EP1287221B1 - Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle - Google Patents
Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1287221B1 EP1287221B1 EP00969282A EP00969282A EP1287221B1 EP 1287221 B1 EP1287221 B1 EP 1287221B1 EP 00969282 A EP00969282 A EP 00969282A EP 00969282 A EP00969282 A EP 00969282A EP 1287221 B1 EP1287221 B1 EP 1287221B1
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- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- electronic key
- base station
- communication mode
- received
- selection instruction
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 36
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 76
- 230000003595 spectral effect Effects 0.000 claims description 10
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000018109 developmental process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000203 mixture Substances 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00341—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks keyless data carrier having more than one limited data transmission ranges
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
- G07C2009/00777—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by induction
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
- G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and a device for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle, in which between an electronic key and a base station in an active or a passive communication mode, these devices wirelessly exchange authentication data, at the beginning of this authentication process, the base station the electronic key sends a call signal and this responds to the call signal with a response signal, and wherein in the active communication mode, a security procedure against a Funkumblenverilind fürimide, and an apparatus for performing this method.
- the running between the electronic key and the base station backup procedure is such that in the active mode of communication between the electronic key and the base station via UHF frequencies, the range of transmission between the electronic key and the base station limited is to ensure that the communication link is interrupted when the person in possession of the key from the immediate vicinity of the secure location, eg. B. of the motor vehicle, away.
- the intercepted signal is transmitted via a radio link to another attacker who is in the vicinity of the electronic key is then sent and the other attacker then the response signal of the electronic key to the call signal of the base station over the radio link extension back to the first attacker and sends back via this back to the base station, is provided in the known method that the electronic key of the base station transmits a signal which is converted by the base station into spectral data.
- the base station then grants access only to the secure location if, during the transmission of the authentication data, these spectral data coincide with a spectral signature of the electronic key stored in the base station.
- the signal emitted by the electronic key signal comprises at least two tones with different frequencies f 1 and f 2 , and that the spectral data third-order tones represent the transmitted signal from the base station on the frequencies 2f 1 -f 2 and 2f 2 -f 1 is measured. If the received signal strength of these secondary lines of the signal emitted by the electronic key exceeds a predefined value, this interprets the base station as a sure sign that a radio link extension has been made and denies access to the secured location.
- a data transfer between the electronic key and the base station is effected by a passive modulation of the exciting field emitted by the base station:
- the electronic key detunes its Ressonanznik according to the data to be transmitted, which can be measured by the base station as an additional burden on their resonant circuit.
- This LF frequency passive communication is limited to a few centimeters, which means that a potential attacker must place his corresponding antenna very close to the base station's transmitting antenna in order to operate in this back-up mode when attempting to transmit data signals sent from the key to the base station on an LF frequency in back-up mode.
- the known method and the known devices operating according to this method have the disadvantage that they do not offer effective protection against an attack occurring in the aforementioned manner.
- the base station examines the response signal of the electronic key received from it, in which communication mode this response signal was received, and that the base station in the event that receive the response signal of the electronic key in the active communication mode has been sent to the electronic key a first selection command which causes the electronic key to perform the subsequent communication in the active communication mode, and in the event that the response signal of the electronic key has been received in the passive communication mode, the base station to the electronic key sends a second selection command which causes the electronic key to perform the subsequent communication in the passive communication mode.
- the inventive method is achieved in an advantageous manner that even in passive communication mode between the electronic key and the base station, a corresponding attack an unauthorized person can be warded by the base station active on the type of communication in which they the response signal of the electronic Key receives, responds. If the response signal is in the active communication mode, the further authentication method is performed in the active communication mode and a radio link extension can be excluded by the known backup procedure. However, when the base station receives the electronic key response signal in the passive communication mode, it advantageously prevents base station-to-key communication via the first active communication mode until completion of the access procedure. It is thus not possible for an attacker to perform a radio link extension over a frequency of the active communication mode.
- Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the method.
- FIG. 1 now shows the typical constellation which is the starting point of the method for access control to a secure location, in this case a motor vehicle F, described below.
- a base station 10 is arranged, which exchanges wirelessly with an electronic key 20 authentication data to ensure that only the owner of the electronic key 20 can get access to the secured location.
- the base station 10 in an active, first communication mode emits a call signal WA for the electronic key 20 when an actuator B, z. B. a door handle, is operated on the motor vehicle F.
- the electronic key 20 then responds in the active communication mode with a corresponding response signal R, whereby a running in the active communication mode communication link between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 is made.
- the data transmitted between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 are determined by a known per se and therefore not described in more detail communication protocol, which follow the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 and the transmission of authentication data from the electronic key 20 to the Base station 10 includes.
- Access to the secured motor vehicle F is only permitted by the base station 10 if the authentication data transmitted by the electronic key 20 agrees with the authentications stored by the base station 10.
- the signals emitted by the electronic key 20 and / or by the base station 10 have only a limited range in order to prevent access to the secured motor vehicle F from the base station 10 even if the electronic key is present 20 is not within a defined environment typically a few meters - the motor vehicle F is located.
- Such a security procedure is z.
- the electronic key 20 transmits, as part of its response signal R generated in response to the call signal WA of the base station 10, an identification signal which converts the base station 10 into spectral data and only then continues the communication with the electronic key 20, if the spectral data received by it agrees with the spectral signature of the electronic key 20 stored in the base station 10.
- the electronic key 20 emits two tones with the frequency f 1 and f 2 , respectively be measured by the base station 10.
- the base station 10 breaks off communication with the electronic key 20 and blocks access to the secured motor vehicle F.
- the electronic key 20 with the base station 10 not only in the above-described active communication mode, but also in the so-called back-up mode in a second passive communication mode to be able to communicate with each other, it is necessary, even in this passive communication mode in which the backup procedure of the active communication mode does not work, to provide a further backup procedure for just this passive communication mode.
- the base station 10 not only evaluates the information content of the signals supplied to it, in particular the response signal R of the key 20, but also investigates whether the signals supplied to it of the electronic key 20 in the first active communication mode or in the second, passive communication mode.
- the base station 10 When the base station 10 receives the response signal R generated by the electronic key 20 in the first, active communication mode in response to a polling command WA emitted by it, it sends to the latter a first selection signal S1 in response to the response signal R of the electronic key 20 obtained in the active communication mode which - in addition to the usual functions of a selection signal - causes at least the security-related and preferably all further communication between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 is performed exclusively in the first, active communication mode and the implementation of the remaining authentication process is inhibited in the passive communication mode ,
- This has the advantage that a radio link extension V can be detected by the security procedure of the active communication mode and, if appropriate, appropriate measures can be taken against attack by a non-authorized person.
- the base station 10 of the motor vehicle F receives the response signal R of the electronic key 20 in the second, passive communication mode, it sends in response to the electronic key 20, a second selection signal S2, which causes the communication in a corresponding manner Authentication process is performed in the second, passive communication mode, and a performance of the remaining authentication process in the first communication mode is inhibited. It is thus one working in active communication mode Radio Range Extension V attacking attackers no longer possible to use this successfully.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Description
Die Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, insbesondere zu einem Kraftfahrzeug, bei dem zwischen einem elektronischen Schlüssel und einer Basisstation in einem aktiven oder einem passiven Kommunikationsmodus diese Einrichtungen drahtlos Authentifizierungsdaten austauschen, wobei zu Beginn dieses Authentifizierungsprozesses die Basisstation an den elektronischen Schlüssel ein Aufrufsignal sendet und dieser auf das Aufrufsignal mit einem Antwortsignal antwortet, und wobei im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus eine Sicherungsprozedur gegen eine Funkstreckenveriängerung durchgeführt wird, sowie eine Vorrichtung zur Durchführung dieses Verfahrens.The invention relates to a method and a device for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle, in which between an electronic key and a base station in an active or a passive communication mode, these devices wirelessly exchange authentication data, at the beginning of this authentication process, the base station the electronic key sends a call signal and this responds to the call signal with a response signal, and wherein in the active communication mode, a security procedure against a Funkstreckenveriängerung is performed, and an apparatus for performing this method.
Ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung der eingangs genannten Art sind in der älteren internationalen Patentanmeldung PCT/DE99/02178 beschrieben. Hierbei ist vorgesehen, daß die zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation ablaufende Sicherungsprozedur derart erfolgt, daß im aktiven Betriebsmodus die Kommunikation zwischen dem elektronischem Schlüssel und der Basisstation über UHF-Frequenzen erfolgt, wobei die Reichweite der Übertragung zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation begrenzt ist, um zu gewährleisten, daß die Kommunikationsverbindung unterbrochen wird, wenn sich die im Besitz des Schlüssels befindliche Person aus der unmittelbaren Nähe des gesicherten Ortes, z. B. des Kraftfahrzeugs, entfernt.A method and a device of the aforementioned type are described in the earlier international patent application PCT / DE99 / 02178. It is provided that the running between the electronic key and the base station backup procedure is such that in the active mode of communication between the electronic key and the base station via UHF frequencies, the range of transmission between the electronic key and the base station limited is to ensure that the communication link is interrupted when the person in possession of the key from the immediate vicinity of the secure location, eg. B. of the motor vehicle, away.
Um nun zu verhindern, daß ein derartiges passives Zugangskontrollsystem nicht dadurch außer Kraft gesetzt wird, daß ein unbefugter Angreifer das von der Basisstation ausgesandte Aufrufsignal an den elektronischen Schlüssel abfängt, das abgefangene Signal über eine Funkstreckenveränderung an einen weiteren Angreifer, der sich in der Nähe des elektronischen Schlüssels befindet, weitersendet und der weitere Angreifer dann das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels auf das Aufrufsignal der Basisstation über die Funkstreckenverlängerung wieder zurück zum ersten Angreifer und über diesen zurück zur Basisstation sendet, ist bei dem bekannten Verfahren vorgesehen, daß der elektronische Schlüssel der Basisstation ein Signal übermittelt, das von der Basisstation in spektrale Daten umgesetzt wird. Die Basisstation gewährt dann nur Zugang zu dem gesicherten Ort, wenn bei der Übertragung der Authentifizierungsdaten diese spektralen Daten mit einer in der Basisstation gespeicherten spektralen Signatur des elektronischen Schlüssels übereinstimmen. Hierbei ist vorgesehen, daß das von dem elektronischen Schlüssel ausgesandte Signal mindestens zwei Töne mit unterschiedlichen Frequenzen f1 bzw. f2 umfaßt, und daß die spektralen Daten Töne dritter Ordnung des übermittelten Signals darstellen, die von der Basisstation auf den Frequenzen 2f1-f2 und 2f2-f1 gemessen wird. Liegt die empfangene Signalstärke dieser Nebenlinien des vom elektronischen Schlüssel ausgesandten Signals über einem vordefinierten Wert, so interpretiert dies die Basisstation als sicheres Anzeichen dafür, daß eine Funkstreckenverlängerung durchgeführt wurde, und verweigert den Zugang zum gesicherten Ort.In order to prevent such a passive access control system from being overridden by an unauthorized attacker intercepting the call signal sent by the base station to the electronic key, the intercepted signal is transmitted via a radio link to another attacker who is in the vicinity of the electronic key is then sent and the other attacker then the response signal of the electronic key to the call signal of the base station over the radio link extension back to the first attacker and sends back via this back to the base station, is provided in the known method that the electronic key of the base station transmits a signal which is converted by the base station into spectral data. The base station then grants access only to the secure location if, during the transmission of the authentication data, these spectral data coincide with a spectral signature of the electronic key stored in the base station. It is provided that the signal emitted by the electronic key signal comprises at least two tones with different frequencies f 1 and f 2 , and that the spectral data third-order tones represent the transmitted signal from the base station on the frequencies 2f 1 -f 2 and 2f 2 -f 1 is measured. If the received signal strength of these secondary lines of the signal emitted by the electronic key exceeds a predefined value, this interprets the base station as a sure sign that a radio link extension has been made and denies access to the secured location.
Um beim Ausfall des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus im Rahmen eines sogenannten Back-up-Modus, also eines passiven Kommunikationsmodus, dem Benutzer der elektronischen Zugangskontrolle noch die Möglichkeit zu geben, den gesicherten Ort betreten zu können, ist vorgesehen, daß in diesem passiven Kommunikationsmodus eine Datenübertragung zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation durch eine passive Modulation des von der Basisstation ausgesandten Erregerfeldes erfolgt: Der elektronische Schlüssel verstimmt entsprechend den zu sendenden Daten seinen Ressonanzkreis, was von der Basisstation als zusätzliche Belastung ihres Schwingkreises gemessen werden kann. Diese auf LF-Frequenzen erfolgende passive Kommunikation ist auf wenige Zentimeter beschränkt, was bedeutet, daß ein potentieller Angreifer seine entsprechende Antenne sehr nahe an die Sendeantenne der Basisstation plazieren muß, um in diesem Back-up-Modus zu arbeiten, wenn er versucht, die vom Schlüssel ausgesandten Datensignale auf einer LF-Frequenz im Back-up-Modus an die Basisstation zu senden. Das bekannte Verfahren sowie die nach diesem Verfahren arbeitenden bekannten Vorrichtungen besitzen den Nachteil, daß sie keinen wirksamen Schutz gegen einen auf diese vorgenannte Art und Weise erfolgenden Angriff bieten.In order to give the user of the electronic access control still the opportunity to enter the secured location in case of failure of the active communication mode in the context of a so-called back-up mode, ie a passive communication mode, it is provided that in this passive communication mode, a data transfer between the electronic key and the base station is effected by a passive modulation of the exciting field emitted by the base station: The electronic key detunes its Ressonanzkreis according to the data to be transmitted, which can be measured by the base station as an additional burden on their resonant circuit. This LF frequency passive communication is limited to a few centimeters, which means that a potential attacker must place his corresponding antenna very close to the base station's transmitting antenna in order to operate in this back-up mode when attempting to transmit data signals sent from the key to the base station on an LF frequency in back-up mode. The known method and the known devices operating according to this method have the disadvantage that they do not offer effective protection against an attack occurring in the aforementioned manner.
Es ist daher Aufgabe der Erfindung, ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung der eingangs genannten Art derart weiterzubilden, daß ein wirksamer Schutz gegen eine Funkstreckenverlängerung im passiven Kommunikationsmodus gegeben ist.It is therefore an object of the invention to provide a method and an apparatus of the type mentioned in such a way that an effective protection against radio link extension is given in the passive communication mode.
Diese Aufgabe wird durch das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren dadurch gelöst, daß die Basisstation das von ihr empfangene Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels daraufhin untersucht, in welchem Kommunikationsmodus dieses Antwortsignal empfangen wurde, und daß die Basisstation für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen wurde, an den elektronischen Schlüssel einen ersten Selektionsbefehl sendet, welcher bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel die darauffolgende Kommunikation im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ausführt, und daß für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels im passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen wurde, die Basisstation an den elektronischen Schlüssel einen zweiten Selektionsbefehl sendet, welcher bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel die nachfolgende Kommunikation im passiven Kommunikationsmodus ausführt.This object is achieved by the method according to the invention in that the base station examines the response signal of the electronic key received from it, in which communication mode this response signal was received, and that the base station in the event that receive the response signal of the electronic key in the active communication mode has been sent to the electronic key a first selection command which causes the electronic key to perform the subsequent communication in the active communication mode, and in the event that the response signal of the electronic key has been received in the passive communication mode, the base station to the electronic key sends a second selection command which causes the electronic key to perform the subsequent communication in the passive communication mode.
Durch das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren wird in vorteilhafter Art und Weise erreicht, daß auch im passiven Kommunikationsmodus zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation ein entsprechender Angriff einer nicht authorisierten Person abgewehrt werden kann, indem die Basisstation aktiv auf die Kommunikationsart, in der sie das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels empfängt, reagiert. Wenn das Antwortsignal im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus erfolgt, wird das weitere Authentifizierungsverfahren im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus durchgeführt und eine Funkstreckenverlängerung kann durch die bekannte Sicherungsprozedur ausgeschlossen werden. Wenn aber die Basisstation das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels im passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfängt, verhindert sie bis zum Abschluß der Zugangsprozedur in vorteilhafter Art und Weise eine Kommunikation zwischen Basisstation und Schlüssel über den ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus. Es ist somit nicht möglich, daß ein Angreifer über eine Frequenz des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus eine Funkstreckenverlängerung durchführt.The inventive method is achieved in an advantageous manner that even in passive communication mode between the electronic key and the base station, a corresponding attack an unauthorized person can be warded by the base station active on the type of communication in which they the response signal of the electronic Key receives, responds. If the response signal is in the active communication mode, the further authentication method is performed in the active communication mode and a radio link extension can be excluded by the known backup procedure. However, when the base station receives the electronic key response signal in the passive communication mode, it advantageously prevents base station-to-key communication via the first active communication mode until completion of the access procedure. It is thus not possible for an attacker to perform a radio link extension over a frequency of the active communication mode.
Vorteilhafte Weiterbildungen der Erfindung sind Gegenstand der Unteransprüche.Advantageous developments of the invention are the subject of the dependent claims.
Weitere Einzelheiten und Vorteile der Erfindung sind dem Ausführungsbeispiel zu entnehmen, das im folgenden anhand der einzigen Figur beschrieben wird. Es zeigtFurther details and advantages of the invention can be found in the embodiment which will be described below with reference to the single figure. It shows
Figur 1 eine Prinzipskizze eines Ausführungsbeispiels des Verfahrens.Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the method.
In Figur 1 ist nun die typische Konstellation dargestellt, die Ausgangspunkt des nachstehend beschriebenen Verfahrens zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, hier zu einem Kraftfahrzeug F, ist. Im Kraftfahrzeug F ist eine Basisstation 10 angeordnet, welche drahtlos mit einem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 Authentifizierungsdaten austauscht, um zu gewährleisten, daß nur der Besitzer des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 Zugang zu dem gesicherten Ort erhalten kann. Hierzu ist vorgesehen, daß die Basisstation 10 in einem aktiven, ersten Kommunikationsmodus ein Aufrufsignal WA für den elektronischen Schlüssel 20 aussendet, wenn ein Betätigungsorgan B, z. B. ein Türgriff, am Kraftfahrzeug F betätigt wird. Der elektronische Schlüssel 20 antwortet daraufhin im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus mit einem entsprechenden Antwortsignal R, womit eine in dem aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ablaufende Kommunikationsverbindung zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 hergestellt ist. Die zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 übermittelten Daten werden durch ein an und für sich bekanntes und daher nicht mehr näher beschriebenes Kommunikationsprotokoll bestimmt, welches der elektronische Schlüssel 20 und die Basisstation 10 befolgen und die Übermittlung von Authentifizierungsdaten vom elektronischön Schlüssel 20 an die Basisstation 10 beinhaltet. Der Zugang zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug F wird von der Basisstation 10 nur dann zugelassen, wenn die vom elektronischen Schlüssel 20 übermittelten Authentifizierungsdaten mit den von der Basisstation 10 gespeicherten Authentifizierungen übereinstimmen. Hierbei ist vorgesehen, daß die vom elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und/oder von der Basisstation 10 ausgesandten Signale nur eine begrenzte Reichweite aufweisen, um zu verhindern, daß von der Basisstation 10 Zugang zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug F auch dann gewährt wird, wenn sich der elektronische Schlüssel 20 nicht innerhalb einer definierten Umgebung typischerweise einige wenige Meter - des Kraftfahrzeugs F befindet.FIG. 1 now shows the typical constellation which is the starting point of the method for access control to a secure location, in this case a motor vehicle F, described below. In the motor vehicle F, a
Um nun zu verhindern, daß sich Angreifer zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug F dadurch Zugang verschaffen, daß ein erster Angreifer A1 das von der Basisstation 10 im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ausgesandte Aufrufsignal WA mittels einer Funkstredcenverlängerung V zu einem zweiten Angreifer A2 leitet, dieser daraufhin das Aufrufsignal WA der Basisstation 10 an den sich außerhalb der Reichweite der Basisstation 10 befindliche elektronische Schlüssel 20 leitet, das Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 auffängt, über die Funkstreckenverlängerung V dem ersten Angreifer A1 weiterleitet und dieser dann das Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 an die Basisstation 10 weiterleitet, ist vorgesehen, daß die zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus stattfindenden Kommunikation auch eine Sicherheitsprozedur aufweist, welche es gestattet, eine derartige Funkstreckenvertängerung V der entsprechenden Signale WA, R zu erkennen und gegebenenfalls daraufhin die Kommunikation abzubrechen. Eine derartige Sicherheitsprozedur ist z. B. in der älteren internationalen Patentanmeldung PCT/DE99/02178 beschrieben, auf die zur Vermeidung von Wiederholungen bezug genommen wird und deren Offenbarung durch diese Bezugnahme explizit zum Gegenstand der hier vorliegenden technischen Lehre gemacht wird. Sie wird dort dadurch realisiert, daß der elektronische Schlüssel 20 im Rahmen seines als Reaktion auf das Aufrufsignal WA der Basisstation 10 generierten Antwortsignals R ein Kennungssignal übermittelt, das die Basisstation 10 in spektrale Daten umsetzt und nur dann die Kommunikation mit dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 fortsetzt, wenn die von ihr empfangenen spektralen Daten mit der spektralen Signatur des elektronischen Schlüssels 20, die in der Basisstation 10 gespeichert ist, übereinstimmt Insbesondere ist hierbei vorgesehen, daß der elektronische Schlüssel 20 zwei Töne mit der Frequenz f1 bzw. f2 aussendet, die nachher von der Basisstation 10 gemessen werden. Es werden aber nicht nur die beiden Töne f1 und f2, sondern auch Mischungen der beiden Grundtöne höherer Ordnung empfangen, welche in von den Grundtönen frequenzmäßig separierten Frequenzkanälen empfangen werden. Wenn nun die empfangene Signalstärke insbesondere der Nebenlinien dritter Ordnung über einem vordefinierten Wert liegt, ist das ein sicheres Indiz dafür, daß das empfangene Signal des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 über eine Funkstreckenverlängerung V geleitet wurde. In diesem Fall bricht dann die Basisstation 10 die Kommunikation mit dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 ab und sperrt den Zugang zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug F.In order to prevent attackers from gaining access to the secured motor vehicle F by virtue of a first attacker A1 receiving the signal from the
Da aber Üblicherweise vorgesehen ist, daß der elektronische Schlüssel 20 mit der Basisstation 10 nicht nur über im vorstehend beschriebenen aktiven Kommunikationsmodus, sondern auch im sogenannten Back-up-Modus in einem zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus miteinander zu kommunizieren in der Lage sein sollen, ist es erforderlich, auch in diesem passiven Kommunikationsmodus, in dem die Sicherungsprozedur des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus nicht funktioniert, eine weitere Sicherungsprozedur für eben diesen passiven Kommunikationsmodus vorzusehen.Since it is usually provided that the
Dies wird in vorteilhafter Art und Weise dadurch erreicht, daß die Basisstation 10 nicht nur den Informationsgehalt der ihr zugeführten Signale, insbesondere des Antwortsignals R des Schlüssels 20 auswertet, sondern auch untersucht, ob die ihr zugeführten Signale des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus oder im zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen werden. Empfängt die Basisstation 10 das als Reaktion auf einen von ihr ausgesandten Aufrufbefehl WA vom elektronischen Schlüssel 20 generierte Antwortsignal R im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus, so sendet sie als Reaktion auf das im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus erhaltene Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 an diesen ein erstes Selektionssignal S1, welches - neben den üblichen Funktionen eines Selektionssignals - bewirkt, daß zumindest die sicherheitsrelevante und vorzugsweise die gesamte weitere Kommunikation zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 ausschließlich im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus durchgeführt wird und die Durchführung des verbleibenden Authentifizierungsprozesses im passiven Kommunikationsmodus unterbunden wird. Dies hat den Vorteil, daß eine Funkstreckenverlängerung V durch die Sicherungsprozedur des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus detektierbar ist und gegebenenfalls entsprechende Maßnahmen gegen einen Angriff einer nicht-authorisierten Person vorgenommen werden können.This is achieved in an advantageous manner in that the
Empfängt jedoch die Basisstation 10 des Kraftfahrzeugs F das Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 im zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus, so sendet sie als Reaktion darauf an den elektronischen Schlüssel 20 ein zweites Selektionssignal S2, welches in entsprechender Art und Weise bewirkt, daß die Kommunikation des weiteren Authentifizierungsvorgangs im zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus durchgeführt wird, und eine Durchführung des verbleibenden Authentifizierungsvorgangs im ersten Kommunikationsmodus unterbunden wird. Es ist somit einem eine im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus arbeitende Funkstreckenverlängerung V verwendenden Angreifer nicht mehr möglich, diese erfolgreich einzusetzen.However, if the
Claims (5)
- Method for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle (F), in which these devices (10, 20) interchange authentication data without the use of wires between an electronic key (20) and a base station (10) in an active or a passive communication mode, with the base station (10) sending a call signal (WA) to the electronic key (20) at the start of this authentication process and with the electronic key (20) responding to the call signal (WA) with a response signal (R), and with a security procedure against radio path lengthening (V) being carried out in the active communication mode, characterized in that the base station (10) investigates the response signal (R) received by it from the electronic key (20) to determine the communication mode in which this response signal (R) was received, and in that, in the situation where the response signal (R) from the electronic key (20) was received in the active communication mode, the base station (10) sends a first selection instruction (S1) to the electronic key (20), which first selection instruction (S1) results in the electronic key (20) carrying out the subsequent communication in the active communication mode, and in that, in the situation where the response signal (R) from the electronic key (20) was received in the passive communication mode, the base station (10) sends a second selection instruction (S2) to the electronic key (20), which second selection instruction (S2) results in the electronic key (20) carrying out the subsequent communication in the passive communication mode.
- Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that the security procedure in the active communication mode is carried out in that the electronic key (20) transmits an identifier to the base station (10) in the course of its response signal (R) which is generated as a reaction to the call signal (WA) from the base station (10), which identifier is converted by the base station (10) to spectral data, and the communication using the electronic key (20) is then continued only if the spectral data received by it matches a spectral signature of the electronic key (20), which is stored in the base station (10).
- Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that, once the electronic key (20) has received a selection instruction (S1, S2), it carries out at least the security-relevant communication of the authentication process in the communication mode which corresponds to the received selection instruction (S1, S2).
- Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that, after the electronic key (20) has received a selection instruction (S1, S2), it carries out at least the entire subsequent authentication process in the communication mode which corresponds to the received selection instruction (S1, S2).
- Apparatus for access control to a secure location (F), which has a base station (10) and an electronic key (20), with the base station (10) and the electronic key (20) containing means for interchanging authentication data in an active or a passive communication mode, and the base station (10) having means for carrying out a security procedure against radio path lengthening (V) in the active communication mode, characterized in that the base station (10) has analysis means for analysis of a received response signal (R) from the electronic key (20) with respect to the communication mode, and the base station (10) has means for production of a first selection instruction (S1) and for transmission of the first selection instruction (S1) to the electronic key (20) so that, in the situation in which the response signal (R) from the' electronic key (20) is received in the base station (10) in the active communication mode, the electronic key (20) carries out the subsequent communication, with the base station (10) on the basis of the reception of the first selection instruction (S1) in the active communication mode, and the base station (10) has means for production of a second selection instruction (S2) and for transmission of the second selection instruction (S2) to the electronic key (20), so that, in the situation in which the base station (10) has received the response signal (R) from the electronic key (20) in the passive communication mode, the electronic key (20) carries out the subsequent communication with the base station (10) in the passive communication mode.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE19949970A DE19949970A1 (en) | 1999-10-16 | 1999-10-16 | Access control of a road vehicle has data exchange between electronic key and in vehicle controller for authentication |
| DE19949970 | 1999-10-16 | ||
| PCT/EP2000/009276 WO2001029352A1 (en) | 1999-10-16 | 2000-09-22 | Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP1287221A1 EP1287221A1 (en) | 2003-03-05 |
| EP1287221B1 true EP1287221B1 (en) | 2006-05-10 |
Family
ID=7925919
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP00969282A Expired - Lifetime EP1287221B1 (en) | 1999-10-16 | 2000-09-22 | Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle |
Country Status (6)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US6954007B1 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP1287221B1 (en) |
| JP (1) | JP2003512549A (en) |
| CN (1) | CN1285815C (en) |
| DE (2) | DE19949970A1 (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2001029352A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE10246060B4 (en) * | 2002-10-02 | 2012-06-28 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Device for safe signal generation |
| CN1813271B (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2010-12-01 | Nxp股份有限公司 | Method and arrangements for increasing the security of transponder systems, particularly for access to automobiles |
| EP1759336A2 (en) * | 2004-06-15 | 2007-03-07 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Radio identification with an additional close-range check |
| DE102005061660A1 (en) * | 2005-12-22 | 2007-06-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Portable data carrier with active contactless interface |
| US20100274570A1 (en) * | 2009-04-24 | 2010-10-28 | Gm Global Technology Operations, Inc. | Vehicle charging authorization |
| US8841881B2 (en) | 2010-06-02 | 2014-09-23 | Bryan Marc Failing | Energy transfer with vehicles |
| CN102201135A (en) * | 2011-05-26 | 2011-09-28 | 深圳中兴力维技术有限公司 | Access control management method applied to base station |
Family Cites Families (17)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GB2239571B (en) * | 1989-12-29 | 1994-08-03 | Schlumberger Ind Ltd | Transponder |
| DE4003280C5 (en) | 1990-02-03 | 2007-06-28 | Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag | Safety device for motor vehicles |
| DE4226053C2 (en) * | 1991-08-09 | 1994-12-01 | Alps Electric Co Ltd | Remote control device for a motor vehicle locking system |
| DE4329697C2 (en) | 1993-09-02 | 1995-10-05 | Siemens Ag | Remote controllable access control device |
| EP0659963A1 (en) * | 1993-12-20 | 1995-06-28 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Electronic immobilizing device for a motor vehicle |
| DE4409167C1 (en) * | 1994-03-17 | 1995-06-29 | Siemens Ag | Remote-controlled centralised locking system for automobile |
| DE4440855C2 (en) * | 1994-11-15 | 2000-04-06 | Simons & Vos Identifikationssy | Control system |
| DE19539851C2 (en) | 1995-10-26 | 1999-01-07 | Daimler Benz Ag | Key vehicle communication device for controlling an immobilizer and a remote-controlled function |
| DE19632025C2 (en) * | 1996-08-08 | 1998-07-23 | Daimler Benz Ag | Authentication device with electronic authentication communication |
| EP0848123B1 (en) * | 1996-10-10 | 2004-12-08 | Texas Instruments Deutschland Gmbh | A remote keyless entry system |
| US6323566B1 (en) * | 1996-10-10 | 2001-11-27 | Texas Instruments Incorported | Transponder for remote keyless entry systems |
| US5883443A (en) * | 1997-06-27 | 1999-03-16 | Ut Automotive Dearborn, Inc. | Countermeasure method and system for securing a remote keyless entry system |
| DE19802526B4 (en) * | 1998-01-26 | 2006-02-09 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Device for controlling the access authorization |
| DE19818158A1 (en) * | 1998-04-23 | 1999-10-28 | Huf Huelsbeck & Fuerst Gmbh | Remote control system for controlling access control devices located on vehicles |
| AU743933B2 (en) * | 1998-07-20 | 2002-02-07 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | An entry system |
| DE19836957C1 (en) * | 1998-08-14 | 1999-09-30 | Siemens Ag | Theft protection arrangement for motor vehicle |
| JP2000160896A (en) * | 1998-12-01 | 2000-06-13 | Tokai Rika Co Ltd | Remote control device for vehicle |
-
1999
- 1999-10-16 DE DE19949970A patent/DE19949970A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2000
- 2000-09-22 DE DE50012740T patent/DE50012740D1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-09-22 EP EP00969282A patent/EP1287221B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-09-22 WO PCT/EP2000/009276 patent/WO2001029352A1/en active IP Right Grant
- 2000-09-22 US US10/110,825 patent/US6954007B1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2000-09-22 CN CN00814391.9A patent/CN1285815C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2000-09-22 JP JP2001532319A patent/JP2003512549A/en active Pending
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US6954007B1 (en) | 2005-10-11 |
| WO2001029352A1 (en) | 2001-04-26 |
| EP1287221A1 (en) | 2003-03-05 |
| CN1285815C (en) | 2006-11-22 |
| DE50012740D1 (en) | 2006-06-14 |
| DE19949970A1 (en) | 2001-04-19 |
| JP2003512549A (en) | 2003-04-02 |
| CN1379841A (en) | 2002-11-13 |
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