EP2088051A1 - Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail - Google Patents
Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP2088051A1 EP2088051A1 EP08002440A EP08002440A EP2088051A1 EP 2088051 A1 EP2088051 A1 EP 2088051A1 EP 08002440 A EP08002440 A EP 08002440A EP 08002440 A EP08002440 A EP 08002440A EP 2088051 A1 EP2088051 A1 EP 2088051A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- road
- setting
- master key
- key
- monitoring elements
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 42
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 79
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 12
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 11
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 101000879675 Streptomyces lavendulae Subtilisin inhibitor-like protein 4 Proteins 0.000 description 7
- 230000007274 generation of a signal involved in cell-cell signaling Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000005352 clarification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000011218 segmentation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000004083 survival effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- HRANPRDGABOKNQ-ORGXEYTDSA-N (1r,3r,3as,3br,7ar,8as,8bs,8cs,10as)-1-acetyl-5-chloro-3-hydroxy-8b,10a-dimethyl-7-oxo-1,2,3,3a,3b,7,7a,8,8a,8b,8c,9,10,10a-tetradecahydrocyclopenta[a]cyclopropa[g]phenanthren-1-yl acetate Chemical compound C1=C(Cl)C2=CC(=O)[C@@H]3C[C@@H]3[C@]2(C)[C@@H]2[C@@H]1[C@@H]1[C@H](O)C[C@@](C(C)=O)(OC(=O)C)[C@@]1(C)CC2 HRANPRDGABOKNQ-ORGXEYTDSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 230000015572 biosynthetic process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000903 blocking effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001934 delay Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004090 dissolution Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012423 maintenance Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011076 safety test Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000009781 safety test method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010998 test method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
- B61L21/04—Electrical locking and release of the route; Electrical repeat locks
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method and a device for safely setting a route for a rail vehicle.
- Railway networks are particularly in the area of stations and in particular in the area of large stations due to the large number of control elements used, such as switches and signals, etc., and monitoring elements used, such as track circuits, axle counter, etc., highly complex systems that avoid persons - and property damage must be operated with a very high level of security interlocking technology.
- the signal box has the task to allow the train runs provided in the control system (according to the timetable) and also due to delays to be controlled individually by the setting of routes.
- a route is usually a piece of a track for the rail vehicle, which starts at a start signal point and ends with the arrival of the next start signal point usually.
- the control and monitoring elements involved and the possibly. Required edge protection, etc. are set and temporarily secured if the setting and monitoring element this setting is allowed.
- SIL4 describes in systems with permanently high Security requirements a probability of default between 10 -9 and 10 -8 per hour.
- the present invention is therefore based on the object of specifying a method and a system for the secure setting of a road, which make it possible to proceed in the setting of safe road with redistribution of hierarchical segmentation decentralized and less proprietary.
- Each setting and monitoring element can, so to speak, check whether it is basically available for setting the requested road and, if so, whether it already has the correct state.
- state is meant here, for example, the position of a switch or the blocking of a switch for the flank protection or even the presence of the free-field state of a track vacancy detector.
- the required safety check or proof thereof is greatly simplified and can be carried out generically, for example for the type "switch" or the "track free detector".
- the signal ground generator which checks the presence of the main and sub-keys required for the travel command (eg the signal term "green lamp ON", red lamp OFF).
- Subkey is intended to imply that the master key and the subkey represent a unique amount of data that can be uniquely assigned to a setting or monitoring element and its respective state. and monitoring element and a logical "1" for the availability of the setting and monitoring element Further subkeys can then be transmitted, for example, as further logical "ones" with the above-mentioned data
- the main terminals and one or more shunts auc h be summarized in a record.
- the choice of the component "key” here further implies that the respective master key and any subkey (s) are a unique set of data identifying the respective setting and monitoring element and their respective state. Furthermore, a certain authenticity attribute can also be seen in the concept of the key, for example the signal originator allows recognizing the key as such and belonging to a particular element, which also provides a significant safety gain, but can also be achieved purely in the context of signal generation. Further, the above method and system allow expansion and modification to be made comparatively easily on an existing road or in the establishment of a new road because only the new or changed positioning and monitoring elements are equipped with new keys and the algorithm on the signal ground generator must be adapted to the new situation. However, the method basically implemented in the signal generation generator for generating the signal term as such also remains unchanged, which is why the validation of a larger network area is considerably simplified.
- the hardware used can be predominantly of the type SIL0, since the signaling safety on the one hand on the control and monitoring elements themselves and on the other hand in the configuration of the master key and the subkey and the check for the complete existence of the keys can be reduced in the Signalbegriffer Weger.
- An advantageous embodiment of the invention may provide that a Signalbegriffer Weger is definable for each route, the control and participation elements involved in the road is communicated within the message to which Signalbegriffer Weger the respective master key and, if necessary, the respective subkey to send ,
- a Signalbegriffermaschineer is definable for each route, the control and participation elements involved in the road is communicated within the message to which Signalbegriffer Weger the respective master key and, if necessary, the respective subkey to send ,
- the process of signal generation with a signal associated with the corresponding start signal logic unit where the road begins.
- the entire interlocking logic remains unchanged, if, for example, within the Driveway new elements installed, modified or removed. Only in the algorithm for driving concept formation, this process must be mapped.
- the Signalbegriffer Weger is advantageously associated with the actuator that outputs the respective signal term optically to a signal or in the case of ETCS level 2 and higher the Signalbegriffer Weger is advantageously associated with the actuator that the respective signal term for wireless transmission to an on-board computer of the rail vehicle to a higher-level entity passes.
- the master keys and any subkeys that may be present may be generated and secured by a secure coding method (CRC, MD4) and thus checked for authenticity by the signal conditioner. Then, not only can it be unambiguously checked that all the required keys have been sent, but it can also be unambiguously checked whether these sent keys are really the very keys whose transmission was expected.
- CRC secure coding method
- the Signalbegriffer Weger the control and monitoring elements to receive the receipt of an authenticizable master key and, if necessary, further authentizierbarer subkey.
- the setting and monitoring elements are so feedback that their keys have actually arrived at the right Signalbegriffermaschineer and could be authenticated by this.
- the receipt of this receipt can further be used, for example, to block the corresponding element for the further dispatch of keys.
- the setting and monitoring elements can either already with the transmission of their associated master key or after receiving the acknowledgment of the program to re-broadcast their Main key blocked.
- no other Signalbegriffermaschineer possible to obtain a master key of this so blocked setting and monitoring elements. In this way, the reservation of a road can be easily and also again outsourced security related to the control and monitoring elements.
- a monitoring entity is provided, which can replace a missing for generating the desired with the request of the road signal term master key and the possible subkey by an explicitly transmitted intervention key. In this way, intervention can be intervened in a case of failure deliberately in compliance with the safety signal, then set under defined (also definable) conditions an emergency train or other bypasses the disturbed road (if necessary. Also the avoidance of another road) to trigger.
- a further advantageous embodiment of the invention may provide that the control and monitoring elements that have sent their respective master key and, if necessary, further shunts to the Signalbegriffgenerierer, the Signal Generators cyclically provide an assurance of the sent master key and possibly. Additional subkey. In this way, the Signalbegriffer Weger always be sure that all required keys are still reserved by the control and monitoring elements with him. At the same time, this cyclical confirmation could also be used as a request, whether the transmitted to him master key and possibly also sent subkey actually still needed or, for example, due to a temporary disruption, the keys have actually been returned but not yet arrived. Signal generation generators and setting and monitoring elements trigger each other so as to achieve a process-oriented key positioning as possible.
- the method may be further configured such that the failure to confirm the assertion of the transmitted master and subkeys results in a response of the signal conditioner.
- One possible reaction is the immediate withdrawal of the driving concept. The same can apply if the confirmation is lost in the communication path. It can be provided that the higher-level instance - if necessary, taking into account a certain timeout - causes the Signalbegriffermaschineer to give back all received main and subkeys.
- the signal term generator can execute an algorithm specified for the requested travel route, which checks the presence of the master key required for granting a driving license via the requested travel route as well as any additional subkeys.
- FIG. 1 shows a simple railway system 2 in an initial configuration in which no route FS is set.
- the system 2 has a control center 4, a server unit 6 and adjusting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 arranged along a simple track topology. Further, the system 2 comprises two signals 26, 28 to which in each case a signal unit 30 or 32 is assigned.
- each of the setting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 has means M for detecting the state at a security level SIL4, which is shown in the lower third of the symbol S.
- SIL4 security level
- the symbol S In the upper part of the symbol S is an associated, within the railway system 2 unique address AD.
- available keys KA are shown; Correspondingly, on the left side, the currently unavailable (locked) keys KL are located.
- the setting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 can be subdivided generically into two functionalities. With 14 and 22 two actual control elements are shown, which monitor only the position of a switch, but can also adjust this. All other elements 8, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20 and 24 are provided for determining the track occupancy and may be, for example axle counting systems, track circuits or the like. These elements usually have only one key referred to in the context of this application with the element-side designations A, B, D, Q, N, X and Y, which stands for their availability. An availability of such elements then only results if the track section monitored by them is not occupied, ie free.
- the adjusting elements 14 and 22 differ herebefore in the sense that although they also each have a master key C and E, but also extends over more Subkeys C li , C re , E li and E re have, each representing a particular state of the actuator, so in the points, for example, the control states "distracted” or “not distracted” or "position left” or “position right” ,
- the main and possibly further existing subkeys are unambiguous and secured in the present embodiment in the appendix by means of CRC32.
- a possible alternative backup could also be MD4, for example.
- One-to-one means in the context existing here that each key (main key as well as secondary key) occurs only once in the entire area to be protected.
- FIG. 2 Now shows the state after the setting of the road FS, ranging from the signal 26 to the signal 28.
- a corresponding command for setting the route FS to the server unit 6 was transmitted in the control center 4.
- a first client-server process R-1 accepts this setting command.
- This first client-server process R-1 also always has a current image of the state of the control and monitoring elements 8 to 24 and the signal units 30 and 32.
- verifies the first client-server process R -1 the presence and release of all necessary major and minor keys.
- the first client-server process R-1 communicates directly with the participating setting and monitoring elements 8 to 24 and thus already provides preliminary clarifications with regard to the adjustability of the road FS. He further checks whether the signal unit 30 of the start signal 26 is empty in the present case, so does not contain any keys. The first client-server process R-1 does not require any knowledge of the nature and nature of the main and possibly existing subkeys at this point. With a successful completion of these clarifications, the first client-server process R-1 transfers the further setting routine to a second one Client-server process R-2. This second client-server process R-2 now causes the involved control and monitoring elements, here 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 22, in addition to the required for this road main and auxiliary key, here A, B, C.
- This third client-server process R-3 provides the affected signal unit 30 with a last release key R-3io for enabling the corresponding route FS.
- a last release key R-3io for enabling the corresponding route FS.
- the signal 26 now shows green light, so that a train driver can enter the road.
- the algorithm executed in the signal unit 30 determines the valid signal term.
- survival telegrams securing the road in an advantageous manner.
- the survival telegrams are exchanged between the actuating and monitoring elements 10 to 18 and 22 and the signal unit 30 involved in the route.
- the control and monitoring elements 10 to 18 and 22 confirm the signal unit 30 basically in this way the allocation of their master key.
- this confirmation can also be interpreted with caution that the control and monitoring elements request the return of their master key as well as the subkey involved, if necessary, cyclically in the case of the signal unit 30.
- the process can be designed so that the setting and monitoring elements either for the first time after their occupancy (ie the actual train crossing) in the signal unit 30 request the return of the corresponding key no longer needed.
- the signal unit 30 can already return the first request, which is no longer required, to the requesting setting and monitoring elements. With the return of the first of the keys still needed before the signal unit 30 is no longer able to maintain the signal concept "RIDE".
- the signal 26 accordingly shows red light; Driving concept "HALT".
- the syntax of the main keys and any subkeys can be designed so that with a simple processing (for example, an addition of all necessary key) in the signal unit 30 a valid Beautysentelegramm is generated as a driving concept, so to speak.
- the balise telegram derived from the keys can be used to control the optical signals.
- the main and auxiliary keys can also be evaluated directly on the on-board computer of the rail vehicle.
- the master and subkeys are in this case transmitted wirelessly (for example with a transparent data beacon) to the vehicle. Since the transmission of train control data by means of transparent data balises, for example within the framework of ETCS Level 1, has to achieve a particularly high level of safety anyway (here too SIL4 is required), this solution would not even require any additional effort in terms of safety testing. If the main keys and the subkeys also contain further information regarding the topology of the route, not only the driver's license but also the speed profile for the route lying in front of the rail vehicle can be generated with the on-board computer.
- auxiliary key In combination with the existing on the signal unit (regular) main and auxiliary key can then be generated together with the emergency key, the originally intended driving concept or even just an auxiliary signal term or other underboostedere signal terms.
- this emergency key for example, temporarily provided detours can be realized, as may be the case for example during construction or maintenance.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Platform Screen Doors And Railroad Systems (AREA)
- Seats For Vehicles (AREA)
- Steering Controls (AREA)
- Controls For Constant Speed Travelling (AREA)
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE502008003266T DE502008003266D1 (de) | 2008-02-11 | 2008-02-11 | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur sicheren Einstellung von einer Fahrstrasse für ein Schienenfahrzeug |
AT08002440T ATE506241T1 (de) | 2008-02-11 | 2008-02-11 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur sicheren einstellung von einer fahrstrasse für ein schienenfahrzeug |
EP08002440A EP2088051B1 (fr) | 2008-02-11 | 2008-02-11 | Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP08002440A EP2088051B1 (fr) | 2008-02-11 | 2008-02-11 | Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2088051A1 true EP2088051A1 (fr) | 2009-08-12 |
EP2088051B1 EP2088051B1 (fr) | 2011-04-20 |
Family
ID=39590280
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP08002440A Not-in-force EP2088051B1 (fr) | 2008-02-11 | 2008-02-11 | Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2088051B1 (fr) |
AT (1) | ATE506241T1 (fr) |
DE (1) | DE502008003266D1 (fr) |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP2253524A1 (fr) * | 2009-05-19 | 2010-11-24 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Procédé et système de réglage d'une voie de circulation pour le trafic sur rails |
DE102014212516A1 (de) * | 2014-06-27 | 2015-12-31 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Überprüfung der Authentizität einer Balise |
DE102015004068A1 (de) * | 2015-03-30 | 2016-10-06 | PINTSCH TIEFENBACH GmbH | Verfahren und System zum Betrieb einer Gleisanlage |
DE102017201892A1 (de) | 2017-02-07 | 2018-08-09 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Einstellen wenigstens einer Fahrstraße einer eisenbahntechnischen Anlage |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP4234361A1 (fr) * | 2022-02-25 | 2023-08-30 | ALSTOM Holdings | Procédé de commande d'une pluralité de dispositifs de rails et système de commande de chemin de fer |
Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20020173884A1 (en) * | 2001-05-18 | 2002-11-21 | Clawson Keith W. | Distributed track network control system |
-
2008
- 2008-02-11 AT AT08002440T patent/ATE506241T1/de active
- 2008-02-11 DE DE502008003266T patent/DE502008003266D1/de active Active
- 2008-02-11 EP EP08002440A patent/EP2088051B1/fr not_active Not-in-force
Patent Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20020173884A1 (en) * | 2001-05-18 | 2002-11-21 | Clawson Keith W. | Distributed track network control system |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
---|
MASCHEK U: "ELEKTRONISCHE STELLWERKE - EIN INTERNATIONALER UEBERBLICK", SIGNAL + DRAHT, TELZLAFF VERLAG GMBH. DARMSTADT, DE, vol. 89, no. 3, 1 March 1997 (1997-03-01), pages 15/16,18 - 23, XP000779765, ISSN: 0037-4997 * |
WALTHER H ET AL: "EINSATZ VON ELEKTRONISCHEN STELLWERKEN BEI DER DEUTSCHEN BUNDESBAHN", ETR EISENBAHNTECHNISCHE RUNDSCHAU, HESTRA-VERLAG. DARMSTADT, DE, vol. 34, no. 11, 1 January 1985 (1985-01-01), pages 789 - 796, XP001246968 * |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP2253524A1 (fr) * | 2009-05-19 | 2010-11-24 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Procédé et système de réglage d'une voie de circulation pour le trafic sur rails |
DE102014212516A1 (de) * | 2014-06-27 | 2015-12-31 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Überprüfung der Authentizität einer Balise |
DE102015004068A1 (de) * | 2015-03-30 | 2016-10-06 | PINTSCH TIEFENBACH GmbH | Verfahren und System zum Betrieb einer Gleisanlage |
EP3075626A3 (fr) * | 2015-03-30 | 2016-11-16 | Pintsch Tiefenbach GmbH | Procede et systeme d'exploitation d'une voie ferree |
DE102017201892A1 (de) | 2017-02-07 | 2018-08-09 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Einstellen wenigstens einer Fahrstraße einer eisenbahntechnischen Anlage |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE502008003266D1 (de) | 2011-06-01 |
EP2088051B1 (fr) | 2011-04-20 |
ATE506241T1 (de) | 2011-05-15 |
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