EP1113403A1 - Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité - Google Patents

Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1113403A1
EP1113403A1 EP01250023A EP01250023A EP1113403A1 EP 1113403 A1 EP1113403 A1 EP 1113403A1 EP 01250023 A EP01250023 A EP 01250023A EP 01250023 A EP01250023 A EP 01250023A EP 1113403 A1 EP1113403 A1 EP 1113403A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
window
sub
franking
franking machine
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP01250023A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Wolfgang Dr. Thiel
Harald Windel
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Original Assignee
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Francotyp Postalia GmbH filed Critical Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Publication of EP1113403A1 publication Critical patent/EP1113403A1/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
    • G07B2017/00161—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a central, non-user location, e.g. for updating rates or software, or for refilling funds
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00258—Electronic hardware aspects, e.g. type of circuits used
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
    • G07B2017/00443—Verification of mailpieces, e.g. by checking databases
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/0058—Printing of code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/0058—Printing of code
    • G07B2017/00588—Barcode
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/00604—Printing of advert or logo
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00637—Special printing techniques, e.g. interlacing
    • G07B2017/00645—Separating print into fixed and variable parts
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00661—Sensing or measuring mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00701—Measuring the weight of mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00661—Sensing or measuring mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00709—Scanning mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G07B2017/0075—Symmetric, secret-key algorithms, e.g. DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, Skipjack, CAST, AES
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/0079—Time-dependency
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00822—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system including unique details
    • G07B2017/0083—Postal data, e.g. postage, address, sender, machine ID, vendor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for production a security imprint in the in the preamble of Specified claim 1 type.
  • the process starts from the formation of a crypto number as part of the Security imprint made using a franking machine is printed on a piece of mail.
  • the invention relates in particular to franking machines, which generated a fully electronic impression Franking of postal items including reprinting one Deliver advertising clichés and a marker.
  • the franking machine is with at least one input means, an output means, an input / output control module Storage means, a control device and one Printer module equipped.
  • a franking machine usually creates an imprint right-justified in a form agreed with Swiss Post, starting parallel to the upper edge of the mail with the content of postage in the postmark, date in Daily stamps and stamp impressions for advertising slogan and if necessary, type of shipment in the election stamp.
  • the post value that The date and the type of shipment form the corresponding ones variable information to be entered into the item of mail.
  • the post value is usually that of Sender prepaid transportation fee (franking), which is taken from a refillable credit register and used to clear the mail item.
  • the date is a current date or a future date in a postmark. While the current date from a clock / date block automatically is provided must be manual Predating a setting of the desired future Date. Pre-dating is interesting in all cases where the volume of postal items processed and stamped very early, but at one certain date must be dispatched.
  • the embedding the variable dates for the date in the day stamp can basically as well as when printing the postage value be made.
  • the approved advertising clichés can send a wide variety of messages kind contain, especially the Address, company logo, mailbox and / or another any message.
  • the advertising cliché is about is additional information in the postal sense, which must be agreed with the postal authority.
  • DE 38 23 719 is a security system with a character printing authorization device known.
  • a computer of the franking machine is a Memory for the graphics change data to be loaded and the data of the associated date. If the user is looking for a change in funds from the computer of the franking machine to an external dialing device via a connection device (modem) accessed a selection of one to print Character pattern.
  • modem connection device
  • the disadvantage here is that the user of the franking machine no freedom of choice for the selection of the character pattern is granted. It is provided that the printed character pattern for review the security of the authorization of the franking machine is used. But here's the whole those printed with that special pattern of characters Print image to evaluate by the postal authority, what only with a high effort is possible.
  • US 4,775,246 is an alphanumeric Number
  • US 4,649,266 a single alphanumeric Number in a number additionally in the postmark printed, with the comparison by the postal official such digits or numbers are not subjective errors excluded are.
  • ACATEL a machine-readable barcode in a separate field next to the postage stamp printed, but what the disadvantage available printing area for the postmark and / or of the advertising cliché reduced.
  • Such a bar code using a separate Printers can be found in US Pat. No. 4,660,221 U.S. 4,829,568, the latter being the patent also printed a character with offset elements whose offset is the relevant safety information contains.
  • the imprinter will be variable on the one hand by means of a selection device Data from a storage device and on the other Data from an encryption circuit alternately fed.
  • In the field provided for the variable Data are alphanumeric characters with mixed in Areas (SPECKLE) created and printed on the print medium.
  • SPECKLE mixed in Areas
  • the evaluation is carried out in accordance with US 4,641,346. by reading such a character column by column and using stored characters is compared in columns recover the safety information. In doing so those from the encryption circuit Data separated again, which is another facility is required. The evaluation is accordingly complicated and only by means of complex devices and qualified post office personnel.
  • the post office can, if necessary, compare the data printed on the passport with the data stored electronically in the central station if a post identified as manipulated is found.
  • This invalid manipulated mail identified in this way can only be sorted out in the post office if the entire post is constantly checked in the post office. In terms of the result, this effort is far too high, especially since only one manipulation on the service device but other manipulations on the post on the way to the post office cannot be determined.
  • Crypted data is printed in accordance with the US 4,725,718 in the address field. It is also known a comparison of plain text data for evaluation including the crypted representation of this data address data. Although for that crypted data in the address field relatively much space is consumed and also the generation of the crypted Data consuming and using a special Encryption module must be done, this is System not completely forgery-proof, because it becomes a Encrypted text composed of segments generated from the individual output data, which with the related segments related by which long-term observation to be explored could. This also applies if it is printed as a barcode or in another machine-readable form.
  • a security system known from US 4,949,381 uses imprints in the form of bitmaps in a separate Marking field under the franking machine stamp imprint. Although the bitmaps are packed particularly densely there are required by the relatively large Mark the height of the stamp image around the The height of the selection field is reduced. A lot goes with that lost of the space usable for an advertising cliché.
  • Another disadvantage is the necessary high-resolution Detection device for evaluating the marking with the two-dimensional barcode used for smaller post offices, the effort for an automatic evaluation cannot drive, is unacceptable. Thus remains the disadvantage is that such code only mechanically, i.e. can no longer be checked manually.
  • Another security system uses imprints in Form of a diagram (US 5 075 862) within the franking machine stamp imprint. But if individual printing elements failed, dots are missing in the print image, which signals an alleged forgery can lead. Such markings in diagram form within of the franking machine stamp imprint are therefore not so sure. Even with an error-free impression the machine evaluation is difficult because that is always the case entire print image is to be evaluated.
  • DE 40 03 006 A1 describes a method for Labeling of postal items to enable identification been proposed by franking machines, including a multi-digit crypto number the date, the machine parameters, the postal value and of the advertising cliché and cached separately becomes.
  • a printer media setting Printer control becomes the crypto number when printing additionally inserted in the print pattern. So can a counterfeit or any imitation using the crypto number of the franking machine stamp by an unpaid one Postage imprint can be recognized.
  • the user can easily find out who manipulated the post value.
  • the task was to solve the disadvantages of the stand the technology to overcome and a significant increase in safety without an extraordinary inspection to be reached on site. With a security imprint should in an uncomplicated way an evaluation whether manipulation of the mail piece or on the Franking machine was made possible.
  • An arrangement for generating a security imprint consists of a franking machine with a microprocessor in a control device, which is an encryption a combination number to a crypto number carries out and this as marker pixel image data in the remaining fixed and variable pixel image data during of printing inserts.
  • the process includes steps for Formation of a series of marking symbols from the Crypto number encrypted combination number, where the latter from at least a first number (sum of all Postage since the last reload date), one third number (postage value) and a fourth number (from the serial number) is composed. This allows a review of the security imprint in one Postal authority, with further involvement in the Data center of stored and / or calculated data Manipulations are recognized.
  • An order for review has a marker reader consisting from a CCD line scan camera, D / A converter, comparator and Encoder, which has an input / output unit with a Input means are connected.
  • a marker reader consisting from a CCD line scan camera, D / A converter, comparator and Encoder, which has an input / output unit with a Input means are connected.
  • storage and output means marking data the input device with the data center is to be evaluated connected.
  • a first variant of checking a security imprint with a row of marker symbols begins with a transmission of information from the data center to the postal authority regarding such franking machines, who have not reloaded any credit for a long time have or are no longer at the data center have reported and therefore appear suspicious.
  • the solution according to the invention is based on the knowledge that that only stored centrally in a data center Data adequately protected against manipulation can be.
  • Corresponding register values are at communication, such as in Within the framework of a remote value specification for a reload credit.
  • the accrued credit amounts which are in the Totaling the franking machine will ultimately be at Franking used up. So in a calculation the average credit inflow through the data center with the outflow of credit (postage consumption) compared to the previous use of the franking machine to analyze and to determine future user behavior to forecast.
  • the franking machine which has a regular credit recharge receives or regularly at a data center reports, can be classified as suspicious become.
  • the on a forecast reload date franking machine operated without reloading does not necessarily have to be manipulated his. Rather, this may differ from the franking machine Mail volumes to be processed are above average have decreased. So if in the franking machine sufficient remaining credit available is, of course, a user must continue franking be allowed. Only an extraordinary one In this case, an on-site inspection could clarify whether manipulation has occurred. But this inspection can a franking machine user with irregular Postpone franking and credit reloading behavior, when he reports to the data center as soon as he receives the information that its franking machine as is suspect. The data center then takes one Remote inspection before. For security, the invention proposed both measures, i.e. a remote inspection the franking machine through the data center and a check of the mail items in the post office or a commissioned institute.
  • the invention is based on the one hand on the consideration that the user who manipulated either would have to bear increased effort if he tried to undo his manipulation to himself to report in good time to the data center, which the Queries register values, or only irregularly or would no longer report.
  • an intervention in the franking machine function for manipulation purposes also by the safety construction the franking machine by means of a sensor and detector device to complicate as much as possible. So it works a significant increase in security without one to achieve extraordinary inspection on site.
  • a security imprint with separate Areas for the marker information from the Franking machine made on the mail piece.
  • marking information area to be evaluated can by the postal authority in an inexpensive and relative manner easily between the manipulated with the intention of falsification of such unmanipulated franking machine imprints be distinguished.
  • the series of symbols used is an evaluation easily possible, also with regard to a reference to a machine that has been mimicked by the manipulator or that has been manipulated and regarding a reference to the machine made by the user the remote inspection date was continued.
  • the series of marking symbols also printed for security purposes is based on its compressed representation on an encrypted combination number whose Digits for an assignment of evaluable Sizes are predetermined.
  • a series of marker symbols can be done through a routine by the microprocessor Franking machine without using an additional one Encryption circuit can be generated. there are different variants of marking information possible, which from a marking symbol row can be recovered.
  • Each digit or each by predetermined digits within the combination number is a number assigned in terms of content. Then later in an evaluation, for further evaluation relevant information can be separated.
  • the above information about other data can but also from the post office or the one with the check commissioned institute queried by the data center become.
  • the corresponding one second number forming size in the data center stored needs the monotonously changeable Size only partially to form the combination number be included, but then only the part maximum change to form a first number is included.
  • a fourth number corresponds to the information via the corresponding franking machine identification number (Serial number).
  • the information can in the franking stamp additionally or exclusively as Barcode can be printed.
  • Such information can also the checksum or another suitable one Wise derived number from the identification number because the only thing that matters is the franking stamp on the mail piece or indirectly the franking machine by means of the impression of manipulation check. If manipulation is found, it must also be possible to use the mail piece to determine the open true sender.
  • the microprocessor of the franking machine For the time-critical generation of the marking data the microprocessor of the franking machine is used, to at least one after all entries have been completed Form combination number from the predetermined sizes and to do this according to an encryption algorithm to encrypt a crypto number, which is then converted into a Marking symbol row is implemented.
  • a security imprint is a random one or centrally initiated control of mail pieces is provided, order from the printed marking of a security imprint in a postal authority or similar authorized institution the individual information recover and with the open on the mail piece compare printed information.
  • the verification of the series of marking symbols by the Postal authority is based on a second variant only on samples.
  • the imprint of any one is selected Mail piece examined for manipulation without that there is already evidence of manipulation elsewhere or has given suspicion.
  • the value of a split off current size for example the total value of all since the last Reloading franking values is a monotony check using data of the last recorded value subjected to this size. This rules out that for example, by fraudulently copying the Franking impression apparently by means of a color copier real copies are created that are not original would be different.
  • Between the actually in the Marking encoded with the current one printed Size and the last recorded size must be a difference at least equal to the postage value. in the The aforementioned case is the last size recorded in the Data center during the last remote query of the register status stored total value of all previously made Frankings.
  • the corresponding one Size has been separated by comparing the Counterfeiting of the franking machine serial number using the Marking can be recognized.
  • the aforementioned marking is preferably in the form a series of symbols in a field of the franking machine image simultaneously with this by the single printer module printed.
  • the shape of the symbols With their orthogonal edges, pattern recognition is possible with minimal computational effort.
  • Another advantage over a bar code is in that due to the symbolism of the image content good legibility of the individual strings Icons in the checkbox and the possibility Linguistically the image content for manual evaluation capture.
  • the symbolism is next to the machine also a visual evaluation by a trained examiners of the form and the conceptual content which evaluates symbols, made possible in the post office.
  • the invention assumes that after switching on the franking machine automatically receives the postage in the value impression according to the last entry before switching off the franking machine and the date in the day stamp according to the current date that the variable data in the fixed dates for the frame and unchanged for everyone permanent associated data electronically embedded become.
  • This variable data of the window contents hereinafter briefly as window data and all fixed data for the value stamp, the day stamp and the advertising slogan stamp referred to as framework data.
  • the framework data are a first memory area of a read-only memory (ROM), which also serves as a program memory serves, removable.
  • the window data becomes one taken from the second memory area and correspond to the Input saved in a non-volatile working memory and this at any time for assembly to an overall representation of a franking image removable.
  • the invention it is proposed to transfer hexadecimal window data in run-length-coded form to the respectively separate memory areas of a non-volatile working memory and to store them there. If no new input is made, the data is transferred to a volatile pixel memory and the window data is classified according to the predetermined assignment in the frame data.
  • the data from the two memory areas are combined in accordance with a predetermined assignment before printing to form a pixel print image and are completed during printing to form a column of the entire franking machine print image.
  • Those variable data which are embedded in the printing column during printing comprise at least the marking data.
  • the time required for previously assembling the entire pixel image with the remaining data is accordingly reduced.
  • the previous composition is similar to the date in the postmark and as with the postage in the value print, whereby the variable information can be added and modified subsequently in the window provided. In order to save time, only those parts of a graphic representation that are actually changed are stored in the non-volatile working memory when a change is made.
  • Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the invention Franking machine with a printer module 1 for a fully electronically generated franking image, the one Advertising slogan and / or a mark for a security imprint contains, with at least one actuator having input means 2, and with a Display unit 3, both via an input / output control module 4 are coupled, a non-volatile Memory 5 for at least the constant parts of the Franking picture and with a control device 6.
  • a Character memory 9 provides the necessary print data for the volatile memory 7.
  • the control device 6 has a microprocessor ⁇ P, which with the Input / output control module 4, with the character memory 9, with the volatile memory 7 and with the non-volatile working memory 5, with a cost center memory 10, with a program memory 11, with a transport or feed device, if necessary Strip release 12, an encoder (coding disk) 13 as well as with a permanently in use Clocks / date block 8 is connected.
  • ⁇ P microprocessor
  • the control device 6 has a microprocessor ⁇ P, which with the Input / output control module 4, with the character memory 9, with the volatile memory 7 and with the non-volatile working memory 5, with a cost center memory 10, with a program memory 11, with a transport or feed device, if necessary Strip release 12, an encoder (coding disk) 13 as well as with a permanently in use Clocks / date block 8 is connected.
  • the preferred arrangement for generating a security imprint for franking machines has a first memory area A in the program memory 11 (inter alia for the data of the constant parts of the franking image, including the advertising slogan frame).
  • a cost center number is usually entered in order to select the advertising cliché.
  • an advantageous method for user-oriented billing has already been proposed, in which the selected cliché is examined in order to automatically determine the cost center under which billing is to be carried out.
  • the character memory 9 contains all alphanumeric characters or symbols are stored pixel by pixel as binary data. Data for alphanumeric characters or symbols are in the non-volatile memory 5 compressed in the form a hexadecimal number. Once the number entered the cost center or in memory area C the compressed data is saved from the program memory 11 with the help of the character memory 9 into a binary pixel data Print image converted, which decompressed in such Form stored in volatile memory 7 becomes.
  • the compressed data read from memory 5 and using the character memory 9 into a binary Converted print image having pixel data, which also in such decompressed form in volatile Memory 7 is saved.
  • Memory 7a, 7b and Pixel memory 7c is used, although this is physical preferably by a single memory chip acts.
  • the working memory 7b and the pixel memory 7c stand with the printer module 1 via a print register (DR) 15 and a printer controller having output logic 14 in connection.
  • the pixel memory 7c is on the output side to a first input of the printer controller 14 switched, at the other control inputs output signals the microprocessor control device 6.
  • the constant parts of the franking image once called up and advertising clichés are in the pixel memory rich I constantly decoded in volatile pixel memory 7c to disposal.
  • a second memory area B in non-volatile memory 5 there is a second memory area B in non-volatile memory 5.
  • the pixel memory area I in the pixel memory 7c is also for the selected decompressed data of the variable Parts of the franking image provided, which with the Indiz j are marked.
  • the second pixel storage area II in the pixel memory 7c is for the selected decompressed data of the variable parts of the franking image provided, which with the indication k Marked are. This is the only immediately before the security imprint is printed marker data formed.
  • the memory areas B to ST in the non-volatile working memory 5 can contain a large number of sub-memory areas, under which the respective data are stored in data records.
  • the number strings (sTrings) that are entered for the generation of the input data with a keyboard 2 or via an electronic balance 22 connected to the input / output device 4 and calculating the postage value are automatically stored in the memory area ST of the non-volatile working memory 5.
  • data records of the sub memory areas for example B j , C etc., are also retained. This ensures that the last input values are retained even when the franking machine is switched off, so that after switching on the postage value in the value print is automatically specified in accordance with the last entry before the franking machine was switched off and the date in the day stamp in accordance with the current date.
  • the program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least one advertising slogan frame, being stored in a first memory area A i and an assigned name identifying the advertising slogan frame.
  • the non-volatile working memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the semi-variable parts of the franking image being stored in a second memory area B j and an assigned name identifying the semi-variable part, a first assignment of the names of the there are semi-variable parts to the names of the constant parts.
  • a second assignment can be made in the franking machine in accordance with the cost center number stored in a third memory area C, so that an advertising slogan is optionally assigned to each cost center KST.
  • control code and run length-coded frame or window data are alternately contained one after the other.
  • the non-volatile Program memory 11 Before the first print, the non-volatile Program memory 11 the respective selected common Framework data for the advertising slogan stamp, for the Postmark and postage stamp in register 100, 110, 120, ..., a volatile working memory 7a taken over, whereby during the takeover tax code decoded and in a separate memory area of the RAM 7b are stored. Likewise, the respective selected window data in register 200, 210, 220, ..., loaded. Preferably the Register of sub memory areas in the memory area of the working memory 7a. In another Variant are these aforementioned registers and / or the volatile memory 7 part of the microprocessor control 6.
  • the run-length encoded are decompressed hexadecimal data into corresponding binary pixel data transferred.
  • the decompressed binary Pixel data that remains unchanged over a long period of time can remain in a first pixel storage area I and the binary pixel data that is the marking data that changes constantly with every print relate to the second pixel memory area II accepted.
  • Figure 1 shows a block diagram for such a first variant of the invention Solution.
  • window data from Type 1 The less changeable (semivariable) Window data are subsequently referred to as window data from Type 1 designated.
  • window data from Type 2 the constantly changing (variable) Called window data.
  • New frame and / or window data of type 1 can be selected as long as after inserting and saving of binary pixel data in the first pixel storage area I have a need for this. Is this not the case, an automatic generation of follows Type 2 window data with subsequent decompression and their storage as binary pixel data in the second pixel memory area II. In another Variant not shown can above Repeat steps if there are still none There is a print request. The assembly with the remaining binary stored in the pixel memory area I. Pixel data preferably takes place after the presence of a Print request during a print routine.
  • the data in the memory areas C, D and E be changed. It is preferably the same Microprocessor of the control device 6, which is also the Accounting routine and the printing routine executes used.
  • the data from the storage areas will be according to a predetermined (in certain Limits freely selectable) assignment during printing for an overall presentation of a security imprint composed.
  • fourth and fifth memory areas D and E of the non-volatile RAM 5 usage are present Name saved before that of the currently set Features an advertising cliché frame while in a fifth memory area E data for another selectable assignments of at least one advertising slogan part corresponding to a frame of the advertising cliché the aforementioned name are stored. It it is provided that the data from the memory areas according to a predetermined (in certain Limits freely selectable) assignment during printing for an overall presentation of a security imprint be put together.
  • a franking machine is usually identified by means of an 8-digit serial number, which but only partially in the marking symbol row needs to do a review of the in Allow plain text printed serial number. In a simple variant, this can be done, for example Cross sum from the serial number. In more complicated ones other variants use other data for education preferably at least two-digit information which allows the serial number to be checked.
  • a marking of mail based on a crypto number flag to enable identification of franking machines can be made without difficulty if the multi-digit Crypto number not including the as hexadecimal number of stored data values of the whole Clichés, but only with the inclusion of selected ones Data values of the cliché frame and other data, such as the machine parameters of the value setting and the date is formed and cached. It can with the method according to the invention not only numerical or numerical values, such as the number of the used Advertising clichés, but also data values of the image information to form the encrypted information is used. In contrast to DE-PS 40 03 006 can use any range to form the crypto number of advertising clichés, which separate data, in one Data record are assigned.
  • the associated Data of the columnar regional image information selected from the data set to at least one Take the number of data (hexadecimal numbers).
  • each advertising slogan number Records can be assigned, with each record those a part of the advertising cliché has relevant data. This is done by an in existing and / or generated size of the machine Data record with the associated data of the columns regional image information selected to at least take a number of data (hexadecimal numbers).
  • those run length-coded hexadecimal data corresponding to a predetermined print column are combined with at least some of the data of the machine parameters (serial number, monotonously variable size, time data, inspection data, such as the number of prints during the last inspection, or suspicious variable) and the postage value in in a special way - explained in connection with FIG. 10 - combined and encrypted.
  • the DES algorithm Data Encryption Standard
  • a conversion into a special graphic character set can be used for a high security standard. This enables the encryption of at least a first, third and fourth number of combination numbers in an 8-byte data record.
  • the character memory 9 is a conversion a crypto number in a symbolic identifier performed.
  • one is through another size, advantageously by the Post value, selected list that the individual Maps crypto numbers to graphic symbols used.
  • the encrypted hexadecimal data decompressed by means of the character memory to the from the symbols to be printed to press. This is also a too machine-readable marking.
  • window data from Type 2 for the security markings in a separate Window in the postage stamp or in the day stamp or between the two stamps is particularly advantageous. Then the entire franking imprint is not enlarged (which is also not permitted by post) or it will no additional printing unit, which is elsewhere in the Letter prints, required.
  • Marking data for marking - for example the Franking machine serial number - can be used.
  • Another option is machine-readable though communication of the Franking machine serial number, the data of which either the memory area F of the non-volatile working memory 5 or taken from the program memory 11 will be like this in the franking image shown for example with reference to FIG. 3e - insert.
  • a communication by means of a separate Sender address to be printed on using a Barcodes can be promoted through a discount.
  • Newer franking machines are based on a remote value specification FWV from a data center with a new one Reload credit loaded.
  • the data center saves the credit amounts for each franking machine user and the dates on which these balances are sent to the Franking machine were transferred. On the base this data is stored in the data center more security checks to check the regular Use of the franking machine possible.
  • Figure 2 shows what communication in a Evaluation of the security imprint according to the invention, is required.
  • a data connection line L needed for credit reloading.
  • receives the data center with every communication via the data link L information about the respective franking machine.
  • a selection parameter in a further memory area N. and / or phone number is stored to the Establish a communication connection to the data center DZ to be able to see at least the postal registers in the queries non-volatile cost center memory 10.
  • To the data center provides their evaluation if necessary a data connection via a line H to the evaluation device 29 in the post office or in the Evaluation of the franking stamp of the postal items commissioned institute.
  • the first check variant assumes a franking machine is considered suspect by the postal authority inspects the mail items.
  • the The postal authority receives information from the data center via the data connection line H together transmitted with the serial number. Is also for Inquiries from the post office depending on the The data connection line H to the type of evaluation to use. On the other hand, for inquiries from the Franking machine to the data center the data connection line L provided.
  • the data center determines an average postage consumption P K on the basis of the user-specific historical data of a specific past time period. It is assumed according to the invention that the average credit inflow also corresponds to the average credit outflow, ie the average postage consumption. This is the same as the ratio of the sum of the credits G transferred in the period under consideration and the sum of the periods t between the reloads:
  • a value R2 taken from the ascending register corresponds to the current query value. According to the default request , which is to lead to a reload credit G K.n + 1 , which must be added to the current query value R2, the future value R 2 new results .
  • R2 New - R2 G K, n + 1
  • the disposition factor ⁇ x depends on the classification of the franking machine user as an A, B or C customer.
  • P K disposition factor ⁇ K is assigned to one of for example three consumption classes A, B and C: P K ⁇ P A / B ⁇ ⁇ A P A / B ⁇ P K ⁇ P B / C ⁇ ⁇ B P K > P B / C ⁇ ⁇ C
  • Each of these consumption classes is assigned a typical disposition factor ⁇ A , ⁇ B , ⁇ C , which means that according to equation (6) the longest time (t A ) is reached for consumption class A, i.e. the class with the lowest consumption, and at consumption class C the shortest time (t C ).
  • a typical consumption time t A , t B , t C is assigned to each of these consumption classes, whereby the longest time (t A ) is assigned to the consumption class A, i.e. the class with the smallest consumption, and the shortest time (t C ).
  • the second check variant is for random selected mail items or senders a random check carried out.
  • the security imprint is evaluated in cooperation with the data center. Via the data connection H are franking machine data queried which in the data center stored and not open on the mail piece are printed.
  • the imprint of any arbitrarily selected mail item is examined for manipulation. After all symbols in a series of symbols have been recorded and converted into data, the corresponding DES key can be used to decrypt them. The result is the COMBI number from which the sizes, in particular the sum of all franking values and the current postage value, are split off.
  • the split postage value G3 is compared with the actually printed postage value G3 '.
  • the split-off size G4 ie the total value of all franking values carried out since the last reload, is subjected to a monotony check using data of the last recorded size G4 '.
  • the size G4 'last recorded is the total value of all frankings made so far, which was stored in the data center when the register readings were last remotely queried.
  • the counterfeiting of the franking machine serial number can be identified by means of the marking, in that, after decoding, the size G0 is separated from the COMBI number and checked.
  • the franking machine accumulates the used postage values since the last credit reload or forms a residual value by the previously loaded credit the sum of the postage used is subtracted. This value is updated with each franking. He is shared with other security-related data (Postage value, date, franking machine serial number) combined and cryptified for security against counterfeiting and finally printed in the manner described above. After capturing the security imprint and the Decrypting and separating the individual Data as in the above Way already described takes place the evaluation. The comparison of postage values and the The monotony test can be carried out as described above. Way performed become. The information about since the last Reloading used postage values W will now compared to those stored at the examining center Data on this franking machine.
  • the value W is fixed Threshold value for normal use of the franking machine is not exceeded, compared. If exceeded is suspicious.
  • W is compared with a threshold value SW n , which corresponds to the respective postage consumption class.
  • SW n can be defined once for the use of the respective franking machine. However, they can also come from a statistic that was kept for this franking machine. These statistics can be kept by the verifying postal authority or the statistical data that the data center creates anyway and which are then transferred to the postal authority are used.
  • a further refinement of the check results from the fact that, according to a first marking information variant, the combination number also contains the date of the last credit reload t L as a second number and is also printed with the other data in cryptified form.
  • the postal authority is then able to check to what extent certain specified maximum time periods between two credit reloads have been exceeded, as a result of which the franking machine in question has become suspicious.
  • serial number can also be printed out as a barcode become.
  • all other information will be on represented another way according to the invention, because a Barcode claimed in the franking machine print image in Dependence on the amount of information coded below Considerable space or forces enlargement of the franking machine imprint or it can not all information is reproduced in the barcode imprint become.
  • License plate formed can be in front, behind, under u./o. above a field within the actual franking stamp imprint to be printed. This is what it is about himself according to man, as well machine-readable marking.
  • a letter envelope transported under the printer module 1 17 comes with a franking machine stamp image printed.
  • the check box is located in an advantageous manner for an evaluation in one Line below the fields for the value stamp for which Daily stamp, for the advertising cliché and possibly in the field for the optional print addition of the franking machine stamp image.
  • the check box is located inside of the franking machine print image under the Daily stamp arranged window FE 6.
  • the the postage value in a first window FE 1, the machine serial number in a second and third window FE 2 and Value stamps containing FE 3 may have a reference field in a window FE 7 and a possible specification of the Number of the advertising cliché in a window FE 9.
  • the reference field is used for pre-synchronization for the Reading the graphic string and for extraction a reference value for the light / dark threshold at a machine evaluation.
  • a pre-synchronization for reading the graphic string also by and / or in connection with the frame, in particular the postage stamp or stamp.
  • the fourth window FE 4 in the day stamp contains the current one or the predated entered in special cases Date.
  • an eighth window for FE 8 a compressed exact time, in particular for high-performance franking machines with tenths of a second. This ensures that no one else's footprint The impression is the same, which means that it can be counterfeited by copying of the impression with a color copier becomes.
  • a fifth window FE 5 is in the advertising cliché for one editable advertising cliché text part provided.
  • FIG. 3b shows a security imprint with a checkbox in the columns between the value stamp and the day stamp can be seen, the upstream vertical part of the frame of the Value stamp of the pre-synchronization and if necessary as a reference field serves. This eliminates a separate window FE7.
  • the marking data can in this variant with a vertical arrangement of the symbol row in shorter Time can be recorded almost simultaneously.
  • the marking data FE 6 contains the marking data, which based on at least the post value and such a time count are generated - as below is explained with reference to Figure 10 - already sufficient.
  • a third example - shown in FIG. 3c for the security imprint is in addition to that a further marking field in the variant shown in FIG. 3b in the postmark under the window FE 1 for the Postage value arranged.
  • FIG. 3d a fourth example of the security imprint, two more check boxes in the postmark below and above the window FE 1 for the Postage value arranged.
  • FIG. 3e in a fifth example for the security imprint, two more check boxes in the postmark below and above the window FE 1 for the Postage value arranged.
  • the check box indicates which in the postmark above the window FE 1 for the Postage value is arranged on a barcode. So that can for example, the post value unencrypted but in one machine-readable form. A comparison the encrypted and the unencrypted Since both are machine-readable, information can be fully automated be performed.
  • the form of marking is freely compatible with any postal authority. Every general change of the marking picture or the arrangement of the check box is because of the electronic printing principles possible without any problems.
  • the arrangement for the rapid creation of a security imprint for franking machines allows a fully electronic generated franking image, which by the microprocessor-controlled printing process from fixed data and current data was formed.
  • the data for the constant parts of the franking image which relate to at least part of the fixed data, are stored in a first memory area A i and, by means of an assigned address, and the data for the variable parts of the franking image are in a second memory area B j or for marking data stored in a memory area B k and identified by an assigned address.
  • At predetermined intervals for example regularly every inspection of the franking machine can also a change or replacement of - in the figure 3f shown - set of symbols can be made to further increase the security against counterfeiting.
  • 3f shows a representation of a sentence Icons for a check box are shown, with the Symbols are suitably shaped so that both a mechanical as well as a visual evaluation made possible by trained personnel in the postal authority becomes.
  • a sentence is added to increase the security against counterfeiting Used symbols that are not in the standard character set of common pressure equipment is included.
  • the very high number of variations allows also a variant that has multiple symbol sets for uses the marker.
  • the information density is higher compared to a barcode when printing the symbols Space saved. It is sufficient to choose between 10 Distinguish degrees of darkness, for example compared to the ZIP-CODE one shorter by a factor of three To achieve length in the representation of the information. This results in ten symbols, whereby the Degree of blackening differs by 10% in each case. At a Reduction to five symbols can reduce the degree of blackening differ by 20%, however it is necessary to increase the number the symbol fields to be printed significantly increase if the same information as with that in the symbol set shown in Figure 3f, are reproduced should. Also a set with a higher number of symbols is conceivable.
  • the row or rows are shortened of symbols accordingly, but also reduced accordingly the detection security, so that then suitable evaluation devices of the digital Image processing, for example those with edge detection, required are.
  • suitable evaluation devices of the digital Image processing for example those with edge detection, required are.
  • FIG. 4a shows the structure of a combination number KOZ in an advantageous variant with a first Number (sum of all postage values since the last reload date), third number (postage value) and a fourth number (generated from a serial number).
  • a corresponding one - shown in FIG. 4b - Security imprint evaluation device 29 for a A computer 26 has manual identification suitable program in memory 28, input and Output means 25 and 27.
  • FIG. 4c shows a partial step for marking symbol recognition shown which for an automatic Input, according to a - in Figure 4d closer explained - security imprint evaluation method, is required.
  • the check box is in the preferred variant at least under or in a field of the franking machine stamp image arranged and it becomes a series of such symbols below the franking stamp imprint and printed with it at the same time.
  • the checkbox can, however, also be different - such as in the Figure 3 b shown - be arranged, each appropriate transport devices for the mail item are provided if the image sensor, for example the CCD line camera is immovably arranged.
  • An in The marking reader 24 shown in FIG. 4b can for example also as a guided tour Read pen to be designed.
  • the device preferably comprises a CCD line camera 241, one with the CCD line camera 241 and with a D / A converter 243 connected comparator 242 and an encoder 244 for Detection of the gradual movement.
  • the data input of the D / A converter 243 for digital data and the The outputs of comparator 242 and encoder 244 are included connected to an input / output unit 245. This is about it is a standard interface to the input means 25 of the security imprint evaluation device 29.
  • the machine identification of the symbols in the license plate can be done in two ways: a) via the integrally measured degree of darkness of each symbol or b) via edge detection for symbols.
  • the orthogonal edges of the symbol set according to FIG. 3 allow a particularly simple and with little effort Automatic detection method to be implemented.
  • the detection device contains one Medium resolution CCD line scan camera, e.g. 256 pixels. With a suitable lens, the height of the Row of symbols depicted on the 256 pixels of the line scan camera.
  • the respective symbol field is now corresponding a letter movement from left to right with scanned column by column starting from the right column.
  • the line scan camera is preferably stationary arranged and the letter is placed under the line scan camera guided away by uniform motor drive.
  • the CCD line scan camera determines the contrast value for each column of the pixels belonging to the column.
  • the output of the CCD line scan camera is with a comparator connected by means of threshold value comparison of the pixels assigns binary data 1 and 0. Even at constant artificial lighting conditions an adjustment of the threshold to the very different Light reflection factors of the different required for paper types used for envelopes his.
  • the threshold value is managed according to a reference field FE 7, which consists of a series of bars and arranged at and in front of the row of symbols is.
  • the threshold is called the mean of the light-dark stripes of the reference field.
  • the scan of the reference field is either with an additional Sensor (e.g. a photo transistor), or with the CCD line scan camera itself.
  • the measured values of the line scan camera A / D must be changed be connected in a via a standard interface Computer from which the threshold is formed and the comparator via a D / A converter be fed.
  • Newer CCD line scan cameras have that Comparator integrated, its threshold value directly be controlled by the computer with a digital value can.
  • the ones supplied by the line scan camera, including the comparator binary data are computerized Column and evaluation device in an image memory filed line by line.
  • An easy and quick ongoing evaluation program examined in each column of a symbol field the change of the binary data contents from 1 to 0 or 0 to 1, as shown in FIG. 4c has been shown.
  • the address of this 1st binary change and also the address m2 of the following binary change (1st unprinted) pixel is stored in a feature memory saved.
  • the security imprint evaluation method shows like this security information printed in the franking field evaluated in an advantageous manner become. Individual sizes are required manually and / or enter it automatically.
  • the row of symbols is in this case vertically between the value and the Date stamp arranged. It contains in cryptified Form information about the printed Postage value, a monotonically variable variable (for example the date or an absolute time count) and the Information about the serial number or whether the suspected mode is present. This information is shared with the Plain text information visually / manually or automatically detected.
  • a first evaluation variant - according to FIG. 4d - consists of the printed marking recover individual information and use the information printed on the mail piece to compare.
  • the series of symbols acquired in step 71 becomes converted into a corresponding crypto number in step 72.
  • This unique assignment can be made using an im Memory of the evaluation device stored table, in a particularly advantageous manner from the Icon set in Figure 3f is used, wherein then each symbol field a digit of the crypto number corresponds.
  • the crypto number determined in this way is Step 73 using the data stored in the evaluation device Decrypted crypto key.
  • the crypto numbers were used for the marking after a symmetric algorithm (for example the DES algorithm) generated, after step 73 the first evaluation variant from each crypto number again the starting number are generated.
  • the starting number is a combination number KOZ and contains the number combination at least two sizes, one size through the upper digits of the combination number KOZ and the other size by the lower digits of the KOZ is represented. That part of the number combination (for example, the post value) to evaluate is separated and displayed in step 74.
  • the initial number is assigned a meaning in terms of content. In this way, those relevant for further evaluation Information to be separated. Besides, it is essential the postage value actually to be checked, which one Size forms, among other things a monotonously changeable Size. A certain monotonously continuously variable size and other sizes form certain marking information variants.
  • a first Marking information variant of the in a franking machine register Total value saved on frankings at least one of the predetermined digits Combination number assigned first number.
  • the above first number is a monotonously continuously changeable Size. This changes the marking for everyone Printing what such a franked mail piece makes distinctive and at the same time information delivers on the current credit consumption.
  • This Information about the credit consumption is in Intervals based on known ones in the data center saved available credit consumption and Credit reload data checked for plausibility.
  • the total value preferably forms franking values at least one den since the last reload date assigned predetermined digits of the combination number first number.
  • a second number that is at predetermined Places the combination number is placed for example, the last reload date.
  • a third marking information variant forms this aforementioned first number corresponding to the total value franking together with the second number, regarding the quantity data at the time of the last Reloading, a constantly changing variable.
  • An evaluation with an appropriate program is sufficient equipped device (laptop). This can also possibly not from the franking machine stamp image Removable sizes G1 or G4 and at least one only the franking machine manufacturer and / or the data center known size and notified to the postal authority G5 encrypted. These are also through Decryption recovered from the mark and can then be saved with the user-specific Sizes are compared.
  • the stored in memory 28 Lists can be connected to the data center 21 be updated.
  • the one created for each serial number or user preferably in data center databases for all Franking machines saved existing lists included for each variable data values for verification the authenticity of a franking.
  • the assignment of the symbols can listed values and on the other hand with one another sentence - not shown in FIG. 3f Symbols the assignment of meaning and degree of blackening set differently for different users become.
  • Evaluation variants are in the evaluation device 29 manually or automatically by the operator using a Reader unencrypted in plain text Sizes G0, G2, G3 and G4 entered to match the same key and encryption algorithm as it is used in the franking machine, only one Crypto number and then a row of markers to derive. Further details are given in Connection with the - shown in Figure 10 - Step 45, formation of new encoded window data made of "Type 2" for a marker picture. A the marking created from it is displayed and by the Operator with the on the mail item (envelope) printed marking compared. The operator the comparison to be made comes the symbolism of shown in the output means 25 and on the Marks printed on postal items.
  • Evaluation variants are in a first step in the input means 25 by the trained examiner manually or automatically by means of a suitable reading device 24 the graphic symbols entered in order to the marking printed on the postal matter (letter) in convert back at least a first crypto number KRZ1.
  • the actuators in particular Keyboard, the input device marked with the symbols to facilitate manual entry.
  • the Franking machine stamp image removable openly printed Sizes, especially G0 for the serial number SN of the franking machine, G1 for the advertising cliché frame number WRN, G2 for the date DAT and G3 for the Post value PW, G4 for non-repeating time data TIME and at least one only from the franking machine manufacturer and / or the data center known and size G5 INS communicated to the postal authority at least partially used to compare at least one crypto number VKRZ1 form.
  • the review is done in a third step by comparing two Crypto numbers KRZ1 with VKRZ1 in the computer 26 Evaluation device 29, wherein a signal for authorization in the event of equality or non-justification given a negative comparison result (inequality) becomes.
  • the first size G1 is the advertising slogan frame number WRN, which the inspector recognizes from the franking stamp image. In addition to the user, this first size is also known to the franking machine manufacturer and / or data center and is communicated to the postal authority. In a variant, preferably with a data connection to the data center, the advertising slogan frames WR n belonging to the serial number SN of the respective franking machine with assigned numbers WRN n are displayed on a screen of the data output device 27. The comparison with the advertising slogan frame WR b used on the letter is made by the examiner, who enters the number WRN n determined in this way.
  • Those transferred from the data center to the memory 28 stored lists contain the current one Allocation of the parts of the advertising slogan frame WRNT to a second size G2 (e.g. the date DAT) and on the other hand the assignment of symbol lists to a third size G3 (e.g. the Post value PW). Additionally, a list of through the first size G1, in particular the advertising cliché frame number WRN, selected parts SNT of the serial number SN to be available.
  • User-specific information such as for example, the advertising slogan frame number WRN can be used for random manual evaluation of the marking can be used by decoding lists based on the user-specific information can be selected, the contain corresponding data records. With the size G2 (DAT) the byte is then determined from the data record what is used in generating the combination number becomes.
  • a monotony test used for testing the uniqueness of the impression.
  • the examiner takes the serial number SN the windows FE2 and FE3 of the impression and represents the Franking machine user fixed. This can additionally the ad cliché number will be used as it is in are assigned to certain cost centers as a rule, if the same machine from different Users.
  • data from last test also data from the last inspection registered. Such data are, for example Number of pieces if the machine has an absolute piece count or the absolute time data if the machine has an absolute time count.
  • the accuracy of the printed is checked Postage value according to the valid regulations checked by the postal authority. This can be fraudulent Subsequent manipulations be determined on the value print.
  • the test step is then the monotony of the data, in particular which checked in window FE8. It can make copies of a franking imprint. A Manipulation for counterfeiting is therefore not promising, because this data is in the form of a cryptified Symbol row additionally in at least one marking field be printed.
  • the must Number specified in the FE8 window since last exam increased. There are nine in the FE8 window Digit represented what is the representation of a period of about 30 years with a resolution of seconds, allowed. Only after this time would the counter run over.
  • a third optional test step can then be carried out at Other manipulations are suspected of manipulation, in particular the serial number SN of the franking machine, if necessary, the user's cost center is checked and ascertained become.
  • the information such as the advertising slogan frame number WRN, on the other hand, can be predetermined Window FE9 must be specified.
  • the associated Window data is of type 1, i.e. they are becoming fewer often changed as type 2 window data, like for example in the window FE8 the TIME data and in Window FE6 the marking data.
  • the data the window FE8 and FE9 are not printed open and unencrypted, but are only used for encryption. Therefore, the ones shown compared to FIG. 3a are missing Windows FE8 and FE9 in the - in Figures 3b to 3e shown - franking machine print images, to illustrate these variants.
  • the temporarily variable sizes to be entered for example the advertising cliché frame number WRN, the Date DAT, post value PW, time data TIME and serial number SN automatically by means of a reading device 24 each from the corresponding field of the franking machine stamp image detected and read.
  • a reading device 24 each from the corresponding field of the franking machine stamp image detected and read.
  • the size G5 forms, for example, the key for the encryption, which is changed at predetermined time intervals, ie after each inspection of the franking machine. These time intervals are dimensioned such that even when using modern analysis methods, for example differential cryptanalysis, it is certainly not possible to reconstruct the original information from the markings in the marking field in order to subsequently produce counterfeit stamp images.
  • size G1 corresponds to an advertising cliché frame number.
  • Corresponding number strings (sTrings) for window or frame input data are stored in the sub-memory areas ST i , ST j of the working memory 5 of the franking machine.
  • the sizes G0, G2 and G3 correspond, for example, to the window data stored in the sub-storage areas ST j of the non-volatile working memory 5 of the postage meter machine, the size G0 in the windows FE2 and FE3 from the sub-storage areas ST 2 and ST 3 and the size G2 in the window FE4 the sub-storage area ST 4 and the size G3 in the window FE1 originate from the sub-storage area ST 1 .
  • the stored window data for an advertising slogan text part, a marking field and possibly for a reference field are available. It should be noted that in some of the sub-memory areas of the main memory 5 of the postage meter machine identified as B k , the window data are written and / or read out more often than in other sub-memory areas.
  • the non-volatile working memory is an EEPROM, a special storage method can be used to ensure that it remains safely below the limit number of storage cycles that is permitted for it.
  • a battery-backed RAM can also be used for the non-volatile working memory 5.
  • FIG. 5 shows a flow chart of the invention Solution shown, the procedure on the Presence of two shown in Figure 1 Pixel storage areas.
  • decoded binary frame and window data are stored in two pixel storage areas before printing.
  • the (semi-variable) window data of type 1 such as the date, serial number of the franking machine and the cliché text part that is not to be constantly changed, can be decompressed together with the frame data in binary data before printing and combined to form a pixel image stored in the pixel memory area I.
  • constantly changing (variable) window data of type 2 are decompressed and stored as binary window data in the second pixel memory area II before printing.
  • Type 2 window data are, for example, the postal value and transport-dependent postal value to be printed and / or the constantly changing marking.
  • a franking machine can be switched on and on initializing several states (communication mode, Test mode, franking mode etc. Modes), what, for example, in application P 43 44 476.8 in German laid-open publications DE 42 17 830 A1 and DE 42 17 830 A1 have been described in more detail.
  • Start step 40 of the franking mode takes place on the basis of Enter the cost center in step 41 an automatic Enter the last window currently saved and frame data and a corresponding one in step 42 Display.
  • Relevant memory areas are also included C, D, E of the non-volatile working memory 5 with regard to a set assignment of window and framework data or cost center queried.
  • the manner described in DE 42 21 270 A1 can also a cliché text part, which a certain advertising cliché is assigned automatically.
  • step 43 frame data are stored in registers 100, 110, 120, ..., of the volatile working memory 7a and thereby control code is detected and in the volatile working memory 7b saved.
  • the rest of the framework data are decompressed and stored in volatile pixel memory 7c saved as binary pixel data.
  • the Window data in registers 200, 210, 220, ..., of the volatile RAM 7a loaded and control code detected and stored in volatile working memory 7b and the remaining window data after it has been decompressed accordingly in volatile pixel memory in columns 7c saved.
  • FIG. 9a shows the decoding of the control code, Decompression and loading of the fixed frame data as well as the formation and storage of the window parameters and in Figure 9b the embedding is decompressed current window data of type 1 into the decompressed Framework data after the start of the franking machine or in detail after editing frame data shown.
  • step 44 either the decompressed frame and type I window data as binary pixel data stored in the pixel storage area I before and can Step 45 are processed further or it is done a new entry of frame and / or window data. in the the latter case branches to step 51.
  • step 51 the microprocessor determines whether an input has been made via the input means 2 in order to Window data, for example for the post value to replace a new one or for window data, for example for a line of cliché text or edit. If such an entry has been made, the necessary sub-steps for the entries have been made, i.e. it will be a finished one another data set selected (cliché parts) and / or a new data record is generated which contains the data for the individual characters (digits and / or letters) of the Includes input size.
  • step 53 corresponding data records for a Called up to check the input data and for the subsequent step 54 for reloading the pixel memory area I with the window data of type 1 provided.
  • FIG. 9c shows step 54 for embedding decompressed type 1 semi-variable window data the decompressed frame data after a new entry or after editing this type 1 window data detailed.
  • the data from according to the Called records are evaluated to Control code for a "color change” or a Detect "column end", which for embedding of the newly entered window data are required. Then those data that do not have a tax code are decompressed into binary window pixel data and into embedded the pixel memory area I in columns.
  • step 51 it was determined in step 51 that no window data should be selected or edited, then the program branches to step 55.
  • step 55 leads the possibility to change the fixed advertising cliché or frame data to a step 56 the input of the currently selected framework data records to be carried out together with the window data sets. Otherwise the program branches to step 44.
  • step 44 If a new entry of selected special sizes a flag is set in step 44 and in the subsequent step 45 for formation of Data for a new series of marking symbols taken into account, if here for a second variant Process step 45b.
  • step 45 the new encoded is formed Type 2 window data Marking data generated for a window FE6, where previous steps of encrypting data for Generation of a crypto number are included.
  • Step 45 is also a bar code form and / or symbol chain provided.
  • FIG. 10 is the formation of new coded window data in two variants of type 2 explained for a marker image.
  • a monotonously variable size in a step 45a processed a monotonously variable size, so that ultimately through the printed symbol row every print becomes distinctive.
  • a second Variant are in a step 45b before the step 45a processed other sizes.
  • the correspondingly formed data record for the marking data is then loaded into an area F and / or at least in a sub-memory area B 6 of the non-volatile working memory 5 and overwrites the previously saved data record for which window characteristic values have already been determined or are predetermined and are only now in the volatile working memory 7b are stored.
  • the sub-storage area B 10 is preferably provided for a data record which leads to the printing of a second row of marking symbols, as is shown in FIGS. 3c and 3d. In addition, double rows of symbols can also be printed side by side - in a manner not shown in FIG. 3b.
  • the area F is preferably provided for a data record which leads to the printing of a bar code, as is shown in FIG. 3e.
  • step 46 the data of the data set is transferred byte by byte for the marking in registers in the volatile working memory 7a and the control characters "color change" and "end of column” are detected, in order then to decode the remaining data of the data set and to decode the decoded binary window pixel data of the type 2 to load into the pixel memory area II of the volatile working memory 7c.
  • FIG. 11 shows the decoding of the control code and conversion into decompressed binary window data of type 2 in detail.
  • Such type 2 window data are identified in particular by the index k and relate to the data for the window FE6, possibly FE10 for marking data and possibly FE8 for the TIME data of the absolute time count.
  • the time data in particular represents a variable that can be changed in a monotonous manner, as it increases as a function of time.
  • BCD-packed time data supplied from the clock / date module 8 are, if appropriate, converted into a suitable data set containing time data with run-length-coded hexadecimal data. Now they can also be stored in a memory area B 8 for window data FE8 of type 2 and / or loaded immediately in step 46 into register 200 of the working memory 7a or into the print register 15 in columns.
  • step 47 if a print request has been made, the step 48 containing a print routine is waited for and if the print request has not yet taken place, the print request is waited in a waiting loop.
  • the waiting loop - as shown in FIGS. 5 and 6 - is directly traced back to the beginning of step 47.
  • the waiting loop - in a manner not shown in FIGS. 5 and 6 - is traced back to the beginning of step 44 or 45.
  • the print routine - shown in detail in FIG. 12 - carried out in step 48 for the compilation of print column data from the pixel memory areas I and II takes place while the print register (DR) 15 is being loaded.
  • the printer controller (DS) 14 effects this immediately after loading the Print register (DR) 15 a print of the loaded print column. It is then checked in step 50 whether all columns for a franking machine printed image are printed by comparing the current address Z with the stored end address Z end . If the printing routine has been carried out for a piece of mail, a branch is made to step 57. Otherwise, the process branches back to step 48 in order to generate and print the next print column until the print routine has ended.
  • step 57 it is checked whether further mail pieces are closed are franking. If not, and that If the printing routine has ended, step 60 is reached and thus the franking ended. Otherwise it is Print end has not been reached and it becomes a step 51 branches back.
  • step 46 shows a fourth variant of the invention Solution, deviating from the block diagram According to FIG. 1, only one pixel memory area I is used. In this pixel storage area I become decoded binary frame data and window data type 1 assembled before printing and saved. The steps are up to step 46, which is saved here in this variant according to FIG. 6 and step 48, which is here by the Step 49 is replaced identically. Up to step 46 there is essentially the same order in the Procedure.
  • Window data Type 2 are, for example, the one to be printed postal and postage dependent postage and / or the constantly changing marking.
  • a letter envelope 17 is moved under the printing module 1 of an electronic franking machine at the speed v in the direction of the arrow and is thereby printed in columns s 1 starting in a grid-like manner with the postage stamp image shown.
  • the printer module 1 has, for example, a print bar 16 with a number of print elements d1 to d240.
  • the ink-jet or a thermal transfer printing principle for example the ETR printing principle (Electroresistive Termal Transfer Ribbon), can be used for printing.
  • a column s f to be printed has a printing pattern 30 to be printed, which consists of colored printing dots and non-colored printing dots.
  • a colored printing dot is printed by a printing element.
  • the non-colored print dots are not printed.
  • the first two printing dots in the printing column s f are colored in order to print the frame 18 of the postage stamp image 30.
  • 15 non-colored (ie not active) and 3 colored (ie active) printing dots alternate until a first window FE1 is reached, in which the postage value (postage) is to be inserted. This is followed by a range from 104 non-colored pressure dots to the end of the column.
  • Such run length coding is implemented in the data set using hexadecimal numbers. The space requirement is minimized by having all the data in such a compressed form.
  • control code "00" for color changes can theoretically be used omitted, since with a single hexadecimal number "F0" an entire print column of 240 dots with one same coloring can be fully defined. Nonetheless, with only a slight increase in memory, if there are several windows in one column, a color change make sense.
  • a data record for the pressure column s f results in the form shown in sections: ... "2", “0D”, “02”, “4F”, “F1”, “68”, “FE”, ..., ...
  • control characters are detected from hexadecimal numbers "QQ" and evaluated in the course of a step 43.
  • window characteristic values Z j , T j , Y j or Z k , T k , Y k are also generated and together with defined values for the start address Z 0 , end address Z end and the total run length R, ie the number of each printing column required binary data, stored in volatile memory RAM 7b.
  • a maximum of 13 windows could be called for the 13 control characters "F1" to "FD” and the start addresses determined.
  • a start address Z 6 can be determined and saved as a window characteristic value.
  • FIG. 8 shows the window characteristic values relating to a pixel memory image and stored separately therefrom for a first window FE1.
  • FIG. 9a shows the decoding of the control code, decompression and loading of the fixed frame data as well as the formation and storage of the window characteristic values.
  • a control code "color change" was taken into account when considering the creation of very high-resolution prints.
  • the source address H i for frame data is incremented and a color change is carried out so that the initial data byte is evaluated as colored, for example, which later leads to correspondingly activated printing elements.
  • the above-mentioned byte which is a run-length-coded hexadecimal number for frame data, is now transferred in sub-step 4313 from the area A i of the non-volatile memory 5 which is automatically selected by the cost center KST to a register 100 of the volatile memory 7a. Control characters are detected and a run length variable X is reset to zero.
  • sub-step 4314 a control character "00" for detected a color change, what after branching back on the sub-step 4312 leads to a color change, i.e. the next run length coded hexadecimal number an inactivation of the printing elements according to the Barrel length. Otherwise it is determined in sub-step 4315 whether there is a control character "FF" for end of image. If one is recognized, point d is corresponding of FIGS. 5 or 6 and step 43 is processed.
  • sub-step 4316 determines whether there is a control character "FF" for end of image. If one is recognized, the color flip-flop 1 is reset in sub-step 4319 and a branch is made to sub-step 4312 in order to then load the byte for the next printing column in sub-step 4313. If there is no end of column, it is determined in sub-step 4317 whether there is a control character for a window of type 2. If one has been recognized, then a branch is made to sub-step 4322. Otherwise, it is examined in sub-step 4318 whether there is a control character for type 1 windows. If this is the case, a point c 1 is reached at which a step 43b - shown in FIG. 9b - is carried out.
  • sub-step 4322 if there is a control character for window data of type 2, the storage of window characteristic values T k is carried out . If a window characteristic, in this case the window column run variable T k is still at the initial value zero, the window start address Z k corresponding to the address Z is determined in a sub-step 4323 and stored in the volatile working memory 7b. Otherwise, a branch is made to a sub-step 4324. Sub-step 4323 is also followed by sub-step 4324, in which the window characteristic of the window column variable T k is incremented. In the subsequent sub-step 4325, the previous window column variable T k stored in the volatile main memory 7b is overwritten with the current value, and the point b is reached.
  • FIG. 9b shows the embedding of decompressed current window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after the start of the franking machine or after editing frame data. Assuming a control character for windows of type 1 was recognized in sub-step 4318, point c 1 and thus the beginning of step 43b are reached.
  • step 4330 the storage of window parameters T j is carried out . If a window characteristic value, in this case the window column run variable T j is still at the initial value zero, the window start address Z j corresponding to the address Z is determined in a sub-step 4331 and stored in the volatile working memory 7b. Otherwise, a branch is made to a sub-step 4332. Sub-step 4331 is also followed by sub-step 4332, in which the window characteristic of the window column run length Y j and the window column run length variable W j to an initial value of zero, and the window source address U j to the initial value U oj -1 and the second color flip-flop for windows "Print in non-color" can be set.
  • the previous window source address U j is incremented and a color change is carried out, so that any window bytes which are loaded in the subsequent sub-step 4334 are evaluated as colored, which subsequently leads to activated printing elements during printing.
  • sub-step 4334 a byte from the sub-memory areas B j in the non-volatile main memory 5 is loaded into register 200 of the volatile main memory 7 a and is thereby detected for control characters.
  • sub-step 4335 the window column run length Y j is incremented by the value of the window column run length variable W j .
  • sub-step 4336 it is determined whether there is a control character "00" for color changes. If one has been recognized, the process branches back to sub-step 4333. Otherwise, it is examined in sub-step 4337 whether there is a control character "FE" for the end of the column. If this is not the case, window data is available.
  • a sub-step 4338 the content of the register 200 is decoded with the help of the character memory 9 and the binary window pixel data corresponding to this byte is stored in the pixel memory area I of the pixel memory 7c.
  • the window column run length variable W j is then determined in a sub-step 4339 to increment the address Z to the value of variable W j.
  • the new address is thus available for a new byte of the data record to be converted and a branch is made back to sub-step 4333, in which the new source address for a byte of the data record for window FEj is also generated.
  • sub-step 4340 If a control character "FE" for a column end was recognized in sub-step 4337, a branch is made to sub-step 4340, in which the window column variable T j is incremented and the volatile working memory 7b stored window column variable T j and the window column run length Y j are overwritten with the current value. A color change is then carried out in sub-step 4341 and point b has been reached.
  • step 43b This completes step 43b and new framework data could be implemented in step 43a if not a next window is recognized or the point d has been reached.
  • FIG. 9c shows the embedding of decompressed variable window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after editing this window data of type 1.
  • pixel memory data and window characteristics have already been stored before the start of step 54.
  • the sub-step 5440 begins with the determination of the number n 'of windows for which the data have been changed and a determination of the associated one.
  • a window counter variable q is also set to zero.
  • the source address U j is set to an initial value U oj -1
  • the target address Z j is used to address the pixel memory area I
  • a window column counter P j and the second color flip-flop are reset to the initial value zero.
  • sub-step 5443 the source address is incremented and a color change is carried out before the sub-step 5444 is reached.
  • sub-step 5444 a byte of the changed data record is called up in the non-volatile memory and transferred to the register 200 of the volatile memory 7a, control characters being detected. If a control character "00" for color change is branched back to sub-step 5443 in sub-step 5445. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 5446 to look for control characters "FE" for the end of a column. However, if such a control character is not present, the content of the register 200 can be decoded in the subsequent sub-step 5447 with the cooperation of the character memory 9 and converted into binary pixel data for the window to be changed.
  • sub-step 5446 if a control character "FE" for the end of the column is recognized in sub-step 5446, a branch is made to sub-step 5449, in which the window column counter P j is incremented.
  • sub-step 5450 it is examined whether the window column counter P j has reached the window characteristic value for the associated window column variable T j . Then, for a first changed window, all the change data would be loaded into the pixel memory area I and branching back to the sub-step 5453 and from there to the sub-step 5441 in order to transfer change data into the pixel memory area I for a possibly second window. For this purpose, the window counter variable q is incremented in sub-step 5453 and the subsequent window start address Z j + 1 and the subsequent window column variable T j + 1 are determined.
  • the target address for the data in the pixel memory area I is incremented by the frame total column length R in sub-step 5451.
  • the target address V j is thus set to the next column for binary pixel data of the window in the pixel memory area I.
  • the color flip-flop is reset to zero, so that the conversion begins with pixel data that is rated as color.
  • step 45 If no further new entry is found in step 44 in step 45, new ones can now be created coded window data of type 2 for a marking picture, especially after a first variant with a Step 45a take place.
  • Step 45 includes further ones - shown in FIG. 10 - Sub-steps to create new coded window data type 2 for a marker image.
  • step 44 in step 45 the output data for the data records containing the compressed data for the windows FEj and possibly for the frame data are required again in order to generate new coded window data of type 2 for one To form a series of marking symbols.
  • the individual output data (or input data) are stored in the memory areas ST w as a BCD-packed number in accordance with the respective sizes G w .
  • the data for a data record for window FEk of type 2 are now compiled in several steps and stored non-volatile in a sub-memory area B k .
  • a row of marking symbols is generated in a step 45a.
  • the sizes are used in the postage meter machine to form a single number combination (sub-step 451) due to the amount of information from the sizes G0 to G5, which are only to be partially printed in the franking machine stamp image in an unencrypted manner a single crypto number is encrypted (sub-step 452) and then converted into a marking to be printed on the postal matter (sub-step 453).
  • the data record to be generated for the marking in a window FE6 can be stored in a final sub-step 454. Then point c 3 is reached.
  • This first variant, executed in partial step 45a can save the time that would otherwise be required in the franking machine for generating further crypto numbers.
  • the continuously monotonically variable quantity G w is at least one ascending or descending machine parameter, in particular a time count or its complement during the life of the franking machine.
  • a machine parameter is time-dependent is, especially if it is a diminishing one Characterizing the battery voltage of the battery-supported memory Size G4a and a second continuously monotonous falling size G4b or the respective complements size G4a and G4b.
  • the constantly monotonously decreasing size corresponds to a numerical value the next inspection date (INS) and one is constantly monotonically falling time-dependent variable.
  • the combination number KOZ1 is a part of the user of the Franking machine characterizing size G0, G1 from the control device 6 is made available.
  • the upper 10 digits of the combination number KOZ1 for the TIME data (size G4) and the lower 4 digits for the postal value (size G3) are preferably provided from the memory areas ST w .
  • a maximum of 8 bytes, ie 16 digits can be encrypted at once.
  • the combination number KOZ1 can be supplemented by a further size in the direction of the least significant digits.
  • the supplementary part can be part of the serial number SN or the number WRN of the advertising slogan frame or the byte which is selected from the data record of the advertising slogan frame depending on a further size.
  • This combination number KOZ1 can be found in sub-step 452 approx. 210 ms are encrypted into a crypto number KRZ1, here a number of others known per se Steps. After that is in the sub-step 453 the crypto number KRZ1 based on a predetermined in the memory areas M of the non-volatile working memory 5 saved marking list in a corresponding Convert a series of symbols.
  • KRZ1 a number of others known per se Steps.
  • Figure 3c are in - here arranged orthogonally to each other - windows FE6 and FE10 each have a row with a total of 20 symbols with which, for example, the total 8 bytes, i.e. 16 digits, the crypto number KRZ1 and further information, if necessary, unencrypted or to others Played encrypted.
  • a second variant with an additional step 45b to step 45a differs from the first variant by others that have to be considered equally Output or input variables.
  • step 45b is carried out analogously to step 45a.
  • a flag has been set in order to cause sub-steps 45b and / or 45a to be carried out. that in step 45b a second combination number KOZ2 having at least the other part of the size G0, G1 characterizing the user of the franking machine is formed, then encoded to a second crypto number KRZ2 and then converted into at least one second marking symbol row MSR2 using a second set SSY2 of symbols .
  • sub-step 455 is compared to sub-step 451 a combination number KOZ2 formed, in particular here the sizes for other parts of the serial number, for advertising cliché (frame) number etc. Size can.
  • sub-step 456 as in sub-step 452 a crypto number KOZ2 is formed. This is done in sub-step 457 then again the transformation into a series of marking symbols, the non-volatile in sub-step 458 is cached.
  • Sub-step 45a which comprises sub-steps 451 to 453, then takes place. If necessary, this can be connected by a sub-step 454. Then point c 3 is reached.
  • a is entered in sub-step 456 different encryption algorithm than the DES for Time savings used.
  • the sub-step 453 of the first variant or in sub-step 457 the second variant is a transformation to the additional one Increasing the information density of the marking symbol row compared to the crypto number KRZ1 or KRZ2 performed.
  • KRZ1 or KRZ2 the crypto number
  • the series of marker symbols shown there to double That can be done by means of a - in Figure 3b shown - marking symbol row in parallel further marking symbol row.
  • a series of marking symbols - as shown in FIG. 3a has been shown - is designed for 10 digits and can map a crypto number KRZ1 if the symbol set 40 symbols.
  • - is designed for 10 digits and can map a crypto number KRZ1 if the symbol set 40 symbols.
  • Here is a fully automated one Input and evaluation - if only subjective errors of the To avoid the inspector from recognizing the symbols, sensible.
  • step 45 the data of a record for the marker symbol series after decompressing them into the others Pixel data embedded.
  • two different options are provided. One possibility becomes another on the basis of FIG. 11 explained in more detail with reference to FIG.
  • FIG. 11 explains step 46 in FIG. 5 in particular.
  • window parameters Z k and T k are specified for changed window data, the window change number p ′ is determined and a window count variable q is set to zero.
  • a sub-step 4661 it is evaluated whether the window count variable q is equal to the window change number p '. Then point d 3 and thus the next step 47 would already have been reached. However, this path is not regularly followed at the beginning, since the monotonously increasing size constantly creates new marker symbol rows for each print.
  • a new source address for the data of the data record of the window FEk just processed is generated in order to load a byte of the coded window data of type 2 from the memory area B k into registers of the non-volatile memory 7 a and to detect control characters in the next sub-step 4664 .
  • a sub-step 4665 the window column run length Y k is then incremented by the window column run length variable W k , which is still zero here. Then a check is carried out for control characters for color changes (sub-step 4666) and, if necessary, branching back to sub-step 4663 or a search for control characters for the end of the column (sub-step 4667). If successful, branch is made to sub-step 4669 and the window column counter P k is increased. Otherwise, the next sub-step 4668 is to decode the control code and convert the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2.
  • Sub-step 4670 then checks whether all of the window's columns have been processed. If this is the case, a branch is made to sub-step 4671 and the column run length Y k of the window FEk is stored in memory 7b and branched back to sub-step 4673. If it is recognized in sub-step 4670 that all the columns have not yet been processed, the sub-step 4672 branches back to sub-step 4663, with the window characteristic value Y k and the color flip-flop being reset to zero. In the next sub-step 4668, a decoding of the control code and a conversion of the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2 may then be carried out again.
  • the printing column has N printing elements.
  • a sub-step 481 the register 15 of the printer controller 14 is loaded serially bit by bit from the area I of the pixel memory 7c with binary print column data which are called up with the address Z, and the window counter h is set to a number which is the number of windows increased by one p corresponds.
  • a window counter h is decremented, which outputs window numbers k one after the other, whereupon in sub-step 483 the address Z reached in the pixel memory is compared with the window start address Z k of the window FE k . If the comparison is positive and a window start address is reached, a branch is made to sub-step 489, which in turn consists of sub-steps 4891 to 4895. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 484.
  • sub-step 4891 a first bit from the area II of the pixel memory 7c for the window FE k, the binary window pixel data is loaded into the register 15, the address Z and the bit count variable 1 being incremented in sub-step 4892 and the window bit count length X k being decremented.
  • a sub-step 4893 if not all bits corresponding to the window column run length Y k have been loaded yet, further bits from area II are loaded. Otherwise, a branch is made to sub-step 4894, the window start address Z k for addressing the next window column being increased accordingly by the total length R and the window column counter P k being decremented. At the same time, the original window bit count length X k is restored in accordance with the window column run length Y k .
  • Sub-step 4895 then checks whether all window columns have been processed. If this is the case, then the start address Z k for the corresponding window FE k is set to zero or an address which lies outside the pixel memory area I. Otherwise and after sub-step 4896, a branch is made to point e 1 .
  • step 484 it is checked whether all window start addresses have been queried. Once that's done, then the program branches to sub-step 485 to determine the current Increment address Z. Hasn't that happened yet? the system branches back to sub-step 481 by which Continue decrementing window counter h until the next window start address is found or until in sub-step 484 the window counter h becomes zero.
  • sub-step 486 it is checked whether all data for column s k to be printed are loaded in register 15. If this is not yet the case, the bit count variable l is incremented in sub-step 488 to return to point e 1 and then (in sub-step 481) to load the next bit addressed with the address Z from the pixel memory area into register 15.
  • step 50 - already shown in FIG. 5 - it is determined whether all the pixel data of the pixel memory areas I and II have been printed out, that is to say the item of mail has been franked completely. If this is the case, then point f 1 is reached. Otherwise, a branch is made to sub-step 501 and bit count variable 1 is reset to zero, in order to then branch back to point e 1 . Now the next print column can be created.
  • Step 49 which is already beginning in FIG. 6, comprises the sub-steps 491 to 497 and the sub-steps 4990 to 4999.
  • the sub-steps 491 to 497 run with the same result in the same order as the sub-steps 481 to 487 have already been explained in connection with FIG.
  • sub-step 4990 a color change already explained - in connection with FIG. 7 - when evaluating the type 2 window pixel data to be converted, so that the first hexadecimal data of the called data set are, for example, evaluated as colored.
  • the source address is incremented.
  • the compressed window data for the type 2 windows FE k are then loaded from the predetermined data record (stored in the corresponding sub-memory areas B j ) into the registers 200 of the volatile main memory 7a in sub-step 4992.
  • a hexadecimal number "QQ" corresponds to one byte.
  • control code is also detected here. If a window column is to be printed which begins with non-colored, ie not to be printed, pixels, the control code "color change" would be in the first place in the data record. Thus, branching back to sub-step 4991 in sub-step 4993 in order to carry out the color change. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 4994. In sub-step 4994, it is determined whether there is a "column end" control code. If this is not yet the case, the register content must be decoded and thus decompressed.
  • step 4996 the address is then incremented and a corresponding next hexadecimal number is selected in the data record, which is stored in the non-volatile main memory 5 in sub-area B 5 , and the bits converted during the decoding of the run length coding are determined in order to form a window column run length variable W j , with which the destination address is incremented.
  • the new destination address for reading is thus generated. and branching back to sub-step 4991.
  • sub-steps 4997 to 4999 follow in order to then branch back to point e 2 .
  • the sub-steps 4998 and 4999 run similarly to the sub-steps 4895 and 4894 shown in FIG.
  • sub-step 497 the print column is loaded printed.
  • the sub-steps 491 to 497 run similar to the sub-steps shown in FIG 481 to 487.
  • a printer module applies a fully electronically generated franking image to a mail piece, corresponding to the current inputs or data made via an input means and an input / output control module, which can be checked with a display unit .
  • the data for the constant parts of the franking image which relate to at least the frame of an advertising cliché, are stored in a first memory area A i of the program memory 11, that the non-volatile memory 5 has a plurality of memory areas and that the data for the variable or semi-variable parts of the franking image are stored in second memory areas B k and B j of the non-volatile memory 5.
  • the selectable cost center numbers for the cost centers can be assigned the names of the advertising slogan frames in a third memory area C of the non-volatile memory 5.
  • the name of the advertising slogan frames corresponds to advertising slogan frame numbers WRN.
  • the print pattern is generated from fixed data and current data. It is provided that according to the name or the advertising slogan frame number WRN, which are stored in the memory areas of the non-volatile memory 5 and identify the currently set frame of an advertising slogan. Frame data are taken from the first memory area of the program memory 11, decompressed and stored in a first area I of a pixel memory 7C. Semivariable window data from the second memory area B j are subsequently embedded in the aforementioned constant data.
  • billing is carried out in a sub-step 470 under the aforementioned cost center number in the cost center memory 10 and then variable window data from the second memory area B k for the marking data are embedded during printing, the embedding while the printing register 15 is being loaded he follows.
  • step 47 when a print request has been made to step 48 or a printing routine 49 and if a print request has not yet been made in a queue for the print request serviced by - shown in Figures 5 and 6, respectively Way - to the beginning of step 47 directly according to the invention has one Another time advantage, since it is not constantly new crypto numbers are generated according to the DES algorithm have to. The next recordable time after one Generation of the marking symbol row can already Trigger pressure. Nevertheless, as mentioned, there are others Back branches possible.
  • Step 47 can be a additional step 61 can be arranged in advance in order to can be found if a missing print request in step 61 to a standby mode (step 62) branch, for example at the current time and / or display the date and / or to check for errors perform automatically. From standby mode 62 becomes the starting step 40 directly or indirectly branched back over further steps or modes.
  • step 45 be placed between steps 53 and 54.
  • Step 45 following step 54 then becomes the data a record for the series of marking symbols after decompression into the remaining pixel data of the pixel storage area I embedded. Another Pixel storage area is then not required.
  • Another opposite variant stores in the pixel memory area just frame pixel data and embeds all window pixel data equal to that in the print register 15 read corresponding columns without that in between requires a pixel memory for window data becomes.
  • the program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least one advertising cliché frame, being stored in a first memory area A i .
  • An assigned name identifies the advertising slogan frame.
  • the non-volatile working memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the semi-variable parts of the franking image being stored in the second memory area B j and an assigned name identifying the semi-variable part.
  • a first assignment of the names of the semi-variable parts to the names of the constant parts exists according to the stored program.
  • a second assignment is made in accordance with the cost center number stored in a third memory area C, so that an advertising cliché is optionally assigned to each cost center KST.
  • a microprocessor is provided in the control device 6 in order to encrypt the marker pixel image data before it is embedded in columns in the remaining pixel image data.
  • a volatile working memory 7 is therefore connected to the microprocessor, and a printer controller 14 is connected to print register 15, with which the marker pixel image data are inserted into the remaining fixed and variable pixel image data during printing under the control of the microprocessor in accordance with a program stored in the program memory 11.
  • the invention is not based on the present embodiment limited. Rather is a number of Variants conceivable, which of the solution shown even with fundamentally different types Make use.
EP01250023A 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité Ceased EP1113403A1 (fr)

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DE4344471A DE4344471A1 (de) 1993-12-21 1993-12-21 Verfahren und Anordnung zur Erzeugung und Überprüfung eines Sicherheitsabdruckes
DE4344471 1993-12-21
EP94250259A EP0660270B1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour générer et vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité

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EP94250259A Division-Into EP0660270B1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour générer et vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité
EP94250259A Division EP0660270B1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour générer et vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité

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EP94250259A Expired - Lifetime EP0660270B1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour générer et vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité
EP01250023A Ceased EP1113403A1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité

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US5712916A (en) 1998-01-27
EP0660270B1 (fr) 2004-12-29
DE59410399D1 (de) 2005-02-03
US5680463A (en) 1997-10-21
US5734723A (en) 1998-03-31
EP0660270A2 (fr) 1995-06-28
DE4344471A1 (de) 1995-08-17
EP0660270A3 (fr) 1995-09-06
US5991409A (en) 1999-11-23
EP1118964B1 (fr) 2008-08-20
US5970151A (en) 1999-10-19
DE59410458D1 (de) 2008-10-02
EP1118964A1 (fr) 2001-07-25

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