WO1998056635A1 - Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau - Google Patents

Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1998056635A1
WO1998056635A1 PCT/DE1998/001595 DE9801595W WO9856635A1 WO 1998056635 A1 WO1998056635 A1 WO 1998056635A1 DE 9801595 W DE9801595 W DE 9801595W WO 9856635 A1 WO9856635 A1 WO 9856635A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
level crossing
switch
modules
route
objects
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/DE1998/001595
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Thomas Eckerlein
Axel Heilmann
Dirk Peter
Hans-Joachim Vornholz
Original Assignee
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Aktiengesellschaft filed Critical Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority to AT98936142T priority Critical patent/ATE211696T1/de
Priority to DK98936142T priority patent/DK0988207T3/da
Priority to EP98936142A priority patent/EP0988207B1/fr
Publication of WO1998056635A1 publication Critical patent/WO1998056635A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L29/00—Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a device according to the preamble of claim 1.
  • a device is known from Signal + Draht 84 (1962) No. 6, pages 166 to 171.
  • Level crossings vary in their topographical design in a variety of ways due to the number of tracks running over them, the switching means used to secure cross-traffic, the required switching behavior of these switching means and with regard to monitoring the level crossing; a distinction must also be made as to whether the activation of the level crossing, i. H . the activation of its security components, vehicle-operated by means of track switching means, or is carried out from a signal box or another control point.
  • a level crossing may also have to be temporarily or permanently adapted to new circumstances.
  • appropriate control software must be provided in the case of computer-controlled level crossing technology, which takes into account the individual projecting cases and can be adapted to new conditions if necessary.
  • the projection parameters are usually stored in a central software memory of the level crossing by means of a suitable input device, preferably by means of a computer. Because of the diversity of the topographical design of level crossings, the control software of computer-controlled level crossings varies more or less considerably from case to case. Every new level crossing and every change An existing level crossing requires an almost complete re-creation of the control software with the resulting requirements with regard to simulation, testing and ultimately also the creation of a safety certificate. The same applies to non-computer-controlled, exclusively or predominantly hardware-controlled level crossings.
  • the object of the present invention is to provide a device according to the preamble of claim 1, with which it is possible to adapt the control software of a level crossing to the given topographical requirements in a simple, manageable manner, the control software generated in this way being precisely because of its manageability only little elaborate safety evidence can be provided.
  • the invention solves this problem by the characterizing features of claim 1.
  • the control then consists of an arbitrary number of strings that can be arranged in principle
  • Modules the so-called route objects, which are designed in completely the same way and for which a safety certificate once provided can be used again and again.
  • the safety components of the level crossing are connected by means of a common assignment module controlled by the modules, for which proof of safety has to be provided only once.
  • the individual adaptation of the control of a concrete level crossing consisting of the modules and the assignment module to the respective topography takes place by means of an individual linking logic, which consists of a series of simple linking modules. stones is formed. Only this linking logic has to be redesigned for each new level crossing, whereby the assignment of the controlling process elements to the route-oriented modules (route objects) provided according to the invention provides a clear and easily understandable definition of the linking parameters.
  • the linking logic provided according to the invention can each be constructed from a plurality of standard links, the number of these standard links being based on e.g. B. five different logic modules is limited.
  • the guideway objects, including their modules, and the assignment module are part of a computer or computer system which controls a level crossing or controls several level crossings.
  • the central assignment module which causes the switching components of a level crossing to be switched on and off and their monitoring, is to have a memory according to the teaching of claim 4, in which the interaction of the process periphery with the safety components of the level crossing, which is predetermined by the topography of a level crossing, is stored. This makes it possible to use a uniform assignment module for different level crossings and to adapt this assignment module to a specific level crossing by having the modules intended for the level crossing have very specific inputs of the assignment module or very specific address areas of the assignment module.
  • the drawing shows a level crossing in the area of two parallel tracks Gl and G2 in the upper part; the two tracks are connected by switches Wl and W2.
  • switch-on contacts AzEl and AzE2 are shown, via which the level crossing BÜ can be switched on when a train approaches.
  • software then takes over the securing of the level crossing by z.
  • B. switches a light signal system, not shown, and / or lowers barriers, also not shown.
  • the level crossing is switched off via switch-off contacts AzA2 or AzA4 by the train passing the level crossing.
  • the safety components of the level crossing remain effective, ie the light-sign system blocks the level crossing against cross traffic and any barriers provided remain lowered. Only when the switch-off contacts are no longer actuated after actuation does the level crossing switch off after a specified delay time and the level crossing is released for cross-traffic. A prerequisite for switching off the level crossing is that the associated siding is not used at the time of switching off. There are no make contacts for the opposite direction. Rather, it is assumed here that the activation of the HpEl, HpE2
  • switch-off contacts AzAl and AzA3 are provided in the direction of travel from right to left behind the level crossing, which act analogously to the switch-off contacts AzA2 and AzA4.
  • a corresponding monitoring elRank leads to the activation of a monitoring signal ÜS1 or ÜS2 or to the output of a corresponding monitoring message to the signal box.
  • the lighting up of the monitoring signal ÜS1 or ÜS2 tells the driver of an approaching train that the level crossing BÜ is secured against cross traffic; Accordingly, the line signals Hpl or Hp2 activated by the interlocking on the basis of the monitoring message of the level crossing enable the train journey in the direction of the level crossing. If the level crossing is not monitored, the signals ÜS1, ÜS2, Hpl or Hp2 block further advancement on the level crossing.
  • the driver of an approaching train then has to initiate braking, the initiation of this braking process also being able to be brought about by means of additional track switching means.
  • By specifying the appropriate driving speeds and arranging the signals at given intervals from the level crossing it must be ensured that an approaching train can be brought to a standstill in good time before the level crossing if the monitoring message is not received.
  • different monitoring or route signals must be activated;
  • To switch off the level crossing it is also important to actuate certain switch-off contacts.
  • topographically complex level crossings it may also be the case that, depending on the track on which a train approaches a level crossing, different safety components must be switched on at the level crossing.
  • the different dependencies must be defined in detail and implemented in a suitable manner in the control software, whereby it must be demonstrated in an individual safety certificate that the safety of the level crossing is guaranteed for all conceivable operationally permissible journeys.
  • the software for controlling and monitoring a level crossing is particularly confusing for the technicians, just like the pure programmer has to record the interaction of the technical components of the level crossing and implement it in a corresponding control software.
  • the invention makes the project planning software for a level crossing clear and comprehensible for everyone involved, that is to say both the technician and the programmer; In particular, this also facilitates the safety verification for the control software that still has to be provided for each level crossing.
  • the control software of a level crossing into uniformly designed software modules and to organize these by route.
  • the routes are indicated by arrows next to the tracks and have the numbers 1 to 5.
  • These five possible routes are assigned five modules, so-called route objects, XI to X5 in the control software. All track objects are designed in the same way and work together with three software modules E each for switching on, A for switching off and Ü for monitoring the level crossing.
  • the route object XI is used for the route marked 1 and causes one
  • Switch-on request for this route via an assignment module Z common to all route objects, the connection of certain safety components S of the level crossing.
  • the safety components to be switched on are always the same, regardless of which route is used by the level crossing. Specifically, that means receiving a switch-on signal
  • a guideway object has activated the security components of the level crossing via the assignment module, there is a corresponding monitoring message from the security components via the assignment module to the initiating guideway object.
  • the track object then causes its software module Ü to switch on the monitoring signal to which the announced train is advancing or. he causes a corresponding monitoring message to be output to the signal box, which in turn now enables the train to cross the level crossing for the train for which the level crossing was activated.
  • the linking of the software modules E, A and Ü assigned to the individual track objects with the process periphery P of the level crossing and the signals which inform the approaching trains of the switched-on state of the level crossing is done via a logic logic VL between the software modules of the controller and the periphery of the level crossing.
  • This link logic consists of one or more standard links of the functions AND, OR, NOT, distribute or connect; those in the lower part of the
  • route 1 causes the path transition from left to right on track G2 to approach
  • Monitoring signal ÜS2 is permanently assigned to route 1 and thus to route object XI.
  • the route object XI has no possibility at all to pass on the monitoring message which it receives when fulfilling the screening requirements for the level crossing via its software module Ü to a signal other than to the monitoring signal claimed by route 1
  • the switch-on contacts AzE2 are also actuated when a train is approaching the level crossing; However, the position stress of the turnout Wl is different from that of the previously assumed route 1. For this reason, the activation of the level crossing via the route object X3 is dependent on an AND operation Vu of the switch-on contact actuation AzE2 and the negation of the turnout position Wl +; the latter takes place via a negation element Vn.
  • the activation software modules E of these objects are controlled via standard linkage Va for the decoupled division of the traffic report and the point position stress on the two track objects; the standard links Va and Vu are cascaded.
  • the route object X3 caused the level crossing to be switched on by the switch contacts AzE2 via the assignment module Z and the fuse components S of the level crossing then took over its protection, there is a corresponding feedback to the route object X3 via the assignment module.
  • This then causes the monitoring signal ÜS1 to be switched on in the further course of the route 3 via its software module Ü. Since this monitoring signal is also to be switched on for route 2, the monitoring signal is preceded by an OR operation Vo in which the monitoring orders of the two route objects X2 and X3 are linked.
  • the level crossing is switched off (deactivating its safety components) in a vehicle-controlled manner by actuating the switch-off contacts AzA4 (route 1) or AzA2 (routes 2 and 3).
  • the switch-off functions A2 and AI which depending on the direction of travel, actuate the switch-off contacts AzA3 or AzA4 or AzAl or AzA2 and the expiry of a specified delay time for the switch-on software module A of the route objects XI to X5 Include switch-off process. Switching off the level crossing should not only depend on the actuation of the switch-off contacts and the expiry of the specified delay time; the switch-off process should only take place if the inlet route specified by the route to be negotiated is cleared to the level crossing.
  • the switch-off is made dependent on the presence of the switch-off function A2 (e.g. switch-off contacts AzA4 actuated and delay time elapsed) be the free notification E2; Both peripheral messages are V-AND linked via the standard link. If the switch-off conditions are met, the switch-off software module A of the route object XI uses the assignment module Z to deactivate the safety components of the level crossing. The corresponding feedback of the signaling state via the deactivation of the security components causes the travel path object XI to switch off the monitoring signal US2 via its monitoring software module U.
  • the switch-off function A2 e.g. switch-off contacts AzA4 actuated and delay time elapsed
  • the switch-off of the level crossing depends on the presence of the peripheral message AI (e.g. AzA2 activated, delay time expired) dependent on the clearing of the access track used by route 2 on the level crossing. If the inlet track between the switch-on contacts AzEl and the switch-off contacts AzAl is released, the corresponding peripheral message El, in cooperation with the other switch-off conditions, triggers the switch-off of the level crossing.
  • the interaction of the switch-off conditions is realized by the AND link of the corresponding peripheral signals, each cascaded with standard links for the non-reactive division of the corresponding message for switching off the level crossing switched on via other routes.
  • the switch-off conditions are the presence of the switch-off function AI (e.g. use of switch-off contacts AzA2, delay time expired) and the free signaling of the incoming track between the switch-on contacts AzE2 and the switch-off contacts AzAl (peripheral message El).
  • the corresponding, interconnected AND-linked peripheral messages let the switch-off software module A of the route object X3 deactivate the safety components of the level crossing.
  • the switch-off of the level crossing depends solely on the presence of the switch-off function AI or A2.
  • the additionally required monitoring of the free state of the feeder tracks is carried out by the controlling signal box or another switching device.
  • the aforementioned software modules are always and always the same; only the number of route objects and thus also the number of software modules for switching on, switching off and monitoring the level crossing and the number of software modules for controlling and monitoring the security components can vary from case to case. So there is for the control of the level crossing uniform software that is only created once and for which security proof has to be provided even once.
  • This software is adapted to the topography of the level crossing to be controlled exclusively via the link logic, which in turn consists of a few standard links.
  • a control function of the same type as was explained above on the basis of a computer-controlled level crossing can also advantageously be used for hardware-controlled level crossings or mixed forms of hardware- and software-controlled level crossings.
  • the modular design of the control elements and the connection of these elements on the input side also result in a manageable structure of the control of the level crossing in accordance with the topography of the level crossing.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Servomotors (AREA)
  • Magnetically Actuated Valves (AREA)
  • Vehicle Body Suspensions (AREA)
  • Hardware Redundancy (AREA)

Abstract

Selon l'invention, la commande destinée à un passage à niveau (BÜ) est constituée d'une pluralité de modules d'une conception identique, appelés objets de voie (X1 à X5). Pour le passage à niveau il y a autant d'objets de voie que de voies (1 à 5) différentes qui peuvent être placées sur lui. Par l'intermédiaire d'une logique combinatoire (VL) constituée de simples opérateurs logiques standards (Vo, Vu, Vn, Vv, Va), le matériel périphérique de processus (P) peut chaque fois avoir accès seulement à l'objet de voie qui est affecté à une voie définie. Cet objet de voie peut, de son côté, par affectation individuelle, attribuer des messages de surveillance seulement à un signal de surveillance (ÜS1, ÜS2) affecté à la voie concernée. La mise hors circuit se fait aussi par l'intermédiaire de la logique combinatoire, exclusivement par rapport aux voies. Pour la commande des composants de sécurité (S) du passage à niveau, un bloc fonctionnel d'affectation (Z) commun reçoit ses instructions de commande des objets de voie individuels et transmet à ceux-ci des messages de surveillance. L'adaptation de la commande à différentes données topographiques et à différentes exigences fonctionnelles se fait exclusivement par l'intermédiaire de la logique combinatoire.
PCT/DE1998/001595 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau WO1998056635A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AT98936142T ATE211696T1 (de) 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Einrichtung zur steuerung von bahnübergängen
DK98936142T DK0988207T3 (da) 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Indretning til styring af jernbaneoverskæringer
EP98936142A EP0988207B1 (fr) 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19725320.2 1997-06-10
DE19725320A DE19725320A1 (de) 1997-06-10 1997-06-10 Einrichtung zur Steuerung von Bahnübergängen

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1998056635A1 true WO1998056635A1 (fr) 1998-12-17

Family

ID=7832573

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/DE1998/001595 WO1998056635A1 (fr) 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau

Country Status (8)

Country Link
EP (1) EP0988207B1 (fr)
CN (1) CN1139508C (fr)
AT (1) ATE211696T1 (fr)
DE (1) DE19725320A1 (fr)
DK (1) DK0988207T3 (fr)
ES (1) ES2171301T3 (fr)
PT (1) PT988207E (fr)
WO (1) WO1998056635A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2005075273A1 (fr) * 2004-02-03 2005-08-18 General Electric Company Dispositif de commande de voie de chemin de fer a programmation d'application ameliore

Families Citing this family (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE10221575A1 (de) * 2002-05-08 2003-12-04 Siemens Ag Prozessanschaltungen für das sichere Betreiben von sicherungstechnischen Einrichtungen
CN100562451C (zh) * 2004-02-03 2009-11-25 通用电气公司 具有改进的应用编程的铁路控制器
CN101758839B (zh) * 2010-01-29 2012-02-01 北京全路通信信号研究设计院有限公司 铁路车站控制方法
US8833703B2 (en) 2011-07-15 2014-09-16 General Electric Company Systems and method for a crossing equipment controller
DE102017201892A1 (de) * 2017-02-07 2018-08-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Einstellen wenigstens einer Fahrstraße einer eisenbahntechnischen Anlage

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH03220062A (ja) * 1990-01-26 1991-09-27 Higashi Nippon Riyokaku Tetsudo Kk 踏切制御装置
JPH04292261A (ja) * 1991-03-19 1992-10-16 Railway Technical Res Inst 踏切制御装置
JPH0558302A (ja) * 1991-08-29 1993-03-09 East Japan Railway Co 踏切制御装置
EP0773155A1 (fr) * 1995-10-13 1997-05-14 Gec Alsthom Transport Sa Système d'enclenchement ferroviaire à architecture logicielle et son procédé d'implémentation

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH03220062A (ja) * 1990-01-26 1991-09-27 Higashi Nippon Riyokaku Tetsudo Kk 踏切制御装置
JPH04292261A (ja) * 1991-03-19 1992-10-16 Railway Technical Res Inst 踏切制御装置
JPH0558302A (ja) * 1991-08-29 1993-03-09 East Japan Railway Co 踏切制御装置
EP0773155A1 (fr) * 1995-10-13 1997-05-14 Gec Alsthom Transport Sa Système d'enclenchement ferroviaire à architecture logicielle et son procédé d'implémentation

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
PATENT ABSTRACTS OF JAPAN vol. 015, no. 501 (M - 1193) 18 December 1991 (1991-12-18) *
PATENT ABSTRACTS OF JAPAN vol. 017, no. 099 (M - 1373) 26 February 1993 (1993-02-26) *
PATENT ABSTRACTS OF JAPAN vol. 017, no. 370 (M - 1444) 13 July 1993 (1993-07-13) *

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2005075273A1 (fr) * 2004-02-03 2005-08-18 General Electric Company Dispositif de commande de voie de chemin de fer a programmation d'application ameliore
GB2426110A (en) * 2004-02-03 2006-11-15 Gen Electric Railway Controller With Improved Application Programming
US7315770B2 (en) 2004-02-03 2008-01-01 General Electric Company Railway controller with improved application programming
GB2426110B (en) * 2004-02-03 2008-01-23 Gen Electric Co Plc Railway Controller With Improved Application Programming
AU2005210648B2 (en) * 2004-02-03 2010-10-07 General Electric Company Railway controller with improved application programming

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE19725320A1 (de) 1998-12-17
CN1259914A (zh) 2000-07-12
PT988207E (pt) 2002-07-31
ES2171301T3 (es) 2002-09-01
DK0988207T3 (da) 2002-04-29
CN1139508C (zh) 2004-02-25
EP0988207B1 (fr) 2002-01-09
ATE211696T1 (de) 2002-01-15
EP0988207A1 (fr) 2000-03-29

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