Classifications

• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
  • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
  • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
  • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
  • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
  • B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L2205/00—Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic
  • B61L2205/02—Global system for mobile communication - railways [GSM-R]

Definitions

• CTCS-2 is a point-connected train overspeed protection system based on point transponders and continuous track circuits for transmitting train operation control information. It has been speeding lines and passenger transport. The dedicated line has been successfully applied and is suitable for lines from 200km/h to 250km/h.
• CTCS-2 train control system there are too many ground devices along the railway, and the amount of information transmitted by the ground to the train is insufficient, and the real-time performance is insufficient. Two-way communication cannot be realized between the vehicles and the ground.
• the Radio Block Center is the ground core device for the CTCS-3 train control system.
• the RBC system receives information such as the train position and train operating parameters transmitted by the CTCS-3 train-controlled vehicle subsystem through the Global System of Mobile Communication for Railways (GSM-R), and simultaneously obtains the connection with it.
• Information provided by other equipment of the ground subsystem such as interlocking, temporary speed limit server, etc.
• Track occupancy information including track occupancy information, temporary speed limit command, interlocking approach status, disaster protection information, etc.
• Control information such as the Movement Authority (MA) and line description, temporary speed limit and emergency stop are generated and transmitted to the CTCS-3 class vehicle subsystem through the GSM-R wireless communication system. Simultaneously.
• the status of the controlled train can be forwarded to devices such as CTC.
• embodiments of the present invention provide a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless occlusion center.
• Embodiments of the present invention provide a railway train security monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center, including:
• the wireless blocking center RBC detects whether a communication failure occurs with the communication between the interlocking machine; if the communication failure occurs between the detection and the interlocking machine, the control is stopped within the control range of the interlocking machine or the mobile authorized MA is extended to All railway trains within the control range of the interlocking machine send messages.
• the method further includes:
• the RBC detects a communication failure with the communication between the temporary speed limit server, the temporary rate limit received before is maintained; or
• the RBC detects a communication failure with the communication between the railway trains, the MA of the railway train is retained for a predetermined time, and the lines included in the MA are not allocated to other railway trains; or
• the RBC detects that a communication failure occurs with the communication between the railway trains, and at this time, the emergency message is sent to the railway train, and the emergency message is continuously transmitted for a predetermined time.
• the method further includes:
• Handover RBC If it is detected that the handover procedure with the receiving RBC has not started and the communication connection with the receiving RBC is disconnected, the handover RBC will monitor the railway train to the point of handover to the RBC and the receiving RBC; or
• the handover RBC stops sending any message to the railway train;
• Receiving RBC if it is detected that the handover process with the handover RBC has started, but has not established a connection with the railway train, and the communication connection with the handover RBC is disconnected, the relevant information of the railway train is deleted; or
• the receiving RBC detects that the handover process with the handover RBC has started, and has already been with the railway train. When the connection is established and the communication connection with the handover RBC is disconnected, the relevant information of the railway train is retained.
• the method further includes:
• the handover RBC if the handover RBC detects that the communication connection with the railway train is disconnected, the MA of the railway train is retained for a predetermined time before receiving the train information for receiving the RBC, and the The MA sends to other railway trains and sends a cancel handover message to the receiving RBC; or
• the handover RBC if the handover RBC detects that the communication connection with the railway train is disconnected and receives the takeover information of the receiving RBC, the relevant information of the railway train is deleted; or
• the relevant information of the railway train is deleted;
• the railway train is notified. Disconnect the communication.
• the method further includes:
• the RBC will receive all current temporary speed limit information sent by the temporary speed limit server after restarting, and then accept the train registration.
• the method further includes:
• the RBC sends a conditional emergency stop message CEM to the railway train that the end point is the starting point of the occupied route;
• the MA of the railway train is shortened to the end position.
• the method further includes:
• the RBC When the SA sent by the interlock indicates that a certain route is degraded, the RBC will periodically travel to the railway train. Transmitting the shortened mobile authorization SMA until the railway train returns an acknowledgment, and the MA corresponding to the railway train that the RBC will retain is correspondingly shortened; or
• EMA indicates that an emergency area is activated
• the RBC will immediately send an unconditional emergency stop message UEM to the railway train that has entered the area indicated by the EMA;
• the RBC will send a conditional emergency stop message CEM to the railway train that has not entered the area indicated by the EMA but the MA has extended to the area.
• the method further includes:
• the RBC receives the temporary speed limit command sent by the temporary speed limit server, the RBC saves the temporary speed limit command and immediately sends it to all railway trains whose MA is affected by the temporary speed limit.
• the method further includes:
• the RBC can The railway train transmits the MA.
• the invention relates to a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center, which causes communication failures with other equipments for RBCs; after RBC startup; processing of sending messages to external ground plane devices; processing of mode conversion of trains
• the train safety monitoring program is proposed to realize the safety monitoring of the train by the wireless blocking center in the CTCS-3 train control system, which ensures the safe operation of the train without causing excessive impact on the operation efficiency.
• FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center according to the present invention. detailed description
• the present invention only specifies the communication specification between the RBC and the in-vehicle device in the system requirement specification of the CTCS-3 train control system, and does not involve the influence of other ground devices, when the communication failure of the RBC with other devices and because of the CTCS-3
• the difference between the level system and other systems needs to be treated differently, which will cause defects in train safety and operational efficiency.
• the CTCS-3 train control system based on the wireless occlusion center.
• FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the method includes:
• Step 100 The wireless blocking center detects whether a communication failure occurs in communication between the RBC and the interlocking machine;
• C3 On the CTCS-3 (hereafter abbreviated as C3) line, not only the C3 train runs, but also the CTCS-2 (hereinafter abbreviated as C2) train.
• the C2 class train is not monitored by the RBC. Therefore, the RBC cannot determine the MA of each car simply by relying on the position of all registered trains. It is necessary to determine the signal authorization message SA sent by the interlocking machine. The RBC needs to detect and interlock the machine. Whether there is a communication failure between the communication;
• Step 101 If the communication failure between the detection and the interlocking machine is detected, stop sending messages to all railway trains within the control range of the interlocking machine or the mobile authorization MA extends to the control range of the interlocking machine. .
• the RBC When it is detected that the RBC and the interlocking machine have a communication failure, the RBC will not be able to receive the current SA status, and the train can no longer be controlled. In order to keep the train running safely without causing excessive impact on operational efficiency, the RBC draws a solution. All messages are sent to all trains within the control range of the interlock or that the MA has extended to the control of the interlock. If the train does not receive any message from the RBC for a configured safe time (if currently configured for 20 seconds), it will be considered that the communication with the RBC is interrupted and the in-vehicle equipment will immediately initiate protection measures to ensure safe operation of the train.
• the wireless blocking center-based railway train monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides supervision The control found that the RBC and the interlocking machine had communication failures and carried out safety treatment.
• the wireless blocking center In the CTCS-3 train control system, when the communication failure occurred between the RBC and the interlocking machine, the wireless blocking center safely monitors the train to ensure the safety of the train. It does not have an excessive impact on operational efficiency while operating.
• RBC and the temporary speed limit server interface stipulate that, in this case, the temporary speed limit server shall not issue any new temporary speed limit to the RBC range, and the RBC maintains the temporary limit previously received. Speed, ensure the safety monitoring of the train.
• the wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method realizes communication failure and safe processing of the RBC and the temporary speed limit server by monitoring, and realizes the RBC and the temporary limit in the CTCS-3 train control system.
• the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure safe operation of the train.
• the train will consider disconnected from the RBC, but the RBC cannot determine the status of the train at this time, due to the train possible Still operating according to the MA that RBC previously sent to it, the RBC will retain the MA of the train and will not temporarily assign the route included in the MA to other trains to ensure safe operation of the train until a configured safe time (eg After 5 minutes), the train is written off. If the train is re-contacted within this time, the RBC will continue to monitor the safe operation of the train based on the latest status of the train report.
• a configured safety time eg After 5 minutes
• the RBC is sending an emergency message to the train, and the RBC will continue to send the emergency message until after a safe time.
• the wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method detects that a communication failure occurs between the RBC and the railway train and performs safety processing.
• the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure the safe operation of the train.
• the handover of the train between different RBCs when it is detected that the communication connection between the RBC and the adjacent RBC is disconnected, the handover of the train between different RBCs will be affected, and in the RBC-RBC handover process, the train monitoring right is transferred to the adjacent RBC. Called RBC, the party that receives the train monitoring right is called the receiving RBC. Specifically, if the handover procedure of the handover RBC and the receiving RBC has not started, the communication connection between the two RBCs is disconnected, and the handover RBC will normally monitor the train running to the boundary points of the two RBCs, but no longer extend the mobile authorization to receive the RBC. Within the control range.
• the handover RBC is disconnected from the adjacent RBC, and the handover RBC will stop sending any messages to the train, allowing the train to take protective measures on its own.
• the communication connection with the handover RBC is disconnected, the receiving RBC will retain the train status, and the train safety operation will be normally monitored according to the position sent by the train.
• the wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides that the RBC and the phase are realized in the CTCS-3 train control system by monitoring and discovering that the communication connection between the RBC and the adjacent RBC is disconnected and safely processed. When the communication connection of the adjacent RBC is disconnected, the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure the handover of the train between different RBCs.
• the following specifically includes:
• the handover RBC will be processed in the manner of disconnection from the train communication as described above until the handover information of the reception RBC is received. After the configured security time (if currently 5 minutes), delete the train related information, and notify the receiving RBC to cancel the handover;
• the handover to the RBC will delete the information associated with the train.
• the receiving RBC If during the RBC-RBC handover, the receiving RBC starts from receiving the mobile traffic information, and after a configured security time (such as 5 minutes currently), still fails to establish a communication connection with the train, then the receiving RBC deletes. Information about the train. If the cancel handover message sent by the RBC is received during this period, the relevant information of the train is directly deleted.
• a configured security time such as 5 minutes currently
• the communication connection is disconnected from the notification train.
• the wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method finds that the communication connection between the RBC and the train is disconnected and safely processed during the RBC and RBC handover process, and is implemented in the CTCS-3 train control system.
• the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure the safe operation of the train.
• RBC will immediately attempt to establish a connection with the interlocking machine and the temporary speed limit server. If the connection with the interlocking machine is unsuccessful, RBC will not send any message to the affected train to ensure the safety of the train.
• the temporary speed limit server After the RBC successfully establishes a connection with it, the temporary speed limit server initializes the RBC, and sends all current temporary speed limits to the RBC, thus ensuring that the RBC can safely monitor the train operation. If the RBC cannot be successfully initialized, registration of any train will not be accepted to avoid security risks.
• the wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides a RBC restart in the CTCS-3 train control system by monitoring and detecting the communication failure of the RBC after restarting with other equipment and performing safety processing.
• the wireless blocking center conducts safety monitoring of the train to ensure safe operation of the train.
• the RBC when the signal authorization message SA sent by the interlocking machine indicates that an approach is occupied in the MA range of the railway train, the RBC sends a conditional emergency stop message to the railway train that the end point is the starting point of the occupied route ( Referred to as CEM);
• the continuous transmission is continuously performed.
• the message is currently sent continuously at a rate of 7 seconds.
• the train After receiving the CEM, the train reacts differently according to its own position. If the train has entered the occupied route, the train informs the RBC not to accept the CEM and continues to operate, and the RBC maintains the previous MA of the train unchanged;
• the train will inform the RBC to accept the CEM and accordingly Taking the corresponding protective measures, the RBC also shortens the MA of the train to the same place.
• the RBC will immediately send a shortened mobile authorization (SMA) to the train at a frequency of 7 seconds until the train confirms the message.
• SMA shortened mobile authorization
• EMA emergency area message
• the RBC will immediately send an unconditional emergency stop message (UEM) to the train that has entered the area, to the area that has not yet entered the area but the MA has Trains extending to the area send CEM to ensure the safety of the train.
• EEM unconditional emergency stop message
• the temporary speed limit command sent by the temporary speed limit server will be saved by the RBC and sent immediately to the trains that will be affected by these temporary speed limits to ensure their safety.
• the wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides a RBC according to different message pairs in the CTCS-3 train control system by monitoring the security processing performed by the RBC according to messages sent by other ground equipments. Safe handling in different situations ensures safe operation of the train.
• the RBC is not responsible for the control of the train in the visual driving mode, and its operational safety is the responsibility of the driver.
• Trains in full monitoring mode are responsible for their safe operation by RBC, so the conversion of visual mode to full monitoring mode requires special handling.
• the method that is learned is that only when the approach state of the train in front of the visual mode changes from the train approach to the occupied time, the difference between the time when the train reports that it has entered the approach is at a safe time ( At present, within 13 seconds), the RBC can send a mobile authorization to the train, causing the train to switch to full monitoring mode.
• the wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment, through the RBC monitoring and conversion of the train driving mode, realizes the RBC to convert the train driving mode while ensuring the train in the CTCS-3 train control system. safe operation.

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
• Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
• Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

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Cited By (7)

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Citations (5)

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• 2011
  • 2011-05-16 CN CN2011101256350A patent/CN102248958B/zh active Active
• 2012
  • 2012-05-16 WO PCT/CN2012/075559 patent/WO2012155836A1/zh active Application Filing
  • 2012-05-16 RS RS20190578A patent/RS58695B1/sr unknown
  • 2012-05-16 TR TR2019/07039T patent/TR201907039T4/tr unknown
  • 2012-05-16 EP EP12785414.9A patent/EP2746131B1/en active Active
  • 2012-05-16 HU HUE12785414 patent/HUE044226T2/hu unknown

Patent Citations (5)

Non-Patent Citations (2)

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