EP1287221B1 - Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug - Google Patents

Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1287221B1
EP1287221B1 EP00969282A EP00969282A EP1287221B1 EP 1287221 B1 EP1287221 B1 EP 1287221B1 EP 00969282 A EP00969282 A EP 00969282A EP 00969282 A EP00969282 A EP 00969282A EP 1287221 B1 EP1287221 B1 EP 1287221B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
electronic key
base station
communication mode
received
selection instruction
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP00969282A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP1287221A1 (de
Inventor
Michael Meier
Stephan Schmitz
Andreas Titze
Dominique Nemetschek
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Robert Bosch GmbH
Volkswagen AG
Original Assignee
Robert Bosch GmbH
Volkswagen AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Robert Bosch GmbH, Volkswagen AG filed Critical Robert Bosch GmbH
Publication of EP1287221A1 publication Critical patent/EP1287221A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1287221B1 publication Critical patent/EP1287221B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00341—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks keyless data carrier having more than one limited data transmission ranges
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00777—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by induction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a device for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle, in which between an electronic key and a base station in an active or a passive communication mode, these devices wirelessly exchange authentication data, at the beginning of this authentication process, the base station the electronic key sends a call signal and this responds to the call signal with a response signal, and wherein in the active communication mode, a security procedure against a Funkumblenverilind fürimide, and an apparatus for performing this method.
  • the running between the electronic key and the base station backup procedure is such that in the active mode of communication between the electronic key and the base station via UHF frequencies, the range of transmission between the electronic key and the base station limited is to ensure that the communication link is interrupted when the person in possession of the key from the immediate vicinity of the secure location, eg. B. of the motor vehicle, away.
  • the intercepted signal is transmitted via a radio link to another attacker who is in the vicinity of the electronic key is then sent and the other attacker then the response signal of the electronic key to the call signal of the base station over the radio link extension back to the first attacker and sends back via this back to the base station, is provided in the known method that the electronic key of the base station transmits a signal which is converted by the base station into spectral data.
  • the base station then grants access only to the secure location if, during the transmission of the authentication data, these spectral data coincide with a spectral signature of the electronic key stored in the base station.
  • the signal emitted by the electronic key signal comprises at least two tones with different frequencies f 1 and f 2 , and that the spectral data third-order tones represent the transmitted signal from the base station on the frequencies 2f 1 -f 2 and 2f 2 -f 1 is measured. If the received signal strength of these secondary lines of the signal emitted by the electronic key exceeds a predefined value, this interprets the base station as a sure sign that a radio link extension has been made and denies access to the secured location.
  • a data transfer between the electronic key and the base station is effected by a passive modulation of the exciting field emitted by the base station:
  • the electronic key detunes its Ressonanznik according to the data to be transmitted, which can be measured by the base station as an additional burden on their resonant circuit.
  • This LF frequency passive communication is limited to a few centimeters, which means that a potential attacker must place his corresponding antenna very close to the base station's transmitting antenna in order to operate in this back-up mode when attempting to transmit data signals sent from the key to the base station on an LF frequency in back-up mode.
  • the known method and the known devices operating according to this method have the disadvantage that they do not offer effective protection against an attack occurring in the aforementioned manner.
  • the base station examines the response signal of the electronic key received from it, in which communication mode this response signal was received, and that the base station in the event that receive the response signal of the electronic key in the active communication mode has been sent to the electronic key a first selection command which causes the electronic key to perform the subsequent communication in the active communication mode, and in the event that the response signal of the electronic key has been received in the passive communication mode, the base station to the electronic key sends a second selection command which causes the electronic key to perform the subsequent communication in the passive communication mode.
  • the inventive method is achieved in an advantageous manner that even in passive communication mode between the electronic key and the base station, a corresponding attack an unauthorized person can be warded by the base station active on the type of communication in which they the response signal of the electronic Key receives, responds. If the response signal is in the active communication mode, the further authentication method is performed in the active communication mode and a radio link extension can be excluded by the known backup procedure. However, when the base station receives the electronic key response signal in the passive communication mode, it advantageously prevents base station-to-key communication via the first active communication mode until completion of the access procedure. It is thus not possible for an attacker to perform a radio link extension over a frequency of the active communication mode.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the method.
  • FIG. 1 now shows the typical constellation which is the starting point of the method for access control to a secure location, in this case a motor vehicle F, described below.
  • a base station 10 is arranged, which exchanges wirelessly with an electronic key 20 authentication data to ensure that only the owner of the electronic key 20 can get access to the secured location.
  • the base station 10 in an active, first communication mode emits a call signal WA for the electronic key 20 when an actuator B, z. B. a door handle, is operated on the motor vehicle F.
  • the electronic key 20 then responds in the active communication mode with a corresponding response signal R, whereby a running in the active communication mode communication link between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 is made.
  • the data transmitted between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 are determined by a known per se and therefore not described in more detail communication protocol, which follow the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 and the transmission of authentication data from the electronic key 20 to the Base station 10 includes.
  • Access to the secured motor vehicle F is only permitted by the base station 10 if the authentication data transmitted by the electronic key 20 agrees with the authentications stored by the base station 10.
  • the signals emitted by the electronic key 20 and / or by the base station 10 have only a limited range in order to prevent access to the secured motor vehicle F from the base station 10 even if the electronic key is present 20 is not within a defined environment typically a few meters - the motor vehicle F is located.
  • Such a security procedure is z.
  • the electronic key 20 transmits, as part of its response signal R generated in response to the call signal WA of the base station 10, an identification signal which converts the base station 10 into spectral data and only then continues the communication with the electronic key 20, if the spectral data received by it agrees with the spectral signature of the electronic key 20 stored in the base station 10.
  • the electronic key 20 emits two tones with the frequency f 1 and f 2 , respectively be measured by the base station 10.
  • the base station 10 breaks off communication with the electronic key 20 and blocks access to the secured motor vehicle F.
  • the electronic key 20 with the base station 10 not only in the above-described active communication mode, but also in the so-called back-up mode in a second passive communication mode to be able to communicate with each other, it is necessary, even in this passive communication mode in which the backup procedure of the active communication mode does not work, to provide a further backup procedure for just this passive communication mode.
  • the base station 10 not only evaluates the information content of the signals supplied to it, in particular the response signal R of the key 20, but also investigates whether the signals supplied to it of the electronic key 20 in the first active communication mode or in the second, passive communication mode.
  • the base station 10 When the base station 10 receives the response signal R generated by the electronic key 20 in the first, active communication mode in response to a polling command WA emitted by it, it sends to the latter a first selection signal S1 in response to the response signal R of the electronic key 20 obtained in the active communication mode which - in addition to the usual functions of a selection signal - causes at least the security-related and preferably all further communication between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 is performed exclusively in the first, active communication mode and the implementation of the remaining authentication process is inhibited in the passive communication mode ,
  • This has the advantage that a radio link extension V can be detected by the security procedure of the active communication mode and, if appropriate, appropriate measures can be taken against attack by a non-authorized person.
  • the base station 10 of the motor vehicle F receives the response signal R of the electronic key 20 in the second, passive communication mode, it sends in response to the electronic key 20, a second selection signal S2, which causes the communication in a corresponding manner Authentication process is performed in the second, passive communication mode, and a performance of the remaining authentication process in the first communication mode is inhibited. It is thus one working in active communication mode Radio Range Extension V attacking attackers no longer possible to use this successfully.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
EP00969282A 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug Expired - Lifetime EP1287221B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19949970 1999-10-16
DE19949970A DE19949970A1 (de) 1999-10-16 1999-10-16 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, insbesondere einem Kraftfahrzeug
PCT/EP2000/009276 WO2001029352A1 (de) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1287221A1 EP1287221A1 (de) 2003-03-05
EP1287221B1 true EP1287221B1 (de) 2006-05-10

Family

ID=7925919

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP00969282A Expired - Lifetime EP1287221B1 (de) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US6954007B1 (enExample)
EP (1) EP1287221B1 (enExample)
JP (1) JP2003512549A (enExample)
CN (1) CN1285815C (enExample)
DE (2) DE19949970A1 (enExample)
WO (1) WO2001029352A1 (enExample)

Families Citing this family (7)

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DE10246060B4 (de) * 2002-10-02 2012-06-28 Robert Bosch Gmbh Vorrichtung zur sicheren Signalerzeugung
JP2007527961A (ja) 2003-06-25 2007-10-04 コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ 特に自動車にアクセスするためのトランスポンダシステムのセキュリティを向上させるための方法及び構成
US8451089B2 (en) * 2004-06-15 2013-05-28 Nxp B.V. Radio identification with an additional close-range check
DE102005061660A1 (de) * 2005-12-22 2007-06-28 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Tragbarer Datenträger mit aktiver Kontaktlosschnittstelle
US20100274570A1 (en) * 2009-04-24 2010-10-28 Gm Global Technology Operations, Inc. Vehicle charging authorization
US8841881B2 (en) 2010-06-02 2014-09-23 Bryan Marc Failing Energy transfer with vehicles
CN102201135A (zh) * 2011-05-26 2011-09-28 深圳中兴力维技术有限公司 一种应用于基站的门禁管理方法

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GB2239571B (en) * 1989-12-29 1994-08-03 Schlumberger Ind Ltd Transponder
DE4003280C5 (de) 1990-02-03 2007-06-28 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Sicherheitseinrichtung für Kraftfahrzeuge
DE4226053C2 (de) * 1991-08-09 1994-12-01 Alps Electric Co Ltd Fernbedienungseinrichtung für eine KFZ-Schließanlage
DE4329697C2 (de) * 1993-09-02 1995-10-05 Siemens Ag Fernsteuerbare Zugangskontrolleinrichtung
EP0659963A1 (de) * 1993-12-20 1995-06-28 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Elektronische Wegfahrsperre für ein Kraftfahrzeug
DE4409167C1 (de) * 1994-03-17 1995-06-29 Siemens Ag Schlüssellose Zugangskontrolleinrichtung
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DE19539851C2 (de) * 1995-10-26 1999-01-07 Daimler Benz Ag Schlüssel-Fahrzeug-Kommunikationseinrichtung zur Ansteuerung einer Wegfahrsperre und einer fernbedienbaren Funktion
DE19632025C2 (de) * 1996-08-08 1998-07-23 Daimler Benz Ag Authentikationseinrichtung mit elektronischer Authentikationskommunikation
US6323566B1 (en) * 1996-10-10 2001-11-27 Texas Instruments Incorported Transponder for remote keyless entry systems
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DE19802526B4 (de) * 1998-01-26 2006-02-09 Robert Bosch Gmbh Vorrichtung zur Kontrolle der Zugangsberechtigung
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN1285815C (zh) 2006-11-22
JP2003512549A (ja) 2003-04-02
CN1379841A (zh) 2002-11-13
US6954007B1 (en) 2005-10-11
DE19949970A1 (de) 2001-04-19
EP1287221A1 (de) 2003-03-05
DE50012740D1 (de) 2006-06-14
WO2001029352A1 (de) 2001-04-26

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