EP4035139A1 - Verfahren zum zumindest assistierten überqueren eines knotenpunkts durch ein kraftfahrzeug - Google Patents
Verfahren zum zumindest assistierten überqueren eines knotenpunkts durch ein kraftfahrzeugInfo
- Publication number
- EP4035139A1 EP4035139A1 EP20751085.0A EP20751085A EP4035139A1 EP 4035139 A1 EP4035139 A1 EP 4035139A1 EP 20751085 A EP20751085 A EP 20751085A EP 4035139 A1 EP4035139 A1 EP 4035139A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- motor vehicle
- remote control
- control signals
- signals
- infrastructure
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
- G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
- G05D1/02—Control of position or course in two dimensions
- G05D1/021—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles
- G05D1/0276—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles using signals provided by a source external to the vehicle
- G05D1/028—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles using signals provided by a source external to the vehicle using a RF signal
- G05D1/0282—Control of position or course in two dimensions specially adapted to land vehicles using signals provided by a source external to the vehicle using a RF signal generated in a local control room
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G05D1/0011—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots associated with a remote control arrangement
- G05D1/0022—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots associated with a remote control arrangement characterised by the communication link
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
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- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W30/00—Purposes of road vehicle drive control systems not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. of systems using conjoint control of vehicle sub-units
- B60W30/18—Propelling the vehicle
- B60W30/18009—Propelling the vehicle related to particular drive situations
- B60W30/18159—Traversing an intersection
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- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
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- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
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- G05D1/0061—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots with safety arrangements for transition from automatic pilot to manual pilot and vice versa
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- G05D1/0055—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots with safety arrangements
- G05D1/0077—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots with safety arrangements using redundant signals or controls
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G1/00—Traffic control systems for road vehicles
- G08G1/09—Arrangements for giving variable traffic instructions
- G08G1/0962—Arrangements for giving variable traffic instructions having an indicator mounted inside the vehicle, e.g. giving voice messages
- G08G1/0968—Systems involving transmission of navigation instructions to the vehicle
- G08G1/096805—Systems involving transmission of navigation instructions to the vehicle where the transmitted instructions are used to compute a route
- G08G1/096811—Systems involving transmission of navigation instructions to the vehicle where the transmitted instructions are used to compute a route where the route is computed offboard
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- H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
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- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
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- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
- B60W50/029—Adapting to failures or work around with other constraints, e.g. circumvention by avoiding use of failed parts
- B60W2050/0292—Fail-safe or redundant systems, e.g. limp-home or backup systems
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W2556/00—Input parameters relating to data
- B60W2556/45—External transmission of data to or from the vehicle
- B60W2556/50—External transmission of data to or from the vehicle of positioning data, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System] data
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- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
Definitions
- the laid-open specification DE 102018 129 066 A1 discloses systems and methods for unprotected left turns in situations with a high volume of traffic in autonomous vehicles.
- a method for at least assisted crossing of a junction by a motor vehicle comprising the following steps:
- a device which is set up to carry out all steps of the method according to the first aspect.
- a machine-readable storage medium is provided on which the computer program according to the third aspect is stored.
- the phrase "at least partially automated leadership” includes one or more of the following cases: partially automated leadership, highly automated leadership, fully automated leadership.
- Partially automated guidance means that in a specific situation (for example: driving on a motorway, driving within a parking lot, overtaking an object, driving within a lane that is defined by lane markings) and / or for a certain period of time, a longitudinal and a Lateral guidance of the motor vehicle can be automatically controlled remotely.
- a driver of the motor vehicle does not have to manually control the longitudinal and lateral guidance of the motor vehicle himself.
- the driver must permanently monitor the automatic remote control of the longitudinal and lateral guidance in order to be able to intervene manually if necessary. The driver must be ready to take full control of the vehicle at all times.
- Highly automated guidance means that for a certain period of time in a specific situation (for example: driving on a freeway, driving within a parking lot, overtaking an object, driving within a lane that is defined by lane markings), longitudinal and lateral guidance of the motor vehicle automatically controlled remotely.
- a driver of the motor vehicle does not have to manually control the longitudinal and lateral guidance of the motor vehicle himself.
- the driver does not have to constantly monitor the automatic remote control of the longitudinal and lateral guidance in order to be able to intervene manually if necessary.
- a takeover request is automatically issued to the driver to take over the control of the longitudinal and lateral guidance, in particular issued with a sufficient reserve of time.
- the driver must therefore potentially be able to take control of the longitudinal and lateral guidance.
- Limits of the automatic remote control of the lateral and longitudinal guidance are automatically recognized. In the case of highly automated leadership, it is not possible to automatically bring about a low-risk state in every initial situation.
- Fully automated guidance means that in a specific situation (for example: driving on a freeway, driving within a parking lot, overtaking an object, driving within a lane that is defined by lane markings), longitudinal and lateral guidance of the motor vehicle are automatically remotely controlled .
- a driver of the motor vehicle does not have to manually control the longitudinal and lateral guidance of the motor vehicle himself.
- the driver does not have to monitor the automatic remote control of the longitudinal and lateral guidance in order to be able to intervene manually if necessary.
- the driver is automatically requested to take over the driving task (controlling the transverse and longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle), in particular with sufficient time reserve. If the driver does not take over the driving task, the system automatically returns to a low-risk state.
- the limits of the automatic control of the lateral and longitudinal guidance are automatically recognized. In all situations it is it is possible to automatically return to a risk-minimizing system state.
- safety condition signals are received which represent at least one safety condition which must be met so that the motor vehicle may be remote controlled, it being checked whether the at least one safety condition is met, the remote control signals based on a result of the Checking whether the at least one safety condition is met, can be generated.
- the technical advantage is brought about that, if the safety condition is met, then remote control of the motor vehicle is safely possible.
- the at least one safety condition is in each case an element selected from the following groups of safety conditions: Presence of a predetermined safety integrity level (in English: “Safety Integrity Level” SIL or “Automotive Safety Integrity Level” ASIL) of at least that Motor vehicle and an infrastructure, in particular including a communication path and / or communication components (for example communication interface), for remote control of a motor vehicle, in particular with regard to the overall systems in the motor vehicle and infrastructure and in particular parts; e.g.
- a communication link is, for example, a communication link between the device according to the second aspect and the motor vehicle.
- a communication link comprises, for example, one or more communication channels.
- a component which is used to carry out the method according to the first aspect is an element selected from the following group of components: environment sensor, motor vehicle, infrastructure, remote control device, device according to the second aspect, motor vehicle system, in particular drive system, clutch system, Brake system, driver assistance system, communication interface of the motor vehicle or the infrastructure, processor, input, output of the device according to the second aspect.
- a function that is used to carry out the method according to the first aspect is an element selected from the following group of functions: remote control function, communication function between the motor vehicle and the infrastructure or the remote control device, evaluation function of environment sensor data from an environment sensor, planning function, in particular the scheduling function, traffic analysis function.
- Remote control signals are only generated when it can be determined that the result is correct.
- the technical advantage is brought about that, if the safety condition is met, then remote control of the motor vehicle is safely possible.
- remote control of the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle based on the output remote control signals is checked in order to detect an error, with the remote control being aborted or emergency remote control signals for remote control of the remote control if an error is detected Transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle are generated and output in an emergency.
- the emergency remote control signals are, for example, such that when the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle is remotely controlled based on the emergency remote control signals, the motor vehicle is brought into a safe state, in particular stopped.
- remote control of the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle is checked based on the output remote control signals in order to detect an error, the remote control being aborted or vehicle-internal emergency control signals for controlling if an error is detected the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle can be generated and output in an emergency.
- the motor vehicle-internal emergency control signals are, for example, such that when the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle is controlled based on the motor vehicle-internal emergency control signals, the motor vehicle is brought into a safe state, in particular is stopped.
- identification signals are received which contain a respective identification of at least one of the motor vehicle, an owner of the motor vehicle and a driver of the motor vehicle (i.e. a respective identification of the motor vehicle and / or an owner of the motor vehicle and / or a driver ,), the remote control signals being generated based on the respective identification.
- the remote control signals can be generated efficiently. That means in particular, that the remote control of the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle can depend on the respective identification.
- drivers who have not paid any fees for assisted crossing of a junction in the past can be efficiently excluded from a current assisted crossing.
- drivers can be identified who have abused the assisted crossing in the past, so that the corresponding drivers can also be excluded.
- At least one motor vehicle parameter of the motor vehicle is received, the remote control signals being generated based on the at least one motor vehicle parameter.
- the remote control signals can be generated efficiently.
- the remote control signals can thereby be generated efficiently for the specific motor vehicle.
- a maximum possible vehicle speed, a maximum possible vehicle acceleration, a current vehicle load, a current vehicle weight, a length, a width, a height, a maximum possible steering angle, a wheelbase, a turning radius and / or a turning circle diameter can be efficiently taken into account.
- the remote control signals are generated based on a motor vehicle standard parameter corresponding to the at least one motor vehicle parameter.
- the crossing includes a left turn or a right turn.
- this has the technical advantage that the motor vehicle can efficiently turn left or efficiently turn right.
- one or more method steps except for the steps of generating and outputting the remote control signals are carried out inside the vehicle and / or with one or more method steps being carried out outside the vehicle, in particular in an infrastructure, preferably in a cloud infrastructure.
- one or more method steps are documented, in particular documented in a blockchain.
- control signals for controlling a traffic control system are generated and output in order to directing traffic in the vicinity of the motor vehicle by means of the traffic control system in order to support the motor vehicle in crossing the junction.
- a traffic control system therefore includes, in particular, one or more variable message signs and / or one or more light signal systems.
- a check is made as to whether the entirety of the motor vehicle and the infrastructure involved in the method according to the first aspect, including communication between the infrastructure and the motor vehicle, is currently safe for the "intervention in the motor vehicle for critical actions" concept described here. That means in particular that the motor vehicle and / or a local and / or a global infrastructure and / or a communication are checked accordingly.
- the remote control signals are generated in particular based on a result of the checking.
- the method according to the first aspect is a computer-implemented method.
- the method according to the first aspect is carried out or carried out by means of the device according to the second aspect.
- Device features result analogously from corresponding process features and vice versa. That means in particular that technical functions of the device according to the second aspect result analogously from corresponding technical functionalities of the method according to the first aspect and vice versa.
- FIG. 1 shows a flow chart of a method for at least assisted crossing of a junction by a motor vehicle
- FIG. 2 shows a device
- FIG. 3 shows a machine-readable storage medium
- FIG. 4 shows a node.
- FIG. 1 shows a flow chart of a method for at least assisted crossing of a junction by a motor vehicle.
- the procedure consists of the following steps:
- Receiving 101 ambient signals which represent an environment of the motor vehicle at least partially encompassing a node generating 103 remote control signals for remote control of a transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle based on the environmental signals in such a way that when remote control of the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the Motor vehicle based on the remote control signals, the motor vehicle crosses the junction at least assisted,
- safety condition signals are received which represent at least one safety condition that must be met so that the motor vehicle may be remote controlled, it being checked whether the at least one safety condition is met, the remote control signals based on a result of the Checking whether the at least one safety condition is met, can be generated.
- the result of checking whether the at least one safety condition is met indicates, for example, that the at least one safety condition is met.
- the result of checking whether the at least one safety condition is met indicates, for example, that the at least one safety condition is not met.
- the remote control signals are only generated and output if the result of the checking whether the at least one security condition is met, indicates that the at least one security condition is met.
- generating and outputting remote control signals is dispensed with if the result of checking whether the at least one safety condition is met indicates that the at least one safety condition is not met.
- the method according to the first aspect comprises remote control of the transverse and / or longitudinal guidance of the motor vehicle based on the output remote control signals.
- FIG. 2 shows a device 201.
- the device 201 is set up to carry out all steps of the method according to the first aspect.
- the device 201 comprises an input 203 which is set up to receive the ambient signals.
- the device 201 comprises a processor which is set up to generate the remote control signals based on the ambient signals.
- the outputting of the generated remote control signals comprises sending the remote control signals to the motor vehicle via a communication network, in particular via a wireless communication network.
- signals that are received are received via input 203.
- the input 203 is therefore set up in particular to receive the corresponding signals.
- signals that are output are output by means of the output 207.
- the output 207 is therefore set up in particular to output the corresponding signals.
- a plurality of processors are provided instead of the one processor 205.
- a computer program 303 is stored on the machine-readable storage medium 301, which comprises instructions which, when the computer program 303 is executed by a computer, cause the computer to carry out a method according to the first aspect.
- the device 201 comprises a remote control device which is set up to remotely control the motor vehicle based on the remote control signals generated.
- an infrastructure or an infrastructure system which, for example, comprises the device according to the second aspect.
- the infrastructure includes, for example, a hub.
- FIG. 4 shows an intersection 401 as an example of a junction.
- environment sensors 403 are arranged spatially distributed in the intersection area, which detect their respective environment.
- the respective environment sensors 403 make available environment sensor data corresponding to the respective detection.
- the environment sensors 403 transmit their environment sensor data as environment signals to the device according to the second aspect. This means that, according to one embodiment, the device according to the second aspect receives the environment sensor data as environment signals.
- the surroundings sensor data are processed, for example, in order to detect a motor vehicle that is approaching intersection 401.
- FIG. 4 Such a motor vehicle is shown in FIG. 4 with the reference number 405.
- An arrow with the reference number 407 identifies a direction of travel of the motor vehicle, which runs from left to right in relation to the plane of the paper.
- one embodiment provides that upon detection of a motor vehicle approaching the intersection 401, it is determined that a motor vehicle should cross the intersection 401.
- the remote control signals are then correspondingly transmitted to the motor vehicle 405 via the communication link.
- control signals for controlling the light signal system 409 are generated and output, these control signals being such that when the light signal system 409 is controlled based on the control signals, the light signal system 409 visually signals to the motor vehicle 405 using a green signal that the traffic is clear and the traffic signal 409 visually signals cross traffic using a red signal that cross traffic must stop.
- a current traffic situation permits an intervention, that is to say in particular remote control, in order, for example, to prevent other road users in the vicinity of the motor vehicle from being injured.
- the process that is to say the process, in other words the process steps, is forgery-proof and documented in a comprehensible manner, for example documented in a blockchain.
- a prerequisite for the remote control or for the intervention is that the remote control is safe.
- “secure” means in particular “safe” and “secure”. These two English terms are usually translated into German as “safe”. Nevertheless, these have a partially different meaning in English.
- safe is particularly aimed at the topic of accidents and accident prevention.
- Remote control which is “safe”, has the effect in particular that a probability of an accident or a collision is less than or less than or equal to a predetermined probability threshold value.
- secure is aimed in particular at the subject of computer protection or hacker protection, i.e. in particular how secure is a (computer infrastructure and / or a communication infrastructure, in particular a communication link between a motor vehicle and a remote control device for remote control of a motor vehicle, against unauthorized access or . secured against data manipulation by third parties ("hackers").
- Remote control which is “secure”, is based on appropriate and sufficient computer protection or hacker protection.
- Important or dependent criteria are, for example, one or more of the safety conditions described above.
- the overall system (motor vehicle, infrastructure, communication path, cloud %) is checked with regard to the safety condition.
- the individual parts are also checked with regard to compliance with the safety condition. This in particular before remote control of the motor vehicle.
- this checking that is to say checking whether the at least one safety condition is met, takes place according to an embodiment before and / or after and / or during one or more predetermined method steps.
- registration signals are received which represent a registration for an at least assisted crossing of a junction by means of a motor vehicle.
- request signals are received which represent a request for an at least assisted crossing of a junction by means of a motor vehicle.
- the request or the request relate to a special node.
- the request or the request relate to nodes in general.
- the motor vehicle transmits corresponding request signals or registration signals permanently, that is to say continuously, in particular repetitively at a predetermined frequency, via a wireless communication network.
- the remote control signals are generated automatically when the motor vehicle approaches the special junction or a junction, that is to say is at a predetermined distance from the junction.
- a communication link is set up between the motor vehicle and the infrastructure, which in particular comprises the device according to the second aspect.
- the infrastructure comprises a local infrastructure, for example the node.
- the infrastructure comprises a global infrastructure; preferably a cloud infrastructure.
- it is checked whether the infrastructure is functionally ready and / or available for the assisted crossing of a node.
- the service or the functionality “assisted crossing of a junction” is enabled for the motor vehicle (or driver or owner) requesting the functionality. This is particularly true at the vehicle level, infrastructure level and service level. For example, it is provided that a provider of the functionality “assisted crossing of a junction” will no longer allow the requesting motor vehicle or its owner or driver due to fees that have not been paid in the past or misuse.
- a determination and / or reception (and in particular a transmission) of motor vehicle options are provided.
- motor vehicle parameters are provided by the motor vehicle sent. This means that, for example, motor vehicle parameters sent by the motor vehicle are received.
- motor vehicle parameters are sent from the cloud, in particular from a cloud server.
- vehicle parameters sent from the cloud in particular from a cloud server, are received.
- data signals are received which represent respective data of the motor vehicle or of at least one other road user, in particular another motor vehicle.
- the data include, for example
- Traffic environment information or traffic environment functions are used, for example, to support or improve an evaluation or processing of the environment sensor data of the environment sensors 403. This means in particular that an evaluation or processing of the environment sensor data is carried out based on the data.
- the data are sent, for example, from the motor vehicle or from the at least one other road user via a, in particular wireless, communication network.
- One embodiment provides for checking whether the traffic situation allows the motor vehicle to be able to cross the junction with assistance. This checking preferably runs continuously, that is to say permanently - that is, even before a corresponding request, that is, independently of a request. In a further embodiment, other road users preferably - if possible - send their current and planned driving maneuvers additionally to the motor vehicle and / or to the cloud server via V2X.
- a calculation or determination is provided as to whether an at least assisted crossing of the junction by the motor vehicle is possible.
- the motor vehicle is remotely controlled, for example.
- the management of the vehicle is therefore carried out by the infrastructure.
- Intelligence, decision-making and control lie with the infrastructure.
- the process of crossing is preferably also checked.
- the check is carried out according to one or more of the following options:
- the latter advantageously being able to bring about redundancy, which can increase security.
- the entire process preferably starts very early so that the motor vehicle does not have to stop in front of the intersection. Ie not the speed must be reduced, for example because not all registration / analysis processes (verification steps) have been completed.
- the entire traffic in the vicinity of the motor vehicle is automatically controlled or organized by the infrastructure through a traffic control system including, in particular, traffic system (s), in particular light signal system (s), so that an optimal process (optimal at least assisted crossing) for the motor vehicle and for other motor vehicles that can be at least partially automated, in particular remotely controlled, and / or for other motor vehicles that cannot be at least partially automated, in particular that cannot be remotely controlled.
- a traffic control system including, in particular, traffic system (s), in particular light signal system (s), so that an optimal process (optimal at least assisted crossing) for the motor vehicle and for other motor vehicles that can be at least partially automated, in particular remotely controlled, and / or for other motor vehicles that cannot be at least partially automated, in particular that cannot be remotely controlled.
- the infrastructure takes over control in addition to the motor vehicle also over other motor vehicles, which can be at least partially automated, in particular remote-controlled, the entire traffic is regulated in such a way that an optimal traffic flow is achieved.
- this checking that is to say checking whether the at least one safety condition is met, takes place according to an embodiment before and / or after and / or during one or more predetermined method steps.
- the checking is carried out or carried out in the event of problems.
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- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Transportation (AREA)
- Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
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DE102019214420.9A DE102019214420A1 (de) | 2019-09-23 | 2019-09-23 | Verfahren zum zumindest assistierten Überqueren eines Knotenpunkts durch ein Kraftfahrzeug |
PCT/EP2020/071091 WO2021058176A1 (de) | 2019-09-23 | 2020-07-27 | Verfahren zum zumindest assistierten überqueren eines knotenpunkts durch ein kraftfahrzeug |
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EP4035139A1 true EP4035139A1 (de) | 2022-08-03 |
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EP20751085.0A Pending EP4035139A1 (de) | 2019-09-23 | 2020-07-27 | Verfahren zum zumindest assistierten überqueren eines knotenpunkts durch ein kraftfahrzeug |
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US (1) | US20220299992A1 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP4035139A1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP7366253B2 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN114514485A (ja) |
DE (1) | DE102019214420A1 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2021058176A1 (ja) |
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DE102020211484A1 (de) | 2020-09-14 | 2022-03-17 | Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung | Verfahren zum Führen eines Kraftfahrzeugs |
DE102020211485A1 (de) | 2020-09-14 | 2022-03-17 | Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung | Verfahren zum Führen eines Kraftfahrzeugs |
DE102022202741A1 (de) | 2022-03-21 | 2023-09-21 | Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung | Verfahren zum Ausführen einer zumindest teilautomatisierten Fahrfunktion |
DE102022205522A1 (de) | 2022-05-31 | 2023-11-30 | Robert Bosch Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung | Verfahren zum infrastrukturgestützten Assistieren eines Einsatzkraftfahrzeugs |
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US20070124056A1 (en) * | 2005-10-25 | 2007-05-31 | Schulthess Carl W | Method for efficient use of roadways with advantages for reducing traffic congestion |
DE102008024656A1 (de) * | 2007-05-22 | 2009-11-19 | Continental Teves Ag & Co. Ohg | Bevorrechtigungssystem für Einsatzfahrzeuge an signalgeregelten Verkehrsknotenpunkte |
JP5506423B2 (ja) | 2010-01-21 | 2014-05-28 | 株式会社Ihiエアロスペース | 無人車両の半自律走行システム |
DE102010021591B4 (de) * | 2010-05-26 | 2024-02-01 | Audi Ag | Verfahren zur Steuerung des Betriebs eines vollautomatischen, zur unabhängigen Fahrzeugführung ausgebildeten Fahrerassistenzsystems eines Kraftfahrzeugs und Kraftfahrzeug |
US9020660B2 (en) * | 2012-05-10 | 2015-04-28 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Efficient intersection autonomous driving protocol |
DE102012021282A1 (de) * | 2012-10-29 | 2014-04-30 | Audi Ag | Verfahren zur Koordination des Betriebs von vollautomatisiert fahrenden Kraftfahrzeugen |
MY187372A (en) * | 2012-12-31 | 2021-09-22 | Sena Traffic Systems Sdn Bhd | A system for intelligent traffic control |
EP3154830B1 (en) * | 2014-06-11 | 2024-07-24 | Veridium IP Limited | Method for facilitating user access to vehicles based on biometric information |
JP6201916B2 (ja) | 2014-07-04 | 2017-09-27 | 株式会社デンソー | 車両の運転モード制御装置 |
DE102015209976B4 (de) * | 2015-05-29 | 2019-06-27 | Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft | Sicherheitsprüfung eines Fahrzeugs mit einem per Fernbedienung bedienbaren Assistenzsystem zum fahrerlosen Fahren |
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DE102016205972A1 (de) * | 2016-04-11 | 2017-11-09 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zur autonomen oder teilautonomen Durchführung eines kooperativen Fahrmanövers |
DE102016212195A1 (de) * | 2016-07-05 | 2018-01-11 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Verfahren zum Durchführen eines automatischen Eingriffs in die Fahrzeugführung eines Fahrzeugs |
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JPWO2018155159A1 (ja) | 2017-02-24 | 2019-12-19 | パナソニックIpマネジメント株式会社 | 遠隔映像出力システム、及び遠隔映像出力装置 |
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WO2020133208A1 (zh) * | 2018-12-28 | 2020-07-02 | 驭势科技(北京)有限公司 | 一种自动驾驶车辆的控制方法和自动驾驶系统 |
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- 2020-07-27 US US17/641,577 patent/US20220299992A1/en active Pending
- 2020-07-27 CN CN202080067573.XA patent/CN114514485A/zh active Pending
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US20220299992A1 (en) | 2022-09-22 |
JP7366253B2 (ja) | 2023-10-20 |
DE102019214420A1 (de) | 2021-03-25 |
JP2022549262A (ja) | 2022-11-24 |
WO2021058176A1 (de) | 2021-04-01 |
CN114514485A (zh) | 2022-05-17 |
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