitive scanner by a mold.
  • a mold can be made of gelatin, silicone or even play-doh. To create a mold, the actual finger is required. But to obtain a picture that might defraud an optical scanner, it is enough to have something that a person has touched, like a glass, to create an image of that person's fingerprint. Hence, the optical scanner is easier to deceive.
  • There are numerous other methods to deceive the system like flashing lights, heat, moist or various powders. However, these methods for deceiving the system are useless if the scanner is equipped with so called vitality detection.
  • Vitality detection can be carried out in a number of ways; by analyzing temperature, pulse, blood flow, pulse oximetry, electric resistance, EGG, relative dielectric permittivity, pore or skin deformations, or combinations of these. Vitality detection methods are more or less easy to get around. A major problem is for the scanner to determine whether the scanned print is a part of the finger, a leaf thin image, or a mold attached to the fingertip. A new method using perspiration might be the solution, but it is yet under development and therefore it is not possible to tell how well it really works.
  • Some scanners are designed to facilitate the right positioning of the finger, using for instance guidance pegs or depressions.
  • An iris scanner takes a picture of the eye using a regular digital camera.
  • the image is usually about 120 pixels in radius and the result is usually an 8-bit image of one iris.
  • the first step in the template creation process is to locate the pupil and the iris. After that, the ring that occurs when the pupil is cut out from the image is transformed to a disc using a polar transformation.
  • the analyzing program uses a number of algorithms to create a template based on the different characteristics (See Fig. 6 ).
  • Vitality detection can be implemented by letting in visible light in the eye and detect whether the size of the pupil changes or not. That requires either a quite powerful light source, or that the person stands very close to the scanner. This vitality detection will therefore not be further discussed since it would not be suitable in a truck and therefore is out of the focus for this invention.
  • iris There are more than 266 independent characteristics in the iris.
  • the iris is unique not just for every person, but also for every eye. Usually about 170 of the 266 characteristics are used to form the template for comparison.
  • Other biometric verification methods only use about 15 to at the most 35 independent significant characteristics for the analysis.
  • the method is very reliable for verification. Physical characteristics like our facial looks and our voice change over time, but the iris is, disregarded some color fluctuations in young years, invariant over our entire lifetime. This is a great advantage, since the time-consuming update of the database will not be required (See Fig. 7 ).
  • a proof of the methods reliability is the United Arab Emirate's iris recognition system to prevent expelled foreigners from re-entering the country. About 600 people are being scanned every day and today the database consists of over 355,000 irises. Over 1.6 million searches have been made so far and not a single false match has been detected. Statistical analysis of the program suggests the probability of a false match is less than 1 to 80 billion.
  • the enrollment rate is very good; all irises can be analyzed, except for those of some visually impaired people. Besides, there are applications that automatically capture an image of the iris from distances up to three feet, hence making the process less intrusive.
  • This method identifies people based on the differences in their voices.
  • the subject speaks a pre-defined phrase into a microphone; the system captures the voice sample and creates a template based on for instance pitch, cadence and/or tone.
  • the procedure is the same for the verification.
  • the subject says the pre-defmed phrase in the microphone and the system extracts a template to compare with the stored templates in the database.
  • voice recognition is hard to deceive without having high-end recording/playback equipment.
  • the voice verification system can use a microphone that captures frequencies not recordable with for instance a dictaphone. Even if the password would be recorded satisfactory to deceive the system, the spoken phrase could be altered making the unauthorized copy useless.
  • a sophisticated playback system would be required in order to reproduce all frequencies in a proper way.
  • the demand for high-end equipment can be seen as a type of vitality detection.
  • voice recognition A disadvantage with voice recognition is that voice templates take more storage place than other sorts of biometric information. Consequently the voice verification might take longer time than other methods due to the larger amount of data to analyze. This can be annoying for the user, as he would have to wait for the verification.
  • Another problem is that health, emotional state, fatigue and aging are factors that affect a person's voice characteristics. Thus voice verification should not be relied on as the only method for authorization.
  • Alphonse Bertillon at the Paris police formulated the first model for visual identification in 1883. His system was called anthropometry and was founded upon several complicated anatomic measurements of the size of the head, the length of a finger, the height of the face and special features like the color of the eyes, scars and the color of the hair. This method was not reliable and was soon replaced by fingerprints. Tests with surveillance cameras have recently been carried out in Great Britain in order to identify criminals. Those tests have shown that it is very difficult to identify people this way, especially if the camera does not get a clear shot; or if the person has altered his/her attributes with for instance a beard or glasses. Despite the lack of reliable results for identification the method works satisfactory for verification purposes.
  • the principle is simple and similar to the analysis used for the previously described verification methods.
  • An image of the subject's face is taken and analyzed with a computer to find prominent characteristics such as the outlines of the eye sockets or corners of the mouth.
  • the results from the analysis are stored in a template.
  • An image is taken and a template is created based on the new image.
  • the new template is matched against the one stored in the database.
  • a standard PC of today can compare a template with thousands of templates in a database in less than one second.
  • face recognition can be used in conjunction with for example lip movement and voice recognition. Research has been done, trying to enhance the algorithms for face verification to achieve robustness against aging, lighting conditions or facial expression.
  • Facial thermography One important decision to make when considering face recognition is which type of camera to choose; an ordinary digital camera or an infrared? When the camera uses infrared the method is called Facial thermography (see the following section).
  • Facial thermography is a special kind of face recognition. With the use of an infrared camera a heat pattern, founded on a person's facial blood vessel pattern, can be seen. This pattern is unique for each person and is hard to forge (See Fig. 8 ).
  • infrared camera works approximately the same way as an ordinary camera, the difference is that it is sensitive for infrared light which is electromagnetic radiation in the interval of roughly 760 nm - 0.5 mm. This makes infrared light invisible to the human eye. Note that visible light also is a form of electromagnetic radiation, but of a different wavelength than infrared light. Infrared light is sometimes referred to as heat radiation and is sent out by all objects with a temperature above absolute zero. Thus, the camera shoots a temperature image of the object. Since different parts of the face have different temperature due to the shape of the face and variations in blood flow, this can be used for verification.
  • Retinal recognition was formulated in the 1930s, but it was not until the I 980s the technology was developed enough to make the method commercially viable.
  • Retinal scanning is a fast and very exact method which uses laser to analyze the blood vessel pattern of the retina.
  • the system When the picture of the retina is taken, the system usually stores a template based on the characteristics extracted from the image, similarly with previously mentioned methods (See Fig. 9 ).
  • Retinal scanning is considered the most accurate biometric verification method since the vessel pattern is unique for every person and does not change over time.
  • the retinal vasculature disappears within seconds if the subject ceases to live, hence insuring that the captured image was obtained from a living human being.
  • a study showed that, even though the retina is not easy to scan, the time needed to imaging the retina was less than the time required for imaging of a fingerprint (See Fig. 10 ).
  • the camera must have high resolution and the method demands accurate alignment of the eye to be able to scan.
  • Image caption can be done from a distance up to three feet. It is, however, uncertain under which environmental conditions these qualities are valid.
  • Lip movement recognition is not accurate enough to serve as single method of verification. It is therefore suggested to be used in conjunction with for instance voice recognition.
  • a special case of lip recognition is called smile recognition.
  • the muscle movements in the lower part of the face, activated while smiling, are different from person to person. These muscles are nearly impossible to control by will and they are visible even if the subject tries to keep a facial expression, like keeping himself from laughing. Since there are no functional systems on the market, it will not be discussed any further.
  • a hand geometry scanner measures the fingers length, width, thickness and curvature.
  • the system consists of a flat surface with a number of pegs, a light source, a mirror and a camera.
  • the hand is placed on the flat surface, palm faced down and the fingers guided by the pegs.
  • the mirror is used to project the side of the hand into the camera and the retrieved pictures are analyzed (See Fig. 11 ).
  • Soft biometric traits are for instance age, gender, height, weight, ethnicity, and hair and eye color. These biometrics are vague and several of them change through life, they are also easier to forge than, for instance, fingerprints. Soft biometrics can therefore not be used for identification or secure verification. Nevertheless, soft biometrics can be used as a complement to other biometric methods.
  • a weight control could be implemented in a vehicle as a complement to fingerprint scanning.
  • the major advantage is that the system is quite simple. A keypad and a computer is all that is needed. Other advantages are that it is easy to use, people are used to it and do not find it intrusive.
  • Access cards have a magnetic strip to store information and some types use a PIN to verify that the person having the card is the rightful owner.
  • the magnetic strip is read by the ATM, access terminal or cash register.
  • a smart card is basically a credit-card-sized simple computer. It has a microprocessor and memory embedded on the card. These cards are more versatile than a regular credit card, since much more information can be stored in the memory on the smart card than on the magnetic strip. It is common to use a PIN to verify that the cardholder is the rightful owner.
  • the microprocessor on the smart card opens up possibilities to implement more sophisticated methods, such as the Match-On-CardTM technology developed by Precise Biometrics. This technology implies that the actual matching is done by the computer on the smart card instead of by an external computer which is the normal procedure.
  • RFID is a method of remotely storing and retrieving data using devices called RFID tags. These tags are either active or passive. The difference between them is that a passive tag does not have any power supply. Instead it retrieves power by magnetic induction from the reader device. This means that a passive tag must be held close to the reader during the actual reading, while an active tag can be read from several meters. A passive tag can, due to its lack of power supply, be made smaller than an active tag. The smallest passive tags are about 0.4 millimeters in square and thin as a sticker, while the smallest active tags are roughly the size of a coin.
  • RFID tags can be used for verification purposes in the same fashion as cards. The main difference is that it is merely required to hold the tag against the scanner (passive tag) or carry it sufficiently close to the scanner (active tag) in order to do the verification.
  • a multimodal biometric verification system consists of two or more biometric verification methods working in conjunction.
  • a system merely using one method is called unimodal.
  • multimodal systems are of course more expensive, but, as stated below, there are advantages using more than one method of verification.
  • the subject can choose one method which is the most appropriate at the moment, due to environmental or other factors. For instance, if the driver's hands are dirty, scan the iris, if it is dark in the coupé, scan the fingerprint.
  • the subject uses both methods independent of each other and the system weighs both results to make the decision.
  • This configuration has been empirically proven to be able to reduce False Rejection Rate (FRR) without increasing False Acceptance Rate (FAR). If the match for one of the verification methods is unsatisfying, but the other method gives a valid match, the subject may still pass the verification.
  • FRR False Rejection Rate
  • FAR False Acceptance Rate
  • the multi-modal systems described in the previous section are a special case of the so-called multiple systems. They use several measurements, but not necessarily different methods.
  • the inquiry was divided into two documents called the attitude inquiry and the method inquiry respectively.
  • the former asked for instance about routines at work, knowledge about biometric methods and feelings of security and safety at work.
  • the latter gave a short explanation of each biometric method described in section 2.
  • the respondents were asked to give spontaneous comments to each method. Some of the questions asked the respondent to grade the answers between 1 and 5, where I was always the more negative answer and 5 the positive answer; while some questions only asked for more reflecting answers. All questions had space left for reflections and comments.
  • the reason for making two different documents was to prevent that the respondents peeked at the following questions and thereby might be influenced by the facts in the descriptions of the different verification methods. Since the inquiry was divided into two parts the drivers were forced to answer the first part before they received the next.
  • Fingerprint verification was by far the most appreciated method; everyone thought it to be the cheapest and the easiest one to use. Even those who did not want biometric verification methods in the vehicle preferred fingerprints. Still, four drivers were concerned that dirty hands would cause troubles. Two respondents imagined scenarios where they lost their fingers or were kidnapped to start the vehicle, but even though they could see these disadvantages, they could still see advantages too. Besides, when asked about the other methods, the drivers sometimes answered that they preferred to use the fingerprint (rather than the method in question).
  • a verification system like the one in this invention would not only be important for the drivers, but also for the different haulage contractors. To get an idea about the various demands from the haulage contractors, a number of telephone interviews were held.
  • the working conditions within the four interviewed offices varied, for instance both long haul and distribution was represented, as well as hazardous and high value cargos.
  • the company size differed from eight drivers to 76. Only one of the companies used external personnel in case of illness or other unexpected absence.
  • Fingerprint technology is well-tested in the sense that it has been used and developed for a long time.
  • the scanners can be made small and inexpensive and the method is experienced as non-intrusive by most people.
  • a wide variety of brands are available on the market, which vouch for good opportunities to find a product that fits the desired requirements.
  • One way to increase security for a verification system would be to use more than one finger for the verification. There are two different ways to do this; either the system requires the scanning of a pre-defined set of fingers, or else the system randomly demands for which finger to be scanned at that specific time.
  • One drawback with these alternatives is of course that if a set of prints is demanded, an impostor might try to steal all of a person's prints. In that case, the increased security might be at the cost of the user's safety.
  • Iris scanning is considered to be an accurate, reliable and safe verification method.
  • equipment available that can take an image from a distance of approximately one meter and still get high enough quality to match the image against the template. This means that it might be possible to install a camera in the coupé in such a way that the camera does not disturb the driver or obscure his view. It is however uncertain if these applications are suitable for vehicles and even more uncertain if it is possible to scan while driving, since no test has been carried out in this area.
  • a system for voice verification may easily be integrated in a vehicle, perhaps using existing equipment such as the cellular phone hands-free system. It should be possible to use voice verification while driving, at least in the sense that most people are able to talk and drive at the same time. If the driver uses the cell phone or other verbal communication system, the verification demand could be suppressed for a few minutes. In the case when the driver listens to the stereo, it is suggested that the sound is muted during the verification.
  • the downside is that the database will continuously need updates since a person's voice and accent changes over time. Furthermore, a person's voice can change rapidly due to health related and emotional factors. These aspects have caused some people to mistrust the technology.
  • Face recognition is sensitive to light conditions, but it can be an alternative to use before starting the vehicle since it is possible to add more coupé lighting during the verification. However, it is not recommended to do so while driving since it can be disturbing for the driver. The light conditions change throughout the day, it is therefore uncertain if face recognition can be used while driving. A picture taken during nighttime might not be similar enough to the stored image for the system to succeed with the verification. Different light conditions will be tested herein, since a camera in the vehicle gives many other possibilities like drowsiness detection, coupé surveillance, etcetera. However, these possibilities are beyond the purpose of this invention, thus they will not be further investigated.
  • the time-consuming part of face recognition is the template creation. During verification the system might need to take three or more pictures to ensure that at least one of them is good enough.
  • the template creation takes about 3-5 seconds which means that the entire verification process will take about 10-15 seconds which is too long.
  • One interesting side effect is the fact that the camera used actually takes pictures of the person intending to drive the vehicle. If an impostor drives the vehicle, the verification will fail but pictures are still taken and stored. These pictures can then be used when trying to identify him.
  • face recognition is a user friendly, inexpensive and non-intrusive method. Yet, it was not possible to find any research on face verification in environments that resembles the coupé of a vehicle and it is therefore uncertain how well the method suits the purpose.
  • facial thermography uses an IR-camera, which means that the method is not as sensitive to light conditions compared to face recognition.
  • multimodal systems can be used for automatic update of the template database.
  • a verification system that uses three verification methods randomly, for instance, PIN, fingerprint and facial recognition.
  • PIN the verification method
  • fingerprint the verification method
  • facial recognition the system demands for driver verification, it analyses all three characteristics. If two of the methods complete successfully, the database can be updated using the third sample.
  • the system can take a picture of the face to update the template database. This can save large amounts of time since the system continuously updates the database itself; thus reducing maintenance of the system.
  • PINs are common today and the method can easily be implemented in a vehicle using the keypad for the cellular phone. Therefore a PIN-verification system was implemented as well. This would also enable a comparison between a common verification method and the biometric ones.
  • biometric templates were to be stored on a card, which they could take with them when leaving the vehicle.
  • a smart card reader was also included in the system.
  • the methods chosen for the prototype system are: fingerprint, face recognition, voice recognition plus PIN- and card verification.
  • the driver verifies his identity using all the methods to assure that he is the appropriate person. Below are some examples for how this verification might proceed.
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working-day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code and then places his finger on the scanner.
  • the PIN is correct and the finger is verified against the card, so the system asks for a voice sample.
  • the driver says his password in the microphone.
  • a system message appears, telling the driver to sit in a normal driving position, in order to perform the face verification. Recorded data is analyzed and compared to the template data stored on the smart card - the verification was successful.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office.
  • the driver goes through the verification procedure, but fails with one of the methods.
  • a system message informs the driver about the failed verification.
  • the procedure continues, as in the example above and at least one method succeeds.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office, together with information about the failed verification(s).
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working-day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code and then places his finger on the scanner.
  • the PIN is correct and the finger is verified against the card.
  • the system asks for a voice sample so the driver says his password in the microphone. Recorded data is analyzed and compared to the template data stored on the smart card - the verification was successful.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office.
  • the driver fails with one or more method(s), but at least one method succeeds.
  • the driver's name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office, together with information about the failed verification(s).
  • This verification is suggested to occur after a shorter stop, after that the driver has already been verified with several methods, or if the security level makes it sufficient with only one biometric method.
  • the security levels can of course be discussed, but in these examples they are classified as high, medium and low security level. Here follows some examples for high security.
  • the driver is unloading cargo at one of many stops during the day.
  • the vehicle is standing still with the engine running. When finished unloading the driver climbs back into the truck. It is a short stop, therefore only one verification is required, which method it will be is established at random. This time the system requires fingerprint verification, so the driver puts his finger on the scanner, to verify that he is still the one driving the vehicle. As the system verifies the driver he can drive off, while his name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office for confirmation.
  • the driver has stopped to buy some snacks at a truck stop. It is a quick stop with the engine left running, thus only one of the methods available will be required for verification before driving off.
  • An impostor takes place in the driver's seat, which initiates the verification. Since no successful verification is carried out, the system takes a picture with the camera and sends it together with a warning to the back-office. The truck is immobilized.
  • the verification system is intended to increase the security, but it must not affect the driver's ordinary work. To make it as easy as possible the medium security level gives the driver more independency than the higher level does.
  • the driver makes one of many stops during the day to unload some cargo.
  • the vehicle is standing still with the engine running.
  • the driver climbs back into the truck.
  • As he sits down he puts his finger on the scanner, to verify his identity.
  • the system checks if it is ok to use fingerprint this time, or if the driver must use one of the other methods. This time the system requires another type of verification why the driver is encouraged to verify his identity by saying his password. The verification succeeds and the driver can drive away, while his name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office for confirmation.
  • the driver has stopped to unload some of the cargo.
  • the engine is left running.
  • the driver gets back in the vehicle and dials his PIN-code.
  • the system informs the driver that the verification has failed and asks him to verify his identity using fingerprint scanning instead.
  • the verification succeeds and the driver can drive off.
  • the driver's name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office for confirmation, along with information about the failed PIN-verification.
  • a low level of security may only require one method for verification. This means that it can be enough for the vehicle to have equipment for one single verification method. It also gives the possibility to have several methods in a truck and depending on for instance the cargo, route, or length of a break, only demand for one method.
  • a verification system in the vehicle can be presumed to increase security. However, with only one method it is naturally a higher risk that frauds succeed than with several verification methods.
  • the driver is unloading cargo at one of many stops during the day.
  • the vehicle is standing still with the engine running.
  • When finished unloading the driver climbs back into the truck. He sits down and puts his finger on the scanner, to verify his identity.
  • As the system has verified the driver he drives off and his name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office for confirmation.
  • the driver has stopped to unload cargo. As the driver has already identified himself earlier that day, one verification method will be enough, even though the vehicle has a higher level of security.
  • Another driver who also has a smart card with his biometric data stored, takes the driver's place and tries to verify his identity. The system notices that the card is taken out and a new one put in, so a single verification will not be enough.
  • the driver verifies his identity with all methods and the information is sent, encrypted, to the back-office, where it is quickly discovered that it is not the appropriate driver who is driving the vehicle.
  • the driver has stopped to buy snacks at a truck stop. It is a quick stop with the engine left running, thus only one of the methods available will be required for verification before driving off.
  • An impostor takes place in the driver's seat, which initiates the verification. Since no successful verification is carried out the vehicle is immobilized.
  • the system takes a picture with the camera and sends it together with a warning to the back-office.
  • a possible scenario might be that an impostor forces the driver to verify his identity and then throw him out of the vehicle. To avoid this and similar risks, the driver should also be verified while driving. Below follows some examples to explain the idea.
  • the vehicle is out on the roads.
  • a system message appears, asking the driver to say his password to verify his identity. The driver does so and succeeds with the verification. His name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office.
  • the driver is out on a long haul assignment. A system message appears, asking the driver to say his password to verify his identity. The driver does so, but the verification fails since he is hoarse this day. The driver tries two more times, but the verification still fails so the system asks him to put a finger on the scanner instead. This time the verification succeeds.
  • the driver's name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office together with information about the failed verification.
  • the vehicle is out on the roads.
  • a system message appears, asking the driver to put a finger on the scanner to verify his identity.
  • the driver cannot verify his identity with any of the methods.
  • a warning is immediately sent out to the back-office, together with a photo of the unverified driver taken by the camera for face verification. Since the driver was verified before starting the vehicle that driver's name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office, together with information about this failed verification while driving.
  • the vehicle is out on the roads.
  • a system message appears asking the driver to put a finger on the scanner to verify his identity.
  • the verification fails and since this is the only method for verification in this vehicle, a warning is immediately sent out to the back-office.
  • the vehicle is out on the roads.
  • the system takes pictures of the driver and compares the characteristics with the template on the smart card in the tachograph. The verification succeeds and the driver's name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office.
  • the driver is out on a long haul assignment in a vehicle with several possible verification methods.
  • the system tries to verify the driver against the template on the smart card in the tachograph. The verification fails, so a system message appears asking the driver to put a finger on the scanner. This time the verification succeeds.
  • An encryption of the driver's name and employment identification number are sent to the back-office together with information about the failed verification.
  • the verification fails so the driver is asked to put a finger on the scanner. No method for verification succeeds so a warning is immediately sent out to the back-office, together with a photo of the unverified driver taken by the camera for face verification.
  • the vehicle is out on the roads.
  • the automatic verification fails and a system message appears, asking the driver to put a finger on the scanner to verify his identity. No verification is done within the following three minutes, a warning is therefore sent out to the back-office together with information about the failed face verification and the absence of verification by any additional method.
  • the fingerprint verification system used is a BioCoreII from Precise Biometrics AB, Sweden. It is an embedded system, hence hardware was included in the kit.
  • the face verification system is a VeriLook SDK 1.1 from Neurotechnologija Inc., Lithuania.
  • GUI The purpose of the GUI was to allow the user and system to communicate with each other.
  • the design phase as well as the result is presented in this section.
  • the low-fi GUI was then shown to a person with vast experience of working with GUIs and test situations.
  • the test scenario as well as the GUI was discussed and two annotations were added.
  • the GUI was then implemented in Macromedia Director MX.
  • VTEC has a simulator, which was supplied for this test.
  • the simulator has three projectors illuminating a big arched screen. This type of setup is to enhance the feeling of actually moving and to enable the driver to perceive the surroundings in a more natural way than with using only one projector and a flat screen.
  • a Volvo FHI2 cabin is placed in the middle of the room, in front of the screen. It was possible to turn on speakers with a simulated engine sound.
  • the simulator had up till recently been used for tests with a car, the cabin and the simulator were therefore not yet fully synchronized. There were additional properties that did not suit the test very well and the authors had no possibilities to change them. For instance, inside the driver had throttle and break, but no parking brake, clutch, gearshift nor cruise control. The tank was always empty and neither the tachometer nor the odometer was adjusted to represent a truck. Since there was no parking brake, the simulator had to be turned off if the driver needed to stop and leave the vehicle. As long as the break was pressed down the simulator did not move, but when releasing the break (such as when leaving the coupé) the simulated vehicle continues to slowly move forward. (See Figs. 1 and 16 )
  • the preparations for the test consisted mainly of four parts; to prepare the interview questions, to outline a scenario for the simulator, to find a satisfying number of appropriate test subjects and to conduct a pilot test. As previously mentioned questions regarding when and how the verification should be carried out were raised during the preparatory work. The interviews and the test scenario were outlined in order to answer these questions (among others).
  • the first interview started with questions about the driver's working-routines. The questions also treated issues like security and what it meant to the driver. After investigating the driver's knowledge of biometrics, the different methods used in the test were introduced to enable spontaneous reactions. The driver was also asked if he could see any advantages or disadvantages with a verification system.
  • test scenario was outlined.
  • the test scenario starts with a thorough initial verification.
  • the driver should then get some time to get used to the simulator before fingerprint verification while driving was requested. After approximately half the time in the simulator a "coffee break" was to take place. After the break the driver had to go through a short verification, using either fingerprint or voice. Yet another verification while driving was requested before the test ended, this time it was voice verification.
  • Two automatic verifications were done while driving, one in the beginning and one after the break. If they failed, the driver would be asked for fingerprint verification instead, but if succeeded, he would not be informed about it during the test. (See Fig. 17 )
  • the pilot test implied modifications to the system in order to increase stability and usability, and to make the test as authentic and exhaustive as possible.
  • a third sound was added so that the user received auditorial feedback when dialing a digit, instead of just the asterisks that show on the screen during the PIN-verification. Some of the interview questions were adjusted to be more specified.
  • the verification system was tested in a simulator, as previously mentioned, to make the test situation as authentic as possible. Unfortunately two drivers had to cancel, thus only 18 of the invited drivers were able to attend, all male. The drivers were tested and interviewed one at a time.
  • test participant From now on also referred to as the driver, arrived he was welcomed by the test supervisor. He was informed, both verbally and in writing, of his rights and obligations, for instance that his anonymity was guaranteed and that he could discontinue the test at any time. He was told that he would first be interviewed about his work and then drive the simulator before he would be interviewed again about that test experience. The test supervisor asked for permission to record the interviews.
  • One of the inventors was test supervisor during all tests; the other acted as the technician and was responsible for the enrollments and the video recording.
  • the testing phase began with an interview about the driver's ordinary working day, routines at work, his opinions on security and what kind of knowledge and experiences he had of biometrics.
  • the first interview endured for approximately 20 minutes and was held in a conference room next to the simulator.
  • the test supervisor wrote down the driver's answers or interpreted and graded them from 1 (negative value) to 5 (positive value), depending on the type of question. If the answer to a grading question was vague the driver was asked to score between I and 5. In case the driver seemed to have misunderstood a question it was explained by the test supervisor.
  • test participant was shown to the simulator and asked to take place and adjust the seat and the steering wheel to a normal and comfortable driving position.
  • the technician verified that the camera could get a clear view of the driver and, if necessary, the driver was asked to lower the steering wheel.
  • the driver was given a PIN and then the enrollment phase began. He was shown which part of the fingerprint to place on the scanner. Since the scanner was placed on the steering wheel the participant had to use the right thumb, the other fingers would be difficult to get in the right position for the scanning. He had a chance to try a few times to place the thumb on the scanner in order to get used to the proper placement. After that the fingerprint was enrolled. The technician then asked the driver to look straight ahead at the simulator screen as if he was driving, this was in order to retrieve the face recognition template. For the voice verification the driver was told that a phrase that endures for at least three seconds was required, in order to make it possible for the computer to analyze it. He was also told that the microphone was embedded in the camera, so that he only had to say the password out loud. The driver was given the password "My name is First name, Surname". As previously mentioned, the function of the voice verification was only simulated.
  • the driver was informed that he would be filmed during the test and that he had the full right to discontinue the test at any time if he would feel uncomfortable. He was told that some people do become nauseous in the simulator even though they normally do not feel sick in vehicles. The driver's attention was directed to the simulator image, which for the moment was standing still in the middle of a highway. He was told that the test supervisor was going to sit beside him inside the coupé to guide him along the way. He was instructed that he would be driving on the highway for a while, then turn to the right and continue till he came to a village. In the village he would stop for a break, after which the scenario continued with yet a couple of minutes of driving. The driver was informed about the existing equipment in the simulator as well as the missing equipment (mentioned in The driving simulator ). The driver was told to imagine that the scenario lasted for an afternoon, instead of the 20 minutes that they actually were driving.
  • the test supervisor entered the vehicle from the other side and started the simulation when the driver was seated and shut the door.
  • the driver took place in the driving seat.
  • the test supervisor entered the vehicle from the other side and started the scenario when the driver shut the door.
  • the initial verification started.
  • This first verification consisted of all four methods and the driver was allowed to fail each method three times before the system moved on to the next one. If the driver passed at least two of the first three methods, the entire initial verification was considered successful.
  • the fourth method was voice recognition, which was only simulated during the test.
  • test began on a simulated highway. After some time, the test supervisor trigged the first verification while driving, which was the automated face recognition. Note that the driver was not informed about this verification unless it failed. In case the automated verification failed the system would ask the driver to verify his identity using fingerprint verification. If this also failed, the system asked the driver to dial his PIN.
  • test participant continued driving and after some time the test supervisor trigged the next step, which was the second verification while driving.
  • the scale consists of nine pairs of contrary words, five are thought to reflect usefulness and four the satisfaction. By adding the answers regarding usefulness and satisfaction, respectively, an average can be calculated out from that and thereby score the usefulness and the satisfaction between -2 and +2.
  • the test supervisor explained that it was only the verification system, not the simulator, that was to be evaluated. If the driver did not understand the acceptance scale by reading the written instructions, the test supervisor explained further and then let the driver fill in the answers in privacy.
  • test supervisor trigged the last verification procedure, voice verification while driving. Shortly after this verification the driver was asked to pull over and stop the vehicle.
  • the driver was asked about his experiences of the first initial verification and the verifications while driving (fingerprint scanning and voice recognition respectively). If the automatic verifications had been successful the driver was informed about their existence. He was encouraged to share his opinions on the use of such methods and about the idea of having to do another kind of verification in case the automatic one had failed.
  • the drivers who had not been successfully verified by the automatic verification were asked about their experiences of having to do yet another kind of verification while driving. They too were encouraged to share their opinions on having an automatic verification while driving. To enable comparisons of the different methods and verifications that had occurred in the test, the driver received the same questions for each occasion respectively. Repeated questions were to grade (from I two 5) if the verification/method was complicated or easy, time consuming or fast, strange or reasonable, boring or amusing, uninteresting or interesting and unnecessary or necessary.
  • the driver was interrogated about his thoughts around security and the implementation of a verification system in a vehicle. He was encouraged to share his thoughts about it before the test, and after, to see if the test had changed his opinion. Before the session was over the driver was asked if he wanted to add anything, if something was missing in the test or if he had any questions.
  • the average age of the participants was 41 years old, with a standard deviation of eleven years. The youngest participant was 23 and the oldest 60 years old.
  • the initial verification consisted of all the implemented verifications methods. At least one of the methods succeeded for all the participants thus all was approved to start the engine.
  • the fingerprint verification was successful for 14 participants.
  • One of these 14 participants needed more than one attempt.
  • Some of the participants were guided where to put the thumb if system failed to find the print. (As described hereinabove with respect to theory, it is a common problem that the finger is not placed correctly.)
  • the system automatically recognized 13 of the participants. Two of the ones that had not been automatically recognized had to dial their PIN since the fingerprint verification had failed as well.
  • the first ten participants used fingerprint verification before starting the vehicle after the break. Nine of those ten were verified, eight of them on their first attempts. The participant that was not successfully verified had to dial his code to be authorized. The PIN verification succeeded on the first attempt.
  • the first response from the drivers after the test was mainly positive.
  • Nine of the drivers perceived the test as realistic. Seven of the drivers thought it to be a vision of the future. One driver found the test unrealistic and the remaining driver never gave a specified answer to the question.
  • the first verification while driving when the drivers had to do a fingerprint scan was not perceived to be as easy as the first verification.
  • the fingerprint verification while driving scored 3.19 as the average, with a standard deviation of 1.67. This verification leaned more towards being perceived as strange rather than reasonable.
  • the voice verification scored the highest average with 4.61 and the standard deviation of 0.66. Fingerprint and voice verification share the highest rank for trust. They both received 4.28 as the average score. Fingerprint had a standard deviation of 1.23 and voice of 1.27.
  • the face verification scored an average of 3.67 and the code verification 3.72 in the question of trust. They had standard deviations of 1.61 and 1.60 respectively.
  • biometrics in the vehicle Four of all participants were more positive to have biometrics in the vehicle than in other situations. Four others thought the opposite, that biometrics are OK, but not in the vehicle. The remaining drivers scored equally for biometrics in the vehicle and biometrics in general. As an average score a verification system in the vehicle received 3.78 with the standard deviation of 1.35. Biometrics in general scored in average 3.76 with the standard deviation of 1.48.
  • the face verification system had a more stable behavior than the one for fingerprint verification. No participants failed the face enrollment. However one of the participants could not be enrolled until he had taken off his baseball cap. It is possible that the cap cast shadows over his face that complicated for the system.
  • the fingerprint verification was, as mentioned, the one that most participants preferred and it also scored the highest average grade. It was also the method that most participants knew. Those who could give more examples said that they had seen things in movies and talked about eye scanning and face/voice recognition, nevertheless it seemed like even those who could mention other methods perceived those methods as futuristic. It is possible that the futuristic feeling did influence their choice of preferred method.
  • test leader Another example of when information is important to achieve acceptance is that several participants questioned the need for verification while driving. However, when the test leader and the participant talked about it after the interviews and the participant asked about the verification while driving, the test leader gave this example: " Imagine a truck driver who has been verified and has started the engine when he sees a wire that needs to be attached to the cargo. When the driver leaves the coupé to fix the wire an impostor might take his place and try to leave with the vehicle .” The participants said it was something they had not thought about before, but said that it happened that they jumped out after starting the vehicle. With the explanation for why the driver should be verified while driving, the participants perceived it as reasonable, even though they did not want to be disturbed by a fingerprint verification. Face or voice recognition were more appreciated while driving.
  • a verification system in commercial vehicles should be developed with respect to the users' privacy. If so, it will probably be well received since most participants were positive to the idea.
  • the system that has been tested is a prototype and the system is not stable enough for use in real life. With verification methods specially adapted for automotive purposes, combined with an embedded control system instead of the both computers, it is probable that a stable, secure and robust system can be achieved. Automatic verification while driving is recommended, however if the problems with the lighting sensitivity remains voice recognition seems to be the second best. This since voice recognition does not require a lot of attention from the driver, but the method has to be tested before it is possible to say if it really is suitable for in-vehicle use.
  • PIN verification is a method that is suitable from a technical perspective but most of the users preferred biometric verification since the PIN is yet another code to remember. The method worked reasonably well while standing still, but it is not suggested to use it while driving since some of these drivers almost lost control over the vehicle while dialing the code. The same goes for fingerprint scanning, something that the drivers themselves commented.
  • the face recognition technology is not yet mature for these types of applications since it is too light sensitive.
  • the face verification scored high and the main part of the drivers was positive to the automatic verification. This indicates that the face verification is preferred, seen from user perspectives. It would be important to assure the drivers that they were not constantly under surveillance, since some of the drivers felt uncomfortable facing a camera during the entire ride. How this balance between the control of the driver and his privacy should be found is yet left to investigate further.
  • the system must be tested under authentic conditions in order to investigate how dirt, scars, calluses etcetera affects the performance of the system.
  • thermography becomes more developed it should be considered to use this method in the verification system.
  • the method would then need to be tested during different circumstances at shifting times of the day, preferably in a real truck.
  • NIR-interval On the border between the visible and the infrared wavelength intervals, the so called NIR-interval can be found.
  • the problem with facial thermography is that there are no viable verification system available on the market, it can be problematic to use regular face recognition since it is sensitive to light conditions.
  • NIR-camera it might be possible to solve both these problems, since the face of the driver can be illuminated with NIR-diodes, invisible to him but not to the camera.
  • the verification system can adjust the level of security automatically. For instance, a gold transport in Cape Town demands a higher security level than when delivering gravel to a building site in a Laplander forest.
  • a multi-modal system can require only one biometric method for verification. Which method that is required is selected randomly so that the driver needs to have them all enrolled, but only use one at a time. With this randomization an impostor can not be sure of what he needs for verification and he will have a lot of work to prepare a fake sample of all the different characteristics.
  • Back office placement means that the template database is placed in a computer at for instance the haulage contractor's office.
  • a verification system might need real-time update and hence a link between the vehicle and the database is required. If a driver is ill and someone else takes that assignment the system must be updated to accept the new driver as the appropriate one. As mentioned earlier, the US government wants to avoid that people in FBI's databases drive trucks carrying hazardous goods. The FBI's database changes, thus real-time update for the verification system would be desired.
  • In-vehicle placement is when the templates are placed on a computer in the truck. This limits the problems caused by the wireless communication, but instead the protection against theft or system hacking will not be as strong as with back office placement. It is the simplest solution, but also probably the most expensive since it demands one database in each vehicle.
  • Smart card placement refers to when the templates are stored on a smart card, which the driver can take with him when leaving the vehicle. This increases the security since the driver also needs to bring the smart card to pass the system. Besides, the fact that the driver himself carries his biometric templates may increase his feeling of privacy.
  • the database is kept either on a card or at the back office is that it is not bound to a specific vehicle. If a driver needs to switch vehicle due to engine failure etcetera it will not be a problem since all drivers can drive all vehicles as long as they carry their own smart card and are registered in the database. Note that a dynamic update of the database will be very important.
  • the digital tachograph is a smart card that automatically registers data, such as speed and driving time between stops.
  • the smart card makes it much more complicated for the drivers to manipulate the registered data and in the long run the digital tachograph is intended to be standard for all vehicles.
  • the digital tachograph opens up possibilities for integration with the biometric smart card that can be used for the templates. That way, the driver only needs one card, but both the vehicle parameters and the templates for verification will be stored together. This might be a way to increase the security even further as it will be assured that the data from the tachograph belongs to the driver (assuming that he has been verified).
  • the simulator was, as previously stated, not perfectly suited for the scenario and due to lack of time it was not possible to do any adjustments. Some of the participants had comments regarding its behavior. This may have affected their judgments about the verification system. The outcome of the testing had probably been more correct if the simulator had been more authentic.
  • a driver enters the vehicle and turns the key whereupon the system demands for verification using several methods to assure that this is the appropriate driver.
  • the driver starts by verifying himself with one of the methods, then he continues with the next, and the next, until the verification is completed.
  • the information is sent, encrypted, to the back-office and the driver can drive away with the vehicle.
  • a driver enters the vehicle and turns the key, whereupon the system demands for verification using several methods to assure that it is the appropriate driver.
  • the driver does not succeed with one or more of the verification methods.
  • After three failures with a method the verification continues with the other methods (or ends without the last one if that is the one to fail).
  • At least one of the methods succeeds and the information is sent, encrypted, to the back-office, and the driver can drive away with the vehicle. Together with the verified information about the driver, the back-office also receives information about the failed verification.
  • a driver enters the vehicle and turns the key whereupon the system demands for verification using several methods to assure that it is the appropriate driver.
  • the driver does not succeed with the first verification method, after three failures the system continues with the next method. None of the methods succeed, whereupon a warning is immediately sent to the back-office.
  • the system should receive information when a person unlocks the doors.
  • the system needs telematics to be able to send the information between the vehicle and the back-office.
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code and then places his finger on the scanner.
  • the PIN is correct and the finger is verified against the card, so the system asks for a voice sample.
  • the driver says his password in the microphone.
  • a system message appears, telling the driver to sit in a normal driving position, in order to perform the face verification. Recorded data is analyzed and compared to the template data stored on the smart card - the verification was successful.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office.
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code places his finger on the scanner. He tries to verify his identity by his voice, but it fails as he has got a cold today.
  • a sign informs the driver about the failed verification.
  • the procedure continues with succeeded face verification.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office, together with information about the failed voice identification.
  • a driver enters the vehicle and turns the key whereupon the system demands for verification using several methods to assure that this is the appropriate driver.
  • the driver starts by verifying himself with one of the methods, then he continues with the next, and the next, until the verification is completed.
  • the information is sent, encrypted, to the back-office and the driver can drive away with the vehicle.
  • a driver enters the vehicle and turns the key, whereupon the system demands for verification using several methods to assure that it is the appropriate driver.
  • the driver does not succeed with one or more of the verification methods.
  • After three failures with a method the verification continues with the other methods (or ends without the last one if that is the one to fail).
  • At least one of the methods succeeds and the information is sent, encrypted, to the back-office, and the driver can drive away with the vehicle. Together with the verified information about the driver, the back-office also receives information about the failed verification.
  • a driver enters the vehicle and turns the key whereupon the system demands for verification using several methods to assure that it is the appropriate driver.
  • the driver does not succeed with the first verification method, after three failures the system continues with the next method. None of the methods succeed, whereupon a warning is immediately sent to the back-office.
  • the system should receive information when a person unlocks the doors.
  • the system needs telematics to be able to send the information between the vehicle and the back-office.
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code and then places his finger on the scanner.
  • the PIN is correct and the finger is verified against the card.
  • the system asks for a voice sample so the driver says his password in the microphone. Recorded data is analyzed and compared to the template data stored on the smart card - the verification was successful.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office.
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code and then places his finger on the scanner.
  • the PIN is correct and the finger is verified against the card.
  • a system message appears telling the driver to sit in a normal driving position, in order to perform the face verification. Recorded data is analyzed and compared to the template data stored on the smart card - the verification was successful.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office.
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code places his finger on the scanner. He tries to verify his identity by his voice, but it fails as he has got a cold today.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office, together with information about the failed voice verification.
  • the driver has arrived at the garage to start the working day.
  • his smart card integrated in the card for the tachograph
  • dials his PIN-code places his finger on the scanner.
  • a picture is taken of the driver's face, but as he has been growing a beard during his vacation the verification fails.
  • the name and employment identification number are sent, encrypted, to the back-office, together with information about the failed face verification.

Claims (18)

  1. Procédé pour vérifier l'identité d'un opérateur de véhicule en utilisant des données biométriques qui peuvent changer avec le temps pour une personne particulière permettant ainsi potentiellement un défaut de vérification de cette personne sur la base d'une comparaison de mesures biométriques courantes avec un modèle produit au préalable constitué des mêmes caractéristiques, le procédé étant caractérisé par :
    une mise à jour de manière automatique du modèle produit au préalable, la mise à jour automatique étant obtenue dans un système de vérification multimodal dans lequel le système de vérification utilise plus qu'une carte biométrique/à code PIN/à puce,
    dans lequel lorsque l'opérateur entre dans le véhicule une invite est fournie demandant une vérification d'identité en utilisant un code PIN, une empreinte digitale et une reconnaissance faciale, et après quoi le système vérifie l'identité de l'opérateur en utilisant le code PIN et la reconnaissance faciale et utilise l'empreinte biométrique pour mettre à jour le modèle d'empreinte digitale dans la base de données.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel au moins un procédé de vérification est utilisé pour vérifier l'identité de l'opérateur alors qu'un autre procédé de vérification qui n'est pas actuellement utilisé à des fins de vérification d'opérateur est utilisé pour mettre à jour le modèle produit au préalable après détermination que le processus de vérification a réussi.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 1, comprenant de plus la mémorisation du modèle biométrique dans une base de données située sur le véhicule, ou la mémorisation du modèle biométrique dans une base de données située au bureau administratif nécessitant ainsi une communication en temps réel entre le véhicule et le bureau administratif.
  4. Procédé selon la revendication 1, comprenant de plus la mémorisation du modèle biométrique dans une base de données qu'un conducteur transporte sur lui.
  5. Procédé selon la revendication 4, dans lequel le modèle biométrique est mémorisé dans une carte à puce, comprenant de préférence l'utilisation d'une carte de conducteur de tachygraphe numérique pour mémoriser les modèles de vérification, la carte étant une carte à puce qui est adaptée pour une telle mémorisation et est quelque chose que le conducteur est forcé d'utiliser par la loi dans certaines juridictions et donc est toujours transportée par le conducteur.
  6. Procédé selon la revendication 1, consistant de plus à :
    assurer que l'opérateur d'un véhicule est un conducteur autorisé en utilisant un système de vérification de conducteur multimodal, embarqué, pour assurer qu'un opérateur est un conducteur autorisé ;
    effectuer un premier processus de vérification de conducteur sur un opérateur présent du véhicule et déterminer si l'opérateur présent est un conducteur autorisé ou non autorisé du véhicule ;
    effectuer un second processus de vérification de conducteur sur le présent opérateur du véhicule et déterminer si le présent opérateur est un conducteur autorisé ou non autorisé du véhicule, dans lequel les premier et second processus de vérification de conducteur sont effectués avec un intervalle de temps entre eux, l'intervalle de temps étant fonction de la nature du travail effectué par l'opérateur ; et
    exercer une mesure corrective pour éviter un impact potentiellement négatif lorsque le présent opérateur du véhicule est déterminé comme étant un conducteur non autorisé sur la base d'au moins un des processus de vérification effectués.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 6, dans lequel le second processus de vérification de conducteur est différent du premier processus de vérification de conducteur, ou le second processus de vérification de conducteur est le même que le premier processus de vérification de conducteur.
  8. Procédé selon la revendication 6, consistant de plus à déclencher la seconde vérification de conducteur immédiatement après avoir déterminé que le présent opérateur est un conducteur non autorisé dans le premier processus de vérification de conducteur.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 6, dans lequel de multiples processus de vérification de conducteur sont effectués pendant un seul changement de conduite de l'opérateur, le seul changement de conduite s'étendant depuis le moment où l'opérateur pénètre dans le véhicule pour la première fois lorsqu'il arrive sur un travail et jusqu'à ce que l'opérateur quitte définitivement le véhicule lorsqu'il quitte le travail.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 6, dans lequel plusieurs processus de vérification de conducteur de différents types sont effectués à des intervalles de temps aléatoires.
  11. Procédé selon la revendication 6, dans lequel au moins un des premier et second processus de vérification de conducteur est un test de vérification passive qui ne nécessite pas une interaction consciente de l'opérateur en association avec la réalisation du au moins un des processus de vérification de conducteur.
  12. Procédé selon la revendication 11, dans lequel le test de vérification passive comprend un balayage d'une caractéristique physique de l'opérateur à partir duquel une image est comparée à un ensemble d'images témoins représentatives de conducteurs autorisés du véhicule.
  13. Procédé selon la revendication 12, dans lequel la caractéristique physique balayée de l'opérateur est l'iris d'au moins un des yeux de l'opérateur ou dans lequel la caractéristique physique balayée de l'opérateur est la rétine d'au moins un des yeux de l'opérateur, ou dans lequel la caractéristique physique balayée est un thermogramme facial de l'opérateur.
  14. Procédé selon la revendication 12, dans lequel le test de vérification passive a un taux d'erreurs dû à au moins un état environnemental qui empêche qu'un balayage adéquat de la caractéristique physique de l'opérateur ne soit obtenu, dans lequel de préférence le au moins un état environnemental est un éclairage insuffisant.
  15. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel au moins un des premier et second processus de vérification de conducteur est un test de vérification active qui nécessite une interaction consciente de l'opérateur en association avec la réalisation du au moins un processus de vérification de conducteur.
  16. Procédé selon la revendication 15, dans lequel le test de vérification active comprend un balayage d'une caractéristique physique de l'opérateur à partir duquel une image est comparée à un ensemble d'images témoins représentatives de conducteurs autorisés du véhicule, le balayage nécessitant que l'opérateur mette une partie de son corps sur un scanneur, dans lequel de préférence la caractéristique physique balayée de l'opérateur est un motif d'empreinte d'au moins un des doigts de l'opérateur ou la géométrie de la main de l'opérateur.
  17. Procédé selon la revendication 15, dans lequel le test de vérification active comprend une action parmi :
    - délivrer une requête à l'opérateur d'entrer un numéro de vérification personnel dans le système identifiant l'opérateur comme un conducteur autorisé ;
    - lire des informations de vérification codées matériellement sur une carte de vérification présentée par l'opérateur et demander à l'opérateur d'entrer un numéro de vérification personnel dans le système qui correspond à un numéro de vérification codé matériellement lu à partir de la carte de vérification ;
    - délivrer une instruction à l'opérateur de prononcer une phrase prescrite et enregistrer la phrase prononcée sous la forme d'un motif de parole et comparer ce motif à un ensemble de motifs de paroles témoins de conducteurs autorisés du véhicule.
  18. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, dans lequel le ou les système(s) de vérification, le ou les processus de vérification, le ou les test(s) de vérification, le ou les numéro(s) de vérification, la ou les carte(s) de vérification, le ou les défaut(s) de vérification, ou des informations de vérification sont remplacés par un ou des système(s) d'identification correspondant(s), un ou des processus d'identification, un ou des test(s) d'identification, un ou des numéro(s) d'identification, une ou des carte(s) d'identification, un ou des défaut(s) d'identification, ou des informations d'identification, selon le cas, ou par toute combinaison de systèmes de vérification et d'identification, d'un ou de processus, d'un ou de test(s), d'un ou de numéro(s), d'une ou de carte(s), d'un ou de défaut(s), ou d'informations, selon le cas.
EP11005752A 2005-07-11 2006-07-11 Procédés et agencement pour effectuer une vérification d'identité de conducteur Not-in-force EP2436566B1 (fr)

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EP2428413B1 (fr) 2013-03-27
WO2007008159A3 (fr) 2007-03-08
US8344849B2 (en) 2013-01-01
EP1904347B1 (fr) 2011-09-28
US20080252412A1 (en) 2008-10-16
CN101296821A (zh) 2008-10-29
ES2374221T3 (es) 2012-02-14
EP1904347A4 (fr) 2010-06-02
JP4852604B2 (ja) 2012-01-11
JP2009500246A (ja) 2009-01-08
CN101296821B (zh) 2013-01-02
EP1904347A2 (fr) 2008-04-02
WO2007008159A2 (fr) 2007-01-18

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