WO2012155836A1

WO2012155836A1 - Railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on radio block center

Info

Publication number: WO2012155836A1
Application number: PCT/CN2012/075559
Authority: WO
Inventors: 江明; 耿宏亮; 李启翮; 侯锡立; 周兴韬; 温抿雄
Original assignee: 北京全路通信信号研究设计院有限公司
Priority date: 2011-05-16
Filing date: 2012-05-16
Publication date: 2012-11-22
Also published as: CN102248958A; RS58695B1; HUE044226T2; EP2746131B1; TR201907039T4; EP2746131A1; EP2746131A4; CN102248958B

Abstract

A railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a radio block center comprises the following steps: the radio block center RBC detects whether communication between the RBC and an interlocking machine fails or not （100）； when a communication failure is confirmed, the RBC stops sending messages to all railway trains in the control range of the interlocking machine or to all railway trains in the control range to which the movement authority MA extends, of the interlocking machine (101). The railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on the radio block center eliminates the influence on train safety when communication between the RBC and ground equipments fails in a CTCS-3 train control system, and ensures safe operation of the train and operation efficiency.

Description

Railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on wireless occlusion center This application claims to be submitted to the Chinese Patent Office on May 16, 2011, the application number is 201110125635.0, and the invention title is "Wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method" Chinese patent Priority of the application, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. TECHNICAL FIELD The present invention belongs to the field of railway train control, and in particular, to a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center. Background technique

China Train Control System-2 (CTCS-2) is a point-connected train overspeed protection system based on point transponders and continuous track circuits for transmitting train operation control information. It has been speeding lines and passenger transport. The dedicated line has been successfully applied and is suitable for lines from 200km/h to 250km/h. However, in the CTCS-2 train control system, there are too many ground devices along the railway, and the amount of information transmitted by the ground to the train is insufficient, and the real-time performance is insufficient. Two-way communication cannot be realized between the vehicles and the ground.

The Radio Block Center (RBC) is the ground core device for the CTCS-3 train control system. The RBC system receives information such as the train position and train operating parameters transmitted by the CTCS-3 train-controlled vehicle subsystem through the Global System of Mobile Communication for Railways (GSM-R), and simultaneously obtains the connection with it. Information provided by other equipment of the ground subsystem (such as interlocking, temporary speed limit server, etc.), including track occupancy information, temporary speed limit command, interlocking approach status, disaster protection information, etc., combined with the line data stored by itself. Control information such as the Movement Authority (MA) and line description, temporary speed limit and emergency stop are generated and transmitted to the CTCS-3 class vehicle subsystem through the GSM-R wireless communication system. Simultaneously. In addition, the status of the controlled train can be forwarded to devices such as CTC.

Since the existing standards only regulate the communication specifications between the RBC and the in-vehicle device, and do not involve the influence of other ground devices, there are RBC interactions with other ground devices, and Because the difference between the CTCS-3 system and other systems needs to be treated differently, the impact on the safe operation of the train. Summary of the invention

In view of the above-mentioned deficiencies of the prior art, embodiments of the present invention provide a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless occlusion center.

Embodiments of the present invention provide a railway train security monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center, including:

The wireless blocking center RBC detects whether a communication failure occurs with the communication between the interlocking machine; if the communication failure occurs between the detection and the interlocking machine, the control is stopped within the control range of the interlocking machine or the mobile authorized MA is extended to All railway trains within the control range of the interlocking machine send messages.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

If the RBC detects a communication failure with the communication between the temporary speed limit server, the temporary rate limit received before is maintained; or

If the RBC detects a communication failure with the communication between the railway trains, the MA of the railway train is retained for a predetermined time, and the lines included in the MA are not allocated to other railway trains; or

The RBC detects that a communication failure occurs with the communication between the railway trains, and at this time, the emergency message is sent to the railway train, and the emergency message is continuously transmitted for a predetermined time.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

Handover RBC If it is detected that the handover procedure with the receiving RBC has not started and the communication connection with the receiving RBC is disconnected, the handover RBC will monitor the railway train to the point of handover to the RBC and the receiving RBC; or

If the handover RBC detects that the handover procedure with the receiving RBC has started and the communication connection with the receiving RBC is disconnected, the handover RBC stops sending any message to the railway train; or

Receiving RBC, if it is detected that the handover process with the handover RBC has started, but has not established a connection with the railway train, and the communication connection with the handover RBC is disconnected, the relevant information of the railway train is deleted; or

The receiving RBC detects that the handover process with the handover RBC has started, and has already been with the railway train. When the connection is established and the communication connection with the handover RBC is disconnected, the relevant information of the railway train is retained.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

During the handover of the RBC, if the handover RBC detects that the communication connection with the railway train is disconnected, the MA of the railway train is retained for a predetermined time before receiving the train information for receiving the RBC, and the The MA sends to other railway trains and sends a cancel handover message to the receiving RBC; or

During the handover of the RBC, if the handover RBC detects that the communication connection with the railway train is disconnected and receives the takeover information of the receiving RBC, the relevant information of the railway train is deleted; or

During the handover of the RBC, if the receiving RBC has not established a communication connection with the railway train or received a cancellation handover message sent by the handover RBC within a predetermined time, the relevant information of the railway train is deleted; or

During the handover of the RBC, if the receiving RBC establishes a communication connection with the railway train, but the railway train has not entered the control range of the receiving RBC, and receives the cancel handover message sent by the handover RBC, the railway train is notified. Disconnect the communication.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

If a restart occurs, the RBC will receive all current temporary speed limit information sent by the temporary speed limit server after restarting, and then accept the train registration.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

When the signal authorization message SA sent by the interlocking machine indicates that an access route is occupied in the MA range of the railway train, the RBC sends a conditional emergency stop message CEM to the railway train that the end point is the starting point of the occupied route;

If the RBC does not receive the reply of the railway train, periodically continuously transmitting the CEM;

If the RBC receives the railway train not accepting the reply of the CEM, maintaining the MA of the railway train unchanged;

If the RBC receives the railway train accepting a reply from the CEM, the MA of the railway train is shortened to the end position.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

When the SA sent by the interlock indicates that a certain route is degraded, the RBC will periodically travel to the railway train. Transmitting the shortened mobile authorization SMA until the railway train returns an acknowledgment, and the MA corresponding to the railway train that the RBC will retain is correspondingly shortened; or

If there is an emergency area message in the message sent by the interlocking machine, EMA indicates that an emergency area is activated, the RBC will immediately send an unconditional emergency stop message UEM to the railway train that has entered the area indicated by the EMA; or

If there is an emergency area activation message EMA in the message sent by the interlock, the RBC will send a conditional emergency stop message CEM to the railway train that has not entered the area indicated by the EMA but the MA has extended to the area.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

If the RBC receives the temporary speed limit command sent by the temporary speed limit server, the RBC saves the temporary speed limit command and immediately sends it to all railway trains whose MA is affected by the temporary speed limit.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, the method further includes:

When the state of the road ahead of the visual mode railway train changes from the train approach to the occupied time, and the difference between the time when the railway train reports that it has entered the approach is within a safe time, the RBC can The railway train transmits the MA.

The invention relates to a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center, which causes communication failures with other equipments for RBCs; after RBC startup; processing of sending messages to external ground plane devices; processing of mode conversion of trains The train safety monitoring program is proposed to realize the safety monitoring of the train by the wireless blocking center in the CTCS-3 train control system, which ensures the safe operation of the train without causing excessive impact on the operation efficiency. DRAWINGS

1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center according to the present invention. detailed description

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention are clearly and completely described in the following with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. It is a partial embodiment of the invention, and not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, those skilled in the art are not making creative labors. All other embodiments obtained below are within the scope of the invention.

The present invention only specifies the communication specification between the RBC and the in-vehicle device in the system requirement specification of the CTCS-3 train control system, and does not involve the influence of other ground devices, when the communication failure of the RBC with other devices and because of the CTCS-3 The difference between the level system and other systems needs to be treated differently, which will cause defects in train safety and operational efficiency. Provide a solution, that is, the CTCS-3 train control system based on the wireless occlusion center. Through the communication failure between RBC and other equipment; after the RBC is started; the processing of sending messages to the external ground plane equipment; the processing of the mode conversion of the train, the train safety monitoring scheme is proposed, and the safety monitoring of the train by the wireless blocking center is realized, and the guarantee is ensured. The safe operation of the train does not have an excessive impact on operational efficiency.

1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the method includes:

Step 100: The wireless blocking center detects whether a communication failure occurs in communication between the RBC and the interlocking machine;

On the CTCS-3 (hereafter abbreviated as C3) line, not only the C3 train runs, but also the CTCS-2 (hereinafter abbreviated as C2) train. The C2 class train is not monitored by the RBC. Therefore, the RBC cannot determine the MA of each car simply by relying on the position of all registered trains. It is necessary to determine the signal authorization message SA sent by the interlocking machine. The RBC needs to detect and interlock the machine. Whether there is a communication failure between the communication;

Step 101: If the communication failure between the detection and the interlocking machine is detected, stop sending messages to all railway trains within the control range of the interlocking machine or the mobile authorization MA extends to the control range of the interlocking machine. .

When it is detected that the RBC and the interlocking machine have a communication failure, the RBC will not be able to receive the current SA status, and the train can no longer be controlled. In order to keep the train running safely without causing excessive impact on operational efficiency, the RBC draws a solution. All messages are sent to all trains within the control range of the interlock or that the MA has extended to the control of the interlock. If the train does not receive any message from the RBC for a configured safe time (if currently configured for 20 seconds), it will be considered that the communication with the RBC is interrupted and the in-vehicle equipment will immediately initiate protection measures to ensure safe operation of the train.

The wireless blocking center-based railway train monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides supervision The control found that the RBC and the interlocking machine had communication failures and carried out safety treatment. In the CTCS-3 train control system, when the communication failure occurred between the RBC and the interlocking machine, the wireless blocking center safely monitors the train to ensure the safety of the train. It does not have an excessive impact on operational efficiency while operating.

Based on the above embodiment, when a communication failure occurs between the RBC and the temporary speed limit server, if a new temporary speed limit is issued and the RBC cannot be obtained, a security risk will occur. When the method is used for this problem, RBC and the temporary speed limit server interface stipulate that, in this case, the temporary speed limit server shall not issue any new temporary speed limit to the RBC range, and the RBC maintains the temporary limit previously received. Speed, ensure the safety monitoring of the train.

The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the present embodiment realizes communication failure and safe processing of the RBC and the temporary speed limit server by monitoring, and realizes the RBC and the temporary limit in the CTCS-3 train control system. When a communication failure occurs in the speed server, the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure safe operation of the train.

Further, if the train does not receive a message from the RBC when the train exceeds a configured safety time (as currently 20 seconds), the train will consider disconnected from the RBC, but the RBC cannot determine the status of the train at this time, due to the train possible Still operating according to the MA that RBC previously sent to it, the RBC will retain the MA of the train and will not temporarily assign the route included in the MA to other trains to ensure safe operation of the train until a configured safe time (eg After 5 minutes), the train is written off. If the train is re-contacted within this time, the RBC will continue to monitor the safe operation of the train based on the latest status of the train report.

If communication with the train is lost, the RBC is sending an emergency message to the train, and the RBC will continue to send the emergency message until after a safe time.

The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment detects that a communication failure occurs between the RBC and the railway train and performs safety processing.

In the CTCS-3 train control system, when the communication fault occurs between the RBC and the railway train, the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure the safe operation of the train.

Based on the above embodiment, when it is detected that the communication connection between the RBC and the adjacent RBC is disconnected, the handover of the train between different RBCs will be affected, and in the RBC-RBC handover process, the train monitoring right is transferred to the adjacent RBC. Called RBC, the party that receives the train monitoring right is called the receiving RBC. Specifically, if the handover procedure of the handover RBC and the receiving RBC has not started, the communication connection between the two RBCs is disconnected, and the handover RBC will normally monitor the train running to the boundary points of the two RBCs, but no longer extend the mobile authorization to receive the RBC. Within the control range.

When the RBC-RBC train handover process has begun, the handover RBC is disconnected from the adjacent RBC, and the handover RBC will stop sending any messages to the train, allowing the train to take protective measures on its own.

If the RBC-RBC train handover process has begun, but the train has not yet established a connection with the receiving RBC, the connection between the two RBCs is broken, and receiving the RBC will delete the train information and will not continue the handover process.

If the RBC-RBC train handover process begins and the train has established a connection with the receiving RBC, the communication connection with the handover RBC is disconnected, the receiving RBC will retain the train status, and the train safety operation will be normally monitored according to the position sent by the train.

The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides that the RBC and the phase are realized in the CTCS-3 train control system by monitoring and discovering that the communication connection between the RBC and the adjacent RBC is disconnected and safely processed. When the communication connection of the adjacent RBC is disconnected, the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure the handover of the train between different RBCs.

Based on the foregoing embodiment, during the RBC-RBC handover process, the following specifically includes:

If the communication connection between the handover RBC and the train is disconnected during the RBC-RBC handover, the handover RBC will be processed in the manner of disconnection from the train communication as described above until the handover information of the reception RBC is received. After the configured security time (if currently 5 minutes), delete the train related information, and notify the receiving RBC to cancel the handover;

If the takeover information of the train sent by the RBC is received during this process, indicating that the train has been monitored by the receiving RBC, the handover to the RBC will delete the information associated with the train.

If during the RBC-RBC handover, the receiving RBC starts from receiving the mobile traffic information, and after a configured security time (such as 5 minutes currently), still fails to establish a communication connection with the train, then the receiving RBC deletes. Information about the train. If the cancel handover message sent by the RBC is received during this period, the relevant information of the train is directly deleted.

If the connection has been established with the train, but the train has not yet entered the control range of the receiving RBC, but receives the cancel handover message sent by the handover RBC (possibly because the handover RBC is disconnected from the train communication), the communication connection is disconnected from the notification train. The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment finds that the communication connection between the RBC and the train is disconnected and safely processed during the RBC and RBC handover process, and is implemented in the CTCS-3 train control system. When the communication connection between the RBC and the train is disconnected during the RBC and RBC handover, the wireless blocking center performs safety monitoring on the train to ensure the safe operation of the train.

Based on the above embodiment, after the RBC is started, all the SAs received, the temporary speed limit, and the registered trains will be cleared. This is because the railway system is a dynamically changing system, all the state of the road, the temporary speed limit. And the train status will change with time. All the information received by the RBC last time may have expired, so it must be cleared to ensure safety.

After startup, RBC will immediately attempt to establish a connection with the interlocking machine and the temporary speed limit server. If the connection with the interlocking machine is unsuccessful, RBC will not send any message to the affected train to ensure the safety of the train.

For the temporary speed limit server, after the RBC successfully establishes a connection with it, the temporary speed limit server initializes the RBC, and sends all current temporary speed limits to the RBC, thus ensuring that the RBC can safely monitor the train operation. If the RBC cannot be successfully initialized, registration of any train will not be accepted to avoid security risks.

The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides a RBC restart in the CTCS-3 train control system by monitoring and detecting the communication failure of the RBC after restarting with other equipment and performing safety processing. When communication with other equipment fails, the wireless blocking center conducts safety monitoring of the train to ensure safe operation of the train.

Based on the above embodiment, when the signal authorization message SA sent by the interlocking machine indicates that an approach is occupied in the MA range of the railway train, the RBC sends a conditional emergency stop message to the railway train that the end point is the starting point of the occupied route ( Referred to as CEM);

If the RBC does not receive a reply from the railway train, the continuous transmission is continuously performed.

CEM, the message is currently sent continuously at a rate of 7 seconds.

After receiving the CEM, the train reacts differently according to its own position. If the train has entered the occupied route, the train informs the RBC not to accept the CEM and continues to operate, and the RBC maintains the previous MA of the train unchanged;

If the train has not yet reached the occupied route, the train will inform the RBC to accept the CEM and accordingly Taking the corresponding protective measures, the RBC also shortens the MA of the train to the same place.

Further, when the SA sent by the interlock indicates that a certain route is degraded, the RBC will immediately send a shortened mobile authorization (SMA) to the train at a frequency of 7 seconds until the train confirms the message. When the train receives the SMA message, it will immediately take the corresponding protection measures according to the message, and the RBC will also shorten the stored MA of the vehicle accordingly.

If there is an emergency area message ( EMA;) in the message sent by the interlocking machine, indicating that a disaster zone is activated, the RBC will immediately send an unconditional emergency stop message (UEM) to the train that has entered the area, to the area that has not yet entered the area but the MA has Trains extending to the area send CEM to ensure the safety of the train.

Further, the temporary speed limit command sent by the temporary speed limit server will be saved by the RBC and sent immediately to the trains that will be affected by these temporary speed limits to ensure their safety.

The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment provides a RBC according to different message pairs in the CTCS-3 train control system by monitoring the security processing performed by the RBC according to messages sent by other ground equipments. Safe handling in different situations ensures safe operation of the train.

Based on the above embodiment, the RBC is not responsible for the control of the train in the visual driving mode, and its operational safety is the responsibility of the driver. Trains in full monitoring mode are responsible for their safe operation by RBC, so the conversion of visual mode to full monitoring mode requires special handling.

The method that is learned is that only when the approach state of the train in front of the visual mode changes from the train approach to the occupied time, the difference between the time when the train reports that it has entered the approach is at a safe time ( At present, within 13 seconds), the RBC can send a mobile authorization to the train, causing the train to switch to full monitoring mode.

The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method provided by the embodiment, through the RBC monitoring and conversion of the train driving mode, realizes the RBC to convert the train driving mode while ensuring the train in the CTCS-3 train control system. safe operation.

A person skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the steps of implementing the above method embodiments may be completed by using hardware related to program instructions, and the foregoing program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and the program is executed when executed. The foregoing steps include the steps of the foregoing method embodiments; and the foregoing storage medium includes: a medium that can store program codes, such as a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk. It should be noted that the above embodiments are only for explaining the technical solutions of the present invention, and are not intended to be limiting; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that: The technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments are modified, or some of the technical features are equivalently replaced. The modifications and substitutions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

Claim

A railway train safety monitoring and processing method based on a wireless blocking center, characterized in that it comprises:

The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

The receiving RBC retains the information about the railway train if it is detected that the handover procedure with the handover RBC has started, a connection has been established with the railway train, and the communication connection with the handover RBC is broken.

4. The wireless occlusion center-based railway train safety monitoring and processing unit according to claim 1. The method is characterized in that: the method further includes:

During the handover of the RBC, if the handover RBC detects that the communication connection with the railway train is disconnected, the MA of the railway train is reserved for a predetermined time before the receiving of the receiving information of the RBC is received; or

During the handover of the RBC, if the handover RBC detects that the communication connection with the railway train is disconnected and receives the receiving train information of the receiving RBC, the relevant information of the railway train is deleted; or

If the RBC restarts, the RBC will receive all current temporary speed limit information sent by the temporary speed limit server after restarting, otherwise no train registration will be accepted.

The method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: When the SA sent by the interlock indicates that a certain route is degraded, the RBC will periodically send a shortened mobile authorization SMA to the railway train until the railway train returns an acknowledgment, and the corresponding RA of the railway train that the RBC will retain corresponds. Shorten; or

If the RBC receives the temporary speed limit command sent by the temporary speed limit server, the RBC saves the temporary speed limit command and immediately sends it to the railway train whose MA is affected by the temporary speed limit.

The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: