EP2216230A1 - Method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking - Google Patents
Method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP2216230A1 EP2216230A1 EP09001487A EP09001487A EP2216230A1 EP 2216230 A1 EP2216230 A1 EP 2216230A1 EP 09001487 A EP09001487 A EP 09001487A EP 09001487 A EP09001487 A EP 09001487A EP 2216230 A1 EP2216230 A1 EP 2216230A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- route
- rbc
- train
- interlocking
- cancellation
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 13
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 22
- 238000004904 shortening Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 5
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000414 obstructive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009897 systematic effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
- B61L21/04—Electrical locking and release of the route; Electrical repeat locks
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
- B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking, and a computer product comprising code means adapted for performing all steps of this method.
- the interlocking system allows the route release after the cancellation:
- the measures a) and b) do not solve the hazard completely and systematically.
- the hazard can still occur with a remaining probability, in case of
- the first confirmation message indicates, if a train under RBC responsibility is affected. (A train is under RBC responsibility, if the train follows a movement authority or has stored a movement authority which will be used after switching under responsibility of the continuous train protection system). If yes, the IL has to wait until a second confirmation. If no train with cab signalling is affected, the IL can continue with the same measures as for other train protection systems (e.g. timer has expired). In case of disturbance of the interface between RBC and IL a timer-based solution can be applied, which ensures that the train comes to standstill before the route is released.
- the second confirmation message indicates that the movement authority is successfully shortened on-board, after an acknowledgement from on-board is received by RBC. The IL is not allowed to release the route before the two confirmation messages are received from RBC.
- the invention is applicable not only to ETCS L2&L3, but to all systems using a continuous train protection with cab signalling.
- the second confirmation message is sent from the RBC to the interlocking not until the RBC has received a standstill message from the OBU of the affected train, i.e. not until standstill of the train.
- the invention relates to a computer product which comprises code means adapted for performing all steps of the above method.
- Fig. 1 shows schematically a "European Train Control System” (ETCS) 1 comprising at the trackside an interlocking IL, balises or loops (not shown) laid in the track 2 and a RBC ("radio block center") connected to the interlocking IL.
- ECS European Train Control System
- a train 3 under RBC responsibility comprises an ETCS on-board unit OBU for communicating with the RBC via GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communications - Rail).
- GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communications - Rail
- a train is under RBC responsibility, if the train follows a movement authority (MA) or has stored a movement authority which will be used after switching under responsibility of the continuous train protection system.
- MA movement authority
- Fig. 1 the train 3 is on the route from A over B to C. If the route B to C is to be canceled and then released by the interlocking IL e.g. for another train, the following steps shown in Fig. 2 are carried out.
- a cancellation message 10 is sent from the interlocking IL to the RBC for cancelling the route B to C (step S1 ).
- the RBC checks whether or not a train under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation (step S2) and, if yes like in the case under consideration, sends a first confirmation message 11 to the interlocking IL indicating that a train under RBC responsibility, i.e. train 3, is affected by the route cancellation (step S3).
- the RBC sends a command 12 to the OBU of the train 3 for shortening a "Movement Authority", MA, of the OBU (step S4 ), in order to bring the train 3 to a standstill (emergency stop).
- the OBU acknowledges the reception of the command 12 by sending an acknowledgement message 13 to the RBC (step S5 ).
- the RBC sends a second confirmation message 14 to the interlocking IL for allowing the route release (step S6 ).
- the interlocking IL has received both the first and second confirmation messages 11, 14 (YES in step S7 )
- the interlocking IL is allowed to release the route B-C e.g. for another train (step S8 ).
- the second confirmation message 14 is sent from the RBC to the interlocking IL not until the RBC has received a standstill message 15 from the OBU of the affected train 3, i.e. not until standstill of the train 3 at time t2.
- step S9 the interlocking IL can continue with the same measures (step S9 ) as for other train protection systems (e.g. timer has expired).
- a timer-based solution can be applied, which ensures that a train comes to standstill before the route is released.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
Abstract
sending a cancellation message (10) from the interlocking (IL) to a radio block center, RBC, for cancelling the route (B-C);
checking by the RBC whether or not a train (3) under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation;
sending a first confirmation message (11) from the RBC to the interlocking (IL) indicating whether or not a train (3) under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation; and
if a train (3) under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation,
- sending a command (12) from the RBC to an on-board unit, OBU, of the affected train (3) for shortening a Movement Authority, MA, of the OBU,
- after receiving an acknowledgement message (13) from the OBU, sending a second confirmation message (14) from the RBC to the interlocking (IL) for allowing the route release; and
- after receiving both the first and second confirmation messages (11, 14), releasing the route (B-C) by the interlocking (IL).
Description
- The invention relates to a method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking, and a computer product comprising code means adapted for performing all steps of this method.
- In "European Train Control System" (ETCS) - L2 (level 2) & L3 (level 3), following hazard has to be avoided to reach the required safety level of an "European Train Control System" (ERTMS): A train with cab signalling moves on a released route after route cancellation. Derailment and collision are possible consequences. The cause for the mentioned hazard is a route cancellation and release by the system responsible for route protection without any confirmation from ERTMS system about an affected train and successful shortening of the "Movement Authority" (MA) on-board. The system responsible for the route protection will be called "Interlocking System" (IL) in the following, because the proposed procedure relates to trackside equipment where the function of route protection and train protection are distributed in different systems resp. units.
- In ETCS systems, the interlocking system allows the route release after the cancellation:
- a) either authorized by the operator with a command automatically registered (applied in Germany). But human error (e.g. selecting wrong route, violate operational rules, insufficient knowledge about successful shortening of MA) may lead to this hazard.
- b) or automatically after expiration of a timer (applied mostly abroad). The problem is that the timer shall be long from safety point of view and as short as possible from operational point of view. That leads to the conflict to find an optimum between safety and operation.
- These two measures a) and b) are operationally obstructive and unnecessarily time consuming for the railway operation, due to the following reasons:
- The train has to reach standstill before the route cancellation is allowed to be performed by an operational rule in both cases a and b).
- The timer has to expire (in case b).
- The train has to be deactivated and activated again, if the driver is not able to see a shortening of the movement authority on the display (in case a).
- The measures a) and b) do not solve the hazard completely and systematically. The hazard can still occur with a remaining probability, in case of
- a) human errors: The operator releases the route without guarantee of shortening of the movement authority stored on-board.
The driver can make a mistake and forget to take appropriated measures for deleting the movement authority. - b) interruptions on RBC-IL ("Radio Block Center of IL") and/or RBC-on-board interfaces, which inhibit the shortening of movement authority in time.
- It is therefore the object of the invention to completely avoid the hazard that a train with cab signalling moves on a released route after route cancellation.
- This object is achieved, in accordance with the invention, by a method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking, comprising the following steps:
- sending a cancellation message from the interlocking to a radio block center, RBC, for cancelling the route;
- checking by the RBC whether or not a train under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation;
- sending a first confirmation message from the radio block center to the interlocking indicating whether or not a train under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation; and
- if a train under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation,
- sending a command from the RBC to an onboard unit, OBU, of the affected train for shortening a Movement Authority, MA, of the OBU,
- after receiving an acknowledgement message from the OBU, sending a second confirmation message from the RBC to the interlocking for allowing the route release; and
- after receiving both the first and second confirmation messages, releasing the route by the interlocking.
- According to the invention, two confirmation messages are sent from RBC to the IL. The first confirmation message indicates, if a train under RBC responsibility is affected. (A train is under RBC responsibility, if the train follows a movement authority or has stored a movement authority which will be used after switching under responsibility of the continuous train protection system). If yes, the IL has to wait until a second confirmation. If no train with cab signalling is affected, the IL can continue with the same measures as for other train protection systems (e.g. timer has expired). In case of disturbance of the interface between RBC and IL a timer-based solution can be applied, which ensures that the train comes to standstill before the route is released.
The second confirmation message indicates that the movement authority is successfully shortened on-board, after an acknowledgement from on-board is received by RBC. The IL is not allowed to release the route before the two confirmation messages are received from RBC. - This confirmation procedure on IL-RBC interface systematically solves the hazard and is completely independent from track topology and operational situations. Operational obstruction occurs only in cases of degraded situations or failures of the involved components, but not during normal operation. The method according to the invention is a systematic technical solution without any impact on the existing on-board units. This is a high economic advantage for railway companies, because the high number of trains can be used without any changes. Moreover, the solution remedies defects in the currently standardized UNISIG SRS ("Union Industry of Signalling"), which does not provide sufficient measures to RBC to handle the shortening of movement authority during the entry to ETCS-L2/L3.
- The invention is applicable not only to ETCS L2&L3, but to all systems using a continuous train protection with cab signalling.
- In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the second confirmation message is sent from the RBC to the interlocking not until the RBC has received a standstill message from the OBU of the affected train, i.e. not until standstill of the train.
- Finally, the invention relates to a computer product which comprises code means adapted for performing all steps of the above method.
- Further advantages can be extracted from the description and the enclosed drawing. The features mentioned above and below can be used in accordance with the invention either individually or collectively in any combination. The embodiments mentioned are not to be understood as exhaustive enumeration but rather have exemplary character for the description of the invention.
- The invention is shown in the drawing, in which:
- Fig. 1
- schematically shows a "European Train Control System" (ETCS) with a train under RBC responsibility and the messages sent between the interlocking, the RBC and the train according to the invention, when a route after cancellation of the route is released by the interlocking; and
- Fig. 2
- shows the steps of a method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking, according to the invention.
-
Fig. 1 shows schematically a "European Train Control System" (ETCS) 1 comprising at the trackside an interlocking IL, balises or loops (not shown) laid in the track 2 and a RBC ("radio block center") connected to the interlocking IL. A train 3 under RBC responsibility comprises an ETCS on-board unit OBU for communicating with the RBC via GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communications - Rail). A train is under RBC responsibility, if the train follows a movement authority (MA) or has stored a movement authority which will be used after switching under responsibility of the continuous train protection system. - In
Fig. 1 , the train 3 is on the route from A over B to C. If the route B to C is to be canceled and then released by the interlocking IL e.g. for another train, the following steps shown inFig. 2 are carried out.
At time t1, acancellation message 10 is sent from the interlocking IL to the RBC for cancelling the route B to C (step S1). The RBC checks whether or not a train under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation (step S2) and, if yes like in the case under consideration, sends afirst confirmation message 11 to the interlocking IL indicating that a train under RBC responsibility, i.e. train 3, is affected by the route cancellation (step S3). Then, the RBC sends acommand 12 to the OBU of the train 3 for shortening a "Movement Authority", MA, of the OBU (step S4), in oder to bring the train 3 to a standstill (emergency stop). The OBU acknowledges the reception of thecommand 12 by sending anacknowledgement message 13 to the RBC (step S5). After receiving theacknowledgement message 13, the RBC sends asecond confirmation message 14 to the interlocking IL for allowing the route release (step S6). After the interlocking IL has received both the first andsecond confirmation messages 11, 14 (YES in step S7), the interlocking IL is allowed to release the route B-C e.g. for another train (step S8). Optionally, thesecond confirmation message 14 is sent from the RBC to the interlocking IL not until the RBC has received astandstill message 15 from the OBU of the affected train 3, i.e. not until standstill of the train 3 at time t2. - If no train under RBC responsibility is affected (NO in step 2), the interlocking IL can continue with the same measures (step S9) as for other train protection systems (e.g. timer has expired). In case of disturbance of the interface between RBC and interlocking IL, a timer-based solution can be applied, which ensures that a train comes to standstill before the route is released.
Claims (3)
- Method for releasing a route (B-C) after cancellation of the route (B-C) by an interlocking (IL), comprising the following steps:sending a cancellation message (10) from the interlocking (IL) to a radio block center, RBC, for cancelling the route (B-C);checking by the RBC whether or not a train (3) under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation;sending a first confirmation message (11) from the RBC to the interlocking (IL) indicating whether or not a train (3) under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation; andif a train (3) under RBC responsibility is affected by the route cancellation,- sending a command (12) from the RBC to an on-board unit, OBU, of the affected train (3) for shortening a Movement Authority, MA, of the OBU,- after receiving an acknowledgement message (13) from the OBU, sending a second confirmation message (14) from the RBC to the interlocking (IL) for allowing the route release; and- after receiving both the first and second confirmation messages (11, 14), releasing the route (B-C) by the interlocking (IL).
- Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the second confirmation message (14) is sent from the RBC to the interlocking (IL) not until the RBC has received a standstill message (15) from the OBU of the affected train (3).
- Computer product comprising code means adapted for performing all steps of the method according to claim 1 or 2.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP09001487A EP2216230A1 (en) | 2009-02-04 | 2009-02-04 | Method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP09001487A EP2216230A1 (en) | 2009-02-04 | 2009-02-04 | Method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP2216230A1 true EP2216230A1 (en) | 2010-08-11 |
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Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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EP09001487A Withdrawn EP2216230A1 (en) | 2009-02-04 | 2009-02-04 | Method for releasing a route after cancellation of the route by an interlocking |
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Cited By (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
KR101164767B1 (en) | 2011-08-25 | 2012-07-12 | 한국철도공사 | A railway interlocking device and radio block center of interface system and operating method thereof |
US20130218375A1 (en) * | 2010-08-24 | 2013-08-22 | Beijing Jiaotong University | Method of movement authority calculation for communications-based train control system |
GB2512901A (en) * | 2013-04-10 | 2014-10-15 | Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Ltd | Method for releasing overlaps |
WO2014114485A3 (en) * | 2013-01-25 | 2014-12-18 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and apparatus for etcs l1 and/or l2 - train control |
JP2015024714A (en) * | 2013-07-25 | 2015-02-05 | 日本電気株式会社 | Mobile station, train communication system, and protection report reception transmitting method |
CN105599786A (en) * | 2015-12-18 | 2016-05-25 | 潘小胜 | Railway interlocking system cooperative control device |
EP3109127A1 (en) * | 2015-06-23 | 2016-12-28 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Method for signalling an expansion of a movement authority from a route control station to a positioning body |
CN106553665A (en) * | 2016-11-29 | 2017-04-05 | 湖南中车时代通信信号有限公司 | Zone controller compatibility handles/method of not handling route |
CN108189863A (en) * | 2017-12-22 | 2018-06-22 | 合肥工大高科信息科技股份有限公司 | A kind of train automatic monitoring system security command control method |
CN108683634A (en) * | 2018-04-10 | 2018-10-19 | 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 | Interface system and control device between CTC and RBC |
CN109278805A (en) * | 2018-09-28 | 2019-01-29 | 湖南中车时代通信信号有限公司 | It is a kind of to have ready conditions the security processing of emergency message for ground |
CN113830139A (en) * | 2021-07-28 | 2021-12-24 | 交控科技股份有限公司 | Train information interaction method and system |
CN114379621A (en) * | 2022-01-04 | 2022-04-22 | 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 | Confirmed information processing method, system, device, equipment and medium |
Citations (1)
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EP1752355A2 (en) * | 2005-08-13 | 2007-02-14 | Westinghouse Brake and Signal Holdings Limited | Train control system |
-
2009
- 2009-02-04 EP EP09001487A patent/EP2216230A1/en not_active Withdrawn
Patent Citations (1)
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EP1752355A2 (en) * | 2005-08-13 | 2007-02-14 | Westinghouse Brake and Signal Holdings Limited | Train control system |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
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"ETCS - System Requirements Specification (SRS) - Chapter 2 General Description", UIC/ETCS SPECIFICATION, UIC/A200, vol. Version 03.01, 9 August 1996 (1996-08-09), XP002276769 * |
"ETCS - System Requirements Specification (SRS) - Chapter 6: Radio Block Centre", UIC/ETCS SPECIFICATION, UIC/A200, vol. Version 03.01, 9 August 1996 (1996-08-09), pages 6 - 1, XP009120697 * |
Cited By (20)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20130218375A1 (en) * | 2010-08-24 | 2013-08-22 | Beijing Jiaotong University | Method of movement authority calculation for communications-based train control system |
US9139210B2 (en) * | 2010-08-24 | 2015-09-22 | Beijing Jiaotong University | Method of movement authority calculation for communications-based train control system |
KR101164767B1 (en) | 2011-08-25 | 2012-07-12 | 한국철도공사 | A railway interlocking device and radio block center of interface system and operating method thereof |
WO2014114485A3 (en) * | 2013-01-25 | 2014-12-18 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and apparatus for etcs l1 and/or l2 - train control |
AU2014253069B2 (en) * | 2013-04-10 | 2019-05-02 | Siemens Mobility Limited | Method for releasing overlaps in a railway signalling system |
GB2512901A (en) * | 2013-04-10 | 2014-10-15 | Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Ltd | Method for releasing overlaps |
WO2014167067A2 (en) * | 2013-04-10 | 2014-10-16 | Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Limited | Method for releasing overlaps in a railway signalling system |
WO2014167067A3 (en) * | 2013-04-10 | 2015-04-09 | Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Limited | Method for releasing overlaps in a railway signalling system |
EP2983960B1 (en) | 2013-04-10 | 2021-02-24 | Siemens Mobility Limited | Method for releasing overlaps in a railway signalling system |
JP2015024714A (en) * | 2013-07-25 | 2015-02-05 | 日本電気株式会社 | Mobile station, train communication system, and protection report reception transmitting method |
EP3109127A1 (en) * | 2015-06-23 | 2016-12-28 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Method for signalling an expansion of a movement authority from a route control station to a positioning body |
CN105599786A (en) * | 2015-12-18 | 2016-05-25 | 潘小胜 | Railway interlocking system cooperative control device |
CN106553665A (en) * | 2016-11-29 | 2017-04-05 | 湖南中车时代通信信号有限公司 | Zone controller compatibility handles/method of not handling route |
CN108189863A (en) * | 2017-12-22 | 2018-06-22 | 合肥工大高科信息科技股份有限公司 | A kind of train automatic monitoring system security command control method |
CN108683634A (en) * | 2018-04-10 | 2018-10-19 | 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 | Interface system and control device between CTC and RBC |
CN109278805A (en) * | 2018-09-28 | 2019-01-29 | 湖南中车时代通信信号有限公司 | It is a kind of to have ready conditions the security processing of emergency message for ground |
CN109278805B (en) * | 2018-09-28 | 2020-03-20 | 湖南中车时代通信信号有限公司 | Safety processing method for ground conditional emergency message |
CN113830139A (en) * | 2021-07-28 | 2021-12-24 | 交控科技股份有限公司 | Train information interaction method and system |
CN114379621A (en) * | 2022-01-04 | 2022-04-22 | 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 | Confirmed information processing method, system, device, equipment and medium |
CN114379621B (en) * | 2022-01-04 | 2023-06-27 | 北京全路通信信号研究设计院集团有限公司 | Method, system, device, equipment and medium for processing confirmed report information |
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