EP2088051B1 - Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2088051B1
EP2088051B1 EP08002440A EP08002440A EP2088051B1 EP 2088051 B1 EP2088051 B1 EP 2088051B1 EP 08002440 A EP08002440 A EP 08002440A EP 08002440 A EP08002440 A EP 08002440A EP 2088051 B1 EP2088051 B1 EP 2088051B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
route
keys
control
signal aspect
monitoring elements
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Not-in-force
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EP08002440A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP2088051A1 (fr
Inventor
Jon Felix
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Siemens Schweiz AG
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Siemens Schweiz AG
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Publication date
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Priority to AT08002440T priority Critical patent/ATE506241T1/de
Priority to EP08002440A priority patent/EP2088051B1/fr
Priority to DE502008003266T priority patent/DE502008003266D1/de
Publication of EP2088051A1 publication Critical patent/EP2088051A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP2088051B1 publication Critical patent/EP2088051B1/fr
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
    • B61L21/04—Electrical locking and release of the route; Electrical repeat locks

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method and a device for safely setting a route for a rail vehicle.
  • railway networks are particularly in the area of stations and in particular in the area of large stations due to the large number of control elements used, such as switches and signals, etc., and monitoring elements used, such as track circuits, axle counter, etc., highly complex systems that avoid persons - and property damage must be operated with a very high level of security interlocking technology.
  • the signal box has the task to allow the train runs provided in the control system (according to the timetable) and also due to delays individually controlled train runs through the setting of driveway.
  • a route is usually a piece of a track for the rail vehicle, which starts at a start signal point and ends with the arrival of the next start signal point usually.
  • the control and monitoring elements involved for the setting of a road then the control and monitoring elements involved as well as the possibly. Required edge protection, etc.
  • SIL4 describes in systems with permanently high Security requirements a probability of default between 10 -9 and 10 -8 per hour.
  • the involved control and monitoring elements and their desired position or statement are assigned and queried with the request of the road on the part of the interlocking and possibly set. If the route is set and secured, the associated signal term "TRAVEL" generated on the start signal can be displayed in conventional train control systems or transmitted at ETCS level 2 via a Radio Block Center in the cab of the rail vehicle.
  • the present invention is therefore based on the object of specifying a method and a system for the secure setting of a road, which make it possible to proceed in the setting of safe road with redistribution of hierarchical segmentation decentralized and less proprietary.
  • Each setting and monitoring element can, so to speak, check whether it is basically available for setting the requested road and, if so, whether it already has the correct state.
  • state is meant here, for example, the position of a switch or the blocking of a switch for the flank protection or even the presence of the free-field state of a track vacancy detector.
  • the required safety check or proof thereof is greatly simplified and can be carried out generically, for example for the type "switch" or the "track free detector".
  • the signal ground generator which checks the presence of the main and sub-keys required for the travel command (eg the signal term "green lamp ON", red lamp OFF).
  • Subkey is intended to imply that the master key and the subkey represent a unique amount of data that can be uniquely assigned to a setting or monitoring element and its respective state. and monitoring element and a logical "1" for the availability of the setting and monitoring element Further subkeys may then be transmitted, for example, as further logical "ones" with the above-mentioned data
  • the main circuits and one or more shunts au ch be summarized in a record.
  • the choice of the component "key” here further implies that the respective master key and any subkey (s) are a unique set of data identifying the respective setting and monitoring element and their respective state. Furthermore, a certain authenticity attribute can also be seen in the concept of the key, for example the signal originator allows recognizing the key as such and belonging to a particular element, which also provides a significant safety gain, but can also be achieved purely in the context of signal generation. Further, the above method and system allow expansion and modification to be made comparatively easily on an existing road or in the establishment of a new road because only the new or changed positioning and monitoring elements are equipped with new keys and the algorithm on the signal ground generator must be adapted to the new situation. However, the method basically implemented in the signal generation generator for generating the signal term as such also remains unchanged, which is why the validation of a larger network area is considerably simplified.
  • the hardware used can be predominantly of the type SIL0, since the signaling safety on the one hand on the control and monitoring elements themselves and on the other hand in the configuration of the master key and the subkey and the check for the complete existence of the keys can be reduced in the Signalbegriffer Weger.
  • An advantageous embodiment of the invention may provide that a Signalbegriffer Weger is definable for each route, the control and participation elements involved in the road is communicated within the message to which Signalbegriffer Weger the respective master key and, if necessary, the respective subkey to send ,
  • a Signalbegriffermaschineer is definable for each route, the control and participation elements involved in the road is communicated within the message to which Signalbegriffer Weger the respective master key and, if necessary, the respective subkey to send ,
  • the process of signal generation with a signal associated with the corresponding start signal logic unit where the road begins.
  • the entire interlocking logic remains unchanged, if, for example, within the Driveway new elements installed, modified or removed. Only in the algorithm for driving concept formation, this process must be mapped.
  • the Signalbegriffer Weger is advantageously associated with the actuator that outputs the respective signal term optically to a signal or in the case of ETCS level 2 and higher the Signalbegriffer Weger is advantageously associated with the actuator that the respective signal term for wireless transmission to an on-board computer of the rail vehicle to a higher-level entity passes.
  • the master keys and any subkeys that may be present may be generated and secured by a secure coding method (CRC, MD4) and thus checked for authenticity by the signal conditioner. Then, not only can it be unambiguously checked that all the required keys have been sent, but it can also be unambiguously checked whether these sent keys are really the very keys whose transmission was expected.
  • CRC secure coding method
  • the Signalbegriffer Weger the control and monitoring elements to receive the receipt of an authenticizable master key and, if necessary, further authentizierbarer subkey.
  • the setting and monitoring elements are so feedback that their keys have actually arrived at the right Signalbegriffermaschineer and could be authenticated by this.
  • the receipt of this receipt can further be used, for example, to block the corresponding element for the further dispatch of keys.
  • the setting and monitoring elements can either already with the transmission of their associated master key or after receiving the acknowledgment of the program to re-broadcast their Main key blocked.
  • no other Signalbegriffermaschineer possible to obtain a master key of this so blocked setting and monitoring elements. In this way, the reservation of a road can be easily and also again outsourced security related to the control and monitoring elements.
  • a monitoring entity is provided, which can replace a missing for generating the desired with the request of the road signal term master key and the possible subkey by an explicitly transmitted intervention key. In this way, intervention can be intervened in a case of failure deliberately in compliance with the safety signal, then set under defined (also definable) conditions an emergency train or other bypasses the disturbed road (if necessary. Also the avoidance of another road) to trigger.
  • a further advantageous embodiment of the invention may provide that the control and monitoring elements that have sent their respective master key and, if necessary, further shunts to the Signalbegriffgenerierer, the Signal Generators cyclically provide an assurance of the sent master key and possibly. Additional subkey. In this way, the Signalbegriffer Weger always be sure that all required keys are still reserved by the control and monitoring elements with him. At the same time, this cyclical confirmation could also be used as a request, whether the transmitted to him master key and possibly also sent subkey actually still needed or, for example, due to a temporary disruption, the keys have actually been returned but not yet arrived. Signal generation generators and setting and monitoring elements trigger each other so as to achieve a process-oriented key positioning as possible.
  • the method may be further configured such that the failure to confirm the assertion of the transmitted master and subkeys results in a response of the signal conditioner.
  • One possible reaction is the immediate withdrawal of the driving concept. The same can apply if the confirmation is lost in the communication path. It can be provided that the higher-level instance - if necessary, taking into account a certain timeout - causes the Signalbegriffermaschineer to give back all received main and subkeys.
  • the signal term generator can execute an algorithm specified for the requested travel route, which checks the presence of the master key required for granting a driving license via the requested travel route as well as any additional subkeys.
  • FIG. 1 shows a simple railway system 2 in an initial configuration in which no route FS is set.
  • the system 2 has a control center 4, a server unit 6 and adjusting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 arranged along a simple track topology. Further, the system 2 comprises two signals 26, 28 to which in each case a signal unit 30 or 32 is assigned.
  • each of the setting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 has means M for detecting the state at a security level SIL4, which is shown in the lower third of the symbol S.
  • SIL4 security level
  • the symbol S In the upper part of the symbol S is an associated, within the railway system 2 unique address AD.
  • available keys KA are shown; Correspondingly, on the left side, the currently unavailable (locked) keys KL are located.
  • the setting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 can be subdivided generically into two functionalities. With 14 and 22 two actual control elements are shown, which monitor only the position of a switch, but can also adjust this. All other elements 8, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20 and 24 are provided for determining the track occupancy and may be, for example axle counting systems, track circuits or the like. These elements usually have only one key referred to in the context of this application with the element-side designations A, B, D, Q, N, X and Y, which stands for their availability. An availability of such elements then only results if the track section monitored by them is not occupied, ie free.
  • the adjusting elements 14 and 22 differ herebefore in the sense that although they also each have a master key C and E, but also extends over more Subkeys C li , C re , E li and E re have, each representing a particular state of the actuator, so in the points, for example, the control states "distracted” or “not distracted” or "position left” or “position right” ,
  • the main and possibly further existing subkeys are unambiguous and secured in the present embodiment in the appendix by means of CRC32.
  • a possible alternative backup could also be MD4, for example.
  • One-to-one means in the context existing here that each key (main key as well as secondary key) occurs only once in the entire area to be protected.
  • FIG. 2 Now shows the state after the setting of the road FS, ranging from the signal 26 to the signal 28.
  • a corresponding command for setting the route FS to the server unit 6 was transmitted in the control center 4.
  • a first client-server process R-1 accepts this setting command.
  • This first client-server process R-1 also always has a current image of the state of the control and monitoring elements 8 to 24 and the signal units 30 and 32.
  • verifies the first client-server process R -1 the presence and release of all necessary major and minor keys.
  • the first client-server process R-1 communicates directly with the participating setting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 and thus already provides preliminary clarifications with regard to the adjustability of the road FS. He further checks whether the signal unit 30 of the start signal 26 is empty in the present case, so does not contain any keys. The first client-server process R-1 does not require any knowledge of the nature and nature of the main and possibly existing subkeys at this point. With a successful completion of these clarifications, the first client-server process R-1 transfers the further setting routine to a second one Client-server process R-2. This second client-server process R-2 now causes the involved control and monitoring elements, here 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 22, in addition to the required for this road main and auxiliary key, here A, B, C.
  • This third client-server process R-3 provides the affected signal unit 30 with a last release key R-3io for enabling the corresponding route FS.
  • a last release key R-3io for enabling the corresponding route FS.
  • the signal 26 now shows green light, so that a train driver can enter the road.
  • the algorithm executed in the signal unit 30 determines the valid signal term.
  • survival telegrams securing the road in an advantageous manner.
  • the survival telegrams are exchanged between the actuating and monitoring elements 10 to 18 and 22 and the signal unit 30 involved in the route.
  • the control and monitoring elements 10 to 18 and 22 confirm the signal unit 30 basically in this way the allocation of their master key.
  • this confirmation can also be interpreted with caution that the control and monitoring elements request the return of their master key as well as the subkey involved, if necessary, cyclically in the case of the signal unit 30.
  • the process can be designed so that the setting and monitoring elements either for the first time after their occupancy (ie the actual train crossing) in the signal unit 30 request the return of the corresponding key no longer needed.
  • the signal unit 30 can already return the first request, which is no longer required, to the requesting setting and monitoring elements. With the return of the first of the keys still needed before the signal unit 30 is no longer able to maintain the signal concept "RIDE".
  • the signal 26 accordingly shows red light; Driving concept "HALT".
  • the syntax of the main keys and any subkeys can be designed so that with a simple processing (for example, an addition of all necessary key) in the signal unit 30 a valid Beautysentelegramm is generated as a driving concept, so to speak.
  • the balise telegram derived from the keys can be used to control the optical signals.
  • the main and auxiliary keys can also be evaluated directly on the on-board computer of the rail vehicle.
  • the master and subkeys are in this case transmitted wirelessly (for example with a transparent data beacon) to the vehicle. Since the transmission of train control data by means of transparent data balises, for example within the framework of ETCS Level 1, has to achieve a particularly high level of safety anyway (here again SIL4 is required), this solution would not even require any additional effort in terms of safety testing. If the main keys and the subkeys also contain further information regarding the topology of the route, not only the driver's license but also the speed profile for the route lying in front of the rail vehicle can be generated with the on-board computer.
  • auxiliary key In combination with the existing on the signal unit (regular) main and auxiliary key can then be generated together with the emergency key, the originally intended driving concept or even just an auxiliary signal term or other underboostedere signal terms.
  • this emergency key for example, temporarily provided detours can be realized, as may be the case for example during construction or maintenance.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Seats For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Steering Controls (AREA)
  • Controls For Constant Speed Travelling (AREA)
  • Platform Screen Doors And Railroad Systems (AREA)

Claims (22)

  1. Procédé de réglage sécurisé d' un trajet ( FS ) d'un véhicule ferroviaire, dans lequel on affecte au trajet ( FS ) des éléments ( 8 à 24 ) de réglage et de contrôle participant au trajet ainsi que des états éventuels correspondants au trajet ( FS ),
    caractérisé en ce que
    on affecte, à chaque élément ( 8 à 24 ) de réglage et de contrôle, une clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale univoque et éventuellement des clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires univoques correspondant aux états possibles, comprenant les stades de procédé suivantes:
    a) le trajet ( FS ) à parcourir par le véhicule ferroviaire est demandé ;
    b) on envoie une communication aux éléments ( 10 à 18, 22 ) de réglage et de contrôle participant au trajet ( FS ) demandé ;
    c) en réponse à la communication envoyée, les éléments ( 10 à 18, 22 ) de réglage et de contrôle vérifient leur disponibilité respective pour le réglage de l'état prévu pour le trajet ( FS ) et règlent cet état dans le cas où ils sont respectivement disponibles ou vérifient la présence de l'état nécessaire pour le réglage du trajet ( FS ) ;
    d) dans le cas de la présence de ladite disponibilité, la clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale et d'éventuelles autres clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires sont en outre envoyées par chaque élément ( 10 à 18, 22 ) de réglage et de contrôle participant au trajet ( FS ); et
    e) une position de signal, en liaison avec la demande du trajet ( FS ) pour le trajet ( FS ) demandé, n'est produite que dans le cas de la transmission complète de la clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale et d'éventuelles autres clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires éventuelles affectées à ce trajet ( FS ).
  2. Procédé suivant la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce que
    on définit pour chaque trajet ( FS ) un producteur ( 30, 32 ) de position de signal, en indiquant, dans le cadre de la communication aux éléments ( 10 à 18, 22 ) de réglage et contrôle faisant partie du trajet ( FS ), les producteurs ( 30, 32 ) de position de signal auxquels doivent être envoyées les clés ( A à E, N, X, Y ) respectives et éventuellement les clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires respectives.
  3. Procédé suivant la revendication 1 ou 2,
    caractérisé en ce que
    l'on produit les clés ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principales et les clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires éventuellement présentes par un procédé ( CRC, MD4 ) de codage sécurisé et on en contrôle l'authenticité par le producteur ( 30, 32 ) de position de signal.
  4. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 3,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les producteurs ( 30, 32 ) de position de signal accusent réception aux éléments ( 8 à 24 ) de réglage et de contrôle de la réception d'une clé principale et éventuellement d'autres clés auxiliaires pouvant être authentifiées.
  5. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 4,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les éléments ( 8 à 24 ) de réglage et de contrôle sont empêchés de renouveler l'envoi de leur clé ( A à E, N, X, ) principale par l'envoi de leur clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale associée et, éventuellement, par l'accusé de réception de l'envoi.
  6. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 5,
    caractérisé en ce qu'une clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale manquante pour la production de la production de signal peut être remplacée par une clé d'intervention transmise explicitement par une instance de contrôle.
  7. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 6,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les éléments ( 8 à 24 ) de réglage et de contrôle envoient aux producteurs ( 30, 32 ) de position de signal, leur clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale respective et, le cas échéant, d'autres clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires confirment au producteur ( 30, 32 ) de position de signal cycliquement l'assurance de l'émission de la clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale et le cas échéant d'autres clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires.
  8. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 7,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les clés ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principales et le cas échéant d'autres clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires émises pour le réglage d'un trajet ( FS ) sont retournées après que le parcours du trajet ( FS ) réglé a été effectué complètement.
  9. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 7,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les clés ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principales et le cas échéant d'autres clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires émises pour le réglage d'un trajet ( FS ) sont, après la progression du déplacement du véhicule sur le trajet ( FS ) réglé, retournées tronçon par tronçon aux éléments ( 10 à 18, 22 ) de réglage et de contrôle respectifs.
  10. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 9,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le producteur ( 30, 32 ) de position de signal exécute un algorithme spécifié pour le trajet ( FS ) demandé, algorithme qui contrôle la présence de la clé ( A à E, N, X, Y ) principale nécessaire ainsi que d'éventuelles clés ( Cli, Cre, Eli, Ere ) auxiliaires.
  11. Système de réglage sécurisé d'un trajet d' un véhicule ferroviaire, dans lequel il est affecté au trajet des éléments de réglage et de contrôle participant au trajet, ainsi que d'éventuels états correspondants au trajet respectif, caractérisé en ce que
    il est affecté à chaque élément de réglage et de contrôle une clé principale univoque et d'éventuelles clés auxiliaires univoques correspondants aux états possibles,
    comprenant:
    a) un poste de pilotage dans lequel le trajet à parcourir par le véhicule ferroviaire peut être demandé ;
    b) une unité de communication par laquelle, par l'intermédiaire d'un réseau de communication, une communication peut être envoyée aux éléments de réglage et de contrôle faisant partie du trajet demandé ;
    c) les éléments de réglage et de contrôle sont équipés de moyens informatiques par lesquels, en réponse à la communication envoyée, leur disponibilité respective pour le réglage de l'état prévu pour le trajet peut être contrôlé, les moyens informatiques réglant, dans les cas de la disponibilité respective, l'état nécessaire ou vérifiant la présence de l'état nécessaire pour le réglage du trajet, et dans lequel, à l'aide des moyens informatiques dans le cas de la présence de ladite disponibilité, la clé principale et d'éventuelles autres clés auxiliaires peuvent être envoyées par l'intermédiaire du réseau de communication par chacun des éléments de réglage et de contrôle participant au trajet ; et
    d) un producteur de position de signal par lequel une position de signal pour le trajet exigé, position de signal qui est reliée à la demande du trajet, ne peut être produite que dans le cas de la transmission complète de la clé principale affectée à ce trajet et d'éventuelles autres clés auxiliaires.
  12. Système suivant la revendication 11,
    caractérisé en ce que
    pour chaque trajet un producteur de position de signal peut être défini, dans lequel aux éléments de réglage et de contrôle participant au trajet peuvent être communiqués, dans le cadre de la communication, les producteurs de position de signal auxquels les clés principales respectives et le cas échéant les clés auxiliaires respectives doivent être envoyées.
  13. Système suivant la revendication 121,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le producteur de position de signal est associé à l'élément de réglage, qui émet la position de signal respective visuellement sur un signal.
  14. Système suivant la revendication 12,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le producteur de position de signal est associé à l'élément de réglage, qui transmet, à une instance supérieure hiérarchiquement, la position de signal respective pour la transmission sans fil à un ordinateur de bord du véhicule ferroviaire.
  15. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 14,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les clés principales et les clés auxiliaires éventuellement présentes sont produites suivant un procédé de codage sécurisé ( CRC, MD4 ) et leur authenticité est contrôlée par le producteur de position de signal.
  16. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 15,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le producteur de signal accuse réception, aux éléments de réglage et de contrôle, de la réception d4une clé principale authentifiable et le cas échéant d'autres clés auxiliaires authentifiables.
  17. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 16,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les éléments de réglage et de contrôle sont empêchés de renouveler l'envoi de leur clé principale par l'envoi de leur clé principale associée le cas échéant par l'accusé de réception de l'envoi.
  18. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 17,
    caractérisé en ce qu'une instance de contrôle remplace une clé principale manquante pour la production de la position de signal souhaitée par la demande de trajet, ainsi que d'éventuelles clés auxiliaires par une clé d'intervention transmise explicitement.
  19. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 18,
    caractérisé en ce que
    les éléments de réglage et de contrôle, qui ont envoyés leur clé principale et le cas échéant d'autres clés auxiliaires aux producteurs de position de signal, confirment aux producteurs de position de signal cycliquement l'assurance que la clé principale et éventuellement d'autres clés auxiliaires ont été envoyées.
  20. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 19,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le producteur de position de signal retourne, aux éléments respectifs de réglage et de contrôle, de la clé principale envoyée pour réglage d'un trajet et le cas échéant d'autres clés auxiliaires, après que le trajet réglé a été parcouru complètement.
  21. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 20,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le producteur de position de signal retourne, aux éléments respectifs de réglage et de contrôle, par tronçon sur le trajet réglé, la clé principale et le cas échéant d'autres clés auxiliaires envoyées pour le réglage d'un trajet après que le véhicule a progressé.
  22. Système suivant l'une des revendications 11 à 21,
    caractérisé en ce que
    le producteur de position de signal exécute pour le trajet demandé un algorithme spécifié qui contrôle la présence de la clé principale ainsi que d'éventuelles clés auxiliaires nécessaires pour l'accord d'un permis de parcourir le trajet demandé.
EP08002440A 2008-02-11 2008-02-11 Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail Not-in-force EP2088051B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AT08002440T ATE506241T1 (de) 2008-02-11 2008-02-11 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur sicheren einstellung von einer fahrstrasse für ein schienenfahrzeug
EP08002440A EP2088051B1 (fr) 2008-02-11 2008-02-11 Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail
DE502008003266T DE502008003266D1 (de) 2008-02-11 2008-02-11 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur sicheren Einstellung von einer Fahrstrasse für ein Schienenfahrzeug

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08002440A EP2088051B1 (fr) 2008-02-11 2008-02-11 Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail

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EP2088051A1 EP2088051A1 (fr) 2009-08-12
EP2088051B1 true EP2088051B1 (fr) 2011-04-20

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EP08002440A Not-in-force EP2088051B1 (fr) 2008-02-11 2008-02-11 Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail

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EP (1) EP2088051B1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE506241T1 (fr)
DE (1) DE502008003266D1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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EP4234361A1 (fr) * 2022-02-25 2023-08-30 ALSTOM Holdings Procédé de commande d'une pluralité de dispositifs de rails et système de commande de chemin de fer

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EP2253524B1 (fr) * 2009-05-19 2012-07-04 Siemens Schweiz AG Procédé et système de réglage d'un itinéraire pour le trafic sur rails
DE102014212516A1 (de) * 2014-06-27 2015-12-31 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Überprüfung der Authentizität einer Balise
DE102015004068A1 (de) * 2015-03-30 2016-10-06 PINTSCH TIEFENBACH GmbH Verfahren und System zum Betrieb einer Gleisanlage
DE102017201892A1 (de) 2017-02-07 2018-08-09 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Einstellen wenigstens einer Fahrstraße einer eisenbahntechnischen Anlage

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US6556898B2 (en) * 2001-05-18 2003-04-29 Bombardier Transportation Gmbh Distributed track network control system

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP4234361A1 (fr) * 2022-02-25 2023-08-30 ALSTOM Holdings Procédé de commande d'une pluralité de dispositifs de rails et système de commande de chemin de fer

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