WO2005070733A1 - セキュリティ装置、車両用認証装置、方法及びプログラム - Google Patents
セキュリティ装置、車両用認証装置、方法及びプログラム Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005070733A1 WO2005070733A1 PCT/JP2004/000656 JP2004000656W WO2005070733A1 WO 2005070733 A1 WO2005070733 A1 WO 2005070733A1 JP 2004000656 W JP2004000656 W JP 2004000656W WO 2005070733 A1 WO2005070733 A1 WO 2005070733A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- key
- electronic key
- user
- electronic
- certificate
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/01—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles operating on vehicle systems or fittings, e.g. on doors, seats or windscreens
- B60R25/04—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles operating on vehicle systems or fittings, e.g. on doors, seats or windscreens operating on the propulsion system, e.g. engine or drive motor
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
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- E—FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
- E05—LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
- E05B—LOCKS; ACCESSORIES THEREFOR; HANDCUFFS
- E05B49/00—Electric permutation locks; Circuits therefor ; Mechanical aspects of electronic locks; Mechanical keys therefor
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a security device, a vehicle security device, a method, and a program.
- an electronic key system such as a keyless entry system or an immobilizer system has been known.
- an electronic key device emits electronic key data by an infrared method, and a door is opened and an engine is started by collating the electronic key data. is there.
- the electronic key device transmits the ID of the electronic key and collates the engine by matching the ID. Is to move
- This type of electronic key method makes it difficult to make a key copy compared to a physical key method that can make a key copy from a keyhole or a spare key. For this reason, the electronic key method is a technology that makes it easier to prevent vehicle theft.
- the transfer source copies the electronic key to the transfer device, the transfer source will be able to drive the car after the transfer, so there is concern that the vehicle will be stolen,
- An object of the present invention is to provide a security device, a vehicle authentication device, a method, and a program that can prevent the vehicle from being stolen even if the electronic key device or the electronic key device is copied. .
- the first aspect of this 9B is for vehicles that are mounted on vehicles that can be driven based on the engine start information and that authenticate users of the vehicle based on an electronic key device that stores the electronic key data K.
- a security device used for an authentication device which is a key for storing a decrypted X engine key E (EK) obtained by encrypting the engine master key EK with the electronic key device K.
- Information storage means and certificate information storage means for storing personal identification information, ID certificate C and ID certificate verification key CK for verifying certificate C in ID device storing user unique key I
- the certificate input from the ID device C ⁇ ⁇ A means for verifying the validity of the ID device by using the ID device proof verification key CK in the certificate information storage means to check the validity of the ID device.
- the certificate C input from the ID device is verified by using the ID device 5l verification key CK.
- the ID device is verified, and the verification result by the ID device is successful.
- the user unique key I in the ID device and the electronic key D in the electronic key device the user and the electronic key are g When the authentication of the user and the electronic key is successful, like creating the start information ⁇ -
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing a configuration of a vehicle authentication device according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 2 is a diagram for explaining the overall operation of the embodiment. In one chat ⁇ £>.
- FIGS. 3 to 5 are flowcharts for explaining first to third specific examples of user and child key authentication in the embodiment.
- FIG. 6 is a vehicle according to a second embodiment of the present invention!
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing a configuration of a siphon device for ⁇ .
- FIGS. 9 to 11 are flowcharts for explaining first to third specific examples of the user and the electronic key in the embodiment.
- FIG. 12 is a schematic diagram showing the configuration of an electronic key system according to the third embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 13 and FIG. 14 are sequence diagrams for explaining the operation in the embodiment.
- FIG. 15 is a sequence diagram for explaining the fourth embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 16 and FIG. 17 are sequence diagrams for explaining the same embodiment.
- FIG. 18 is a sequence diagram for explaining the fifth embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a vehicle authentication system according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
- This vehicle authentication device is mounted on a vehicle such as an automobile, and has an electronic key reader 1, a user information input device 3, an ID card reader 4, a communication device 6, and an engine ⁇ ! Control device 7 is connected to security device 10.
- the electronic key reader 1 has a function of detachably holding the portable electronic key 2, transmitting data read from the electronic key 2 to the security device 10, and a function of the security device 10. It has a function to input the data received from to the electronic key 2.
- the electronic key (electronic key device) 2 can use, for example, an electronic key compatible with a general keyless re-mobilizer system or an IC card in a contact / non-contact form. Further, it has a tamper-resistant area in which the electronic key communication key KK and the electronic key data K or the encrypted electronic key data E (K) are stored.
- the user's electronic key data K is for decrypting the engine master key EK, and includes the signature (digital signature) generated by the owner's electronic key data signature generation key SMK. I will.
- the electronic key communication key K K is an authentication key for communication and is stored at the time of shipment from the manufacturer.
- Electronic key data K or encrypted electronic key data E (K) is stored at the time of key registration.
- the user information input device 3 is used to identify the user.
- biometric information such as a PIN code and a fingerprint
- the ID card reader 4 detachably holds a portable ID card 5 (for example, an IC card license) and transmits data read from the ID card 5 to the security device 10.
- Machine It has a function to input the data received from the security device 10 to the ID terminal 5.
- the ID card (ID device) 5 has a normal IC card function, and can communicate with the security device 10 via the ID card S7E capture device 4 for personal use.
- (User's unique key) I generated from the personal information of the personal information for identifying the vehicle, the license classification information L for which the vehicle has been licensed, and a certificate issued by a specific authority Since C is stored, personal information, Hashki I license classification information and certification C are stored when the ID card is issued.
- Data in ID card 5 have specific authority. Only the ID card can be read, and the ID card owner can read but cannot read.
- the ID car 5 can be changed to an arbitrary ID device such as an electronic organizer, a personal ID notebook, a personal ID page, or a child book, not limited to a force-shaped ID clothing. ing.
- the reading device 4 is not limited to the reading device of the reading device and can be changed to a reading device of an arbitrary reading device.
- the communication device rf 6 has the function of m between the outside of the vehicle and security 10
- the engine controller 7 performs mutual authentication with the security device 10 using the engine key EK having the tamper-resistant area in which the engine key EK is stored before shipment. Successful function and mutual authentication It has a function to control the engine when it crosses the engine start information S from the device 10.
- the X's start key EK is a Blf key for starting the X's start information, and the X's start information S is stored in the security device 10.
- No. J does not sound like a power generator and includes not only internal combustion engines but also motors.
- the security device 10 has an ID capability-5 ⁇ Verification of the validity of the electronic key 2
- the security device 10 performs security processing such as user confirmation.
- the key information storage area 11 It has a user information storage area 12, a vehicle information storage area 13, a certification information storage area 14, a program storage area 15, an input / output unit 16, and a calculation unit 17.
- the key information storage area 11 stores the encryption key corresponding to the owner's (purchaser's) electronic key data MK in advance when the vehicle is delivered from Mae Kyr-the key EM (EK), the electronic key-the signature verification key VMK And the electronic key communication key KK and the encryption engine master key E (EK),
- the encryption engine master key EM (EK) is obtained by encrypting the key E, which is described later, with the electronic key MK and the push key MI, which will be described later.
- the key VMK is a key for verifying the signature of the electronic key data K.
- the user information storage area 12 stores user records in advance of use. Performed, an area for storing Ha V Shiyuki 1 group of users.
- the vehicle information storage area 13 is an area in which the vehicle classification information V of the vehicle is stored at the time of factory shipment.o The vehicle classification information V indicates whether or not the vehicle can be rotated with respect to the license classification information L. O to determine
- the certificate information storage area 14 is an ID card that is a key to check whether it is a valid ID
- a certificate inspection Bit key CK is the area where the CK is stored at the time of factory shipment
- ID Key certificate CK is the key to confirm the validity of ID certificate
- the program storage area 15 is an area in which programs for controlling the operation unit 17 are stored.
- the program calculates the processing with one of Figs. 2 and 3 and Fig. 5 specifically. Department
- the input / output section 16 is a security device 10 and external devices 1
- the operation unit 17 performs a security operation, a reference time, and the like. Specifically, the operation unit 17 physically refers to each storage area 111 to read the program in the program storage area 15. It is an in-vehicle CPU that operates on a gram.
- the ID card 1 When the user gets into the vehicle, the ID card 1 Present it to reader 4.
- the security device 10 reads the certificate C and the license classification information L from the ID card 5 through the ID card reader 4 (ST 1).
- the validity of the certificate C is confirmed by the ID certificate verification C in the certificate information storage area 14 (ST 2).
- the security device 10 determines that the ID card is not an ID card issued by the correct authority, and returns to step ST1.
- the license category information refers to the information on the license category for each vehicle, such as Type 1 Normal, Type 2 Normal, and Type 1 Large.
- the user authentication information P is input to the security device 10 (ST4).
- the security device 10 transmits the input user authentication information P
- the ID power H5 will send the information to the security device 10 with the ID force H5 as the correct user, and the security device 10 will The hash key I is obtained and stored in the user information storage area 12 (S
- the security device 10 authenticates the user and the electronic key using the electronic device 2 (S ⁇ 7). With the authentication of ⁇ , the security device 10 stores the code stored in the key information storage area 11. Kaenjinmasu evening key
- step S ⁇ 7 of decoding E (E K) are shown in FIG.
- step S ⁇ 7 If the authentication fails a (s ⁇ 7; failure), it is determined that the user is an unauthorized electronic key CD user, and the process returns to step S ⁇ 1.
- the security device 10 determines that the user of the correct electronic key is a non-owner.
- Mutual authentication is performed with the device 7 (ST8).
- the engine master key EK decrypted in the security device 10 and the engine master key EK stored in the engine control device 7 are used.
- the security device 10 determines that both devices are valid devices, and uses the engine mass key EK to send the engine start information S to the engine control device 7. Send (ST 9).
- step ST7 Three specific examples of step ST7 will be described with reference to FIGS.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a first specific example of step ST7.
- the security device 10 collates the hash key I of the user read from the ID key 5 in step ST 6 with the hash key group I in the user information storage area 12 (ST 7- 1a). If there is no match with hash key I as a result of the comparison (ST 7 — 2a; N ⁇ ), it is determined that the user is an unregistered user, and the process returns to step ST 1.
- the security device 10 enters and exits as a registered user. 2 Encourage the use of the electronic device 2 from the input unit 16 o
- the user mounts the electronic key 2 on the electronic key reading garment 1, so that the security device 10 uses the slave key S7C. Mutual proof is performed with the electronic key 2 via the device 1 (ST 7 — 3a).
- the electronic key communication key KK in the key information storage area 11 of the security U device 10 and the electronic key communication key 11 KK stored in the electronic key 2 are used.o
- the security device 10 verifies the signature of the electronic key device K using the electronic key signature signature verification key VMK in the key information storage area 11 (ST75). If the signature is incorrect (s ⁇ 75; failed), return to step S ⁇ 1 as an electronic key that has been issued illegally.
- the signature is correct.
- the mouth (s T7-5; success), the security garage 10 as a validly issued electronic key is stored in the key information storage area.
- the encryption key E (( ⁇ ) corresponding to the electronic key data K is read from 11 (S S76), so that the security setting 10 is released.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing the second example of step ST7. In the flowchart, it is assumed that the child key K is stored in the electronic key 2 in an encrypted state using the hash key I. .
- the user attaches the used electronic key 2 to the electronic key reader 1.
- the security device 10 performs mutual authentication with the electronic key 2 via the electronic key reader 1 (ST711b).
- the electronic key communication key KK in the key information storage area 11 of the device 10 and the electronic key communication key ⁇ ⁇ stored in the electronic key 2 are used.
- the security device 10 determines that both are valid devices and sends the hash key-I to the electronic key 2 through the electronic key reader 1. ⁇ 1
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing a third specific example of step ST7, in which the encryption engine master key E (EK) is decrypted using the hash key I and the electronic key data K. It is assumed that the key information is stored in the key information storage area 11 in this state.
- EK encryption engine master key
- steps ST 7-1 a, ST 7 in FIG. 5 As shown in FIG. 5, steps ST 7-1 a, ST 7 in FIG.
- the security device 10 uses the user's hash-I and the electronic key device K read in step ST 6 of the HU to decrypt the encrypted engine key E (E K).
- the authentication of the ID force and the authentication of the user authentication information are executed, and the engine is started when all the passwords are successfully obtained. Since the information is created, the vehicle can be prevented from being stolen even if the electronic key is copied in the evening or electronically.
- the user of the ST7 and the electronic key R'l BL can obtain the following effects in the specific examples shown in Figs. 3 to 5. .
- the link between the issued key material information and the user-specific information is not performed, so the user ID card 5 is not required when issuing the electronic key 2. It is. In other words, the issuance of the electronic key 2 and the registration of the user can be performed asynchronously.
- step ST712 if it is possible to avoid user verification in step ST712 by some means and return to step ST713, there is a risk that the certificate of use will not be realized. Therefore, there is a need for a mechanism for preventing tampering with the security program of the physician 10.
- the ID key 5 of the user is required when issuing the ⁇ 3 ⁇ 4 child key 2.
- the user's ID power- Since the link between the information in step 2 and the information unique to the user is performed, the user's ID power- The Also, when the electronic key is used (when the engine starts), the ID power is H
- the electronic key data K in the electronic key 2 is not encrypted, so if it becomes possible to read the electronic key data K by some means, the forgery of the key would be complete. However, there is a danger that it will be partially possible.Therefore, it is necessary to store the electronic key data K in an area that is resistant to sunset and make it impossible to read it by disassembling electronic key 2, etc. .
- FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the vehicle authentication device according to the second embodiment ti of the present invention.
- the same parts as those in FIG. The subscripts M r X etc. are added, and the changed parts will be mainly described. Note that, in the following embodiments, the description of the same portions is omitted in the same manner. ⁇ That is, this embodiment is a modification of the first embodiment, and has a configuration in which the vehicle owner registers a user. O
- the owner and the registrant may be, for example, family members.
- the specific configuration includes the electronic key readers 1 and I described above.
- An electronic key registration device 1 r and a registration ID card reader 4 r having the same functions as the D card reader 4 are connected to the security device. Further, in the security device 10, the vehicle information storage area 13 is omitted, and a secret key information storage area 18 is provided.
- the owner's electronic key 2 M and ID card 5 M and the registrant's electronic key 2 r and ID card F 5 r are used.
- the electronic key 2M for example, the above-mentioned electronic key or IC key can be used.
- the electronic key communication key ⁇ K and the electronic key data of the owner are used.
- M K is stored.
- the owner's electronic key data MK contains the signature generated by the electronic key data signature generation key STK managed by the manufacturer.
- the electronic key communication key KK is stored at the time of shipment from the manufacturer.
- the electronic key data MK or the encrypted electronic key data E (MK) is stored when the key is registered.
- the registrant's electronic key 2 r has, specifically, a tamper-resistant area in which the electronic key communication key KK and the user's electronic key data K or encrypted electronic key data E (K) are stored. I have. However, here, it is assumed that the electronic key data K and the encrypted electronic key data E (K) have not been registered yet, and the electronic key communication key K K is stored at the time of shipment from the manufacturer.
- the owner's ID card 5M has a normal IC card function
- Hashki MI which can communicate with the security device 10 via the ID card reader 4 and is generated from the personal information for identifying the individual owner, and the authority A certificate MC issued by a specific organization is stored.
- the registrant's ID card 5 r is the user's ID card
- ID cards 5M and 5r are read only by persons with specific authority, as described above. 8 Yes, ID cards can be owned but not imported.
- Key information storage area 1 1 X is the key information ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ (E
- the certification information storage area 14 X is used to detect whether the owner's legitimate ID strength is H5M in addition to the above described user (registrant) ID strength certificate verification key CK.
- the ID key certificate verification key MCK which is the key of the ID card certificate verification key MCK, is stored at the time of output.
- the secret key information storage area 18 is an area for storing the owner's (purchaser) electronic key and signature generation key SMK from the vehicle manufacturer in advance.
- the electronic key decryption key S M K is the secret key information storage area 18 of the electronic key and the key for generating the signature of the signature K.
- the owner presents the ID car 5M to the ID reader 4 when getting into the vehicle.
- the security device 10 X receives the ID force from the ID device 5 M through the device 4.
- the security device 10 transmits the ID force 5 M Confirmation siE certificate m report storage area 1 4 ID strength in X-Certificate verification key
- U tee device 10 X determines that it is not an ID force issued by the correct authority, and returns to step ST 11.
- the 'J tee device 10X determines that the ID force has been issued by the correct organization, and prompts the user to input user information from the input / output unit 16X display / ⁇ ° panel (not shown).
- the owner has the ID card via the user information input device 3 and 5
- the owner authentication information ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ is input to the security device 10 X (ST 13)
- the security device 10 sends the user authentication information 0 P of
- the ID is transmitted to the ID card 5M through the P joking device 4 and the authentication information is detected by the ID card 5M (ST14), If the verification of the authentication information fails (ST14: failure), the failure is returned to the security device 10X as the unauthorized owner, and the process returns to step ST11.
- the ID card 5M If the verification of the authentication information is successful (ST14; success), the ID card 5M returns the hash key MI to the security device 10X as the correct owner, and the security device 1 0 X reads the hash key M l (ST 15).
- the security device 10X authenticates the owner and the electronic key using the electronic key 2M (ST16), and stores it in the key information storage area 11X with this authentication.
- the decrypted encryption engine key Yuichi key EM (EK) is decrypted. Details of this step ST16 will be described later with reference to FIGS. 9 to 11.
- step ST16 If the authentication fails (ST16; failure), it is determined that the owner of the unauthorized electronic key 2M is the process, and the process returns to step ST11.
- the security device 10X prompts the owner to present the registration ID card 5r as the owner of the correct electronic key 2M.
- the owner presents the registration ID card 5r to the registration ID card reader 4r.
- the security device 10X reads the certificate C from the ID card 5r through the registration ID card reader 4r (ST17).
- the security device 10X uses the ID card certificate verification key CK in the certificate information storage area 14x to check the validity of the certificate C in order to check the ID card 5r. (ST 18).
- the security device 10 x determines that the ID card is issued by the correct organization, and proceeds to the next step.
- step ST 16 the details of step ST 16 described in FIG.
- step ST 19 If the details of step ST 16 are according to FIG.
- step ST19 the owner has the user present, and the user reads the user information in the recording ID field 5r through the user information input device 3. Enter the user information P (such as fingerprints and other vital signs / identification information and PIN code). As a result, the user authentication information P is input to the security device 10X (ST 19)
- the security U device 10X sends the user's personal identification information P to the registration ID card 5r through the registration ID force m device 4r, and sends the authentication information to the recording ID card 5r. Verify (S
- the ID card 5r If the verification of the RiL information is successful (ST 20; success), the ID card 5r returns “8” to the security device 10X as the correct user, and the security is determined.
- Equipment 1 0 X Read the hash key I (ST 21).
- the security device 10X reads the electronic key data signature generation key SMK in the secret key information storage area 18 using the hash key MI read in step ST15, and the key SMK A new electronic key data K is generated by using (ST22).
- the security device 10 X If the electronic key data and the name generation key S M K are stored in the electronic 2 M, the security device 10 X
- the electronic key M read out at T15 is transmitted to the electronic key 2M, and the electronic key 2M generates an electronic key ⁇ .
- security device 10X uses the hash key I obtained in step ST21 to generate the electronic key data K. And generate an encrypted electronic key T E (K)
- the owner attaches the new electronic key 2r to the electronic key registration device 1r.
- the security device 10X is connected to the electronic key recording device.
- the electronic key data K or the encrypted electronic key E (K) is transmitted to 2r, and the electronic key 2r stores the received electronic key data in an area that is resistant to noise (ST 2 Four )
- step ST25 the details of ST16 execute the following processes using the mouths shown in FIG. 9, FIG. 10 or FIG. 11, respectively.
- the security device 10 X uses the electronic key device K to secure the security device.
- 0X uses the user's hash key I and the electronic key key K read at step ST 21 to encrypt the en-en-mas key-E ⁇ decrypted in the security device 10X.
- the key information storage area 11 1 X register the encryption key, key, and key E (EK).
- the registration of hash key I in the information storage area 12 can be performed at any time, not only at the same timing as the key issuance, if it is ⁇ of use.
- step ST 16 Three specific examples of step ST 16 will be described with reference to FIGS. 9 to 11.
- FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing a first specific example of step ST16, and has the same processing contents as described in FIG. 3, that is, the security device 10X is owned by The MI of the other party's Hatsukiki MI is verified (ST16-1a), and a mutual proof of identity with the electronic key 2M is performed (ST16-3a).
- security equipment is owned by The MI of the other party's Hatsukiki MI.
- ST16-3a a mutual proof of identity with the electronic key 2M is performed.
- FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing a second specific example of step ST16, and has the same processing contents as FIG. 4 described above. That is, the electronic key data M K is stored in the electronic key 2 M in a state of being encrypted using the hash key M I.
- Security device 10 X performs mutual authentication with electronic key 2 M (ST 16-1 b), and sends hash key Ml to electronic key 2. (ST 16-2b) and reads the encrypted electronic key data E (MK) (ST 16-3b). In addition, security device 10X decrypts encrypted electronic key data E (MK) using hash key MI to obtain electronic key data MK (ST16_4b). Less than
- steps ST7-5 to ST7-7 are executed in the same manner as described above.
- FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing a third specific example of step ST16, and has the same processing contents as FIG. 5 described above. That is, the riVr-encoded engine master key E M (E K) is encrypted using the hash key M I and the electronic key M M.
- step S T 16-1a S
- T 16-2 a is omitted, and step S T 16-3 a to
- the security device 10X will perform the above-described step ST
- the encryption engine master key E M (E K) is decrypted (ST 16-7 c) to obtain the engine master key E K.
- the owner's electronic key data signature generation key SMK electronic key—evening signature verification key VMK is a key pair of the public key cryptosystem, and the electronic key signature verification key VMK has a vehicle key.
- the public key certificate issued by is issued. Therefore, the public key certificate is revoked by the vehicle's capabilities, and the revocation list published through the network is received through the communication device 6 in FIG.
- the electronic key signature generation key S ⁇ K of the vehicle key and the electronic key data signature verification key VTK are paired with the public key ⁇ key, and the electronic key signature verification key VTK is used.
- step 5 the electronic key and signature verification key V ⁇ ⁇ W
- an electronic key MK for issuing the user's electronic key 2r is prepared, and this electronic key MK is similarly used only when used together with the owner's ID card 2M.
- An electronic key for the use of the vehicle can be issued, so that the vehicle can be prevented from being stolen by the criminal as much as possible, even in situations where a dira and a criminal are colluding.
- a new electronic key is issued for each user without making a duplicate electronic key, and the vehicle can be used. Also, the electronic key is validated for each user, making the vehicle unusable. In this way, vehicles can be made available or unusable for each user, thus preventing theft of a car and preventing theft of a car while maintaining the same operation as Ren-Yu. It becomes possible.
- step ST16 and the electronic key authentication are implemented in each of the specific examples shown in Figs. The same effects as in FIGS. 3 to 5 described above can be obtained,
- FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the vehicle authentication device according to the third embodiment of the present invention. That is, in the present embodiment,
- the certification authority 20 may be operated by a vehicle manufacturer, or may be operated by an organization that collectively manages vehicles such as land transportation ⁇ To be used,
- the certificate information storage area 14 y has the verification key M C described above.
- CA public key certificate Digital key signature verification key for verifying the signature generated by certificate authority 20
- Public key certificate for VTK digital key signature verification key
- the public key certificate for the VMK is stored.
- the public key certificate for the digital key signature signature verification key VTK and the public key certificate for the electronic key signature signature verification key VMK are stored in the key information storage area 11 X similarly to the second embodiment. It may be stored.
- the certificate information storage area 14 y can store a revocation list of public key certification.
- a program for causing the arithmetic unit 17 to execute the processing of FIGS. 13 and 14 is stored. This program is assumed to execute the processing of FIGS. 15 to 18 in each of the embodiments described later.
- the security device 10 y certifies the ID card 5 A of the source (ST 32).
- the security device 10 y authenticates the owner (ST34) by one of the methods shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 11 and is stored in the key information storage area 11X along with this authentication. Decrypts the key code EM (EK).
- the security device 10 After that, the security device 10 y comes through the communication device 6. heart)? It invalidates the certificate authority 20 (ST35), and sends the transfer owner's Hashiyuki MI (ST36).
- the bureau 20 verifies that the Hashiki MI belongs to the owner registered in advance (ST37), and if it is valid, the public key of the electronic key signature verification key VMK issued to the owner. Security of public certificate revocation sites including certificate revocation It is returned to lOy (ST38).
- the security device 10 y verifies the validity of the revocation list with the electronic key data signature verification key VTK in the certificate information storage area 14 y (ST 39), and if valid, the certificate information
- the invalidation list is stored in the storage area 14 y (ST 40).
- the security device 10y authenticates the transfer destination ID card 5B (ST41), and receives the hash key of the transfer destination owner from the ID card 5B. Ml 'is obtained (ST42). Thereafter, the security device 10y requests the certificate authority 20 to issue a new public key certificate via the communication device 6 (ST43), and transmits the hash key Ml '(ST44). ). Also, a public key pair is generated in the security device 10 y (ST 45), the secret key is stored in the secret key storage area 18 as the electronic key data signature generation key SMK ′, and the public key is stored. It is sent to the certification authority 20 as the electronic key data signature verification key VMK '.
- the certificate authority 20 registers the hash key MI 'and the electronic key data signature verification key VMK' as new owner information (ST46), and issues a public key certificate to the electronic key data signature verification key VMK '. A certificate is issued, and the public key certificate is returned to the security device 10y (ST47).
- the security device 10y verifies the validity of the public key certificate for the VMK 'sent using the electronic key decryption signature verification key VTK in the certificate information storage area 14y ( ST 48), if it is valid, store it in the certificate information storage area 14 y.
- the security device 10 y connects the electronic key in the electronic key 2 M Three
- Step ST49 differs depending on whether the above-described step ST34 depends on the case shown in Figs. 9 to 11.
- step ST 49 updates the transfer source owner hash key M I previously stored in the user information storage area 12 to the transfer destination owner hash key M I ′.
- step ST49 takes out the electronic key data MK which has been encrypted with the transfer source owner hash key MI in the electronic key 2M, and decrypts with this hash key Ml. After that, the electronic key data MK 'encrypted with the transferee's hash key MI' is again encrypted with the transfer source owner hash key MI in the electronic key 2 M. Replaced with existing electronic key data MK and stored in electronic key 2M.
- the electronic key 2 M is transferred from the transfer owner to the transfer owner.
- the electronic key of the user registered by the transfer source owner becomes unusable, and the electronic key transferred by the transfer source owner cannot be used.
- the certificate authority 20 The configuration in which the activation list and the new public key certificate are issued allows the child key 2M to be safely assigned.
- the electronic key 2M can be transferred without performing communication.
- communication with the certificate authority 20 is automatically performed, for example, while the vehicle is running, as in the third embodiment. Is obtained.
- the security device 10 y authenticates the transfer destination ID card 5B in the same manner as in the above-described steps ST41 to ST42 (ST55). ), And acquire the transferee owner, Yukiichi Hatsushi Ml '(ST56).
- the security device 10y internally generates a public key pair (ST57), and stores the secret key in the secret key storage area 18 as an electronic key decryption signature generation key SMK '.
- the security device 10 y uses the public key as the electronic key data signature verification key VMK ′ and uses the transfer source electronic key data signature generation key SMK stored in the private key information storage area 18 to sign the public key. Then, a public key certificate CERT 'for VMK' to which is added (ST58) is generated, and the public key certificate CERT 'is stored in the certificate information storage area 14y.
- the security device 10 y includes the electronic key data MK: in the electronic key 2 M, the encryption engine mass in the key information storage area, the key EM (EK), and the hash key M l ′ of the owner. Is updated in the same manner as in step ST 49 described above (ST 59, ST 60).
- the security device 10 y automatically communicates with the certificate authority 20 while the vehicle is running.
- a procedure for updating the public key certificate for the electronic key data signature verification key VMK ′ to the same public key certificate as in the third embodiment will be described.
- the security device 10 y authenticates the transfer destination ID card 5 B (ST 61), and transfers the transfer destination owner's hash key M
- the security UTI device 10 y transmits the update request and the destination owner's Eighth 'to ⁇ M I, to a BJE 0 (ST
- Verification is performed using the transfer source owner's electronic key signature signature verification key V M K registered in advance (ST 66)
- the F station 20 registers Hashishki MI and the electronic key signature signature ai £ key VMK 'as new owner information (ST67).
- Electronic key signature verification key issued to the public key validity list including invalidation of the public key certificate of VMK is returned to the security device 10 y (ST 6 ⁇ 0
- a public key certificate is generated for the child key data verification key VMK of the transfer destination and sent to the security device 10y (S S69).
- the security device 10 y verifies the validity of the revocation list with the electronic key data signature verification key VTK in the certificate information storage area 14 y, and if valid, the certificate information storage area 14 y Store the revocation list in
- the security device 10 y verifies the validity of the public key certificate for the electronic key data signature verification key VMK with the electronic key data signature verification key VTK in the certificate information storage area 14 y. If valid, the public key certificate is stored in the certificate information storage area 14 y.
- FIG. 18 an example in which a new electronic key can be reissued by communicating with s & si 20 even if the owner loses the electronic key 2 M is shown in FIG. 18. This will be described in detail.
- the security device 10 y is the ID card 5 of the owner.
- M is authenticated (S ⁇ 72), and the owner's eight key M I is obtained from the ID card 5M (ST 73).
- the security device 10y requests the certificate authority 20 to reissue an electronic key (ST74), and transmits the owner's hashtag I (ST75). ).
- the certified BJE) 3 ⁇ 420 verifies that Hashiyuki MI is the owner of a previously registered owner (ST76). If legitimate A new master key MK ′ different from the master key MK included in the lost electronic key is generated, and the following information is returned to the security device 10y (ST77, ST78).
- steps ST77 and ST78 differ depending on whether the owner and the authentication of the electronic key depend on the case shown in Figs. 9 to 11.
- the certificate authority 20 sends the new master key MK 'and the engine master key EM (EK)', which has been decrypted by the new master key MK ', to the security device. I will send it back.
- the certificate authority 20 has a new master key MK 'encrypted with the owner's hash key and an engine master key EM (EK) encrypted with the new master key MK'. 'Back to the security appliance.
- the certificate authority 20 generates a new master key MK ′ and an engine master key EM (EK) ′ encrypted with the new master key MK ′ and the hash key M l of the owner. Return to security device 1 0 y.
- EK engine master key
- the security device 10y performs mutual authentication with the new electronic key 2r using the electronic key communication key KK stored in the key information storage area 11X (ST79), and the certification authority
- the new engine master key MK ′ sent from 20 or the encrypted new master key MK ′ is stored in the tamper-resistant area in the electronic key 2r (ST80).
- the method described in each of the above embodiments is a program that can be executed in the computer and evening.
- any form of storage may be used as long as the storage medium can store the program and is readable by the computer.
- MW (Operating system), MW ($ 5ware) such as database management software and network software, etc. may execute a part of each process for implementing this function.
- the storage medium according to the present invention is not limited to a medium independent of the computer, but can store or temporarily store a program transmitted by a LAN, an internet, or the like as a download.
- a program transmitted by a LAN, an internet, or the like as a download.
- a program transmitted by a LAN, an internet, or the like as a download.
- a program transmitted by a LAN, an internet, or the like as a download.
- Considering TB also includes storage media ⁇
- the number of storage media is not limited to one, and the processing in the present embodiment is executed from a plurality of media.
- the medium configuration may be any configuration
- the computer according to the present invention executes each process in the present embodiment based on a program written on a storage medium, so that the computer includes one device such as a personal computer, and a plurality of devices. May be installed in any configuration such as a system connected to a network.
- the computer in the present invention is not limited to a personal computer, but includes an arithmetic processing unit, a microcomputer, and the like included in an information processing device, and realizes the functions of the present invention by a program.
- Machines and devices that can be used are collectively referred to.
- the present invention even when the electronic key data or the electronic key device is ⁇ -pitched, it is possible to prevent the vehicle from being difficult.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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PCT/JP2004/000656 WO2005070733A1 (ja) | 2004-01-26 | 2004-01-26 | セキュリティ装置、車両用認証装置、方法及びプログラム |
JP2005517176A JP4489024B2 (ja) | 2004-01-26 | 2004-01-26 | セキュリティ装置、車両用認証装置、方法及びプログラム |
CNB2004800416007A CN100497050C (zh) | 2004-01-26 | 2004-01-26 | 安全设备、车辆验证设备、方法和程序 |
US11/492,188 US7868736B2 (en) | 2004-01-26 | 2006-07-25 | Security device, vehicle authentication device, method and program |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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PCT/JP2004/000656 WO2005070733A1 (ja) | 2004-01-26 | 2004-01-26 | セキュリティ装置、車両用認証装置、方法及びプログラム |
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US11/492,188 Continuation US7868736B2 (en) | 2004-01-26 | 2006-07-25 | Security device, vehicle authentication device, method and program |
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WO2005070733A1 true WO2005070733A1 (ja) | 2005-08-04 |
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PCT/JP2004/000656 WO2005070733A1 (ja) | 2004-01-26 | 2004-01-26 | セキュリティ装置、車両用認証装置、方法及びプログラム |
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US (1) | US7868736B2 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4489024B2 (ja) |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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CN1914069A (zh) | 2007-02-14 |
JPWO2005070733A1 (ja) | 2007-08-23 |
JP4489024B2 (ja) | 2010-06-23 |
US7868736B2 (en) | 2011-01-11 |
US20060255910A1 (en) | 2006-11-16 |
CN100497050C (zh) | 2009-06-10 |
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