EP3925851A1 - Système et procédé pour effectuer un controle d'entrée pour un véhicule ferroviaire - Google Patents

Système et procédé pour effectuer un controle d'entrée pour un véhicule ferroviaire Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3925851A1
EP3925851A1 EP20181055.3A EP20181055A EP3925851A1 EP 3925851 A1 EP3925851 A1 EP 3925851A1 EP 20181055 A EP20181055 A EP 20181055A EP 3925851 A1 EP3925851 A1 EP 3925851A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
train protection
area
etcs
regime
train
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP20181055.3A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Thomas Schrag
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Mobility AG
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Siemens Mobility AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Mobility AG filed Critical Siemens Mobility AG
Priority to EP20181055.3A priority Critical patent/EP3925851A1/fr
Publication of EP3925851A1 publication Critical patent/EP3925851A1/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/10—Operations, e.g. scheduling or time tables
    • B61L27/16—Trackside optimisation of vehicle or train operation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
    • B61L27/37—Migration, e.g. parallel installations running simultaneously
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/40—Handling position reports or trackside vehicle data
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/70—Details of trackside communication
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L2205/00—Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic
    • B61L2205/02—Global system for mobile communication - railways [GSM-R]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a system and method for carrying out an entry control for a rail vehicle.
  • ETCS Level 2 is one of three possible main configurations of the new European Train Control System (ETCS).
  • ETCS Level 1 the light signals positioned on the route are still decisive for the driver of the rail vehicle for driving authorization.
  • the permissible speeds, braking curves and any location information are transmitted as so-called standardized ETCS telegrams by means of transponders (balises, line cables) arranged in the track and received by a vehicle antenna when the transponder is passed and evaluated by the on-board unit (OBU) and displayed in the driver's cab shown on the ETCS display.
  • transponders balises, line cables
  • the electrical energy required for the transmission of the ETCS telegrams is provided inductively on the transponder by a tele-powering signal (so-called 27 MHz lobe) emitted by the Switzerlandspitze.
  • a tele-powering signal (so-called 27 MHz lobe) emitted by the Switzerlandspitze.
  • a tele-powering signal such as 27 MHz lobe
  • the fixed data balises only provide precise location information, for example for the odometry of the rail vehicle
  • the transparent data balises transmit data on driving authorization, braking curves, speed profiles, etc. and can also receive status data emitted by the vehicle antenna and transmit it to train dispatchers.
  • any light signals still on the track are no longer required for operation. All for the ride
  • the required data is transmitted to the on-board unit via the transponder and / or a route control center (so-called Radio Block Center RBC). Data relevant for operation are also sent to the RBC in the opposite direction.
  • RBC Radio Block Center
  • a proprietary cellular network operated by the infrastructure operator, such as GSM-R, is used for communication between the vehicle device and the RBC.
  • GSM-R Global System for Mobile communications
  • the requested route is still set in fixed blocks that are requested by the vehicle from the RBC. Train integrity is also still carried out using train safety devices that secure block by block, for example, by axle counting systems and / or track circuits.
  • the block-wise setting of routes is then canceled and the vehicle can be localized, for example by GPS.
  • the driving license is issued by way of the so-called moving block, in which the distance to the train ahead is determined dynamically as a function of the permissible speed, the braking distance and a predeterminable safety reserve.
  • the rail vehicle in order to be able to operate on a section equipped with ETCS Level 2, for example, the rail vehicle must be approved for standardized driver's cab signaling and have vehicle equipment that is compatible with the line equipment. In other words, this means that a vehicle must be suitable for an ETCS Level 2 section in order to be able to drive on it. An unsuitable vehicle could block the ETCS L2 section with corresponding operational effects.
  • the ETCS L2 section can be carried out with an entry control.
  • the entry control checks at a suitable distance in front of the ETCS L2 section whether the Vehicle is suitable for the ETCS L2 section and prevents the automatic setting of additional routes for unsuitable vehicles.
  • the vehicle must be registered with the RBC in order to carry out the drive-in control.
  • the present invention is therefore based on the object of specifying a system and a method for performing a drive-in control for a rail vehicle, in which it is possible on the one hand to keep travel times as short as possible and on the other hand to be able to avoid increased investment costs in new interlockings in gap sections.
  • the entry control which controls the setting of routes, takes place in the higher-level control system and not at the level of the train protection authorities.
  • the train protection authorities only forward the information from the vehicles for the entry control to the control system.
  • the train protection authorities only check whether a vehicle is suitable for their own area. If, for example, the vehicle is not suitable for the ETCS L2 area, the vehicle will not be given a driver's license and will no longer be able to continue and possibly block other trains. It is precisely this problem that the entry control in the higher-level control system is intended to prevent in advance, so that the vehicle can be stopped at a suitable point.
  • the two train protection authorities do not communicate across the gap area.
  • the higher-level control system which carries out the higher-level entry control, assesses the suitability for the second train protection instance based on the communication with the first assurance instance.
  • a vehicle can be suitable for the first train protection instance.
  • a suitability for the first train protection regime (ETCS L2) does not automatically mean that the vehicle for a certain Train protection instance is suitable.
  • the suitability check is therefore carried out specifically for each area, but suitability in the first area allows at least the setting of routes, even while the vehicle is in the gap area and the suitability for the security instance of the second area at least with regard to the possibility of setting of routes could actually only be made in the second area.
  • the present invention therefore postulates - until the opposite is proven - a suitability for the second area after the suitability of the vehicle for the first area has been determined.
  • a particularly advantageous embodiment of the present invention results in view of the ETCS migration projects that are currently being carried out across Europe and are still to be carried out, if the first train protection regime with driver's cab signaling without track-side driving term signaling, such as ETCS L2, and the first and second train protection instance as a radio block center (RBC) are executed.
  • ETCS L2 track-side driving term signaling
  • RBC radio block center
  • the first train protection regime can effectively be implemented in accordance with the European Train Control System Level 2, whereby the second train protection regime does not have to be compatible with this first train protection regime, as is usually the case with the old train protection systems that are currently still in use across the board.
  • the present invention will now be explained below using the example of a train control system according to the European Train Control System Level 2 (ETCS L2) according to the European standards EN 50128 and EN 50129 or the rules derived therefrom that govern the interfaces and the behavior of a radio block center Define RBC, explained.
  • ECS L2 European Train Control System Level 2
  • EN 50128 and EN 50129 or the rules derived therefrom that govern the interfaces and the behavior of a radio block center Define RBC, explained.
  • the invention is suitable for all train protection systems in which a gap area leads to a temporary interruption of the continuity of a modern train protection system with driver's cab signaling.
  • a rail vehicle LOK is located in a first track section 2 - hereinafter referred to as ETCS L2-1 - on a route 4 set for its journey with a driving license that currently extends with a Movement Authority MA to the end of the set route 4.
  • the rail vehicle LOK and here in particular the vehicle computer (onboard unit OBU) of the rail vehicle, is via a rail-specific Cellular connection (GSM-R) in constant connection with a first ETCS line center (Radio Block Center RBC1) and exchanges data relevant to the journey of the rail vehicle LOK with it.
  • the vehicle computer registers there when it first contacts the first ETCS line control center RBC1.
  • the control system superordinate to the RBC1 then immediately checks whether the rail vehicle and in particular the vehicle computer is ETCS L2-compatible in this case. Only once this suitability has been established can route 4 be closed at all and the MA granted.
  • the determination of the suitability by the first ETCS line control center RBC1 primarily has an effect on the communication between the ETCS line control center RBC and the vehicle. If the vehicle is unsuitable, no driving license will be issued. However, the setting of routes through the interlocking can be done at any time for unsuitable vehicles.
  • the first ETCS route control center RBC1 cannot, however, issue an MA to unfit vehicles, although the route for the vehicle has been set by the signal box. It is the task of the higher-level entry control to prevent routes from being automatically set for unsuitable vehicles.
  • the first ETCS route center RBC1 is an essential component of the European Train Control System (ETCS) in Levels 2 and 3. Its task is to guide and monitor the rail vehicle LOK in the first track section 2, correspondingly the second ETCS route center RBC2 is for a second track section 6, also called ETCS L2-2 here, is responsible.
  • the ETCS route control centers RBC1, RBC2 receive the information required for this from one or more associated interlockings, a higher-level control system 8 with integrated entry control and from the rail vehicle LOK via position reports and thus generate ETCS travel permits (Movement Authority MA), which they send by radio (usually GSM-R) to the rail vehicle LOK.
  • the rail vehicle LOK leaves the first track section 2 as its journey progresses and drives into an ETCS gap area 10, which is shown in FIG Figure 2 is shown schematically.
  • This ETCS gap area 10 is not suitable for ETCS L2 upgraded and can, for example, still be equipped with an old proprietary national train control system, such as ZUB121 in Switzerland or INDUSI in Germany.
  • a second route 12 has been set for the rail vehicle by the signal box, while the first route 4 (only shown in dashed lines here) could already be resolved again.
  • the engine driver drives the rail vehicle LOC here according to the information signaled on the route. While driving in this ETCS gap area 10, there is no connection between the first ETCS line center RBC1 and the rail vehicle LOK.
  • each of the areas 2, 10, 6 can each have an interlocking. These interlockings are connected to the higher-level control system 8; In addition, the interlockings for the first area 2 and the second area 6 are correspondingly connected to the RBC assigned to them.
  • this check can only be carried out when the vehicle is registered with the RBC2, which leads to a delayed setting of route 14. As a result, this also increases the headway time, which leads to a Reduction in line capacity leads.
  • the suitability must be determined by the higher-level entry control of the higher-level control system, since the entry control is responsible for preventing routes for unsuitable vehicles.
  • the second ETCS line center RBC2 also checks the suitability and does not issue an MA to an unsuitable vehicle. From an operational point of view, however, this is unfavorable because the vehicle comes to an undesired stop and blocks the track system.
  • the present invention solves this problem in that the suitability of the rail vehicle LOK determined in the area of the first ETCS line center RBC1 for the area of the second ETCS line center RBC2 is "frozen" beyond the ETCS gap area 10 and for the setting of the others Routes will continue to be used in the higher-level control system. Routes that the rail vehicle LOK already requests when driving through the ETCS gap area 10 for the second ETCS L2 track section 6 can also be set immediately if the rail vehicle LOK has not yet registered with the second ETCS route control center RBC2 and then is also administered there. This is in Figure 2 shown schematically in that a symbolic data block "ETCS L2 - LOK" with a tick is transmitted from the first ETCS line center RBC1 via the interlocking / control system 8 to the second ETCS line center RBC2.
  • third route 14 also set further routes 14 'within the second area.
  • the rail vehicle LOK can thus enter the second ETCS L2 track section 6 without delay, which keeps the operating costs low, the headway time short and thus the line capacity correspondingly high.
  • the entry control carried out in the first ETCS L2 track section 2 for the second ETCS line control center RBC2 for the rail vehicle LOK is therefore sufficient even when the rail vehicle LOK enters the second ETCS track section 6, although the rail vehicle LOK has to pass through an ETCS gap area 10 in the meantime , in which, for the duration of this passage, there is no connection to one of the first or second ETCS route control centers RBC1 or RBC2 responsible for the first and second track sections 2 or 6.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
EP20181055.3A 2020-06-19 2020-06-19 Système et procédé pour effectuer un controle d'entrée pour un véhicule ferroviaire Pending EP3925851A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP20181055.3A EP3925851A1 (fr) 2020-06-19 2020-06-19 Système et procédé pour effectuer un controle d'entrée pour un véhicule ferroviaire

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EP20181055.3A EP3925851A1 (fr) 2020-06-19 2020-06-19 Système et procédé pour effectuer un controle d'entrée pour un véhicule ferroviaire

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116495036A (zh) * 2023-06-30 2023-07-28 卡斯柯信号(北京)有限公司 测试列车正常运行的方法及装置

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1552997A2 (fr) * 2004-01-07 2005-07-13 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Système de gestion de la circulation véhicules ferroviaires avec changement de la commande de la marche des trains
US20190077433A1 (en) * 2016-05-12 2019-03-14 Kyosan Electric Mfg. Co., Ltd. Ground apparatus

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1552997A2 (fr) * 2004-01-07 2005-07-13 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Système de gestion de la circulation véhicules ferroviaires avec changement de la commande de la marche des trains
US20190077433A1 (en) * 2016-05-12 2019-03-14 Kyosan Electric Mfg. Co., Ltd. Ground apparatus

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
DRAEGER U: "ETCS UND DER UEBERGANG ZU DEN NATIONALEN ZUGSICHERUNGSSYSTEMEN DER DB AG", SIGNAL UND DRAHT: SIGNALLING & DATACOMMUNICATION, EURAILPRESS, DE, vol. 96, no. 11, 1 November 2004 (2004-11-01), pages 6 - 15, XP001205535, ISSN: 0037-4997 *
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUP-EUROPEAN RAIL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: "Scenarios - Ref: EEIG: 96E283", ERTMS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION, MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, BRUSSELS, vol. Reference EEIG: 96E2, 31 July 1998 (1998-07-31), pages 1 - 290, XP007904605 *

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN116495036A (zh) * 2023-06-30 2023-07-28 卡斯柯信号(北京)有限公司 测试列车正常运行的方法及装置
CN116495036B (zh) * 2023-06-30 2023-10-03 卡斯柯信号(北京)有限公司 测试列车正常运行的方法及装置

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