EP0988207B1 - Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau - Google Patents

Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0988207B1
EP0988207B1 EP98936142A EP98936142A EP0988207B1 EP 0988207 B1 EP0988207 B1 EP 0988207B1 EP 98936142 A EP98936142 A EP 98936142A EP 98936142 A EP98936142 A EP 98936142A EP 0988207 B1 EP0988207 B1 EP 0988207B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
level crossing
switching
route
switch
modules
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP98936142A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0988207A1 (fr
Inventor
Thomas Eckerlein
Axel Heilmann
Dirk Peter
Hans-Joachim Vornholz
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
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Siemens AG
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Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP0988207A1 publication Critical patent/EP0988207A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0988207B1 publication Critical patent/EP0988207B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L29/00—Safety means for rail/road crossing traffic

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a device according to the Preamble of claim 1.
  • a device is from Signal + Draht 84 (1962) Issue 6, pages 166 to 171 or from Patent Abstracts of Japan, vol. 017, no. 99 (M-1373) & JP 04292261 A known.
  • Level crossings vary in their topographical design in manifold ways by the number of those leading over them Rail tracks used for securing cross traffic Switching means, the required switching behavior of this Switching means and with regard to monitoring the level crossing; a distinction must also be made as to whether activation the level crossing, d. H. the activation of its security components, vehicle operated by track switching means or from a signal box or other control center is made from. If necessary, a level crossing also temporarily or permanently adapted to new circumstances become. This is the case with a computer-controlled level crossing technology to provide appropriate control software, which takes into account the individual project planning cases and if necessary can be adapted to new conditions.
  • the configuration parameters are usually determined using a suitable input device, preferably by means of a Computer, in a central software memory of the level crossing stored. Because of the diversity of the topographical design The control software varies from level crossings computer controlled level crossings from case to case more or less significant. Every new level crossing and every change at an existing level crossing requires one almost complete new creation of the control software with the resulting requirements with regard to simulation, Test and ultimately also a safety certificate. The same applies to non-computer-controlled, exclusively or predominantly hardware-controlled level crossings.
  • the object of the present invention is a device specify according to the preamble of claim 1 with which is possible, the control software of a level crossing in a simple, manageable way the given adapt topographical requirements, whereby for the so generated level crossing-specific control software Because of its manageability, it is only an inexpensive safety certificate can be provided.
  • the invention solves this problem by the characterizing Features of claim 1.
  • the control is then from any number that can be arranged in a row Modules, the so-called track objects, which are completely identical are designed and for which a security certificate once provided can be used again and again.
  • the safety components of the level crossing are connected through a common assignment module controlled by the modules, for which even a single proof of security must be provided.
  • the individual adaptation the one consisting of the modules and the assignment module Control of a concrete level crossing to the respective one Topography happens through an individual logic, that consists of a series of simple logic modules is formed. Only this logic is redesign for each new level crossing, whereby by the assignment of the controlling process elements to those after Invention provided route-oriented modules (route objects) a clear, easily understandable definition the linkage parameter is given.
  • the track objects are including them Modules and the assignment module part of a computer or Computer system that controls a level crossing or also controls multiple level crossings.
  • the central assignment module, the switching on and off the security components of a level crossing and their Surveillance causes, according to the teaching of the claim 4 have a memory in which the topography of a level crossing predetermined interaction of the process periphery with the security components of the level crossing is deposited. This makes it possible to have a uniform assignment module to be used for different level crossings and adapting this assignment module to one to effect concrete level crossing by the fact that for the Level crossing provided modules very specific entrances of the assignment module or very specific address areas of the assignment block.
  • the invention is based on one in the drawing illustrated embodiment for a computer-controlled Level crossing explained in more detail.
  • the drawing shows a level crossing in the upper part Area of two parallel tracks G1 and G2; the two tracks are connected by switches W1 and W2.
  • Left of the level crossing Switch-on contacts AzE1 and AzE2 are shown above the level crossing switched on when a train approaches can be. In the present case then takes over software securing the level crossing by z.
  • B. turns on a light signal system, not shown and / or lowers barriers, also not shown. Switched off the level crossing is made via break contacts AzA2 or AzA4 through the train passing the level crossing. As long as the switch-off contacts within a predetermined time As a result, the fuse components remain the level crossing is still effective, d. H. the traffic light system blocks the level crossing against cross traffic and any intended Barriers remain lowered.
  • HpE1 and AzA3 are provided at the level crossing, which act analogously to the switch-off contacts AzA2 and AzA4.
  • the level crossing has been switched on and thereupon the security components of the level crossing the security of the level crossing, leads a corresponding monitoring message for switching on a monitoring signal ÜS1 or ÜS2 or to output a corresponding monitoring message to the signal box.
  • the monitoring signal lights up ÜS1 or ÜS2 tells the driver of an approaching vehicle Train that the level crossing secured against cross traffic is; correspondingly give from the signal box the monitoring message of the level crossing switched on Route signals Hp1 or Hp2 the train journey towards the Level crossing free. Comes monitoring the level crossing not established, then the signals ÜS1, ÜS2, Hp1 resp Hp2 the further advancement on the level crossing.
  • the driver an approaching train then has the Initiate braking, the initiation of this braking process also brought about by additional track switching means can be. It is more appropriate by default Driving speeds and arrangement of the signals in given Clearances to the level crossing ensure that an approaching Train if the monitoring message does not appear brought to a standstill in good time before the level crossing can.
  • Switch on monitoring or track signals; for switching off the level crossing also depends on the actuation very specific switch-off contacts.
  • topographical elaborate level crossings it can also be that after the track on which a train approaches a level crossing, Different security components at the level crossing are to be switched on. All of this can be done from level crossing to level crossing be different and is not necessarily the only one depending on which track a train on the level crossing tapers. For example, if a train is from the left coming to the right via the switch-on contact AzE2 on the Track G2 advances, the corresponding monitoring message that Switch on monitoring signal ÜS2.
  • the corresponding monitoring message should Switch on the monitoring signal ÜS1.
  • the different Dependencies must be specified in detail and appropriately implemented in the control software be in an individual safety certificate It must be demonstrated that the level crossing is safe guaranteed for all conceivable operational journeys is.
  • the software to control and monitor one Level crossing is particularly confusing for the technicians just like the pure programmer difficulties has the interaction of the technical components of the level crossing to record and in an appropriate control software implement.
  • the invention makes the project planning software for a level crossing for everyone involved, i.e. both the technician as well as the programmer, manageable and understandable; this also makes it easier for every level crossing safety proof for the Control software.
  • the control software is provided Level crossing in uniformly trained software modules to divide and organize them by road. Based on the level crossing shown in the upper part of the drawing there are five different routes over this. The Routes are indicated by arrows next to the tracks and bear the numbers 1 to 5. These five possible ones in the example There are five modules in the control software, so-called Route objects assigned to X1 to X5. All track objects are designed in the same way and work together with three software modules E each of the same design for switching on, A for switching off and Ü for monitoring the Level crossing. Coming on the route marked 1 the route object X1 for use and causes one Switch-on order for this route via one for all route objects common assignment block Z the connection certain safety components S of the level crossing. at the assumed constellation of the level crossing are fuse components to be connected always the same, independent of which route takes up the level crossing.
  • a switch-on signal (Software module E) the affected track object, e.g. B. X1, via the assignment module Z and the only briefly indicated Software modules Li and Schr for control and monitoring the light signals of the level crossing and the barriers acts on them and activates them.
  • Software module E the affected track object
  • the assignment module Z the only briefly indicated Software modules Li and Schr for control and monitoring the light signals of the level crossing and the barriers acts on them and activates them.
  • different track objects via the assignment block to different fuse components S act on the level crossing, for example on light signs installed in different locations and / or on different barrier systems, whereby z. B. lowering the barrier systems in a known manner Can still be dependent on certain defined danger zones at the time of lowering the Barriers must be cleared so that it is not included of cross traffic between interacting barriers can come.
  • a route object has the security components via the assignment block level crossing activated, there is one corresponding monitoring message from the security components via the assignment module to the initiating one Path object.
  • the route object then causes via his software module Ü switching on the monitoring signal, on which the announced train advances or it initiates the Output of a corresponding monitoring message to the Signal box, which in turn is now the journey across the level crossing for the train for which the level crossing was activated, releases.
  • This logic logic consists of one or each several standard links of the functions AND, OR, NOT, distribute or connect; those in the lower part of the The legend given in the drawing describes the function of each Standard shortcuts.
  • the level crossing is caused approaching from left to right on track G2 Vehicle with the activation of the switch-on contacts AzE2 a switch-on order to that assigned to route 1 Track object X1.
  • This is done by an AND operation Vu of a switch-on signal originating from the switch-on contacts AzE2 with the switch position indicator + for the in Track switch W1.
  • Both conditions, the actuation the switch-on contacts and the specification of the specific switch position clearly describe the route over the level crossing and thus clearly determine on which signal the Monitoring message is to be displayed.
  • the route 1 and thus the route object X1 is the monitoring signal ÜS2 permanently assigned.
  • the route object X1 has no possibility who meet the security requirements of the Level crossing monitoring message coming up at him pass his software module Ü on to a signal other than to the monitoring signal claimed by route 1 ÜS2.
  • the switch W1 both for the application of the Route object X1 as well as the route object X3 takes place the activation of the switch-on software modules E of these objects via standard linkage Va for decoupled division of the Entry report and the switch position stress on the two track objects; the standard links Va and Vu are cascaded.
  • this monitoring signal is also switched on in route 2 is to be an OR operation of the monitoring signal Vo upstream in which the monitoring orders of the two route objects X2 and X3 are linked.
  • Switching off the level crossing happens vehicle-controlled with the actuation the switch-off contacts AzA4 (route 1) or AzA2 (Route 2 and 3).
  • the switch-off functions A2 and A1 the circuitry depending on the direction of actuation the opening contacts AzA3 or AzA4 or AzA1 or AzA2 and the expiry of a predetermined delay time for the switch-off process include.
  • the elimination of the level crossing but is not only intended to operate the switch-off contacts and the expiry of the specified delay time his; the switch-off process should only take place if the inlet route specified by the route to be negotiated is released on the level crossing.
  • the switch-off is except for the switch-off function A2 (e.g. switch-off contacts AzA4 actuated and Delay time elapsed) made dependent on the existence the free report E2; both peripheral messages are over the standard link Vu AND-linked.
  • the switch-off function A2 e.g. switch-off contacts AzA4 actuated and Delay time elapsed
  • both peripheral messages are over the standard link Vu AND-linked.
  • Switching off the level crossing is excluded for route 2 from the presence of peripheral message A1 (e.g. AzA2 actuated, Delay time expired) depending on the free message of the inlet track claimed by route 2 the level crossing. If the feed track between the switch contacts AzE1 and the switch-off contacts AzA1 released the corresponding peripheral message E1 in cooperation with the other switch-off conditions Switch off the level crossing.
  • the interaction of the switch-off conditions is realized through the AND link of the corresponding peripheral signals, each cascaded with Standard links for the non-reactive division of the corresponding message to switch off the via other routes level crossing switched on.
  • the switch-off conditions are present for route 3 the switch-off function A1 (e.g. use switch-off contacts AzA2, Delay time has elapsed) and the clearing of the incoming track between the switch-on contacts AzE2 and the switch-off contacts AzA1 (peripheral message E1).
  • the feedback of the reporting status of these security components via the assignment block to route object X3 shutdown there via the monitoring software module the monitoring signal ÜS1.
  • the level crossing is switched off solely depending on the presence of the switch-off function A1 or A2.
  • the additional required monitoring of the free state the incoming tracks are done by the controlling signal box or another switching device.
  • the aforementioned software modules are always and constantly trained the same; only the number of route objects and thus also the number of software modules for switching on, switching off and monitoring the level crossing and the number of software modules for the control and Monitoring of the fuse components may vary from case to case vary. So there is for the control of the level crossing uniform software that is only created once and for which even a single proof of security is given to provide.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Hardware Redundancy (AREA)
  • Servomotors (AREA)
  • Magnetically Actuated Valves (AREA)
  • Vehicle Body Suspensions (AREA)

Claims (4)

  1. Dispositif de commande de passage (Bü) à niveau qui sont connectés à partir d'un poste de commande ou de manière commandée par véhicule par des éléments (AzE1, AzE2) de processus sur l'itinéraire et qui sont déconnectés de manière commandée par véhicule par des éléments (AzA1 à AzA4) de processus sur l'itinéraire, un logiciel de planification assurant la conversion conforme à la topographie des signaux de connexion et de déconnexion en instructions de commande pour les composants (S) de sécurité du passage à niveau, et les éléments (AzA1 à AzA4, AzE1, AzE2) de processus, des signaux (ÜS1, ÜS2, Mp1, Mp2) et des aiguillages (W1, W2) formant une périphérie (P) de processus du passage (Bü) à niveau, caractérisés    en ce que la commande pour chaque passage (Bü) à niveau est constituée d'un nombre correspondant au nombre de voies (1 à 5) de communication pouvant être réglées par son intermédiaire de modules réalisés de la même façon appelés objets (X1 à X5) de voies de communication, à chacun desquels il est associé un module pour le traitement de la connexion (E), un module pour le traitement de la déconnexion (A) et un module pour le traitement de la surveillance (Ü) du passage à niveau, ces modules disposant pour la connexion, la déconnexion et la surveillance du passage à niveau, d'interfaces avec la périphérie (P) de processus qui sont réalisées de la même façon,
       en ce que tous les objets (X1 à X5) de voies de communication sont en liaison par l'intermédiaire d'interfaces unitaires avec un composant (Z) d'association commun, qui convertit les signaux de connexion et de déconnexion qui lui sont envoyés par un objet de voies de communication par l'intermédiaire de modules (Li, Schr) supplémentaires en instructions de connexion et de déconnexion pour les composants (S) de sécurité du passage à niveau sollicités par l'objet de voies de communication
       et en ce qu'il est prévu entre la périphérie (P) de processus d'un passage à niveau concret et les modules pour la connexion, la déconnexion et la surveillance du passage à niveau, des objets (X1 à X5) de voies de communication associés, une logique (VL) de combinaison dans laquelle les sollicitations de voies de communication des modules individuels pour la connexion, la déconnexion et la surveillance du passage à niveau sont mises en mémoire par la périphérie de processus du passage à niveau et qui est réalisée de manière à effectuer une combinaison adéquate de la périphérie (P) de processus avec les modules (A, E, Ü) de connexion, de déconnexion et de surveillance du passage à niveau des objets (X1 à X5) de voies de communication.
  2. Dispositif suivant la revendication 1, caractérisés en ce que la logique (VL) de combinaison pour chacun des modules pour la connexion, la déconnexion et la surveillance du passage à niveau d'un objet (X1 à X5) de voies de communication est représentée par une ou plusieurs combinaisons (Va, Vu, Vo, Vn, Vv) normalisées en cascade de la fonction distribuée, et, ou, inversée ou reliée.
  3. Dispositif suivant la revendication 1 ou 2, caractérisés en ce qu'il est associé à chaque passage à niveau un ordinateur ou un système (R) d'ordinateur dans lequel au moins les fonctions du composant (Z) d'association commun ainsi que celles des objets (X1 à X5) de voies de communication et celles des modules (A, E, Ü) pour la connexion, la déconnexion et la surveillance du passage à niveau et des modules (Li, Schr) supplémentaires sont mises en oeuvre.
  4. Dispositif suivant la revendication 3, caractérisés en ce que l'ordinateur ou le système (R) d'ordinateur comporte une mémoire dans laquelle la coopération prescrite par la topographie du passage à niveau de ces éléments de processus avec le composant (S) de sécurité du passage à niveau est mise en mémoire.
EP98936142A 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau Expired - Lifetime EP0988207B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19725320 1997-06-10
DE19725320A DE19725320A1 (de) 1997-06-10 1997-06-10 Einrichtung zur Steuerung von Bahnübergängen
PCT/DE1998/001595 WO1998056635A1 (fr) 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0988207A1 EP0988207A1 (fr) 2000-03-29
EP0988207B1 true EP0988207B1 (fr) 2002-01-09

Family

ID=7832573

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP98936142A Expired - Lifetime EP0988207B1 (fr) 1997-06-10 1998-06-10 Dispositif pour commander des passages a niveau

Country Status (8)

Country Link
EP (1) EP0988207B1 (fr)
CN (1) CN1139508C (fr)
AT (1) ATE211696T1 (fr)
DE (1) DE19725320A1 (fr)
DK (1) DK0988207T3 (fr)
ES (1) ES2171301T3 (fr)
PT (1) PT988207E (fr)
WO (1) WO1998056635A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE10221575A1 (de) * 2002-05-08 2003-12-04 Siemens Ag Prozessanschaltungen für das sichere Betreiben von sicherungstechnischen Einrichtungen
CN100562451C (zh) * 2004-02-03 2009-11-25 通用电气公司 具有改进的应用编程的铁路控制器
US7315770B2 (en) * 2004-02-03 2008-01-01 General Electric Company Railway controller with improved application programming
CN101758839B (zh) * 2010-01-29 2012-02-01 北京全路通信信号研究设计院有限公司 铁路车站控制方法
US8833703B2 (en) * 2011-07-15 2014-09-16 General Electric Company Systems and method for a crossing equipment controller
DE102017201892A1 (de) * 2017-02-07 2018-08-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Einstellen wenigstens einer Fahrstraße einer eisenbahntechnischen Anlage

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2859347B2 (ja) * 1990-01-26 1999-02-17 東日本旅客鉄道株式会社 踏切制御装置
JP2613321B2 (ja) * 1991-03-19 1997-05-28 財団法人鉄道総合技術研究所 踏切制御装置
JP3221573B2 (ja) * 1991-08-29 2001-10-22 東日本旅客鉄道株式会社 踏切制御装置
FR2739824B1 (fr) * 1995-10-13 1997-11-14 Gec Alsthom Transport Sa Systeme d'enclenchement ferroviaire a architecture logicielle et son procede d'implementation

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE19725320A1 (de) 1998-12-17
CN1139508C (zh) 2004-02-25
CN1259914A (zh) 2000-07-12
PT988207E (pt) 2002-07-31
ATE211696T1 (de) 2002-01-15
WO1998056635A1 (fr) 1998-12-17
ES2171301T3 (es) 2002-09-01
DK0988207T3 (da) 2002-04-29
EP0988207A1 (fr) 2000-03-29

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