EP1287221A1 - Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle - Google Patents

Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle

Info

Publication number
EP1287221A1
EP1287221A1 EP00969282A EP00969282A EP1287221A1 EP 1287221 A1 EP1287221 A1 EP 1287221A1 EP 00969282 A EP00969282 A EP 00969282A EP 00969282 A EP00969282 A EP 00969282A EP 1287221 A1 EP1287221 A1 EP 1287221A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
electronic key
base station
communication mode
received
response signal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP00969282A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP1287221B1 (en
Inventor
Michael Meier
Stephan Schmitz
Andreas Titze
Dominique Nemetschek
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Robert Bosch GmbH
Volkswagen AG
Original Assignee
Robert Bosch GmbH
Volkswagen AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Robert Bosch GmbH, Volkswagen AG filed Critical Robert Bosch GmbH
Publication of EP1287221A1 publication Critical patent/EP1287221A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1287221B1 publication Critical patent/EP1287221B1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00341—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks keyless data carrier having more than one limited data transmission ranges
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00777—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by induction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a device for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle, in which these devices exchange authentication data wirelessly between an electronic key and a base station in an active or a passive communication mode, the base station being activated at the beginning of this authentication process the electronic key sends a call signal and this responds to the call signal with a response signal, and in the active communication mode a security procedure is carried out against a radio link extension, and a device for performing this method.
  • the intercepted signal via a radio link change to another attacker who is in the vicinity of the electronic key is located, forwarded and the other attacker then the response signal of the electronic key to the call signal of the base station over the radio link extension back to first attacker and sends back to the base station via this
  • the known method provides that the electronic key transmits a signal to the base station, which is converted into spectral data by the base station. The base station then only grants access to the secure location if the Transmission of the authentication data, these spectral data correspond to a spectral signature of the electronic key stored in the base station.
  • the signal transmitted by the electronic key has at least two tones with different frequencies f-
  • the base station examines the response signal it received from the electronic key in which communication mode this response signal was received, and in that the base station in the event that the response signal of the electronic key was received in the active communication mode , sends a first selection command to the electronic key, which causes the electronic key to carry out the subsequent communication in the active communication mode and, in the event that the response signal of the electronic key was received in the passive communication mode, unites the base station to the electronic key sends a second selection command, which causes the electronic key to carry out the subsequent communication in passive communication mode
  • the inventive method advantageously ensures that even in passive communication mode between the electronic key and the base station, a corresponding attack by an unauthorized person can be warded off by the base station being active in the type of communication in which it receives the response signal from the electronic Key receives, reacts If the response signal occurs in the active communication mode, the further authentication procedure is carried out in the active communication mode and a radio link extension can be excluded by the known security procedure.
  • the base station receives the response signal of the electronic key in passive communication mode, it prevents until the completion of the Access procedure in an advantageous manner, a communication between the base station and the key via the first, active communication mode. It is therefore not possible for an on gripper performs a radio link extension over a frequency of the active communication mode
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the method.
  • FIG. 1 is the starting point of the method described below for access control to a secure location, here to a motor vehicle F.
  • a base station 10 is arranged in the motor vehicle F, which wirelessly exchanges authentication data with an electronic key 20 in order to ensure that only the owner of the electronic key 20 can gain access to the secure location.
  • the base station 10 sends out a call signal WA for the electronic key 20 in an active, first communication mode when an actuator B, e.g. B. a door handle on the motor vehicle F is operated.
  • the electronic key 20 then responds in the active communication mode with a corresponding response signal R, whereby a communication connection running in the active communication mode is established between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10.
  • the data transmitted between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 are determined by a communication protocol which is known per se and is therefore no longer described, which the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 follow and the transmission of authentication data from the electronic key 20 to the Base station 10 includes.
  • Access to the secured motor vehicle F is only permitted by the base station 10 if the authentication data transmitted by the electronic key 20 match the authentications stored by the base station 10. It is provided here that the signals emitted by the electronic key 20 and / or by the base station 10 have only a limited range, in order to prevent the base station 10 from granting access to the secured motor vehicle F even when the electronic key is located 20 is not within a defined environment - typically a few meters - of the motor vehicle F.
  • Radio link extension V forwards to a second attacker B, who then passes the call signal WA of the base station 10 to the electronic key 20 which is out of the range of the base station 10, forwards the response signal R of the electronic key 20 via the radio link extension V to the first attacker A and forwards it then forwards the response signal R of the electronic key 20 to the base station 10, it is provided that the communication taking place between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 in the first, active communication mode also has a security procedure which allows such a radio link extension V of the corresponding one To recognize signals WA, R and, if necessary, then to terminate the communication.
  • the electronic key 20 transmits an identification signal within the framework of its response signal R generated in response to the call signal WA of the base station 10
  • Base station 10 converts into spectral data and only continues the communication with the electronic key 20 if the spectral data received by it matches the spectral signature of the electronic key 20, which is stored in the base station 10, in particular it is provided here that the electronic keys 20 two tones with the frequency f-
  • the base station 10 not only evaluates the information content of the signals supplied to it, in particular the response signal R of the key 20, but also examines whether the signals supplied to it by the electronic key 20 are in the first, active communication mode or are received in the second, passive communication mode.
  • the base station 10 If the base station 10 receives the response signal R generated by the electronic key 20 in response to a call command WA sent by it in the first, active communication mode, it sends in response to the response signal R of the electronic signal received in the active communication mode Final ice 20 to this a first selection signal S1, which - in addition to the usual functions of a selection signal - causes at least the security-relevant and preferably all further communication between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 can be carried out in the first, active communication mode and the implementation of the remaining authentication process in the passive communication mode is prevented.
  • This has the advantage that a radio link extension V can be detected by the security procedure of the active communication mode and, if necessary, appropriate measures are taken against an attack by a non-authorized person can
  • the base station 10 of the motor vehicle F receives the response signal R of the electronic key 20 in the second, passive communication mode, it sends a second selection signal S2 in response to the electronic key 20, which in a corresponding manner causes the communication of the further authentication process is carried out in the second, passive communication mode, and the implementation of the remaining authentication process in the first communication mode is prevented. It is therefore a working in the active communication mode Attackers using radio link extension V are no longer able to use it successfully.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for controlling entry, in particular, into a motor vehicle (F), during which a key (20) and a base station (10) wirelessly exchange authentication data between one another in an active or a passive communication mode. At the beginning of this authentication process, the base station (10) transmits a call signal (WA) to the key (20) and the key replies to said call signal (WA) with a reply signal (R). The base station (10) verifies the received reply signal (R) of the key (20) in the communications mode in which said reply signal (R) was received. If the reply signal (R) of the key (20) was received in the active communications mode, the base station (10) transmits a first selection instruction (S1) to the key (20) thus causing the key (20) to carry out the subsequent communication in the active communications mode. If the reply signal (R) of the key (20) was received in the passive communications mode, the base station (10) transmits a second selection instruction (S2) to the key (20) thus causing the electronic key (20) to carry out the subsequent communication in the passive communications mode.

Description

Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, insbesondere einem Kraftfahrzeug Method and device for controlling access to a secure location, in particular a motor vehicle
Die Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, insbesondere zu einem Kraftfahrzeug, bei dem zwischen einem elektronischen Schlüssel und einer Basisstation in einem aktiven oder einem passiven Kommunikationsmodus diese Einrichtungen drahtlos Authentifizierungsdaten austauschen, wobei zu Beginn dieses Authentifizierungsprozesses die Basisstation an den elektronischen Schlüssel ein Aufrufsignal sendet und dieser auf das Aufrufsignal mit einem Antwortsignal antwortet, und wobei im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus eine Sicherungsprozedur gegen eine Funkstreckenverlängerung durchgeführt wird, sowie eine Vorrichtung zur Durchführung dieses Verfahrens.The invention relates to a method and a device for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle, in which these devices exchange authentication data wirelessly between an electronic key and a base station in an active or a passive communication mode, the base station being activated at the beginning of this authentication process the electronic key sends a call signal and this responds to the call signal with a response signal, and in the active communication mode a security procedure is carried out against a radio link extension, and a device for performing this method.
Ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung der eingangs genannten Art sind in der älteren internationalen Patentanmeldung PCT/DE99/02178 beschrieben. Hierbei ist vorgesehen, daß die zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation ablaufende Sicherungsprozedur derart erfolgt, daß im aktiven Betriebsmodus die Kommunikation zwischen dem elektronischem Schlüssel und der Basisstation über UHF-Frequenzen erfolgt, wobei die Reichweite der Übertragung zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation begrenzt ist, um zu gewährleisten, daß die Kommunikationsverbindung unterbrochen wird, wenn sich die im Besitz des Schlüssels befindliche Person aus der unmittelbaren Nähe des gesicherten Ortes, z. B. des Kraftfahrzeugs, entfernt.A method and a device of the type mentioned at the outset are described in the older international patent application PCT / DE99 / 02178. It is provided here that the security procedure that takes place between the electronic key and the base station takes place in such a way that, in the active operating mode, the communication between the electronic key and the base station takes place via UHF frequencies, the range of the transmission between the electronic key and the base station being limited is to ensure that the communication link is interrupted when the person in possession of the key is in the immediate vicinity of the secure location, e.g. B. the motor vehicle removed.
Um nun zu verhindern, daß ein derartiges passives Zugangskontrollsystem nicht dadurch außer Kraft gesetzt wird, daß ein unbefugter Angreifer das von der Basisstation ausgesandte Aufrufsignal an den elektronischen Schlüssel abfängt, das abgefangene Signal über eine Funkstreckenveränderung an einen weiteren Angreifer, der sich in der Nähe des elektronischen Schlüssels befindet, weitersendet und der weitere Angreifer dann das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels auf das Aufrufsignal der Basisstation über die Funkstreckenverlängerung wieder zurück zum ersten Angreifer und über diesen zurück zur Basisstation sendet, ist bei dem bekannten Verfahren vorgesehen, daß der elektronische Schlüssel der Basisstation ein Signal übermittelt, das von der Basisstation in spektrale Daten umgesetzt wird Die Basisstation gewahrt dann nur Zugang zu dem gesicherten Ort, wenn bei der Übertragung der Authentifizierungsdaten diese spektralen Daten mit einer in der Basisstation gespeicherten spektralen Signatur des elektronischen Schlusseis übereinstimmen Hierbei ist vorgesehen, daß das von dem elektronischen Schlüssel ausgesandte Signal mindestens zwei Tone mit unterschiedlichen Frequenzen f-| bzw f2 umfaßt, und daß die spektralen Daten Tone dritter Ordnung des übermittelten Signals darstellen, die von der Basisstation auf den Frequenzen 2f-|-f2 und 2f2-f-| gemessen wird Liegt die empfangene Signalstarke dieser Nebenlinien des vom elektronischen Schlüssel ausgesandten Signals über einem vordefinierten Wert, so interpretiert dies die Basisstation als sicheres Anzeichen dafür, daß eine Funkstreckenverlangerung durchgeführt wurde, und verweigert den Zugang zum gesicherten OrtIn order to prevent such a passive access control system from being overridden by an unauthorized attacker intercepting the call signal sent by the base station to the electronic key, the intercepted signal via a radio link change to another attacker who is in the vicinity of the electronic key is located, forwarded and the other attacker then the response signal of the electronic key to the call signal of the base station over the radio link extension back to first attacker and sends back to the base station via this, the known method provides that the electronic key transmits a signal to the base station, which is converted into spectral data by the base station. The base station then only grants access to the secure location if the Transmission of the authentication data, these spectral data correspond to a spectral signature of the electronic key stored in the base station. It is provided that the signal transmitted by the electronic key has at least two tones with different frequencies f- | or f2, and that the spectral data represent third-order tones of the transmitted signal, which are transmitted by the base station on the frequencies 2f- | -f2 and 2f2-f- | If the received signal strength of these secondary lines of the signal emitted by the electronic key is above a predefined value, the base station interprets this as a sure sign that the radio link has been extended and denies access to the secure location
Um beim Ausfall des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus im Rahmen eines sogenannten Back-up-Modus, also eines passiven Kommunikationsmodus, dem Benutzer der elektronischen Zugangskontrolle noch die Möglichkeit zu geben, den gesicherten Ort betreten zu können, ist vorgesehen, daß in diesem passiven Kommunikationsmodus eine Datenübertragung zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation durch eine passive Modulation des von der Basisstation ausgesandten Erregerfeldes erfolgt Der elektronische Schlüssel verstimmt entsprechend den zu sendenden Daten seinen Ressonanzkreis, was von der Basisstation als zusätzliche Belastung ihres Schwingkreises gemessen werden kann Diese auf LF-Frequenzen erfolgende passive Kommunikation ist auf wenige Zentimeter beschrankt, was bedeutet, daß ein potentieller Angreifer seine entsprechende Antenne sehr nahe an die Sendeantenne der Basisstation plazieren muß, um in diesem Back-up-Modus zu arbeiten, wenn er versucht, die vom Schlüssel ausgesandten Datensignale auf einer LF-Frequenz im Back-up-Modus an die Basisstation zu senden Das bekannte Verfahren sowie die nach diesem Verfahren arbeitenden bekannten Vorrichtungen besitzen den Nachteil, daß sie keinen wirksamen Schutz gegen einen auf diese vorgenannte Art und Weise erfolgenden Angriff bieten Es ist daher Aufgabe der Erfindung, ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung der eingangs genannten Art derart weiterzubilden, daß ein wirksamer Schutz gegen eine Funkstreckenverlangerung im passiven Kommunikationsmodus gegeben istIn order to give the user of the electronic access control the possibility of being able to enter the secure location in the event of failure of the active communication mode in the context of a so-called back-up mode, i.e. a passive communication mode, it is provided that in this passive communication mode a data transmission between the electronic key and the base station by passive modulation of the excitation field emitted by the base station.The electronic key detunes its resonance circuit according to the data to be sent, which can be measured by the base station as an additional load on its resonant circuit.This is passive communication that takes place on LF frequencies limited to a few centimeters, which means that a potential attacker would have to place his corresponding antenna very close to the base station's transmit antenna in order to work in this back-up mode if he tries to transmit the ones transmitted by the key Sending data signals on an LF frequency in the back-up mode to the base station The known method and the known devices operating according to this method have the disadvantage that they offer no effective protection against an attack taking place in this manner It is therefore an object of the invention to develop a method and a device of the type mentioned at the outset in such a way that effective protection against a radio link extension in the passive communication mode is provided
Diese Aufgabe wird durch das erfindungsgemaße Verfahren dadurch gelost, daß die Basisstation das von ihr empfangene Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels daraufhin untersucht in welchem Kommunikationsmodus dieses Antwortsignal empfangen wurde, und daß die Basisstation für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen wurde, an den elektronischen Schlüssel einen ersten Selektionsbefehl sendet, welcher bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel die darauffolgende Kommunikation im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ausfuhrt, und daß für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels im passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen wurde, die Basisstation an den elektronischen Schlüssel einen zweiten Selektionsbefehl sendet, welcher bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel die nachfolgende Kommunikation im passiven Kommunikationsmodus ausfuhrtThis object is achieved by the method according to the invention in that the base station examines the response signal it received from the electronic key in which communication mode this response signal was received, and in that the base station in the event that the response signal of the electronic key was received in the active communication mode , sends a first selection command to the electronic key, which causes the electronic key to carry out the subsequent communication in the active communication mode and, in the event that the response signal of the electronic key was received in the passive communication mode, unites the base station to the electronic key sends a second selection command, which causes the electronic key to carry out the subsequent communication in passive communication mode
Durch das erfindungsgemaße Verfahren wird in vorteilhafter Art und Weise erreicht, daß auch im passiven Kommunikationsmodus zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel und der Basisstation ein entsprechender Angriff einer nicht authoπsierten Person abgewehrt werden kann, indem die Basisstation aktiv auf die Kommunikationsart, in der sie das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlüssels empfangt, reagiert Wenn das Antwortsignal im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus erfolgt, wird das weitere Authentifizierungsverfahren im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus durchgeführt und eine Funkstreckenverlangerung kann durch die bekannte Sicherungsprozedur ausgeschlossen werden Wenn aber die Basisstation das Antwortsignal des elektronischen Schlusseis im passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangt, verhindert sie bis zum Abschluß der Zugangsprozedur in vorteilhafter Art und Weise eine Kommunikation zwischen Basisstation und Schlüssel über den ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus Es ist somit nicht möglich, daß ein Angreifer über eine Frequenz des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus eine Funkstreckenverlangerung durchfuhrtThe inventive method advantageously ensures that even in passive communication mode between the electronic key and the base station, a corresponding attack by an unauthorized person can be warded off by the base station being active in the type of communication in which it receives the response signal from the electronic Key receives, reacts If the response signal occurs in the active communication mode, the further authentication procedure is carried out in the active communication mode and a radio link extension can be excluded by the known security procedure. However, if the base station receives the response signal of the electronic key in passive communication mode, it prevents until the completion of the Access procedure in an advantageous manner, a communication between the base station and the key via the first, active communication mode. It is therefore not possible for an on gripper performs a radio link extension over a frequency of the active communication mode
Vorteilhafte Weiterbildungen der Erfindung sind Gegenstand der Unteranspruche Weitere Einzelheiten und Vorteile der Erfindung sind dem Ausführungsbeispiel zu entnehmen, das im folgenden anhand der einzigen Figur beschrieben wird. Es zeigt:Advantageous developments of the invention are the subject of the dependent claims Further details and advantages of the invention can be found in the exemplary embodiment which is described below with reference to the single figure. It shows:
Figur 1 eine Prinzipskizze eines Ausführungsbeispiels des des Verfahrens.Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the method.
In Figur 1 ist nun die typische Konstellation dargestellt, die Ausgangspunkt des nachstehend beschriebenen Verfahrens zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, hier zu einem Kraftfahrzeug F, ist. Im Kraftfahrzeug F ist eine Basisstation 10 angeordnet, welche drahtlos mit einem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 Authentifizierungsdaten austauscht, um zu gewährleisten, daß nur der Besitzer des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 Zugang zu dem gesicherten Ort erhalten kann. Hierzu ist vorgesehen, daß die Basisstation 10 in einem aktiven, ersten Kommunikationsmodus ein Aufrufsignal WA für den elektronischen Schlüssel 20 aussendet, wenn ein Betätigungsorgan B, z. B. ein Türgriff, am Kraftfahrzeug F betätigt wird. Der elektronische Schlüssel 20 antwortet daraufhin im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus mit einem entsprechenden Antwortsignal R, womit eine in dem aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ablaufende Kommunikationsverbindung zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 hergestellt ist. Die zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 übermittelten Daten werden durch ein an und für sich bekanntes und daher nicht mehr näher beschriebenes Kommunikationsprotokoll bestimmt, welches der elektronische Schlüssel 20 und die Basisstation 10 befolgen und die Übermittlung von Authentifizierungsdaten vom elektronischen Schlüssel 20 an die Basisstation 10 beinhaltet. Der Zugang zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug F wird von der Basissation 10 nur dann zugelassen, wenn die vom elektronischen Schlüssel 20 übermittelten Authentifizierungsdaten mit den von der Basisstation 10 gespeicherten Authentifizierungen übereinstimmen. Hierbei ist vorgesehen, daß die vom elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und/oder von der Basisstation 10 ausgesandten Signale nur eine begrenzte Reichweite aufweisen, um zu verhindern, daß von der Basisstation 10 Zugang zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug F auch dann gewährt wird, wenn sich der elektronische Schlüssel 20 nicht innerhalb einer definierten Umgebung - typischerweise einige wenige Meter - des Kraftfahrzeugs F befindet.The typical constellation is now shown in FIG. 1, which is the starting point of the method described below for access control to a secure location, here to a motor vehicle F. A base station 10 is arranged in the motor vehicle F, which wirelessly exchanges authentication data with an electronic key 20 in order to ensure that only the owner of the electronic key 20 can gain access to the secure location. For this purpose, it is provided that the base station 10 sends out a call signal WA for the electronic key 20 in an active, first communication mode when an actuator B, e.g. B. a door handle on the motor vehicle F is operated. The electronic key 20 then responds in the active communication mode with a corresponding response signal R, whereby a communication connection running in the active communication mode is established between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10. The data transmitted between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 are determined by a communication protocol which is known per se and is therefore no longer described, which the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 follow and the transmission of authentication data from the electronic key 20 to the Base station 10 includes. Access to the secured motor vehicle F is only permitted by the base station 10 if the authentication data transmitted by the electronic key 20 match the authentications stored by the base station 10. It is provided here that the signals emitted by the electronic key 20 and / or by the base station 10 have only a limited range, in order to prevent the base station 10 from granting access to the secured motor vehicle F even when the electronic key is located 20 is not within a defined environment - typically a few meters - of the motor vehicle F.
Um nun zu verhindern, daß sich Angreifer zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug F dadurch Zugang verschaffen, daß ein erster Angreifer A das von der Basisstation 10 im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ausgesandte Aufrufsignal WA mittels einer Funkstreckenverlangerung V zu einem zweiten Angreifer B leitet, dieser daraufhin das Aufrufsignal WA der Basisstation 10 an den sich außerhalb der Reichweite der Basisstation 10 befindliche elektronische Schlüssel 20 leitet das Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 auffangt über die Funkstreckenverlangerung V dem ersten Angreifer A weiterleitet und dieser dann das Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 an die Basisstation 10 weiterleitet, ist vorgesehen, daß die zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus stattfindenden Kommunikation auch eine Sicherheitsprozedur aufweist, welche es gestattet, eine derartige Funkstreckenverlangerung V der entsprechenden Signale WA, R zu erkennen und gegebenenfalls daraufhin die Kommunikation abzubrechen Eine derartige Sicherheitsprozedur ist z B in der alteren internationalen Patentanmeldung PCT/DE99/02178 beschrieben, auf die zur Vermeidung von Wiederholungen bezug genommen wird und deren Offenbarung durch diese Bezugnahme explizit zum Gegenstand der hier vorliegenden technischen Lehre gemacht wird Sie wird dort dadurch realisiert, daß der elektronische Schlüssel 20 im Rahmen seines als Reaktion auf das Aufrufsignal WA der Basisstation 10 generierten Antwortsignals R ein Kennungssignal übermittelt, das die Basisstation 10 in spektrale Daten umsetzt und nur dann die Kommunikation mit dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 fortsetzt, wenn die von ihr empfangenen spektralen Daten mit der spektralen Signatur des elektronischen Schlüssels 20, die in der Basisstation 10 gespeichert ist, übereinstimmt Insbesondere ist hierbei vorgesehen, daß der elektronische Schlüssel 20 zwei Tone mit der Frequenz f-| bzw f2 aussendet, die nachher von der Basisstation 10 gemessen werden Es werden aber nicht nur die beiden Tone f-j und f2, sondern auch Mischungen der beiden Grundtone höherer Ordnung empfangen, welche in von den Grundtonen frequenzmaßig separierten Freqenzkanalen empfangen werden Wenn nun die empfangene Signalstarke insbesondere der Nebenlinien dritter Ordnung über einem vordefinierten Wert liegt, ist das ein sicheres Indiz dafür, daß das empfangene Signal des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 über eine Funkstreckenverlangerung V geleitet wurde In diesem Fall bricht dann die Basisstation 10 die Kommunikation mit dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 ab und sperrt den Zugang zu dem gesicherten Kraftfahrzeug FIn order to prevent attackers from gaining access to the secured motor vehicle F by a first attacker A using a call signal WA transmitted by the base station 10 in the first, active communication mode Radio link extension V forwards to a second attacker B, who then passes the call signal WA of the base station 10 to the electronic key 20 which is out of the range of the base station 10, forwards the response signal R of the electronic key 20 via the radio link extension V to the first attacker A and forwards it then forwards the response signal R of the electronic key 20 to the base station 10, it is provided that the communication taking place between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 in the first, active communication mode also has a security procedure which allows such a radio link extension V of the corresponding one To recognize signals WA, R and, if necessary, then to terminate the communication. Such a security procedure is described, for example, in the older international patent application PCT / DE99 / 02178, to which reference is made to avoid repetitions is taken and the disclosure of which is made explicitly the subject of the present technical teaching by this reference. It is implemented there in that the electronic key 20 transmits an identification signal within the framework of its response signal R generated in response to the call signal WA of the base station 10 Base station 10 converts into spectral data and only continues the communication with the electronic key 20 if the spectral data received by it matches the spectral signature of the electronic key 20, which is stored in the base station 10, in particular it is provided here that the electronic keys 20 two tones with the frequency f- | or f2, which are subsequently measured by the base station 10. However, not only the two tones f- j and f2 are received, but also mixtures of the two higher-order fundamental tones, which are received in frequency channels separated by frequency from the basic tones if the received ones Signal strength, in particular of the third-order secondary lines, is above a predefined value, this is a reliable indication that the received signal of the electronic key 20 was passed via a radio link extension V. In this case, the base station 10 then breaks off the communication with the electronic key 20 and blocks access to the secured motor vehicle F
Da aber üblicherweise vorgesehen ist, daß der elektronische Schlüssel 20 mit der Basisstation 10 nicht nur über im vorstehend beschriebenen aktiven Kommunikationsmodus, sondern auch im sogenannten Back-up-Modus in einem zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus miteinander zu kommunizieren in der Lage sein sollen, ist es erforderlich, auch in diesem passiven Kommunikationsmodus, in dem die Sicherungsprozedur des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus nicht funktioniert, eine weitere Sicherungsprozedur für eben diesen passiven Kommunikationsmodus vorzusehenHowever, since it is usually provided that the electronic key 20 with the base station 10 not only in one in the active communication mode described above, but also in the so-called back-up mode second passive communication mode to be able to communicate with each other, it is necessary to provide a further backup procedure for this passive communication mode even in this passive communication mode, in which the backup procedure of the active communication mode does not work
Dies wird in vorteilhafter Art und Weise dadurch erreicht, daß die Basisstation 10 nicht nur den Informationsgehalt der ihr zugefuhrten Signale, insbesondere des Antwortsignals R des Schlusseis 20 auswertet, sondern auch untersucht, ob die ihr zugefuhrten Signale des elektronischen Schlusseis 20 im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus oder im zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen werden Empfangt die Basisstation 10 das als Reaktion auf einen von ihr ausgesandten Aufrufbefehl WA vom elektronischen Schlüssel 20 generierte Antwortsignal R im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus, so sendet sie als Reaktion auf das im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus erhaltene Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlusseis 20 an diesen ein erstes Selektionssignal S1 , welches - neben den üblichen Funktionen eines Selektionssignals - bewirkt, daß zumindest die sicherheitsrelevante und vorzugsweise die gesamte weitere Kommunikation zwischen dem elektronischen Schlüssel 20 und der Basisstation 10 ausschließlich im ersten, aktiven Kommunikationsmodus durchgeführt wird und die Durchfuhrung des verbleibenden Authentifizierungsprozesses im passiven Kommunikationsmodus unterbunden wird Dies hat den Vorteil, daß eine Funkstreckenverlangerung V durch die Sicherungsprozedur des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus detektierbar ist und gegebenenfalls entsprechende Maßnahmen gegen einen Angriff einer nicht-authoπsierten Person vorgenommen werden könnenThis is achieved in an advantageous manner in that the base station 10 not only evaluates the information content of the signals supplied to it, in particular the response signal R of the key 20, but also examines whether the signals supplied to it by the electronic key 20 are in the first, active communication mode or are received in the second, passive communication mode. If the base station 10 receives the response signal R generated by the electronic key 20 in response to a call command WA sent by it in the first, active communication mode, it sends in response to the response signal R of the electronic signal received in the active communication mode Final ice 20 to this a first selection signal S1, which - in addition to the usual functions of a selection signal - causes at least the security-relevant and preferably all further communication between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 can be carried out in the first, active communication mode and the implementation of the remaining authentication process in the passive communication mode is prevented. This has the advantage that a radio link extension V can be detected by the security procedure of the active communication mode and, if necessary, appropriate measures are taken against an attack by a non-authorized person can
Empfangt jedoch die Basisstation 10 des Kraftfahrzeugs F das Antwortsignal R des elektronischen Schlüssels 20 im zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus, so sendet sie als Reaktion darauf an den elektronischen Schlüssel 20 ein zweites Selektionssignal S2 welches in entsprechender Art und Weise bewirkt, daß die Kommunikation des weiteren Authentifizierungsvorgangs im zweiten, passiven Kommunikationsmodus durchgeführt wird, und eine Durchfuhrung des verbleibenden Authentifizierungsvorgangs im ersten Kommunikationsmodus unterbunden wird Es ist somit einem eine im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus arbeitende Funkstreckenverlangerung V verwendenden Angreifer nicht mehr möglich, diese erfolgreich einzusetzen. However, if the base station 10 of the motor vehicle F receives the response signal R of the electronic key 20 in the second, passive communication mode, it sends a second selection signal S2 in response to the electronic key 20, which in a corresponding manner causes the communication of the further authentication process is carried out in the second, passive communication mode, and the implementation of the remaining authentication process in the first communication mode is prevented. It is therefore a working in the active communication mode Attackers using radio link extension V are no longer able to use it successfully.

Claims

PATENTANSPRUCHE PATENT CLAIMS
1. Verfahren zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, insbesondere zu einem Kraftfahrzeug (F), bei dem zwischen einem elektronischen Schlüssel (20) und einer Basisstation (10) in einem aktiven oder einem passiven Kommunikationsmodus diese Einrichtungen (10, 20) drahtlos Authentifizierungsdaten austauschen, wobei zu Beginn dieses Authentifizierungsprozesses die Basisstation (10) an den elektronischen Schlüssel (20) ein Aufrufsignal (WA) sendet und dieser auf das Aufrufsignal (WA) mit einem Antwortsignal (R) antwortet, und wobei im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus eine Sicherungsprozedur gegen eine Funkstreckenverlangerung (V) durchgeführt wird, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Basisstation (10) das von ihr empfangene Antwortsignal (R) des elektronischen Schlüssels (20) daraufhin untersucht, in welchem Kommunikationsmodus dieses Antwortsignal (R) empfangen wurde, und daß die Basisstation (10) für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal (R) des elektronischen Schlüssels (20) im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen wurde, an den elektronischen Schlüssel (20) einen ersten Selektionsbefehl (S1) sendet, welcher bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel (20) die darauffolgende Kommunikation im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ausführt, und daß für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal (R) des elektronischen Schlüssels (20) im passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen wurde, die Basisstation (10) an den elektronischen Schlüssel (10) einen zweiten Selektionsbefehl (S2) sendet, welcher bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel (20) die nachfolgende Kommunikation im passiven Kommunikationsmodus ausführt.1. Method for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle (F), in which these devices (10, 20) wirelessly exchange authentication data between an electronic key (20) and a base station (10) in an active or a passive communication mode , At the beginning of this authentication process, the base station (10) sends a call signal (WA) to the electronic key (20) and the latter responds to the call signal (WA) with a response signal (R), and in the active communication mode, a security procedure against a radio link extension (V) is carried out, characterized in that the base station (10) examines the response signal (R) of the electronic key (20) it has received to determine in which communication mode this response signal (R) was received, and in that the base station (10) in the event that the response signal (R) of the electronic key (20) in the active K Communication mode was received, to the electronic key (20) sends a first selection command (S1), which causes the electronic key (20) to carry out the subsequent communication in the active communication mode, and that in the event that the response signal (R) of the electronic key (20) was received in the passive communication mode, the base station (10) sends the electronic key (10) a second selection command (S2), which causes the electronic key (20) to carry out the subsequent communication in the passive communication mode.
2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 , dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Sicherungsprozedur des aktiven Kommunikationsmodus dadurch ausgeführt wird, daß der elektronische Schlüssel (20) im Rahmen seines als Reaktion auf das Aufrufsignal (WA) der Basisstation (10) generierten Antwortsignals (R) eine Kennung an die Basisstation (10) übermittelt, welche die Basisstation (10) in spektrale Daten umsetzt und nur dann die Kommunikation mit dem elektronischen Schlüssel (20) fortsetzt, wenn die von ihr empfangenen spektralen Daten mit einer spektralen Signatur des elektronischen Schlusseis (20), die in der Basisstation (10) gespeichert ist übereinstimmt2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the security procedure of the active communication mode is carried out in that the electronic key (20) within its response signal (R) generated in response to the call signal (WA) of the base station (10) Identifier transmitted to the base station (10), which converts the base station (10) into spectral data and only continues the communication with the electronic key (20) if the spectral data received by it with a spectral signature of the electronic key (20) , which is stored in the base station (10)
Vorrichtung zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort (F), die eine Basisstation (10) und einen elektronischen Schlüssel (20) aufweist, wobei zwischen der Basisstation (10) und dem elektronischen Schlüssel (20) in einem aktiven oder passiven Kommunikationsmodus Authentifizierungsdaten ausgetauscht werden, wobei im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus die Basisstation (10) einer Sicherungsprozedur gegen eine Funkstreckenverlangerung (V) durchfuhrt, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Basisstation (10) ein von ihr empfangenes Antwortsignal (R) des elektronischen Schlüssels (20) daraufhin untersucht, in welchem Kommunikationsmodus dieses Antwortsignal (R) empfangen wurde, und daß die Basisstation (10) für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal (R) des elektronischen Schlusseis (20) empfangen wird, einen ersten Selektionsbefehl (S1) erzeugt und an den elektronischen Schlüssel (20) sendet, wobei der erste Selektionsbefehl (S1) bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel (20) die darauffolgende Kommunikation mit der Basisstation (10) im aktiven Kommunikationsmodus ausfuhrt, und daß die Basisstation (10) für den Fall, daß das Antwortsignal (R) des elektronischen Schlüssels (20) im passiven Kommunikationsmodus empfangen wurde, die Basisstation (10) einen zweiten Selektionsbefehl (S2) erzeugt und an den elektronischen Schlüssel (20) sendet, welcher bewirkt, daß der elektronische Schlüssel (20) die nachfolgende Kommunikation mit der Basisstation (10) im passiven Kommunikationsmodus ausfuhrtDevice for controlling access to a secure location (F), which has a base station (10) and an electronic key (20), authentication data being exchanged between the base station (10) and the electronic key (20) in an active or passive communication mode, wherein in the active communication mode the base station (10) carries out a security procedure against a radio link extension (V), characterized in that the base station (10) examines a response signal (R) of the electronic key (20) it has received in which communication mode this response signal (R) has been received, and that the base station (10) in the event that the response signal (R) of the electronic key (20) is received, generates a first selection command (S1) and sends it to the electronic key (20), whereby the first selection command (S1) causes the electronic key (20) to send the following commu application with the base station (10) in the active communication mode, and that the base station (10) issues a second selection command (10) in the event that the response signal (R) of the electronic key (20) has been received in the passive communication mode ( S2) generated and sent to the electronic key (20), which causes the electronic key (20) to carry out the subsequent communication with the base station (10) in the passive communication mode
Verfahren nach einem der vorangehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß nach dem Empfang eines Selektionsbefehls (S1 , S2) durch den elektronischen Schlüssel (20) dieser wenigstens die sicherheitsrelevanten Daten des Authentifizierungsprozesses in dem die empfangene Selektionsbefehle (S1 , S2) entsprechenden Kommunikationsmodus durchfuhrt 5 Verfahren nach einem der vorangehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß nach dem Empfang eines Selektionsbefehls (S1 , S2) durch den elektronischen Schlüssel (20) dieser wenigstens den gesamten darauffolgenden Authentifizierungsprozess in dem die empfangene Selektionsbefehle (S1 , S2) entsprechenden Kommunikationsmodus durchfuhrt Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that after receipt of a selection command (S1, S2) by the electronic key (20), the latter carries out at least the security-relevant data of the authentication process in the communication mode corresponding to the received selection commands (S1, S2) 5 Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that after receiving a selection command (S1, S2) by the electronic key (20) this carries out at least the entire subsequent authentication process in the communication mode corresponding to the received selection commands (S1, S2)
EP00969282A 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle Expired - Lifetime EP1287221B1 (en)

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DE19949970A DE19949970A1 (en) 1999-10-16 1999-10-16 Access control of a road vehicle has data exchange between electronic key and in vehicle controller for authentication
DE19949970 1999-10-16
PCT/EP2000/009276 WO2001029352A1 (en) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle

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