EP0350082A2 - Méthode et dispositif de sécurité et assistance pour un moteur à auto-allumage - Google Patents
Méthode et dispositif de sécurité et assistance pour un moteur à auto-allumage Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0350082A2 EP0350082A2 EP89116695A EP89116695A EP0350082A2 EP 0350082 A2 EP0350082 A2 EP 0350082A2 EP 89116695 A EP89116695 A EP 89116695A EP 89116695 A EP89116695 A EP 89116695A EP 0350082 A2 EP0350082 A2 EP 0350082A2
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- Prior art keywords
- signal
- speed
- control path
- controller
- control
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 17
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 9
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 6
- 238000012806 monitoring device Methods 0.000 claims abstract 2
- 238000002485 combustion reaction Methods 0.000 claims description 19
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- 230000015572 biosynthetic process Effects 0.000 abstract 1
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 24
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 24
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 16
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 10
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 6
- 239000000446 fuel Substances 0.000 description 6
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000002950 deficient Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000001105 regulatory effect Effects 0.000 description 4
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- 239000013641 positive control Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000007493 shaping process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011144 upstream manufacturing Methods 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
- F02D41/2406—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using essentially read only memories
- F02D41/2425—Particular ways of programming the data
- F02D41/2429—Methods of calibrating or learning
- F02D41/2451—Methods of calibrating or learning characterised by what is learned or calibrated
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D11/00—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated
- F02D11/06—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance
- F02D11/10—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance of the electric type
- F02D11/106—Detection of demand or actuation
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D11/00—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated
- F02D11/06—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance
- F02D11/10—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance of the electric type
- F02D11/107—Safety-related aspects
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/30—Controlling fuel injection
- F02D41/38—Controlling fuel injection of the high pressure type
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/22—Safety or indicating devices for abnormal conditions
- F02D2041/224—Diagnosis of the fuel system
- F02D2041/226—Fail safe control for fuel injection pump
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
- F02D41/2406—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using essentially read only memories
- F02D41/2425—Particular ways of programming the data
- F02D41/2429—Methods of calibrating or learning
- F02D41/2441—Methods of calibrating or learning characterised by the learning conditions
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
- F02D41/2406—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using essentially read only memories
- F02D41/2425—Particular ways of programming the data
- F02D41/2429—Methods of calibrating or learning
- F02D41/2451—Methods of calibrating or learning characterised by what is learned or calibrated
- F02D41/2474—Characteristics of sensors
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
- F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
- F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
- F02D41/30—Controlling fuel injection
- F02D41/38—Controlling fuel injection of the high pressure type
- F02D41/40—Controlling fuel injection of the high pressure type with means for controlling injection timing or duration
- F02D41/406—Electrically controlling a diesel injection pump
- F02D41/407—Electrically controlling a diesel injection pump of the in-line type
Definitions
- the invention is based on a method and a device according to the category of the independent claims. It is known to use electrical signal boxes controlled by electrical signals for the electronic control of the operation of self-igniting internal combustion engines (diesel engines), a central control unit generating the necessary control signals instead of mechanical fuel metering and control systems.
- Electrical fuel metering systems in diesel engines are reliable in terms of their reliability, but they may be less and less able to take into account the multitude of different operating conditions and environmental influences today.
- EDC electronic diesel control
- a safety device for an internal combustion engine with auto-ignition it is known (DE-OS 33 01 742), continuously certain signals relating to the operation of the internal combustion engine, such as accelerator pedal position, calculated setpoint of the control path, speed, brake pedal position and the like. and to create a corrected control path setpoint by selecting the minimum value and feeding it to the controller of the EDC system.
- This corrected control path setpoint also serves to determine a control path deviation, including a feedback of the control path actual value signal. If the predetermined limits are exceeded, the known safety device either reacts by switching off the injection pump, de-energizing the output stage of the controller or introducing emergency operation. Problems may arise with this known safety device, however, because not all conceivable boundary conditions are included in the detection of the safety conditions. Thus, an idle signal can be obtained by a corresponding idle contact on the accelerator pedal - but this is not valid if, for example, the internal combustion engine is equipped with a cruise control.
- EDC electronic diesel control
- the invention solves this problem with the characterizing features of the independent claims and has the advantage that a safety case is reliably recognized in connection with a vehicle speed control and, when a safety case occurs, a control path (the injection pump) that is harmless both for the internal combustion engine and for driving operation. is switched over, sharp torque jumps are avoided in the event of incorrect quantity signals specified by the main computer. It is also advantageous that, even if you have to switch to a minimum characteristic curve of the control path, the automatic start quantity control is enabled, for example, during a cold start and is only reset to the normal minimum control path characteristic curve after the so-called normal start shedding speed has been exceeded for the first time (RWmin characteristic curve).
- Another advantage of the present invention is that when a faulty setting of the control path is detected, either the control is switched to a second branch in the input of the control, or a second, redundant control is applied at the same time, thereby also protecting defects in the control that is normally present . There is also a possibility here Possibility to switch back to the first controller when normal operation is resumed, for which purpose corresponding switch-back criteria have been developed.
- the switchover to emergency operation can take place either on the basis of separate monitoring of the main computer function by a dedicated monitoring system (watchdog) or by detection of a special redundant idle signal which, in conjunction with a feedback of the actual position of the control rod position (RWist), causes the switchover to the redundant control controller, to which additional, minimum setpoint generating blocks are assigned, which can also be acted upon by their own speed sensor.
- a dedicated monitoring system watchdog
- RWist control rod position
- the internal combustion engine with auto-ignition (diesel engine) is designated 10; it has an intake pipe 11 and an exhaust pipe 12.
- a fuel injection pump 13 is connected via a pressure line 15 to an injection valve 14, which is shown here schematically as representative of the required quantity of injection valves.
- the injection valve 14 can comprise an injection initiator 16, which feeds a redundant speed signal to a speed signal detection and processing block 17 via a connecting line 16a indicated by dashed lines, or which conveys this speed signal to further processing blocks.
- a speed sensor 18 which detects the speed of the internal combustion engine, for example, via a ring gear 19 driven by its crankshaft, and its output with the speed signal Detection block 17 is connected.
- the block diagram representation of FIG. 1 also shows, in addition to the speed signal N present at the output of the speed detection block 17, further means for signal acquisition.
- the actual value of the control path RW is, which from the position of the control rod 13a
- Fuel pump 13 is generated for example via an actual value transmitter or converter for the control path, an accelerator pedal position signal FFG (foot pedal), for example detected by the position of a tap of a potentiometer 22 which is mechanically connected to the foot pedal 21, from which signal also an accelerator pedal idle signal FFG-LL can be derived, but this can also be generated in the same way by an idle contact switch on the foot pedal.
- FFG foot pedal
- a brake contactor 24 assigned to the brake pedal 23 is also of importance, which can also operate the brake lights 25 or generates the brake signal separately.
- a brake contactor can also be part of a pressure switch arranged in the brake cylinder.
- the control device 26 is supplied with a large number of external operating signals, circulation signals and setpoints and the main computer contained in the control device 26 then uses these input values to generate at least one signal for the setpoint of the control path RWsoll, which is fed to a downstream control controller 27 which has a predetermined control behavior and is usually a so-called PID controller, which controls the actuator 28 via a current controller output stage (not shown in FIG. 1), which moves the control rod 13a into the respectively desired position.
- FIG. 2 A block diagram of the safety and emergency driving device 29 is shown in detail in FIG. 2 and its structure is first explained below. Components of the central control device 26 and the safety and emergency driving device 29 are shown in an interlocking manner in FIG. 2 - the main computer is designated 30, a monitoring function (watchdog) controlling only essential functions of the main computer is designated 30a.
- a monitoring function watchdog
- a first speed signal N comes from a normal speed sensor 31, for example formed by a disk 32 with signal markings that rotates synchronously with the internal combustion engine, a sensor 33 that responds to this, a downstream pulse shaper stage 34 to the main computer 30, which receives the speed signal and the input 35 Accelerator pedal signal FFG, usually evaluated with further variables that are not of interest in this context and generates a control path setpoint RWsoll and supplies it to a first control controller 36 via the output line 30b.
- a current controller 37 connected to the output of the controller 36 (PID controller) directly controls the actuator 38 for the control rod position with its output stage.
- a feedback actual value of the control path RWist reaches line 39 to the input of the controller 36, whereby the loop is closed for the execution of the normal functions.
- At least one auxiliary speed sensor or replacement speed sensor 31 ' is provided, which can also be a spray start sensor (SB sensor), the output signal of which can be used as a replacement speed signal if the normal speed sensor 31 fails.
- SB sensor spray start sensor
- the starting quantity is output as the setpoint for the interlocking control, but the output is only carried out if a fault in the measurement of the internal resistance of the replacement speed sensor has not been detected by a replacement speed sensor monitoring.
- a fault detection of the sensor internal resistance only leads to the release of the starting quantity when a predetermined speed threshold is reached, determined from pulses from the normal speed sensor.
- any other speed sensor 31 ' can be used, for example, as a speed sensor on the starter ring gear.
- the pulse shaping circuit 34 ' is one Divider circuit 42 connected downstream, which is provided for the safety and emergency driving case and in this respect reduces redundant speed signals to approximately the same frequency as the SB signal.
- the main computer 30 receives normal and substitute speed signal, but the safety and emergency driving devices are supplied with speed information by the normal speed sensor via the speed processing block 41. It is equally possible to supply the S + N device or part of it with speed information from the replacement speed sensor.
- FIG. 2 The further safety and emergency driving arrangements of FIG. 2 are explained below in connection with the safety cases that occur in each case and the functions resulting therefrom.
- the actual value of the control path RWist therefore reaches a comparator 43 via a branch line 39 ', the other input of which supplies an RWmin specification relating to the respective speed from an RWmin characteristic block 44.
- the output signal of this comparator then represents a first and necessary signal, which is included in this check.
- EDC electronic diesel control
- the accelerator pedal is in the LL position and nevertheless the internal combustion engine is supplied with a high injection quantity as required, which corresponds to a large control path RWist.
- FFG-LL detection that is to say the detection and evaluation of the idle position of the pedestrian, must be prevented in the FGR vehicle speed control.
- the linkage takes place by means of a linkage circuit 46, which consists of two AND gates 46a, 46b and a downstream OR gate 47.
- the redundant idle signal LL * results only if there is either no vehicle speed control function (is recognized by the negation at the corresponding input of the AND gate 46b) and at the same time an idle signal FFG-LL is present by the pedestrian the vehicle speed control function is available, but the brake is applied.
- Such a combination must not occur in normal operation because the FGR function must be eliminated when the brake is actuated.
- Both signals arrive at the same input via the OR gate 47 as an LL * signal on the one input of a further gate circuit connected downstream, namely an AND gate 48, which then serves together with the redundant idle signal LL * and the check for that If necessary, the comparator 43 supplied RWmin signal to switch over to a control path that is safe for the engine and driver.
- the AND gate 48 is followed by a delay block 49, which only controls a downstream reaction element for immediate actuation when a predetermined time period T has expired.
- the reaction element is shown to illustrate the function as a bistable flip-flop 50 with the inputs S / R, but can also be implemented differently in a computer be (e.g. setting a flag).
- the flip-flop 50 is set at its input S when the security event occurs with consequences to be explained below and is reset at its input R, as can be seen, via an OR gate 51 immediately when the redundant idle signal LL * and moreover when a signal is supplied from a start hysteresis block 52 which indicates a start process, as will be explained below.
- the limit speed threshold concept is therefore replaced by a speed-dependent control path characteristic for minimum control path RWmin, as indicated in the characteristic block 44 in FIG. 2 and shown in detail in the diagram in FIG. 3.
- the RWmin curve over the speed is shown in Fig. 3 in solid lines, it should be added that all the functions described in the form of characteristic curves can also be equipped with more or less complex and each and also here a minimum level that is found to be useful is described.
- the RWmin characteristic curve over the speed consists of three branches a), b) and c), the branch a) being above a threshold speed n limit already mentioned and specifying control paths that are below the zero load quantity requirement of the engine, but above that Control path which is output by the main computer for the idle position of the foot pedal in undisturbed operation; the below the limit rotation Number increasing branch b) allows idling control in emergency driving mode, but is above the idling control characteristic for normal operation, while the third branch c) allows control paths that enable a cold start.
- this RWmin characteristic curve can jeopardize an automatic start quantity control by the electronic diesel control EDC, which wants to release more start quantity (correspondingly larger control path RW) than the RWmin characteristic curve in FIG. 3 allows during a cold start.
- this RWmin characteristic curve is provided with a hysteresis for the start case, which is recognized by block 52 in FIG. 2, which can also be responsible for the change in the RWmin curve to be explained below is shown in dashed lines in Fig. 2 as RWmin 'and causes a shift towards higher speeds when switched on for the first time.
- the diagram in FIG. 3 also has a dash-dot line and I denotes the normal starting quantity curve over the rotational speed.
- RWmin ′ After exceeding the normal take-off speed for the first time (plus a safety margin), RWmin ′, i.e. from the expanded hysteresis configuration, then resets to the normal RWmin characteristic.
- the comparator 43 compares the RWmin value taken from the RWmin characteristic with the actual RWist value If an incorrect setting of the control path RW is determined, that is, if RWist is greater than RWmin and the idle condition LL * occurs at the same time, then after the delay time specified by the delay block 49, the flip-flop 50 is set, which via its output FFA and a downstream OR- Link 53 switches the control of the control path to a second branch, which then, when this security event occurs, regulates to the RWmin characteristic curve just described in detail, and at the same time, via return line 54, notifies the main computer 30 of this security event that has occurred.
- the input of the control regulator 36 can then be switched to the output of the RWmin characteristic curve generation block 44, which is not shown in the drawing in FIG. 2, i.e. you continue to work with the same controller 36 or you can (alternatively) switch to a second redundant controller 36 ', namely by actuating a switch 55 from the output of the flip-flop 50, since in this way defects of the normal controller 36 are secured.
- Such a switchover via the OR gate 53 is also carried out when it is ascertained, namely via the watchdog 30a monitoring circuit of the main computer 30, that the main computer 30 itself is not operational, that is to say is defective, has a too low voltage or the like. Then watchdog 30a also switches switch 55 via line 56.
- the safety flip-flop 50 is reset in any case if, as already mentioned, the empty running condition LL * is lifted again, or in order to bring the flip-flop 50 into the defined starting position via the start hysteresis block 52 under starting conditions.
- the feedback of the switch over the line 54 to the main computer 30 is necessary because the latter itself (if necessary) carries out monitoring for system deviation or to manipulate the main computer 30 in the desired sense, since otherwise this additional redundant switch-off via an additional Actuator (e.g. shut-off valve for the fuel), even the system could shut down altogether.
- an additional Actuator e.g. shut-off valve for the fuel
- An additional measure for pure operation via the RWmin characteristic curve is to additionally supply the RWmin characteristic curve generation block via the partial line 57a to the line 57 from the foot transmitter of a pedestrian signal FFG, which, added to the generated RWmin signal, allows any RW position to be regulated , so that an extended emergency drive is possible in a simple manner in the event of a main computer failure or failure of the components affected by the respective security case.
- a detection switch block 58 is provided for failure of the control transmitter; This detection circuit 58 is therefore additionally supplied with the actual value signal of the control path RWist generated and reported by the control path transmitter.
- any input signals linked to the actual position of the control path are supplied to the detection circuit 58, the control path failure detection then being carried out by a known measure of the so-called signal Range check is carried out. If the control path encoder is found to be defective, then according to a feature of the present invention, the real control path signal RWist (which is, however, no longer applicable) is no longer reported back to the position control (the control controller 36, 36 ') or to the main computer 30, but rather a simulated signal which is generated by switching a switch 59 to an RWist * generation block 60 caused by the detection circuit 58.
- This simulated signal is derived either from the controller output, as shown in FIG. 2, or from other available variables, for example also the output of the current controller 37 connected downstream of the controller. In this respect, however, the RWist generation block is an observer for the general case Position 38.
- an overspeed protection circuit 61 which acts directly on the output stage of the current regulator 37 past all blocks and prevents overspeeds.
- Essential features of the present invention therefore consist in the fact that in addition to the redundant speed sensor 31 'or injection start sensor, a redundant idle signal LL * is generated, as is an RWmin characteristic curve, which can additionally experience a shift for extended emergency operation by signals from the driving foot sensor.
- the RWmin characteristic curve is supplemented by a start hysteresis function, so that in addition to the extended emergency driving mode, starting processes are still possible.
- Switching to emergency operation is optional by acting on a reaction element, namely the flip-flop 50 or also via the watchdog directly assigned to the computer when the flip-flop switchover is reported.
- a redundant control controller is preferably provided, which is controlled by the RWmin characteristic curve generation for the safety case and switchover to emergency operation. Furthermore, by generating a simulated control path signal, an actual value that can be evaluated for emergency operation can be obtained.
- the actuator behavior can also be checked by including the actuator observer in accordance with the RWist * generation block 60 in the monitoring program.
- Another problem for general safety and emergency operation in self-igniting internal combustion engines is that the foot pedal can jam or can no longer return to idle position or if the signal evaluation of the accelerator pedal sensor in the control unit is defective or the signal is interpreted incorrectly by the computer; in this case there is a risk that, even though the driver has taken his foot off the accelerator pedal, that is to say that there is an FFG-LL signal, the accelerator pedal is undesirable.
- Such unwanted accelerating can be prevented by additionally including a brake signal BS, which is then caused by the normal reaction of the driver, as a redundant safety signal, as also happened in FIG.
- the safety case should be canceled again if the LL position of the accelerator pedal is detected or the brake is released again, but not For example, if, after a triggered safety case and the conditions "brake applied, FFG ⁇ LL", the speed condition that may still be required is no longer applicable.
- the evaluation blocks 62 and 63 shown in FIG. 4 are therefore circuit means which can detect a time assignment or a successive occurrence of events and only emit a signal if the conditions indicated in the blocks are met.
- the safety case corresponding to the assuming high-going signal at an output gate (AND circuit 64) therefore only arises if the signal "accelerator pedal is not in idle position" is supplied to one input, while a signal is sent from the upstream OR gate 65 to the other input either according to condition 2a) or 2b) above.
- FIG. 6 A further addition to the present invention can finally be seen in the illustration in FIG. 6. This is the possibility, already mentioned above, of arranging a second control regulator or replacement regulator, which is designated by 66 in FIG. 6. As in FIG. 2, the normal regulator bears the reference symbol 36.
- the safety and emergency driving system in the representation of Figure 2 also has a second and therefore redundant controller 36 '; In this system, however, this can also be optionally provided, since in the event of a safety situation, only the control of the control path to the second one Branch formed from blocks 44 and 52 switches so that the RWmin characteristic continues. This second branch can also be connected to the original actuator.
- the redundant control controller 66 which is effectively provided in accordance with FIG. 6 increases the availability of the entire system and thus also of the vehicle. The following considerations form the basis for this.
- EDC systems the injection quantity via the electromagnetic actuator 38 '(see Fig. 6) with position feedback (position of the control rod - RWist encoder) and a control controller 36 in the control unit. If one of these regulators fails, quantity metering can no longer be carried out, so that the vehicle equipped with such an internal combustion engine also stops.
- the invention here provides a second substitute controller 66 or redundant controller and also provides means which recognize whether the normal actuator 36 is inoperable so that it is possible to switch to the substitute controller 66. It goes without saying that such measures can also be applied to other regulators for other sizes, for example exhaust gas recirculation rate ARF, start of injection or the like.
- the actual controller (PID) itself, and in extension also assigned subsequent stages including the final stage (current controller 37) can be regarded as belonging to such a control controller. Since, as already mentioned, a control controller generally contains an I component, it can be assumed that the control controller is in good working order, if there is a control deviation, the controller output is at the maximum possible position for correcting the deviation goes, he runs to the stop, the direction of the deviation and the direction of the controller at the stop are mutually assigned. This assignment and the requirement that the controller runs to the stop allow the control controller and possibly subsequent stages to be checked, taking into account the principle that if there is a control deviation and if this control deviation is present, it is possible to determine whether the controller output is correct for a given fixed time at the appropriate stop.
- the invention provides a comparison device 67, to which the control deviation is fed at input 67a and the controller starting position at input 67b.
- the control deviation is obtained in the usual way at a summation point 68, to which the control rod setpoint RWsoll is supplied by the main computer and the feedback of the control rod actual value is supplied by the RWist encoder.
- the comparator switches over to the replacement controller 66 via the switch 69, which can then either continue to work with the previous setpoint (supplied via line 70) or a separate setpoint value derived from this can also be supplied from an emergency driving device via line 71 as RWsetpoint-Not (see block 44, FIG. 2).
- a failure of the normal setting controller 36 always means a complete switchover to the emergency travel branch in the latter case, which in some circumstances represents a simplification of the logic.
- the target input of the regulator 36 (initially recognized as defective) is switched to a fixed target value, likewise from the output of the comparator 67 by actuation of a switching device 72, this fixed target value preferably in is in the middle of the normal operating range.
- the comparator 67 continues to monitor the output of the normal controller 36.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
- Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Electrical Control Of Air Or Fuel Supplied To Internal-Combustion Engine (AREA)
- Combined Controls Of Internal Combustion Engines (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE3531198 | 1985-08-31 | ||
DE19853531198 DE3531198A1 (de) | 1985-08-31 | 1985-08-31 | Sicherheits- und notfahrverfahren fuer eine brennkraftmaschine mit selbstzuendung und einrichtung zu dessen durchfuehrung |
Related Parent Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP86109719.4 Division | 1986-07-16 |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP0350082A2 true EP0350082A2 (fr) | 1990-01-10 |
EP0350082A3 EP0350082A3 (en) | 1990-04-11 |
EP0350082B1 EP0350082B1 (fr) | 1991-11-13 |
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ID=6279870
Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP19890116695 Expired - Lifetime EP0350082B1 (fr) | 1985-08-31 | 1986-07-16 | Méthode et dispositif de sécurité et assistance pour un moteur à auto-allumage |
EP86109719A Expired - Lifetime EP0213349B1 (fr) | 1985-08-31 | 1986-07-16 | Procédé de sécurité et de secours pour un moteur à combustion à autoallumage et dispositif mettant en oeuvre ce procédé |
Family Applications After (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP86109719A Expired - Lifetime EP0213349B1 (fr) | 1985-08-31 | 1986-07-16 | Procédé de sécurité et de secours pour un moteur à combustion à autoallumage et dispositif mettant en oeuvre ce procédé |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US4791900A (fr) |
EP (2) | EP0350082B1 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP2504421B2 (fr) |
DE (3) | DE3531198A1 (fr) |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1991015671A1 (fr) * | 1990-04-04 | 1991-10-17 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Papillon actionne par electromoteur pour vehicule automobile a moteur a combustion interne |
EP2472087A1 (fr) * | 2009-12-28 | 2012-07-04 | Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha | Dispositif de commande de véhicule |
DE10222351B4 (de) * | 2001-05-23 | 2019-07-04 | Schaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG | Steuergerät und Verfahren zur Steuerung eines Antriebsstrangsystems |
Families Citing this family (39)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE3743308A1 (de) * | 1987-12-21 | 1989-06-29 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur ueberwachung eines antriebsmotorsollwertgeber |
DE3804012A1 (de) * | 1988-02-10 | 1989-08-24 | Daimler Benz Ag | Verfahren zum verhindern des ueberdrehens einer brennkraftmaschine |
DE3808381C2 (de) * | 1988-03-12 | 1996-07-11 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Überwachung eines Sicherheitsabstellers bei Brennkraftmaschinen |
JP2663982B2 (ja) * | 1988-04-19 | 1997-10-15 | ローベルト ボツシユ ゲゼルシヤフト ミツト ベシユレンクテル ハフツング | 車両用のブレーキ・ストップランプ回路 |
DE3832567A1 (de) * | 1988-09-24 | 1990-03-29 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur sicherheitsabstellung des mengenstellwerks bei einspritzpumpen fuer dieselbrennkraftmaschinen |
DE3838267C2 (de) * | 1988-11-11 | 1997-04-17 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Überwachung eines Sicherheitsabstellers bei Brennkraftmaschinen, insbesondere Dieselmotoren |
WO1990006434A1 (fr) * | 1988-11-29 | 1990-06-14 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Dispositif permettant de detecter et de corriger toute discordance defectueuse entre la position desiree et la position effective d'un element regulateur servocommande |
DE3844286C2 (de) * | 1988-12-30 | 2002-03-07 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Sicherheits-Notlaufverfahren und Sicherheits-Notlaufvorrichtung für Diesel-Brennkraftmaschinen |
DE4002389A1 (de) * | 1989-05-02 | 1990-11-08 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Kraftstoffzumesssystem mit redundanter regeleinrichtung |
DE3925877C2 (de) * | 1989-08-04 | 1998-10-08 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Steuerung der Kraftstoffzumessung bei einer Dieselbrennkraftmaschine |
WO1991004400A1 (fr) * | 1989-09-21 | 1991-04-04 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Systeme de controle pour transducteur de la course utile de la pedale d'acceleration d'un vehicule |
JPH0697007B2 (ja) * | 1990-05-23 | 1994-11-30 | シーメンス アクチエンゲゼルシヤフト | 内燃機関のスロットルバルブを調節する装置 |
DE4103840B4 (de) * | 1991-02-08 | 2011-02-10 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Fehler-Überwachungsverfahren |
DE4114999C2 (de) * | 1991-05-08 | 2001-04-26 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | System zur Steuerung eines Kraftfahrzeuges |
DE4215959C2 (de) * | 1991-05-15 | 1997-01-16 | Toyoda Automatic Loom Works | Verstärkungsfaktor-Einstelleinrichtung für PID-Regler |
DE4118558A1 (de) * | 1991-06-06 | 1992-12-10 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | System zur steuerung einer brennkraftmaschine |
EP0540218A3 (en) * | 1991-11-01 | 1993-06-30 | Lucas Industries Public Limited Company | A method of and an apparatus for detecting a fault in a return system |
DE4219669B4 (de) * | 1992-06-16 | 2007-08-09 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Steuergerät zur Berechnung von Steuergrößen für sich wiederholende Steuervorgänge |
DE4302926C2 (de) * | 1993-02-03 | 2003-05-15 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Fehlermeldung bei Fahrzeugen |
US5713338A (en) * | 1995-09-19 | 1998-02-03 | N.S.I. Propulsion Systems, Inc. | Redundant ignition system for internal combustion engine |
DE19805299A1 (de) * | 1998-02-10 | 1999-08-12 | Deutz Ag | Elektronische Regeleinrichtung |
US5937826A (en) * | 1998-03-02 | 1999-08-17 | Cummins Engine Company, Inc. | Apparatus for controlling a fuel system of an internal combustion engine |
US6429658B1 (en) * | 1998-10-05 | 2002-08-06 | Jeffrey E. Thomsen | Engine ignition timing device |
KR100311536B1 (ko) * | 1999-06-23 | 2001-10-17 | 오세전, 차용원 | 자동차의 급발진 방지용 연료 제어밸브 |
DE10011410A1 (de) * | 2000-03-09 | 2001-09-20 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Vorrichtung zur sicheren Signalerzeugung |
JP3775220B2 (ja) * | 2000-12-27 | 2006-05-17 | 株式会社デンソー | 内燃機関用制御装置 |
GB2392512B (en) * | 2002-08-31 | 2004-11-24 | Visteon Global Tech Inc | Over-ride of driver demand in a motor vehicle |
DE102005045284A1 (de) * | 2005-09-22 | 2007-03-29 | Pfeiffer Vacuum Gmbh | Drehzahlüberwachungsvorrichtung |
US8155853B2 (en) * | 2008-06-26 | 2012-04-10 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Mechanical time dilation algorithm for collision avoidance system |
WO2011074035A1 (fr) | 2009-12-17 | 2011-06-23 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | Dispositif de commande de vehicule |
WO2011074037A1 (fr) | 2009-12-17 | 2011-06-23 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | Dispositif de commande pour vehicule |
US9050965B2 (en) | 2009-12-17 | 2015-06-09 | Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha | Vehicle control apparatus |
US20120259524A1 (en) * | 2009-12-28 | 2012-10-11 | Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha | Vehicle control apparatus |
WO2011121637A1 (fr) * | 2010-03-29 | 2011-10-06 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | Dispositif de commande de véhicule |
CN102822479B (zh) | 2010-04-07 | 2015-07-01 | 丰田自动车株式会社 | 车辆的控制装置 |
JP5229265B2 (ja) * | 2010-04-13 | 2013-07-03 | 日産自動車株式会社 | 内燃機関の出力制御装置 |
CN103347764B (zh) | 2011-02-10 | 2015-07-29 | 丰田自动车株式会社 | 混合动力车辆及混合动力车辆的控制方法 |
JP5510399B2 (ja) | 2011-06-17 | 2014-06-04 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | 車両の制御装置 |
US9166505B1 (en) * | 2013-05-29 | 2015-10-20 | Marvell International Ltd. | Protection circuits for motors |
Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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FR2399545A1 (fr) * | 1977-08-06 | 1979-03-02 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Installation de regulation electronique du debit d'injection pour moteurs a combustion interne a auto-allumage |
JPS58144651A (ja) * | 1982-02-22 | 1983-08-29 | Isuzu Motors Ltd | エンジン制御装置 |
US4425889A (en) * | 1981-04-10 | 1984-01-17 | Nippondenso Co., Ltd. | Electric governor for internal combustion engine |
GB2133906A (en) * | 1983-01-20 | 1984-08-01 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Fuel feed control means for a compression ignition internal combustion engine |
US4491112A (en) * | 1982-01-13 | 1985-01-01 | Nissan Motor Company, Limited | Failsafe for an engine control |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US4401075A (en) * | 1980-10-27 | 1983-08-30 | The Bendix Corporation | Automatic speed control for heavy vehicles |
JPS59119031A (ja) * | 1982-12-24 | 1984-07-10 | Isuzu Motors Ltd | 電子ガバナ制御装置 |
DE3301743A1 (de) * | 1983-01-20 | 1984-07-26 | Robert Bosch Gmbh, 7000 Stuttgart | Sicherheitseinrichtung fuer eine brennkraftmaschine mit selbstzuendung |
JPS59153928A (ja) * | 1983-02-18 | 1984-09-01 | Toyota Motor Corp | デイ−ゼル機関の燃料噴射制御装置 |
DE3510173C2 (de) * | 1984-08-16 | 1994-02-24 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Überwachungseinrichtung für eine elektronisch gesteuerte Drosselklappe in einem Kraftfahrzeug |
-
1985
- 1985-08-31 DE DE19853531198 patent/DE3531198A1/de not_active Ceased
-
1986
- 1986-07-14 US US06/885,166 patent/US4791900A/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-07-16 DE DE8989116695T patent/DE3682510D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-07-16 EP EP19890116695 patent/EP0350082B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-07-16 EP EP86109719A patent/EP0213349B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-07-16 DE DE8686109719T patent/DE3670344D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-08-22 JP JP61195754A patent/JP2504421B2/ja not_active Expired - Lifetime
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2399545A1 (fr) * | 1977-08-06 | 1979-03-02 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Installation de regulation electronique du debit d'injection pour moteurs a combustion interne a auto-allumage |
US4425889A (en) * | 1981-04-10 | 1984-01-17 | Nippondenso Co., Ltd. | Electric governor for internal combustion engine |
US4491112A (en) * | 1982-01-13 | 1985-01-01 | Nissan Motor Company, Limited | Failsafe for an engine control |
JPS58144651A (ja) * | 1982-02-22 | 1983-08-29 | Isuzu Motors Ltd | エンジン制御装置 |
GB2133906A (en) * | 1983-01-20 | 1984-08-01 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Fuel feed control means for a compression ignition internal combustion engine |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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PATENT ABSTRACTS OF JAPAN, Band 7, Nr. 265 (M-258)[1410], 25. November 1983, Seite 49 M 258; & JP-A-58 144 651 (NAKADA) 29-08-1983 * |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1991015671A1 (fr) * | 1990-04-04 | 1991-10-17 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Papillon actionne par electromoteur pour vehicule automobile a moteur a combustion interne |
DE10222351B4 (de) * | 2001-05-23 | 2019-07-04 | Schaeffler Technologies AG & Co. KG | Steuergerät und Verfahren zur Steuerung eines Antriebsstrangsystems |
EP2472087A1 (fr) * | 2009-12-28 | 2012-07-04 | Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha | Dispositif de commande de véhicule |
EP2472087A4 (fr) * | 2009-12-28 | 2013-03-06 | Toyota Motor Co Ltd | Dispositif de commande de véhicule |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP0350082A3 (en) | 1990-04-11 |
US4791900A (en) | 1988-12-20 |
EP0350082B1 (fr) | 1991-11-13 |
EP0213349A2 (fr) | 1987-03-11 |
JPS6251737A (ja) | 1987-03-06 |
JP2504421B2 (ja) | 1996-06-05 |
DE3670344D1 (de) | 1990-05-17 |
DE3531198A1 (de) | 1987-03-12 |
DE3682510D1 (de) | 1991-12-19 |
EP0213349B1 (fr) | 1990-04-11 |
EP0213349A3 (en) | 1988-03-02 |
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