WO2001029352A1 - Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug - Google Patents

Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001029352A1
WO2001029352A1 PCT/EP2000/009276 EP0009276W WO0129352A1 WO 2001029352 A1 WO2001029352 A1 WO 2001029352A1 EP 0009276 W EP0009276 W EP 0009276W WO 0129352 A1 WO0129352 A1 WO 0129352A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
electronic key
base station
communication mode
received
response signal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2000/009276
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Michael Meier
Stephan Schmitz
Andreas Titze
Dominique Nemetschek
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Robert Bosch GmbH
Volkswagen AG
Original Assignee
Robert Bosch GmbH
Volkswagen AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Robert Bosch GmbH, Volkswagen AG filed Critical Robert Bosch GmbH
Priority to EP00969282A priority Critical patent/EP1287221B1/de
Priority to US10/110,825 priority patent/US6954007B1/en
Priority to DE50012740T priority patent/DE50012740D1/de
Priority to JP2001532319A priority patent/JP2003512549A/ja
Publication of WO2001029352A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001029352A1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00341—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks keyless data carrier having more than one limited data transmission ranges
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00777—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by induction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and a device for access control to a secure location, in particular to a motor vehicle, in which these devices exchange authentication data wirelessly between an electronic key and a base station in an active or a passive communication mode, the base station being activated at the beginning of this authentication process the electronic key sends a call signal and this responds to the call signal with a response signal, and in the active communication mode a security procedure is carried out against a radio link extension, and a device for performing this method.
  • the intercepted signal via a radio link change to another attacker who is in the vicinity of the electronic key is located, forwarded and the other attacker then the response signal of the electronic key to the call signal of the base station over the radio link extension back to first attacker and sends back to the base station via this
  • the known method provides that the electronic key transmits a signal to the base station, which is converted into spectral data by the base station. The base station then only grants access to the secure location if the Transmission of the authentication data, these spectral data correspond to a spectral signature of the electronic key stored in the base station.
  • the signal transmitted by the electronic key has at least two tones with different frequencies f-
  • the base station examines the response signal it received from the electronic key in which communication mode this response signal was received, and in that the base station in the event that the response signal of the electronic key was received in the active communication mode , sends a first selection command to the electronic key, which causes the electronic key to carry out the subsequent communication in the active communication mode and, in the event that the response signal of the electronic key was received in the passive communication mode, unites the base station to the electronic key sends a second selection command, which causes the electronic key to carry out the subsequent communication in passive communication mode
  • the inventive method advantageously ensures that even in passive communication mode between the electronic key and the base station, a corresponding attack by an unauthorized person can be warded off by the base station being active in the type of communication in which it receives the response signal from the electronic Key receives, reacts If the response signal occurs in the active communication mode, the further authentication procedure is carried out in the active communication mode and a radio link extension can be excluded by the known security procedure.
  • the base station receives the response signal of the electronic key in passive communication mode, it prevents until the completion of the Access procedure in an advantageous manner, a communication between the base station and the key via the first, active communication mode. It is therefore not possible for an on gripper performs a radio link extension over a frequency of the active communication mode
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the method.
  • FIG. 1 is the starting point of the method described below for access control to a secure location, here to a motor vehicle F.
  • a base station 10 is arranged in the motor vehicle F, which wirelessly exchanges authentication data with an electronic key 20 in order to ensure that only the owner of the electronic key 20 can gain access to the secure location.
  • the base station 10 sends out a call signal WA for the electronic key 20 in an active, first communication mode when an actuator B, e.g. B. a door handle on the motor vehicle F is operated.
  • the electronic key 20 then responds in the active communication mode with a corresponding response signal R, whereby a communication connection running in the active communication mode is established between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10.
  • the data transmitted between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 are determined by a communication protocol which is known per se and is therefore no longer described, which the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 follow and the transmission of authentication data from the electronic key 20 to the Base station 10 includes.
  • Access to the secured motor vehicle F is only permitted by the base station 10 if the authentication data transmitted by the electronic key 20 match the authentications stored by the base station 10. It is provided here that the signals emitted by the electronic key 20 and / or by the base station 10 have only a limited range, in order to prevent the base station 10 from granting access to the secured motor vehicle F even when the electronic key is located 20 is not within a defined environment - typically a few meters - of the motor vehicle F.
  • Radio link extension V forwards to a second attacker B, who then passes the call signal WA of the base station 10 to the electronic key 20 which is out of the range of the base station 10, forwards the response signal R of the electronic key 20 via the radio link extension V to the first attacker A and forwards it then forwards the response signal R of the electronic key 20 to the base station 10, it is provided that the communication taking place between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 in the first, active communication mode also has a security procedure which allows such a radio link extension V of the corresponding one To recognize signals WA, R and, if necessary, then to terminate the communication.
  • the electronic key 20 transmits an identification signal within the framework of its response signal R generated in response to the call signal WA of the base station 10
  • Base station 10 converts into spectral data and only continues the communication with the electronic key 20 if the spectral data received by it matches the spectral signature of the electronic key 20, which is stored in the base station 10, in particular it is provided here that the electronic keys 20 two tones with the frequency f-
  • the base station 10 not only evaluates the information content of the signals supplied to it, in particular the response signal R of the key 20, but also examines whether the signals supplied to it by the electronic key 20 are in the first, active communication mode or are received in the second, passive communication mode.
  • the base station 10 If the base station 10 receives the response signal R generated by the electronic key 20 in response to a call command WA sent by it in the first, active communication mode, it sends in response to the response signal R of the electronic signal received in the active communication mode Final ice 20 to this a first selection signal S1, which - in addition to the usual functions of a selection signal - causes at least the security-relevant and preferably all further communication between the electronic key 20 and the base station 10 can be carried out in the first, active communication mode and the implementation of the remaining authentication process in the passive communication mode is prevented.
  • This has the advantage that a radio link extension V can be detected by the security procedure of the active communication mode and, if necessary, appropriate measures are taken against an attack by a non-authorized person can
  • the base station 10 of the motor vehicle F receives the response signal R of the electronic key 20 in the second, passive communication mode, it sends a second selection signal S2 in response to the electronic key 20, which in a corresponding manner causes the communication of the further authentication process is carried out in the second, passive communication mode, and the implementation of the remaining authentication process in the first communication mode is prevented. It is therefore a working in the active communication mode Attackers using radio link extension V are no longer able to use it successfully.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
PCT/EP2000/009276 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug Ceased WO2001029352A1 (de)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP00969282A EP1287221B1 (de) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug
US10/110,825 US6954007B1 (en) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Method and device for controlling entry into a secured location, especially into a motor vehicle
DE50012740T DE50012740D1 (de) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug
JP2001532319A JP2003512549A (ja) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 安全保護された場所、特に自動車への入場を制御するための方法と装置

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19949970.5 1999-10-16
DE19949970A DE19949970A1 (de) 1999-10-16 1999-10-16 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten Ort, insbesondere einem Kraftfahrzeug

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001029352A1 true WO2001029352A1 (de) 2001-04-26

Family

ID=7925919

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2000/009276 Ceased WO2001029352A1 (de) 1999-10-16 2000-09-22 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur zugangskontrolle zu einem gesicherten ort, insbesondere einem kraftfahrzeug

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US6954007B1 (enExample)
EP (1) EP1287221B1 (enExample)
JP (1) JP2003512549A (enExample)
CN (1) CN1285815C (enExample)
DE (2) DE19949970A1 (enExample)
WO (1) WO2001029352A1 (enExample)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2845505A1 (fr) * 2002-10-02 2004-04-09 Bosch Gmbh Robert Dispositif pour generer un signal notamment un signal d'autorisation d'acces

Families Citing this family (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2007527961A (ja) 2003-06-25 2007-10-04 コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ 特に自動車にアクセスするためのトランスポンダシステムのセキュリティを向上させるための方法及び構成
US8451089B2 (en) * 2004-06-15 2013-05-28 Nxp B.V. Radio identification with an additional close-range check
DE102005061660A1 (de) * 2005-12-22 2007-06-28 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Tragbarer Datenträger mit aktiver Kontaktlosschnittstelle
US20100274570A1 (en) * 2009-04-24 2010-10-28 Gm Global Technology Operations, Inc. Vehicle charging authorization
US8841881B2 (en) 2010-06-02 2014-09-23 Bryan Marc Failing Energy transfer with vehicles
CN102201135A (zh) * 2011-05-26 2011-09-28 深圳中兴力维技术有限公司 一种应用于基站的门禁管理方法

Citations (5)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4020445A1 (de) * 1990-02-03 1992-01-02 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Sicherheitseinrichtung fuer kraftfahrzeuge
DE4329697A1 (de) * 1993-09-02 1995-03-09 Siemens Ag Fernsteuerbare Zugangskontrolleinrichtung
DE19539851A1 (de) * 1995-10-26 1997-06-05 Daimler Benz Ag Schlüssel-Fahrzeug-Kommunikationseinrichtung zur Ansteuerung einer Wegfahrsperre und einer fernbedienbaren Funktion
EP0848123A2 (en) * 1996-10-10 1998-06-17 Texas Instruments Deutschland Gmbh A remote keyless entry system
WO2000005696A2 (de) 1998-07-20 2000-02-03 Robert Bosch Gmbh Passives zugangssystem für fahrzeuge

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GB2239571B (en) * 1989-12-29 1994-08-03 Schlumberger Ind Ltd Transponder
DE4226053C2 (de) * 1991-08-09 1994-12-01 Alps Electric Co Ltd Fernbedienungseinrichtung für eine KFZ-Schließanlage
EP0659963A1 (de) * 1993-12-20 1995-06-28 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Elektronische Wegfahrsperre für ein Kraftfahrzeug
DE4409167C1 (de) * 1994-03-17 1995-06-29 Siemens Ag Schlüssellose Zugangskontrolleinrichtung
DE4440855C2 (de) * 1994-11-15 2000-04-06 Simons & Vos Identifikationssy Kontrollsystem
DE19632025C2 (de) * 1996-08-08 1998-07-23 Daimler Benz Ag Authentikationseinrichtung mit elektronischer Authentikationskommunikation
US6323566B1 (en) * 1996-10-10 2001-11-27 Texas Instruments Incorported Transponder for remote keyless entry systems
US5883443A (en) * 1997-06-27 1999-03-16 Ut Automotive Dearborn, Inc. Countermeasure method and system for securing a remote keyless entry system
DE19802526B4 (de) * 1998-01-26 2006-02-09 Robert Bosch Gmbh Vorrichtung zur Kontrolle der Zugangsberechtigung
DE19818158A1 (de) * 1998-04-23 1999-10-28 Huf Huelsbeck & Fuerst Gmbh Fernbedienungssystem zum Ansteuern für an Fahrzeugen befindlichen Zugangs-Kontrolleinrichtungen
DE19836957C1 (de) * 1998-08-14 1999-09-30 Siemens Ag Diebstahlschutzeinrichtung für ein Kraftfahrzeug und Verfahren zum Betreiben der Diebstahlschutzeinrichtung
JP2000160896A (ja) * 1998-12-01 2000-06-13 Tokai Rika Co Ltd 車両用遠隔操作装置

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4020445A1 (de) * 1990-02-03 1992-01-02 Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag Sicherheitseinrichtung fuer kraftfahrzeuge
DE4329697A1 (de) * 1993-09-02 1995-03-09 Siemens Ag Fernsteuerbare Zugangskontrolleinrichtung
DE19539851A1 (de) * 1995-10-26 1997-06-05 Daimler Benz Ag Schlüssel-Fahrzeug-Kommunikationseinrichtung zur Ansteuerung einer Wegfahrsperre und einer fernbedienbaren Funktion
EP0848123A2 (en) * 1996-10-10 1998-06-17 Texas Instruments Deutschland Gmbh A remote keyless entry system
WO2000005696A2 (de) 1998-07-20 2000-02-03 Robert Bosch Gmbh Passives zugangssystem für fahrzeuge

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2845505A1 (fr) * 2002-10-02 2004-04-09 Bosch Gmbh Robert Dispositif pour generer un signal notamment un signal d'autorisation d'acces

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN1285815C (zh) 2006-11-22
JP2003512549A (ja) 2003-04-02
CN1379841A (zh) 2002-11-13
US6954007B1 (en) 2005-10-11
DE19949970A1 (de) 2001-04-19
EP1287221A1 (de) 2003-03-05
DE50012740D1 (de) 2006-06-14
EP1287221B1 (de) 2006-05-10

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