EP0660270B1 - Procédé et dispositif pour générer et vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif pour générer et vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0660270B1
EP0660270B1 EP94250259A EP94250259A EP0660270B1 EP 0660270 B1 EP0660270 B1 EP 0660270B1 EP 94250259 A EP94250259 A EP 94250259A EP 94250259 A EP94250259 A EP 94250259A EP 0660270 B1 EP0660270 B1 EP 0660270B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
memory
franking
window
marking
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP94250259A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0660270A2 (fr
EP0660270A3 (fr
Inventor
Harald Windel
Wolfgang Dr. Thiel
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Original Assignee
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Francotyp Postalia GmbH filed Critical Francotyp Postalia GmbH
Priority to EP01250023A priority Critical patent/EP1113403A1/fr
Priority to EP01250022A priority patent/EP1118964B1/fr
Publication of EP0660270A2 publication Critical patent/EP0660270A2/fr
Publication of EP0660270A3 publication Critical patent/EP0660270A3/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0660270B1 publication Critical patent/EP0660270B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
    • G07B2017/00161—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a central, non-user location, e.g. for updating rates or software, or for refilling funds
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00258—Electronic hardware aspects, e.g. type of circuits used
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
    • G07B2017/00443—Verification of mailpieces, e.g. by checking databases
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/0058—Printing of code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/0058—Printing of code
    • G07B2017/00588—Barcode
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/00604—Printing of advert or logo
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00637—Special printing techniques, e.g. interlacing
    • G07B2017/00645—Separating print into fixed and variable parts
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00661—Sensing or measuring mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00701—Measuring the weight of mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00661—Sensing or measuring mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00709—Scanning mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G07B2017/0075—Symmetric, secret-key algorithms, e.g. DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, Skipjack, CAST, AES
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/0079—Time-dependency
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00822—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system including unique details
    • G07B2017/0083—Postal data, e.g. postage, address, sender, machine ID, vendor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for generating and checking a security imprint, which is applied to a postal matter by the printing device of a franking machine in franking printing in addition to the postage and daily stamp.
  • franking machines are considered that deliver a fully electronic impression for franking mail, including an advertising slogan and a mark.
  • the franking machine is equipped with at least one input means, one output means, one input / output control module, with storage means, a control device and a printer module.
  • a franking machine generally creates an imprint in a form agreed with the post right-aligned, parallel to the upper edge of the mail item, beginning with the content of the postage value in the postmark, the date in the day stamp and stamp imprints for advertising slogans and, if applicable, the type of shipment in the election print stamp.
  • the post value, the date and the type of shipment form the variable information to be entered according to the piece of mail.
  • the postage value is usually the transport fee paid in advance by the sender, which is taken from a refillable credit register and used to clear the postal item.
  • the date is a current date or a future date in a postmark. While the current date is automatically provided by a clock / date module, the desired future date must be set in the case of manual pre-dating. Pre-dating is interesting in all cases where the volume of mail is processed and franked very early, but has to be dispatched on a certain date.
  • the variable data for the date can be embedded in the day stamp as well as when the postal value is printed.
  • the approved advertising clichés can contain a wide variety of messages, in particular the address, the company logo, the mailbox and / or any other message.
  • the advertising cliché is additional information in the postal sense that must be agreed with the postal authority.
  • DE 38 23 719 discloses a security system with a character printing authorization device.
  • a computer of the franking machine is assigned a memory for the data to be loaded, the graphic change and the data of the associated date.
  • the computer of the franking machine accesses an external dialing device via a connection device (modem) which selects a character pattern to be printed.
  • modem connection device
  • the disadvantage here is that the user of the franking machine is not given freedom of choice for the selection of the character pattern. It is envisaged that the printed character pattern will be used to check the security of the authorization of the franking machine.
  • the entire printed image having that special character pattern is to be evaluated by the postal authority, which is only possible with great effort.
  • Such a bar code by means of a separate printer is known from US Pat. No. 4,660,221 and US Pat. No. 4,829,568, the latter patent also printing a character with offset elements, the offset of which contains the relevant security information.
  • the printing device is supplied with variable data from a storage device on the one hand and data from an encryption circuit on the other hand by means of a selection device.
  • alphanumeric characters with mixed-in areas SPECKLE
  • the evaluation is carried out by reading such a character column by column and comparing it with stored characters column by column in order to recover the security information.
  • the data originating from the encryption circuit are separated again, for which a further device is required.
  • the evaluation is accordingly complicated and can only be accomplished using complex equipment and qualified postal authorities.
  • the post office can, if necessary, compare the data printed on the passport with the data stored electronically in the central station if a mail marked as manipulated is found.
  • This invalid manipulated mail marked in this way can only be sorted out in the post office if the entire post is checked continuously in the post office. In terms of the result, this effort is far too high, especially since only one manipulation on the service device but other manipulations on the post on the way to the post office cannot be determined.
  • EP 540 291 A discloses a device for analyzing post meter use for counterfeiting purposes, which is based on a post-calculation system. The functioning of the system is also dependent on the scanning of the entire mail flow. The individual franked values are scanned, summed and then with the reload amount for the corresponding one Franking machine compared. Although data is automatically entered here with an OCR reader (Optical Character Recognition) and complex computer technology is used, this type of data acquisition is relatively unsafe and too slow for a post office, especially since the entire mail would have to be evaluated in this way.
  • OCR reader Optical Character Recognition
  • Crypted data is printed in the address field in accordance with US Pat. No. 4,725,718. It is also known to carry out a comparison of plain text data with the crypted representation of this data, including the address data, for evaluation. Although a relatively large amount of space is used for the crypted data in the address field and the generation of the crypted data also has to be complex and using a special encryption module, this system is not completely forgery-proof, because an encrypted text composed of segments is generated from the individual output data related to the aforementioned segments, which could be explored through long-term observation. This also applies if it is printed as a barcode or in another machine-readable form.
  • a security system known from US Pat. No. 4,949,381 uses imprints in the form of bitmaps in a separate one Marking field under the franking machine stamp imprint. Although the bitmaps are packed particularly densely there, the required relatively large marking field reduces the height of the stamp image by the height of the marking field. This means that much of the space that can be used for an advertising slogan is lost.
  • Another disadvantage is the necessary high-resolution recognition device for evaluating the marking with the two-dimensional barcode, which is unacceptable for smaller post offices, which cannot drive the effort for an automatic evaluation. Thus, the disadvantage remains that such codes can only be checked automatically, ie no longer manually.
  • Another security system uses imprints in the form of a diagram (US Pat. No. 5,075,862) within the franking machine stamp imprint.
  • imprints in the form of a diagram US Pat. No. 5,075,862
  • dots are missing in the print image, which can signal an alleged forgery.
  • Such markings in diagram form within the franking machine stamp imprint are therefore not so secure. Mechanical evaluation is difficult even with an error-free print, since the entire printed image must always be evaluated.
  • DE 40 03 006 A1 has proposed a method for identifying mail to enable franking machines to be identified, a multi-digit crypto number including the date, the machine parameters, the post value and the advertising slogan being formed and cached separately becomes.
  • the crypto number is additionally inserted into the print pattern during printing via a printer control which sets the printer means.
  • a counterfeit or any imitation of the franking machine stamp can be identified by means of the crypto number by means of a postage imprint that has not been billed.
  • Even with a large number of users of a single franking machine the user who manipulated the postage value can easily be found out.
  • this is neither a fully electronically generated print image for an impact-less printer, nor can such a print image be evaluated electronically in a simple manner.
  • a remote inspection system for franking machines has already been proposed in US Pat. No. 4,812,965, which is based on special messages in the printing of mail pieces which have to be sent to the central office. Sensors within the postage meter machine are intended to detect any counterfeiting act that has been carried out, so that a flag can be set in associated memories if the postage meter machine has been tampered with for manipulation purposes. Such an intervention could be done to load unpaid credit into the registers.
  • Such a system cannot disadvantageously prevent a sufficiently qualified manipulator, which breaks into the postage meter machine, from subsequently removing its traces by deleting the flags. It also cannot prevent the impression itself from being manipulated, which is produced by a properly operated machine. In known machines there is the possibility of producing impressions with the postage value zero. Zero frankings of this type are required for test purposes and could also be falsified subsequently by simulating a postage value greater than zero.
  • the task was to solve the disadvantages of the prior art and to achieve a significant increase in safety without an extraordinary inspection on site.
  • a security imprint an evaluation is to be made in an uncomplicated manner as to whether manipulation of the mail piece or the franking machine has been carried out.
  • the object is achieved by a method for generating a security imprint according to claim 1 or by a method for checking a security imprint according to claim 20.
  • An arrangement for generating and checking a security imprint consists of a franking machine with a microprocessor in a control device, which encrypts the marking pixel image data and inserts it into the other fixed and variable pixel image data during printing.
  • An arrangement for checking has a marker reading device, consisting of a CCD line scan camera, D / A converter, comparator and encoder, which are connected to an input means via an input / output unit.
  • a marker reading device consisting of a CCD line scan camera, D / A converter, comparator and encoder, which are connected to an input means via an input / output unit.
  • the input means is connected to the data center.
  • a first variant of the verification of a security imprint with a row of marking symbols begins with the transmission of information from the data center to the postal authority regarding those franking machines that have not loaded any credit for a long time or have not reported to the data center and therefore appear suspect.
  • the solution according to the invention is based on the knowledge that only data stored centrally in a data center can be adequately protected against manipulation. Corresponding register values are queried during communication, for example in the context of a remote value specification of a reload credit.
  • the inflated credit amounts which add up in the franking machine, are ultimately used up during franking.
  • the average credit inflow is compared with the outflow of credit (postage consumption) in order to analyze the previous use of the franking machine and to predict future user behavior.
  • the franking machine which receives a regular credit reload or reports regularly to a data center, can be classified as unsuspicious. However, the franking machine that continues to operate beyond a predicted reloading date without reloading does not necessarily have to be manipulated. Rather, the volume of mail to be processed by the franking machine may have decreased above average. So if there is still sufficient residual credit available in the franking machine, a user must of course be allowed to continue franking. In this case, only an extraordinary inspection on site could clarify whether there was any manipulation.
  • a franking machine user with irregular franking and credit reloading behavior can postpone this inspection if he reports to the data center as soon as he receives the information that his franking machine is considered suspect.
  • the data center then carries out a remote inspection.
  • the invention is based on the one hand on the consideration that the user who manipulated would either have to bear increased effort if he tried to undo his manipulation in order to report in time to the data center, which queried the register values, or else would only report irregularly or no longer.
  • intervention in the franking machine function for manipulation purposes is also made as difficult as possible by the safety design of the franking machine by means of a sensor and detector device. This means that there is a significant increase in safety without an extraordinary inspection on site.
  • a security imprint with separate areas for the marking information is made by the franking machine on the item of mail.
  • the inspection of the franking machine on site can be replaced by checking a row of marking symbols by a responsible body, preferably at the post office. Only in justified cases (manipulation) would an inspector or person authorized to perform an on-site inspection have a direct inspection of the franking machine on site.
  • the postal authority can differentiate between the manipulated with the intention of forgery from such unmanipulated franking machine imprints in an uncomplicated manner and relatively easily.
  • an evaluation is easily possible, also with regard to a reference to a machine that has been mimicked by the manipulator or that has been manipulated and with regard to a reference to the machine that the user continued to operate after the remote inspection date.
  • the row of marking symbols also printed for security purposes is based on an encrypted combination number, the digits of which are predetermined for an assignment of evaluable quantities.
  • a series of marking symbols can be generated via a routine by the microprocessor of the postage meter machine without using an additional encryption circuit. Different variants of marking information are possible, which can be recovered from a series of marking symbols.
  • Each digit or each number formed by predetermined digits within the combination number is assigned a meaning in terms of content. In this way, the information relevant for further evaluation can be separated later during an evaluation.
  • the marking changes with each print, which makes such a franked mail piece unmistakable, and at the same time provides information about the previous credit consumption and the last credit reload data at the time of the last credit reload or via certain additional data, such as the last reload date / time etc.
  • the aforementioned information about further data can also be requested by the post office or the institute commissioned with the check by the data center.
  • the monotonically variable quantity only needs to be included partially to form the combination number, but only the part of maximum change is then included to form a first number.
  • a fourth number corresponds to the information about the corresponding franking machine identification number (serial number).
  • the information can be printed in the franking stamp additionally or exclusively as a barcode.
  • Such information can also be the checksum or another number derived in a suitable manner from the identification number, since it is only a matter of checking the franking stamp on the mail piece or indirectly the franking machine by means of the imprint for manipulation. If tampering is detected, it must also be possible to open the mail piece to determine the true sender.
  • the microprocessor of the postage meter machine is used for the time-critical generation of the marking data, in order to form at least one combination number from the predetermined sizes after the completion of all the inputs and in order to encrypt this according to an encryption algorithm to a crypto number, which is then converted into a marking symbol row.
  • random or centrally initiated control of mail items is provided in order to retrieve the individual information from the printed marking of a security imprint in a postal authority or similar institution and to compare it with the information printed open on the mail item.
  • the checking of the marking symbol series by the postal authority is based exclusively on random samples. During the sample check, the imprint of any arbitrarily selected piece of mail is examined for manipulation, without there being any other indications of manipulation or suspicions.
  • the corresponding DES key can be used to decrypt them.
  • the result is the COMBI number from which the sizes, in particular the sum of all franking values and the current postage value, are split off.
  • the split postage value is compared to the openly printed postage value.
  • the value of a split off current size for example the total value of all franking values that have been carried out since the last reload, is subjected to a monotony check using data of the last recorded value of this size.
  • the last size recorded is the total value of all frankings made so far, which was stored in the data center when the register status was last remotely queried.
  • the counterfeiting of the franking machine serial number can be identified by means of the marking by means of a comparison.
  • the postal authority or the institute commissioned with the test transmits the associated franking machine serial number to the data center. With this information, the mail pieces (letters) could be checked indirectly in cooperation with the data center.
  • the sender stated on the mail piece is checked.
  • the serial number of the franking machine which is also printed on, can be used for this if it is possible to identify the sender or, if available, the sender printed on the envelope in plain text. If such information is missing or the franking machine serial number has been manipulated, the letter can be opened legally to determine the sender.
  • the aforementioned marking is preferably printed in the form of a series of symbols in a field of the franking machine image simultaneously with this by the single printer module.
  • the shape of the symbols with their orthogonal edges enables pattern recognition with minimal computational effort.
  • An integral measurement of the degree of blackening with a simple optoelectronic sensor (e.g. phototransistor) and a downstream A / D converter enables particularly simple and quick machine readability.
  • the symbols were designed in such a way that they clearly differ in their integral degree of blackening (share of the printed area in the area of the drawing field). Each symbol therefore corresponds to a specific value at the output of the A / D converter. With the row of symbols, a higher information density is achieved compared to the bar code, thus saving space in the franking machine print image. On the other hand, more information can be coded using the graphic symbols.
  • Another advantage over a bar code is the good readability of the individual symbols in the marking field, which is due to the symbolic nature of the image content, and the possibility Linguistically capture the image content for manual evaluation.
  • the symbolism in addition to the mechanical one also enables a visual evaluation by a trained examiner who evaluates the form and the conceptual content of the symbols in the post office.
  • the invention is based on the fact that after the franking machine is switched on, the postage value in the value print is automatically specified in accordance with the last entry before the franking machine was switched off and the date in the day stamp is specified in accordance with the current date, and that the variable data for the printout are in the fixed data for the frame and for all associated data that remain unchanged are electronically embedded.
  • These variable data of the window contents are hereinafter referred to briefly as window data and all fixed data for the value stamp, the day stamp and the advertising slogan stamp as framework data.
  • the frame data is a first memory area of a read-only memory (ROM), which also serves as program memory, can be removed.
  • the window data are taken from a second memory area and stored in accordance with the input in a non-volatile working memory and can be removed at any time for the purpose of composing them into an overall representation of a franking image.
  • the data from the two memory areas are combined according to a predetermined assignment before printing to form a pixel print image and are completed during printing to form a column of the entire franking machine print image.
  • Those variable data which are embedded in the printing column during printing comprise at least the marking data.
  • the time required for the previous assembly of the entire pixel image with the remaining data is reduced accordingly.
  • the previous composition is similar to the date in the postmark and as with the postage in the value print, whereby the variable information can be subsequently added and modified in the window provided. In order to save time, only those parts of a graphical representation that are actually changed are saved in the non-volatile working memory when a change is made.
  • FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a franking machine with a printer module 1 for a fully electronically generated franking image Contains advertising cliché and / or a marking for a security imprint, with at least one input means 2 having actuating elements, and with a display unit 3, both of which are coupled via an input / output control module 4, a non-volatile memory 5 for at least the constant parts of the franking image and with a control device 6.
  • a character memory 9 supplies the necessary print data for the volatile working memory 7.
  • the control device 6 has a microprocessor ⁇ P which is connected to the input / output control module 4, to the character memory 9, to the volatile working memory 7 and to the non-volatile working memory 5, with a cost center memory 10, with a program memory 11, with a transport or feed device, possibly with a strip release 12, an encoder (coding disk) 13 and with a continuously operating clock / date module 8.
  • a sensor 21 with a detector device 20 can be connected to the input / output control module 4 in the manner shown in FIG. 1.
  • a corresponding safety device can also be provided on the microprocessor directly or within the microprocessor, in a manner not shown in FIG. 1.
  • the preferred arrangement for generating a security imprint for franking machines has a first memory area A in the program memory 11 (inter alia for the data of the constant parts of the franking image including the advertising cliché frame).
  • a cost center number is usually entered in order to select the advertising cliché.
  • an advantageous method for user-oriented billing has already been proposed, in which the selected cliché is examined in order to automatically determine the cost center under which billing is to be carried out.
  • All alphanumeric characters or symbols are stored in pixel memory 9 as binary data.
  • Data for alphanumeric characters or symbols are stored in compressed form in the non-volatile working memory 5 in the form of a hexadecimal number.
  • the compressed data from the program memory 11 are converted with the aid of the character memory 9 into a print image having binary pixel data, which is stored in such a decompressed form in the volatile main memory 7.
  • the compressed data are read from the working memory 5 and converted with the aid of the character memory 9 into a printed image having binary pixel data, which is also in such a decompressed form in the volatile memory 7 is stored.
  • Working memories 7a, 7b and pixel memory 7c are used below to explain the invention, although this is physically preferably a single memory chip.
  • the working memory 7b and the pixel memory 7c are connected to the printer module 1 via a printer controller 14 having a print register (DR) 15 and an output logic.
  • the pixel memory 7c is connected on the output side to a first input of the printer controller 14, at whose further control inputs there are output signals from the microprocessor control device 6.
  • the constant parts of the franking image and advertising clichés are continuously decoded in the pixel memory area I in the volatile pixel memory 7c.
  • a second memory area B in the non-volatile working memory 5 there is a second memory area B in the non-volatile working memory 5.
  • the pixel memory area I in the pixel memory 7c is also provided for the selected decompressed data of the variable parts of the franking image, which are identified by the indication j.
  • the second pixel memory area II in the pixel memory 7c is provided for the selected decompressed data of the variable parts of the franking image, which are identified by the indication k.
  • variable data of the marking can be implemented in one or more windows within a fixed through the franking machine print image in order to implement the security impression embedded frame during column-by-column printing.
  • a major reason why the printing speed is not reduced by the time required for the formation of the marking data lies in the fact that the microprocessor of the control device, which carries out the column-wise embedding of window data, taps into a time reserve during printing.
  • the memory areas B to ST in the non-volatile working memory 5 can contain a large number of sub-memory areas, under which the respective data are stored in data records.
  • the strings of numbers that are entered for the generation of the input data with a keyboard 2 or via an electronic scale 22 connected to the input / output device 4 and calculating the postage value are automatically stored in the memory area ST of the non-volatile working memory 5.
  • data records of the sub memory areas for example B j , C etc., are also retained. This ensures that the last input values are retained even when the franking machine is switched off, so that after switching on the postage value in the value print is automatically specified in accordance with the last entry before the franking machine was switched off and the date in the day stamp in accordance with the current date.
  • the program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the constant parts of the franking image which relate to at least one advertising slogan frame, are stored in a first memory area A i and an assigned name identifies the advertising slogan frame.
  • the non-volatile working memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the semi-variable parts of the franking image being stored in a second memory area B j and an assigned name identifying the semi-variable part, a first assignment of the names of the there are semi-variable parts to the names of the constant parts.
  • a second assignment can be made in the franking machine in accordance with the cost center number stored in a third memory area C, so that an advertising slogan is optionally assigned to each cost center KST.
  • the corresponding assignment of the respective cost center to the basic data is automatically queried after switching on.
  • the cost center must be re-entered into the memory area C each time it is switched on during the start routine, while it is retained in the event of brief interruptions in the operating voltage.
  • the number of printed letters with the respective above The setting of the advertising cliché via the cost center is registered in the franking machine for later evaluation.
  • control code and run length-coded frame or window data are alternately contained one after the other.
  • the respective selected common frame data for the advertising slogan stamp, for the postmark and the postage stamp are transferred from the non-volatile program memory 11 into the registers 100, 110, 120, ..., of a volatile working memory 7a, with control code during the transfer can be decoded and stored in a separate memory area of the working memory 7b.
  • the respective selected window data are also loaded into registers 200, 210, 220, ....
  • the registers of sub-memory areas are preferably formed in the memory area of the main memory 7a.
  • these aforementioned registers and / or the volatile working memory 7 are part of the microprocessor control 6.
  • FIG. 1 shows a block diagram for such a first variant of the solution according to the invention.
  • window data of type 1 The (semi-variable) window data, which can be changed less in time, is referred to below as window data of type 1.
  • type 2 window data is used to refer to the constantly changing (variable) window data.
  • New frame and / or window data of type 1 can be selected as long as there is a need for this after inserting and storing binary pixel data in the first pixel memory area I. If this is not the case, an automatic generation of window data of type 2 with subsequent decompression follows and their storage as binary pixel data in the second pixel memory area II. In another variant, not shown, the above-mentioned steps can be repeated, if still none There is a print request.
  • the combination with the other binary pixel data stored in the pixel memory area I is preferably carried out after a print request has been made during a print routine.
  • the data in the memory areas C, D and E can be changed by means of the input means 2 and the control device 6.
  • the same microprocessor of the control device 6, which also executes the billing routine and the printing routine, is preferably used here.
  • the data from the memory areas are put together in accordance with a predetermined (freely selectable within certain limits) assignment during printing to form an overall representation of a security imprint.
  • fourth and fifth memory areas D and E of the non-volatile working memory 5 are used here.
  • a name is stored in the fourth memory area D of the non-volatile memory 5, which identifies the currently set frame of an advertising slogan, while in a fifth memory area E data is stored for a further selectable assignment of at least one advertising slogan part to a frame of the advertising slogan corresponding to the aforementioned name are. It is envisaged that the data from the memory areas are combined according to a predetermined (freely selectable within certain limits) assignment during printing to form an overall representation of a security imprint.
  • a franking machine is usually identified by means of an 8-digit serial number, which, however, only needs to be included in part in the row of marking symbols in order to enable the serial number printed in plain text to be checked.
  • this can be, for example, the checksum from the serial number.
  • other data go to education a preferably at least 2-digit information that allows the serial number to be checked.
  • marking of postal items on the basis of a crypto number can be carried out without difficulty to enable identification of franking machines if the multi-digit crypto number is not including the data values stored as a hexadecimal number of the entire cliché, but only with the inclusion of selected data values from the cliché frame and other data such as how the machine parameters of the value setting and the date are formed and temporarily stored.
  • the method according to the invention not only numerical or numerical values, such as the number of the advertising cliché used, but also data values of the image information can be used to form the encrypted information.
  • any area of the advertising slogan to which separate data in a data record are assigned can be used to form the crypto number.
  • individual data are selected from this data set. It is advantageous that the end of the column is identified as a control code for each column to be printed, which follows the hexadecimal data encoded with run length.
  • the run-length-coded hexadecimal data at the first position in the data record can preferably be used.
  • the associated data of the columnar regional image information are selected from the data set in order to extract at least a number of data (hexadecimal numbers).
  • each advertising slogan number Data records can be assigned, each data record having the data relating to a partial area of the advertising cliché.
  • the data set with the associated data of the columnar regional image information is selected on the basis of an existing and / or generated size in the machine in order to extract at least a number of data (hexadecimal numbers).
  • those run length-coded hexadecimal data corresponding to a predetermined print column are combined with at least some of the data of the machine parameters (serial number, monotonously variable size, time data, inspection data, such as the number of prints during the last inspection, or suspicious variable) and the postage value in in a special way - explained in connection with FIG. 10 - combined and encrypted.
  • the DES algorithm Data Encryption Standard
  • a conversion into a special graphic character set can be used for a high security standard. This enables the encryption of at least a first, third and fourth number of combination numbers in an 8-byte data record.
  • the character memory 9 converts a crypto number into a symbol-containing identifier.
  • a list selected by a further size, advantageously by the postage value, which assigns graphic symbols to the individual crypto numbers, is used.
  • the encrypted hexadecimal data is decompressed by means of the character memory in order to print the identifier formed from the symbols to be printed. This is also a machine-readable marking.
  • the type 2 window data for the security markings is accommodated in a separate window in the postage stamp or in the day stamp or between the two stamps. Then the entire franking imprint is not enlarged (which is also not permitted by post) or an additional printing unit that prints elsewhere in the letter is not required.
  • a sixth memory area F can be used for marking, for example the franking machine serial number.
  • Another possibility is the machine-readable but unencrypted message of the franking machine serial number printed as a bar code, the data of which is taken either from the memory area F of the non-volatile working memory 5 or from the program memory 11 to be included in the franking image - as shown, for example, with reference to FIG. 3e. insert.
  • a notification of the sender address to be provided by means of a separate printer by means of a bar code can be promoted by a discount.
  • these above-mentioned messages can reduce the inspection effort for mail items because they allow a targeted machine inspection of certain senders or franking machines.
  • the data center determines suspicious franking machines and transmits the serial numbers to the postal authority or an institute commissioned with the verification.
  • Newer franking machines are by means of a remote value specification FWV loaded from a data center with a new reload credit.
  • the data center stores for each franking machine user the credit amounts and the dates on which these credit balances were transferred to the franking machine. On the basis of this data stored in the data center, further security checks for checking the regular use of the franking machine are possible.
  • FIG. 2 shows which communication is required when evaluating the security imprint according to the invention.
  • a data connection line L is required for reloading credit.
  • the data center receives information about the respective franking machine with each communication via the data connection line L. It is provided that a dialing parameter and / or telephone number is stored in a further memory area N in order to be able to establish the communication connection to the data center DZ, which at least queries the postal register in the non-volatile cost center memory 10. After their evaluation, the data center establishes, if necessary, a data connection via a line H to the evaluation device 29 in the post office or in the institute commissioned with the evaluation of the franking stamps of the mail pieces.
  • the postal authority controls the mail pieces.
  • the postal authority receives the information from the data center via the data connection line H together with the serial number.
  • the data connection line H must also be used for inquiries on the part of the post office, depending on the type of evaluation.
  • the data connection line L is provided for inquiries from the franking machine to the data center.
  • the data center determines an average postage consumption P K on the basis of the user-specific historical data of a certain past time period. It is assumed that the average credit inflow also corresponds to the average credit outflow, ie the average postage consumption. This is thus equal to the ratio of the sum of the credits G transferred in the period under consideration and the sum of the periods t between the reloads:
  • a value R2 taken from the ascending register corresponds to the current query value. According to the default request , which should lead to a reload credit G K.n + 1 , which must be added to the current query value R2, the future value R 2 new results .
  • R2 New - R2 G K, n + 1
  • the disposition factor ⁇ x depends on the classification of the franking machine user as an A, B or C customer.
  • P K disposition factor ⁇ K is assigned to one of for example three consumption classes A, B and C: P K ⁇ P FROM ⁇ ⁇ A P FROM ⁇ P K ⁇ P B / C ⁇ ⁇ B P K > P B / C ⁇ ⁇ C
  • Each of these consumption classes is assigned a typical disposition factor ⁇ A , ⁇ B , ⁇ C , which means that the longest time (t A ) is reached per time interval according to equation (6) for consumption class A, i.e. the class with the lowest consumption, and at of consumption class C the shortest time (t C ).
  • Each of these consumption classes is assigned a typical consumption time t A , t B , t C , whereby the longest time (t A ) is assigned to the consumption class A, i.e. the class with the smallest consumption, and the shortest time (t C ).
  • the remote value specification center i.e. If the data center initiates, or at least makes it comprehensible, this initiative is based on the franking machine itself in the reaction according to a second verification variant via the security imprint and its verification by the responsible authority or institution, and ultimately by the franking machine itself, whereby the data center and the post office or Review institute only controls the reaction afterwards.
  • the second check variant is for random selected mailpieces or senders carried out a random check.
  • the security imprint is evaluated in cooperation with the data center.
  • Via the data connection H franking machine data are queried which are stored in the data center and are not openly printed on the mail piece.
  • the imprint of any arbitrarily selected mail item is examined for manipulation. After all symbols of a symbol series have been recorded and converted into data, the corresponding DES key can be used to decrypt them. The result is the COMBI number from which the sizes, in particular the sum of all franking values and the current postage value, are split off.
  • the split postage value G3 is compared with the actually printed postage value G3 '.
  • the split size G4 ie the total value of all franking values carried out since the last reload, is subjected to a monotony check using data of the last detected size G4 '.
  • the size G4 'last recorded is the total value of all frankings made so far, which was stored in the data center during the last remote query of the register readings.
  • the counterfeiting of the franking machine serial number can be identified by means of the marking, in that, after decoding, the size G0 is separated from the COMBI number and checked.
  • the sender stated on the mail piece is checked. You can also use the serial number printed on it serve the franking machine, by means of which the sender can be identified or, if available, the sender printed in plain text on the envelope. If such information is missing or the franking machine serial number has been manipulated, the letter can be opened legally to determine the sender.
  • the franking machine accumulates the used postage values since the last credit reloading or forms a residual value by subtracting the sum of the used postage values from the previously loaded credit. This value is updated with every franking. It is combined with other security-relevant data (postage value, date, franking machine serial number) and cryptified for security against forgery and finally printed in the manner described above. After capturing the security imprint and decrypting and separating the individual data, as in the above The evaluation is carried out as already described. The comparison of postage values and the monotony check can be carried out as in the above. Way. The information about the postage values W that have been used since the last credit reloading is now compared with the data relating to this franking machine stored at the testing center.
  • the value W is compared with a fixed threshold value, which is not exceeded during normal use of the franking machine. If it is exceeded, suspicion is obvious.
  • W is compared with a threshold value SW n , which corresponds to the respective postage consumption class.
  • SW n can be defined once for the use of the respective franking machine. But they can also come from a statistic, which for this franking machine was led. These statistics can be kept by the verifying postal authority or the statistical data that the data center creates anyway and which are then transferred to the postal authority are used.
  • a further refinement of the check results from the fact that, according to a first marking information variant, the date of the last credit reload t L is also included as a second number in the combination number and is also printed with the other data in cryptified form.
  • the postal authority is then able to check to what extent certain specified maximum time periods between two credit reloads have been exceeded, which has made the franking machine in question suspicious.
  • the serial number can also be printed out as a barcode.
  • all other information is displayed in a different way, because a barcode in the franking machine print image, depending on the amount of information coded, may take up considerable space or force the franking machine imprint to enlarge, or it may not be possible to reproduce all information in the barcode imprint.
  • a particularly compact print consisting of special graphic symbols is used.
  • a label for example formed from symbols to be printed, can be placed in front of, behind, under u./o. be printed over a field within the actual franking stamp imprint. This is a human-readable and machine-readable marking.
  • a letter envelope 17 transported under the printer module 1 is printed with a franking machine stamp image.
  • the marking field is located in a line which is advantageous for evaluation in a line below the fields for the value stamp, for the day stamp, for the advertising slogan and, if appropriate, in the field for the optional print addition of the franking machine stamp image.
  • the marking field is located in a window FE 6 arranged within the franking machine print image under the day stamp.
  • the value stamp containing the postage value in a first window FE 1 and the machine serial number in a second and third window FE 2 and FE 3 may have a reference field in a Window FE 7 and, if applicable, the number of the advertising cliché in a window FE 9.
  • the reference field is used for pre-synchronization for reading the graphic character string and for obtaining a reference value for the light / dark threshold in the case of a machine evaluation.
  • a pre-synchronization for reading the graphic character string is also achieved by and / or in connection with the frame, in particular the postage stamp or value stamp.
  • the fourth window FE 4 in the day stamp contains the current date or the predated date entered in special cases.
  • an eighth window FE 8 for a compressed precise time indication especially for high-performance franking machines with tenths of a second. This ensures that no print is similar to another print, which makes it possible to detect a forgery by copying the print using a color copying machine.
  • a fifth window FE 5 is provided in the advertising cliché for an editable advertising cliché text part.
  • FIG. 3b shows the representation of a security imprint with a marking field in the columns between the value stamp and the day stamp, whereby the upstream vertical part of the frame of the value stamp serves for pre-synchronization and, if necessary, as a reference field.
  • a separate window FE7 is therefore not necessary.
  • the marking data can be acquired almost simultaneously with a vertical arrangement of the symbol row in a shorter time.
  • the printing speed can be increased because fewer windows have to be embedded in the frame data before printing and the formation of marking data can therefore begin earlier.
  • the cryptified print using marking symbols is sufficient, without an open, unencrypted print of the absolute time in a window FE8.
  • the marking data which are generated on the basis of at least the post value and such a time count, are already sufficient, as will be explained below with reference to FIG. 10.
  • a further marking field is arranged in the postmark under the window FE 1 for the postage value.
  • further information for example about the number of the selected advertising cliché, can be communicated unencrypted but in a machine-readable form.
  • FIG. 3d in a fourth example for the security imprint, two further marking fields are arranged in the postmark below and above the window FE 1 for the postage value.
  • two further marking fields are arranged in the postmark below and above the window FE 1 for the postage value.
  • the marking field which is arranged in the postmark above the window FE 1 for the postage value, has a barcode.
  • the postage value can be communicated unencrypted but in a machine-readable form.
  • a comparison of the encrypted and unencrypted information can be carried out fully automatically since both are machine-readable.
  • the form of marking is freely compatible with any postal authority. Any general change of the marking image or the arrangement of the marking field is possible without any problems due to the electronic printing principle.
  • the arrangement for the rapid generation of a security imprint for franking machines allows a fully electronically generated franking image, which was formed by the microprocessor-controlled printing process from fixed data and current data, to be set.
  • the data for the constant parts of the franking image which relate to at least part of the fixed data, are stored in a first memory area A i and by an assigned address and the data for the variable parts of the franking image are in a second memory area B j or for marking data stored in a memory area B k and identified by an assigned address.
  • the set of symbols - shown in FIG. 3f - can also be changed or exchanged in order to further increase the security against forgery.
  • FIG. 3f shows a representation of a set of symbols for a marking field, the symbols being suitably shaped so that both mechanical and visual evaluation by trained personnel in the postal authority is made possible.
  • the very high number of variations also enables a variant that uses several symbol sets for the marking.
  • space is saved when printing the symbols with a higher information density than a bar code. It is sufficient to distinguish between 10 degrees of blackening, for example to achieve a length of approximately three times shorter in the representation of the information than the ZIP CODE. This results in ten symbols, with the degree of blackening differing by 10% in each case. With a reduction to five symbols, the degree of blackening can differ by 20%, but it is necessary to significantly increase the number of symbol fields to be printed if the same information as the symbol set shown in FIG. 3f is to be reproduced. A sentence with a higher number of symbols is also conceivable.
  • 4a shows the structure of a combination number KOZ in an advantageous variant with a first number (sum of all postage values since the last reload date), third number (postage value) and a fourth number (generated from a serial number).
  • a corresponding security print evaluation device 29 - shown in FIG. 4b - for manual identification has a computer 26 with a suitable program in the memory 28, input and output means 25 and 27.
  • the evaluation device 29 used by the respective postal authority is connected to a data center DZ shown in FIG. 2 via a communication line H.
  • FIG. 4c shows a sub-step for marking symbol recognition, which is necessary for automatic input, in accordance with a security imprint evaluation method, which is explained in more detail in FIG. 4d.
  • the marking field is arranged at least under or in a field of the franking machine stamp image and a series of such symbols is printed below the franking stamp imprint and simultaneously with it.
  • the check box can also be different - such as in the 3b shown - be arranged, with corresponding transport devices for the mail piece being provided if the image recorder, for example the CCD line camera, is arranged immovably.
  • a marking reading device 24 shown in FIG. 4b can also be designed, for example, as a reading pen guided in a guide.
  • the device preferably comprises a CCD line camera 241, a comparator 242 connected to the CCD line camera 241 and to a D / A converter 243, and an encoder 244 for detecting the stepwise movement.
  • the data input of the D / A converter 243 for digital data and the outputs of the comparator 242 and encoder 244 are connected to an input / output unit 245. This is a standard interface to the input means 25 of the security imprint evaluation device 29.
  • the mechanical identification of the symbols in the license plate can be done in two variants: a) via the integrally measured degree of blackening of each symbol or b) via edge detection for symbols.
  • the orthogonal edges of the symbol set according to FIG. 3 allow a particularly simple and easy to implement automatic detection method.
  • the detection device contains a CCD line camera of medium resolution, for example 256 pixels. With a suitable lens, the height of the row of symbols is imaged on the 256 pixels of the line scan camera. The respective symbol field is now scanned column by column starting from the left to the right, starting with the right column.
  • the line camera is preferably arranged stationary and the letter is guided under the line camera by a uniform motor drive. Since the row of symbols is always positioned in the same place within the franking imprint in accordance with an agreement once made, and the Franking imprint is in turn positioned on the envelope by already existing postal regulations, the guidance of the envelope on a fixed edge of the recognition device is sufficient.
  • the CCD line scan camera determines the contrast value of the pixels belonging to the column for each column.
  • the output of the CCD line scan camera is connected to a comparator which uses binary value comparison to assign the binary data 1 and 0 to the pixels.
  • the threshold value is guided according to a reference field FE 7, which consists of a series of bars and is arranged at the level of the symbol row and in front of it.
  • the threshold value is determined as the mean value of the light-dark stripes of the reference field.
  • the reference field is scanned either with an additional sensor (e.g. a photo transistor) or with the CCD line scan camera itself.
  • the measured values of the line camera A / D have to be converted, the threshold value has to be formed from them in a computer connected via a standard interface and these have to be fed to the comparator via a D / A converter.
  • Newer CCD line scan cameras have integrated the comparator, whereby its threshold value can be controlled directly by the computer with a digital value.
  • the binary data supplied by the line scan camera, including the comparator, are stored in columns and lines in an image memory in a computer-strengthened evaluation device.
  • the quantized difference in degree of blackening between the symbols enables simple mechanical evaluation without complex pattern recognition.
  • a suitably focused photo detector is arranged in a reading device.
  • a reference value is derived from the reference field to compensate for different measured values obtained, the differences between which are based on the different printing conditions or paper types.
  • the reference value is used to evaluate the degree of blackening. With this reference value obtained, relative insensitivity to failed printing elements, for example a thermal bar 16 in the printer module 1, can advantageously be achieved.
  • the security imprint evaluation method according to FIG. 4d shows how this security information printed in the franking field is evaluated in an advantageous manner. It is necessary to enter individual sizes manually and / or automatically.
  • the symbol row is arranged vertically between the value and the date stamp. It contains, in cryptified form, information about the printed postage value, a monotonously variable size (for example the date or an absolute time count) and the information about the serial number or whether the suspected mode is present. This information is recorded together with the plain text information visually / manually or automatically.
  • a first evaluation variant - according to FIG. 4d - consists in recovering the individual information from the printed marking and comparing it with the information openly printed on the mail piece.
  • the symbol row detected in step 71 is converted into a corresponding crypto number in step 72.
  • This unambiguous assignment can take place via a table stored in the memory of the evaluation device, use being made particularly advantageously of the symbol set in FIG. 3f, in which case each symbol field corresponds to one digit of the crypto number.
  • the crypto number determined in this way is decrypted in step 73 with the aid of the crypto key stored in the evaluation device.
  • the initial number can be generated again from each crypto number.
  • the starting number is a combination number KOZ and contains the number combination of at least two sizes, one size being the upper digits of the combination number KOZ and the other size is represented by the lower digits of the KOZ.
  • the part of the number combination (for example the postage value) that is to be evaluated is separated and displayed in step 74.
  • Each digit of the initial number obtained after decryptification is assigned a meaning in terms of content. In this way, the information relevant for further evaluation can be separated.
  • the postage value that is actually to be checked which forms a size, it is essential a monotonously continuously variable size.
  • a certain monotonously continuously variable size and further sizes form certain marking information variants.
  • the total value of frankings stored in a franking machine register forms at least one first number assigned to the predetermined digits of the combination number.
  • This aforementioned first number is a monotonously continuously variable.
  • the marking changes with each print, which makes such a franked item of mail unmistakable and at the same time provides information about the current credit consumption.
  • This information about the credit consumption is checked at regular intervals for plausibility on the basis of known credit consumption and credit reloading data stored in the data center. Since the last reload date, the total value of franking values preferably forms at least one first number assigned to the predetermined digits of the combination number.
  • a second number which is placed at predetermined positions in the combination number, is formed, for example, by the last reload date.
  • this aforementioned first number forms in accordance with the total value on franking together with the second number, relating to the credit reload data at the time of the last reload, a monotonously continuously variable quantity.
  • this aforementioned first number in accordance with the total value of frankings, together with the second number, relating to the piece number data at the time of the last reload, forms a monotonously continuously variable quantity.
  • a corresponding number of alternative variants results if the residual value is now used to form the marking information instead of the total value of frankings (postage values used since the last credit reloading).
  • the residual value is obtained by subtracting the sum of the used postage values from the previously loaded credit.
  • a corresponding number of further alternative variants are obtained if current date / time data in total or since the last reload date, total number of items or since the last reload date or other physical but temporally determined data (for example battery voltage) are included to form the marking information.
  • variables G1, possibly G4 and at least one quantity G5 known only to the franking machine manufacturer and / or the data center and communicated to the postal authority and not communicable from the franking machine stamp image can also be encrypted. These are also recovered from the marking by decryption and can then be compared with the user-specific saved values.
  • the lists stored in the memory 28 can be updated via a connection to the data center 21.
  • the lists created for each serial number or each user preferably stored in databases of the data center for all franking machines, contain data values for each variable, which are used to check the authenticity of a franking.
  • the assignment of the symbols to the listed valences and, on the other hand, in the case of another set of symbols (not shown in FIG. 3f), the assignment of meaning and degree of blackening can be defined differently for different users.
  • a second evaluation variant (not shown in FIG. 4d) the operator enters manually or automatically unencrypted variables G0, G2, G3 and G4 into the evaluation device 29 by means of a reading device in order to use the same key and encryption algorithm as that in FIG the franking machine is used to first derive a crypto number and then a row of marking symbols. Further details are given in connection with step 45, shown in FIG. 10, of forming new coded window data of "type 2" for a marking image. A marking generated from this is displayed and compared by the operator with the marking printed on the postal matter (envelope). The comparison to be made by the operator is matched by the symbolism of the markings shown in the output means 25 and printed on the postal matter.
  • a third evaluation variant - also not shown - in a first step the trained examiner automatically enters the graphic symbols one after the other into the input means 25 manually or by means of a suitable reading device 24 in order to convert the marking printed on the mail item (letter) into at least one convert the first crypto number KRZ1 back.
  • the actuating elements, in particular the keyboard, of the input device can be identified with the symbols in order to facilitate manual input.
  • the openly printed sizes from the franking machine stamp image in particular G0 for the serial number SN of the franking machine, G1 for the advertising slogan frame number WRN, G2 for the date DAT and G3 for the postage value PW, G4 for non-repeating time data TIME and from at least one size G5 INS known only to the franking machine manufacturer and / or the data center and communicated to the postal authority in order to form at least one comparison crypto number VKRZ1.
  • the verification is carried out in a third step by comparing two crypto numbers KRZ1 with VKRZ1 in the computer 26 of the evaluation device 29, a signal for authorization in the case of equality or the non-authorization in the event of a negative comparison result (inequality) being emitted.
  • the first size G1 is the advertising slogan frame number WRN, which the inspector recognizes from the franking stamp image. In addition to the user, this first size is also known to the franking machine manufacturer and / or data center and is communicated to the postal authority. In a variant, preferably with a data connection to the data center, the advertising slogan frames WR n belonging to the serial number SN of the respective franking machine with assigned numbers WRN n are displayed on a screen of the data output device 27. The comparison with the advertising slogan frame WR b used on the letter is made by the examiner, who enters the number WRN n determined in this way.
  • the stored lists transferred from the data center into the memory 28 contain the current one Assignment of the parts of the advertising slogan frame WRNT to a second size G2 (for example the date DAT) and on the other hand the assignment of symbol lists to a third size G3 (for example the post value PW).
  • a list of parts SNT of the serial number SN selected by the first size G1, in particular the advertising slogan frame number WRN can be present.
  • User-specific information such as, for example, the advertising slogan frame number WRN, can be used for random manual evaluation of the marking, in that decoding lists can be selected on the basis of the user-specific information and contain the corresponding data records.
  • the size G2 (DAT) is then used to determine the byte from the data record which is used when generating the combination number.
  • a monotony test is used on the one hand to check the unmistakability of the impression.
  • the examiner takes the serial number SN from the windows FE2 and FE3 of the impression and ascertains the franking machine user.
  • the advertising slogan number can also be used here, since these are usually assigned to certain cost centers if the same machine is used by different users.
  • In the above Lists are data from the last check, among others. also data from the last inspection entered. Such data are, for example, the number of pieces if the machine has an absolute piece count, or the absolute time data if the machine has an absolute time count.
  • the correctness of the printed postal value is checked in accordance with the valid regulations of the postal authority. Subsequent manipulation of the value print can be detected with fraudulent intent.
  • the monotony of the data in particular which checked in window FE8. This allows copies of a franking imprint to be identified. Manipulation for the purpose of forgery is therefore not promising, since this data is additionally printed in the form of a cryptified row of symbols in at least one marking field.
  • the number given in window FE8 must have increased since the last check.
  • the FE8 window nine digits are shown, which allows the display of a period of approximately 30 years with a resolution of seconds.
  • the manipulation can also be used to check and determine the other variables, in particular the serial number SN of the franking machine, and, if necessary, the cost center of the user.
  • the information like the advertising slogan frame number WRN, on the other hand, can be indicated by a predetermined window FE9.
  • the associated window data are of type 1, ie they are changed less often than window data of type 2, such as the TIME data in window FE8 and the marking data in window FE6.
  • the data of the windows FE8 and FE9 are not printed openly unencrypted, but are only used for encryption. Therefore, the windows FE8 and FE9 shown in FIG. 3a are missing in the franking machine print images - shown in FIGS. 3b to 3e - in order to clarify these variants.
  • the temporarily variable variables to be entered for example the advertising slogan frame number WRN, are The date DAT, the postage value PW, the time data TIME and the serial number SN are automatically detected and read by means of a reader 24 from the corresponding field of the franking machine stamp image.
  • the arrangement of the windows in the franking machine imprint must be observed in a predetermined manner.
  • the size G5 forms, for example, the key for the encryption, which is changed at predetermined time intervals, ie after each inspection of the franking machine. These time intervals are so dimensioned that even when using modern analysis methods, for example differential cryptanalysis, it is certainly not possible to reconstruct the original information from the markings in the marking field in order to subsequently produce counterfeit stamp images.
  • size G1 corresponds to an advertising cliché frame number.
  • Corresponding number strings (sTrings) for window or frame input data are stored in the sub-memory areas ST i , ST j of the working memory 5 of the franking machine.
  • the sizes G0, G2 and G3 correspond, for example, to the window data stored in the sub-memory areas ST j of the non-volatile main memory 5 of the postage meter machine, the size G0 in the windows FE2 and FE3 from the sub-storage areas ST 2 and ST 3 , the size G2 in the window FE4 comes from the sub-storage area ST 4 and the size G3 in the window FE1 from the sub-storage area ST 1 .
  • the stored window data for an advertising slogan text part, a marking field and possibly for a reference field are available. It should be noted that in some of the sub-memory areas of the main memory 5 of the franking machine identified as B k , the window data are written and / or read out more often than in other sub-memory areas.
  • the non-volatile working memory is an EEPROM, a special storage method can be used to ensure that it remains safely below the limit number of storage cycles that is permitted for it.
  • a battery-backed RAM can also be used for the non-volatile working memory 5.
  • FIG. 5 shows a flowchart of the solution according to the invention, the method being based on the presence of two pixel memory areas shown in FIG. 1.
  • decoded binary frame and window data are stored in two pixel storage areas before printing.
  • the (semi-variable) type 1 window data such as the date, serial number of the franking machine and the cliché text part that is not to be changed continuously, can be decompressed together with the frame data in binary data before printing and combined to form a pixel image stored in the pixel memory area I.
  • constantly changing (variable) window data of type 2 are decompressed and as binary window data in the second pixel memory area II saved before printing.
  • Type 2 window data are, for example, the mail value and transport-dependent post value to be printed and / or the constantly changing marking.
  • a franking machine can run through several states (communication mode, test mode, franking mode and other modes) after it has been switched on and initialized, which was described in more detail, for example, in application P 43 44 476.8, which is described in more detail in DE 42 17 830 A1 and DE 42 17 830 A1 ,
  • the input of the cost center in step 41 results in an automatic entry of the window and frame data that was last saved and in step 42 a corresponding display.
  • Relevant memory areas C, D, E of the non-volatile working memory 5 are also queried with regard to a set assignment of window and frame data or cost center.
  • a cliché text part which is assigned to a specific advertising cliché can also be specified automatically.
  • step 43 frame data in register 100, 110, 120,... Of the volatile working memory 7a are adopted and control code is detected and stored in the volatile working memory 7b.
  • the remaining frame data are decompressed and stored in the volatile pixel memory 7c as binary pixel data.
  • the window data are loaded into registers 200, 210, 220,... Of the volatile working memory 7a, and control code is detected and stored in the volatile working memory 7b, and the remaining window data after it has been decompressed correspondingly stored in columns in volatile pixel memory 7c.
  • step 44 either the decompressed frame and window data of type I are stored as binary pixel data in the pixel memory area I and can be processed further in step 45, or frame and / or window data is re-entered. In the latter case, a branch is made to step 51.
  • step 51 the microprocessor determines whether an input has been made via the input means 2 in order to replace window data, for example for the postage value, with a new one or to replace or edit window data, for example for a cliché text line. If such an entry has been made, the necessary sub-steps for the entries are carried out in step 52, i.e. a finished other data record is selected (cliché text parts) and / or a new data record is generated which contains the data for the individual characters (numbers and / or letters) of the input size.
  • step 53 corresponding data records are called up for a display for checking the input data and are provided for the subsequent step 54 for reloading the pixel memory area I with the window data of type 1.
  • FIG. 9c shows step 54 in detail for embedding decompressed semi-variable window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after a new entry or after editing this window data of type 1.
  • the data from data records called up in accordance with the input are evaluated in order to detect control codes for a “color change” or a “column end” which are required for embedding the newly entered window data. Then, those data that are not control codes are decompressed into binary window pixel data and embedded in the pixel memory area I in columns.
  • step 55 the possibility of changing the fixed advertising slogan or frame data leads to a step 56 in order to carry out the input of the currently selected frame data sets together with the window data sets. Otherwise, the process branches to step 44.
  • a flag is set in step 44 and taken into account in the subsequent step 45 for the formation of data for a new series of marking symbols if a step 45b is to be processed here according to a second variant.
  • the new coded window data of type 2 is formed in step 45.
  • the marking data for a window FE6 are preferably generated here, preceding steps for encrypting data to generate a crypto number being included.
  • a shape as a bar code and / or symbol chain is also provided. The formation of new, coded type 2 window data for a marking image is explained in two variants with reference to FIG.
  • a monotonously variable size is processed in a step 45a, so that ultimately each print is unmistakable due to the printed symbol row.
  • other sizes are processed in a step 45b before step 45a.
  • the correspondingly formed data record for the marking data is then loaded into an area F and / or at least in a sub-memory area B 6 of the non-volatile working memory 5 and thereby overwrites the previously saved data record, for which window characteristic values have already been determined or are predetermined and are only now in the volatile working memory 7b are stored.
  • the sub-memory area B 10 is preferably provided for a data record which leads to the printing of a second row of marking symbols, as is shown in FIGS. 3c and 3d. In addition, double rows of symbols can also be printed side by side - in a manner not shown in FIG. 3b.
  • the area F is preferably provided for a data record which leads to the printing of a bar code, as is shown in FIG. 3e.
  • step 46 the data of the data record is transferred byte by byte for marking in registers in the volatile working memory 7a and the control characters "color change" and "column end” are detected, in order then to decode the remaining data in the data record and to decode the binary window pixel data of the type 2 to load into the pixel memory area II of the volatile working memory 7c.
  • FIG. 11 shows the decoding of the control code and conversion into decompressed binary window data of type 2 in detail.
  • Such type 2 window data are identified in particular by the index k and relate to the data for the window FE6, possibly FE10 for marking data and possibly FE8 for the TIME data of the absolute time count. Just the time data represent a monotonically changeable, since time-dependent, increasing quantity.
  • BCD-packed time data delivered from the clock / date module 8 are, if appropriate, converted into a suitable data record containing time data with run-length-coded hexadecimal data. Now they can also be stored in a memory area B 8 for window data FE8 of type 2 and / or loaded immediately in step 46 into register 200 of the working memory 7a or into the print register 15 in columns.
  • step 47 if a print request has been made, the step 48 containing a print routine is waited for and if the print request has not yet taken place, the print request is waited in a waiting loop.
  • the waiting loop - as shown in FIGS. 5 and 6 - is directly traced back to the beginning of step 47.
  • the waiting loop is - in a manner not shown in FIGS. 5 and 6 - returned to the beginning of step 44 or 45.
  • the print routine - shown in detail in FIG. 12 - carried out in step 48 for the compilation of print column data from the pixel memory areas I and II takes place while the print register (DR) 15 is being loaded.
  • the printer controller (DS) 14 effects immediately after loading the Print register (DR) 15 a print of the loaded print column. It is then checked in step 50 whether all columns for a franking machine print image are printed by comparing the current address Z with the stored end address Z end . If the printing routine has been carried out for a piece of mail, a branch is made to step 57. Otherwise, the process branches back to step 48 in order to generate and print the next print column until the print routine has ended.
  • step 57 it is checked whether further mail pieces are to be franked. If this is not the case and the printing routine is ended, step 60 is reached and the franking is thus ended. Otherwise the end of printing has not yet been reached and the process branches back to step 51.
  • FIG. 6 shows a fourth variant of the solution according to the invention, in which, in deviation from the block diagram according to FIG. 1, only one pixel memory area I is used. Decoded binary frame data and window data of type 1 are assembled and stored in this pixel memory area I before printing. The steps are identical except for step 46, which is saved here in this variant according to FIG. 6, and step 48, which is replaced here by step 49. Up to step 46, there is essentially the same sequence in the sequence.
  • the printing routine for compiling data taken from a pixel memory area I and working memory areas is discussed in more detail.
  • the constantly changing type 2 window data is decompressed in step 49 during the printing of each column and, together with the binary pixel data to be printed column by column, is combined from the pixel memory area I to form a printing column control signal.
  • Type 2 window data are, for example, the postage and transport-dependent postage value to be printed and / or the constantly changing marking.
  • a letter envelope 17 is placed under the print module 1 of an electronic franking machine at speed v moved in the direction of the arrow and, starting with column s 1 , printed in columns with the postage stamp image shown.
  • the printer module 1 has, for example, a print bar 16 with a number of print elements d1 to d240.
  • the ink-jet or a thermal transfer printing principle for example the ETR printing principle (Electroresistive Termal Transfer Ribbon), can be used for printing.
  • a column s f to be printed has a printing pattern 30 to be printed, which consists of colored printing dots and non-colored printing dots.
  • a colored printing dot is printed by a printing element.
  • the non-colored printing dots are not printed.
  • the first two printing dots in the printing column s f are colored in order to print the frame 18 of the postage stamp image 30.
  • alternate 15 non-colored (ie not active) and 3 colored (ie active) printing dots until a first window FE1 is reached, in which the postage (postage) is to be inserted. This is followed by a range from 104 non-colored pressure dots to the end of the column.
  • Such run length coding is implemented in the data set using hexadecimal numbers. The space requirement is minimized by having all the data in such a compressed form.
  • control code "00" for color changes can theoretically be omitted here, since with a single hexadecimal number "F0" an entire print column of 240 dots with the same coloring can be completely defined. Nevertheless, if there is only an imperceptible additional memory requirement, a color change can also make sense for several windows in one column.
  • a data record for the pressure column s f results in the form shown in sections: ... "2", “0D”, “02”, “4F”, “F1”, “68”, “FE”, ..., ...
  • control characters are detected from hexadecimal numbers "QQ" and evaluated in the course of a step 43.
  • window characteristic values Z j , T j , Y j or Z k , T k , Y k are also generated and together with defined values for the start address Z 0 , end address Z end and the total run length R, ie the number of each printing column required binary data, stored in volatile memory RAM 7b.
  • a maximum of 13 windows could be called for the 13 control characters "F1" to "FD” and the start addresses determined.
  • a start address Z 6 can be determined and saved as a window parameter.
  • FIG. 8 shows the window characteristic values relating to a pixel memory image and stored separately therefrom for a first window FE1.
  • FIG. 9a shows the decoding of the control code, decompression and loading of the fixed frame data as well as the formation and storage of the window characteristic values.
  • a control code "color change" was taken into account when considering the creation of very high-resolution prints.
  • the source address H i for frame data is incremented and a color change is carried out so that the initial data byte is evaluated as colored, for example, which later leads to correspondingly activated printing elements.
  • the above-mentioned byte which is a run-length-coded hexadecimal number for frame data, is now transferred in sub-step 4313 from the area A i of the non-volatile memory 5 which is automatically selected by the cost center KST to a register 100 of the volatile memory 7a. Control characters are detected and a run length variable X is reset to zero.
  • a control character "00" for a color change is recognized in sub-step 4314, which, after branching back to sub-step 4312, leads to a color change, ie the next run length-coded hexadecimal number inactivates the printing elements in accordance with Run length. Otherwise, it is determined in sub-step 4315 whether there is a control character "FF" for the end of the image. If one is recognized, point d has been reached in accordance with FIGS. 5 or 6 and step 43 has been processed.
  • sub-step 4316 determines whether there is a control character "FF" for end of image. If one is recognized, the color flip-flop 1 is reset in sub-step 4319 and a branch is made to sub-step 4312, in order then to load the byte for the next printing column in sub-step 4313. If there is no end of column, it is determined in sub-step 4317 whether there is a control character for a window of type 2. If one has been recognized, a branch is made to sub-step 4322. Otherwise, it is examined in sub-step 4318 whether there is a control character for type 1 windows. If this is the case, a point c 1 is reached at which a step 43b - shown in FIG. 9b - is carried out.
  • sub-step 4318 If no control character for window data of type 1 is recognized in sub-step 4318, then the run-length-coded frame data are present in the called byte, which are decoded in sub-step 4320 and converted into binary frame pixel data and stored in the pixel memory area I of the pixel memory 7 c under the set address Z.
  • the column run length variable X is determined in accordance with the number of bits converted and then the target address for the pixel memory area I is increased by this variable X. A point b has thus been reached and in order to call a new byte, the process branches back to sub-step 4312.
  • step 4322 if a control character for Window data of type 2 exist, the storage of window parameters T k determined. If a window characteristic, in this case the window column run variable T k is still at the initial value zero, the window start address Z k corresponding to the address Z is determined in a sub-step 4323 and stored in the volatile working memory 7b. Otherwise, a branch is made to a sub-step 4324. Sub-step 4323 is also followed by sub-step 4324, in which the window characteristic value of the window column variable T k is incremented. In the subsequent sub-step 4325, the previous window column variable T k stored in the volatile main memory 7b is overwritten with the current value, and the point b is reached.
  • the method then branches back to sub-step 4312 in order to load a new byte in sub-step 4313.
  • FIG. 9b shows the embedding of decompressed current window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after the start of the franking machine or after editing frame data. Assuming a control character for windows of type 1 was recognized in sub-step 4318, point c 1 and thus the beginning of step 43b are reached.
  • step 4330 the storage of window parameters T j is determined. If a window characteristic, in this case the window column run variable T j is still at the initial value zero, the window start address Z j will correspond in a sub-step 4331 the address Z is determined and stored in the volatile working memory 7b. Otherwise, a branch is made to a sub-step 4332. Sub-step 4331 is also followed by sub-step 4332, in which the window characteristic of the window column run length Y j and the window column run length variable W j to an initial value of zero, and the window source address U j to the initial value U oj -1 and the second color flip-flop for windows "Print in non-color" can be set.
  • the previous window source address U j is incremented and a color change is carried out, so that any window bytes that are loaded in the subsequent sub-step 4334 are evaluated as colored, which subsequently leads to activated printing elements during printing.
  • sub-step 4334 a byte from the sub-memory areas B j in the non-volatile main memory 5 is loaded into register 200 of the volatile main memory 7 a and is thereby detected for control characters.
  • sub-step 4335 the window column run length Y j is incremented by the value of the window column run length variable W j .
  • sub-step 4336 it is determined whether there is a control character "00" for color changes. If one has been recognized, the process branches back to sub-step 4333. Otherwise, it is examined in sub-step 4337 whether there is a control character "FE" for the end of the column. If this is not the case, window data is available.
  • a sub-step 4338 the content of the register 200 is decoded with the help of the character memory 9 and the binary window pixel data corresponding to this byte is stored in the pixel memory area I of the pixel memory 7c.
  • the window column run length variable W j is determined to increment the address Z by the value of the variable W j .
  • the new address is thus available for a new byte of the data record to be converted, and a branch is made back to sub-step 4333, in which the new source address for a byte of the data record for window FEj is also generated.
  • sub-step 4340 If a control character "FE" for the end of a column was recognized in sub-step 4337, a branch is made to sub-step 4340, in which the window column variable T j is incremented and the volatile working memory 7b stored window column variable T j and the window column run length Y j are overwritten with the current value. A color change is then carried out in sub-step 4341 and point b has been reached.
  • step 43b This completes step 43b and new frame data could be implemented in step 43a if a next window is not recognized or point d has been reached.
  • FIG. 9c shows the embedding of decompressed variable window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after editing this window data of type 1.
  • pixel memory data and window characteristics have already been stored before the start of step 54.
  • the sub-step 5440 begins with the determination of the number n 'of windows for which the data has been changed and a determination of the associated window start address Z j and window column variable T j for each window FEj.
  • a window counter variable q is also set to zero.
  • the source address U j is set to an initial value U oj -1
  • the target address Z j is used to address the pixel memory area I
  • a window column counter P j and the second color flip-flop are reset to the initial value zero.
  • sub-step 5443 the source address is incremented and a color change is carried out before the sub-step 5444 is reached.
  • sub-step 5444 a byte of the changed data record is called up in the non-volatile memory and transferred to the register 200 of the volatile memory 7a, control characters being detected. If a control character "00" for color change is branched back to sub-step 5443 in sub-step 5445. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 5446 to look for control characters "FE" for the end of a column. However, if such a control character is not present, the content of register 200 can be decoded in the following sub-step 5447 with the cooperation of character memory 9 and converted into binary pixel data for the window to be changed.
  • sub-step 5449 branches in which the window column counter P j is incremented.
  • sub-step 5450 it is examined whether the window characteristic value for the associated window column variable T j has been reached by the window column counter P j . Then, for a first changed window, all change data would be loaded into the pixel memory area I and branching back to the sub-step 5453 and from there to the sub-step 5441 in order to transfer change data into the pixel memory area I for a possibly second window. For this purpose, the window counter variable q is incremented in sub-step 5453 and the subsequent window start address Z j + 1 and the subsequent window column variable T j + 1 are determined.
  • sub-step 5443 the target address for the data in the pixel memory area I is incremented by the frame total column length R in sub-step 5451.
  • the target address V j is thus set to the next column for binary pixel data of the window in the pixel memory area I.
  • the color flip-flop is reset to zero, so that the conversion begins with pixel data that is rated as color.
  • step 44 new coded window data of type 2 can now be formed in step 45 for a marking image, in particular according to a first variant with step 45a.
  • Step 45 comprises further sub-steps, shown in FIG. 10, for forming new, coded window data of type 2 for a marking image.
  • step 44 in step 45 the output data for the data records containing the compressed data for the windows FEj and possibly for the frame data are required again in order to generate new coded window data of type 2 for one To form a series of marking symbols.
  • the individual output data (or input data) are stored in the memory areas ST w as a BCD-packed number in accordance with the respective sizes G w .
  • the data for a data record for window FEk of type 2 are now compiled in several steps and stored non-volatile in a sub-memory area B k .
  • the method for the rapid generation of a security imprint comprises, after provision of quantities, a sub-step 45a carried out by the microprocessor of the control device 6 of the franking machine before a print request (step 47).
  • a row of marking symbols is generated in step 45a. Due to the amount of information from sizes G0 to G5, which are only supposed to be partially printed open and unencrypted in the franking machine stamp image, at least some of the sizes are used in the postage meter machine to form a single number combination (sub-step 45i), which results in a single one Encrypted crypto number (sub-step 452) and then converted into a marking to be printed on the postal matter (sub-step 453).
  • the data record to be generated for the marking in a window FE6 can be stored in a final sub-step 454. Then point c 3 is reached.
  • This first variant, executed in partial step 45a saves the time that would otherwise be required in the franking machine for generating further crypto numbers.
  • control device 6 provides part of a quantity G0, G1 which characterizes the user of the franking machine in order to form third contiguous digits of the combination number KOZ1.
  • the upper 10 digits of the combination number KOZ1 for the TIME data (size G4) and the lower 4 digits for the postal value (size G3) are preferably provided from the memory areas ST w .
  • a maximum of 8 bytes, ie 16 digits can be encrypted at once.
  • the combination number KOZ1 can be supplemented by a further size in the direction of the least significant digits.
  • the supplementary part can be a part of the serial number SN or the number WRN of the advertising slogan frame or the byte that is selected from the data record of the advertising slogan frame depending on a further size.
  • This combination number KOZ1 can be encoded in a sub-step 452 in about 210 ms into a crypto number KRZ1, a number of further steps known per se taking place here. Then, in sub-step 453, the crypto number KRZ1 is to be converted into a corresponding symbol row on the basis of a predetermined marking list stored in the memory areas M of the non-volatile working memory 5.
  • the increased density of information that is so advantageous for later printing.
  • a row with a total of 20 symbols is depicted in windows FE6 and FE10, arranged here orthogonally to one another, with which, for example, the total of 8 bytes, i.e. 16 digits, the crypto number KRZ1 and other information may be reproduced unencrypted or otherwise encrypted.
  • a second variant with a step 45b in addition to step 45a differs from the first variant in other output or input variables which have to be considered in the same way.
  • a row of marking symbols is generated in succession in two steps 45b and 45a, step 45b being carried out analogously to step 45a.
  • a first sub-step 450 of the step 45 carried out by the control device 6 it is checked whether a flag has been set in order to carry out the test of sub-steps 45b and / or 45a to cause that in sub-step 45b a second combination number KOZ2 having at least the other part of the size G0, G1 characterizing the user of the franking machine is formed, then encrypted to a second crypto number KRZ2 and then in at least a second row of marking symbols MSR2 is implemented using a second set of SSY2 symbols.
  • sub-step 455 a combination number KOZ2 is formed compared to sub-step 451, with the sizes for other parts of the serial number, for advertising cliché (frame) number, among others, being shown here. Sizes.
  • a crypto number KOZ2 is formed in sub-step 456.
  • sub-step 457 the transformation into a series of marking symbols then takes place, which is temporarily stored in non-volatile manner in sub-step 458.
  • sub-step 45a which comprises sub-steps 451 to 453. If necessary, this can be completed by a sub-step 454. Then point c 3 is reached.
  • an encryption algorithm other than the DES is used in sub-step 456 to save time.
  • a transformation is carried out in sub-step 453 of the first variant or in sub-step 457 of the second variant in order to additionally increase the information density of the marking symbol series compared to the crypto number KRZ1 or KRZ2.
  • a set of 22 symbols is now used in order to represent the information using only 12 digits - in the manner shown in FIG. 3b.
  • the row of marking symbols shown there must be doubled for two crypto numbers. This can be done by means of a further marking symbol row lying parallel to the marking symbol row shown in FIG. 3b.
  • a row of marking symbols - as has been shown in FIG. 3a - is designed for 10 digits and can represent a crypto number KRZ1 if the symbol set has 40 symbols.
  • KRZ1 a crypto number
  • Here is a fully automated input and evaluation - if only subjective errors of the Avoiding the inspector when recognizing the symbols makes sense.
  • step following step 45 the data of a data record for the marking symbol row are then embedded in the remaining pixel data after their decompression.
  • two different options are provided for this. One possibility is explained in more detail with reference to FIG. 11, another with reference to FIG. 13.
  • FIG. 11 explains step 46 in FIG. 5 in particular.
  • window parameters Z k and T k are specified for changed window data, the window change number p ′ is determined and a window count variable q is set to zero.
  • a sub-step 4661 evaluates whether window count variable q is equal to the window change number p '. Then point d 3 and thus the next step 47 would already have been reached. However, this path is not regularly followed at the beginning, since the monotonously increasing size constantly creates new marker symbol rows for each print.
  • the process branches to sub-step 4662 in order to enter window characteristic values corresponding to the changed windows and to set initial conditions.
  • a new source address for the data of the data record of the window FEk just processed is generated in order to load a byte of the coded window data of type 2 from the memory area B k into registers of the non-volatile memory 7 a and to detect control characters in the next sub-step 4664 ,
  • a sub-step 4665 the window column run length Y k is then increased by the window column run length variable W k incremented, which is still zero here. Then a check is carried out for control characters for color changes (sub-step 4666) and, if appropriate, a branch is returned to sub-step 4663 or a search is carried out for control characters for the end of the column (sub-step 4667). If successful, branch is made to sub-step 4669 and the window column counter P k is increased. Otherwise, the next sub-step 4668 is to decode the control code and convert the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2.
  • sub-step 4670 it is then checked whether all columns of the window have been processed. If this is the case, the process branches to sub-step 4671 and the column run length Y k of the window FEk is stored in memory 7b and branched back to sub-step 4673. If it is recognized in sub-step 4670 that all of the columns have not yet been processed, the sub-step 4672 branches back to sub-step 4663, with the window characteristic value Y k and the color flip-flop being reset to zero. In the next sub-step 4668, a decoding of the control code and a conversion of the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2 must then be carried out again.
  • the print routine shown in FIG. 12 for assembling data from the pixel memory areas I and II runs when a print request is recognized in step 47 and data has been loaded in a sub-step 471 (not shown in FIG. 5).
  • the printing column has N printing elements.
  • a sub-step 481 the register 15 of the printer controller 14 is loaded serially bit by bit from the area I of the pixel memory 7c with binary print column data which are called up with the address Z, and the window counter h is set to a number which is the number of windows increased by one p corresponds.
  • a window counter h is decremented, which outputs window numbers k one after the other, whereupon in sub-step 483 the address Z reached in the pixel memory is compared with the window start address Z k of the window FE k . If the comparison is positive and a window start address is reached, a branch is made to sub-step 489, which in turn consists of sub-steps 4891 to 4895. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 484.
  • sub-step 4891 a first bit from the area II of the pixel memory 7c for the window FE k, the binary window pixel data is loaded into the register 15, the address Z and the bit count variable l being incremented in sub-step 4892 and the window bit count length X k being decremented.
  • a sub-step 4893 if not all bits corresponding to the window column run length Y k have been loaded yet, further bits from area II are loaded. Otherwise, a branch is made to sub-step 4894, the window start address Z k for the addressing of the next one Window column is increased accordingly by the total length R and the window column counter P k is decremented. At the same time, the original window bit count length X k is restored in accordance with the window column run length Y k .
  • Sub-step 4895 then checks whether all the window columns have been processed. If this is the case, then the start address Z k for the corresponding window FE k is set to zero or an address which lies outside the pixel memory area I. Otherwise, and after sub-step 4896, a branch is made to point e 1 .
  • sub-step 484 it is checked whether all window start addresses have been queried. If this has taken place, a branch is made to sub-step 485 in order to increment the current address Z. If this has not yet taken place, a branch is made back to sub-step 481 in order to continue to decrement window counter h until the next window start address has been found or until window counter h becomes zero in sub-step 484.
  • sub-step 486 it is checked whether all data for column s k to be printed are loaded in register 15. If this is not yet the case, the bit count variable l is incremented in sub-step 488 to return to point e 1 and then (in sub-step 481) to load the next bit addressed with the address Z from the pixel memory area into register 15.
  • step 50 - already shown in FIG. 5 - it is determined whether all the pixel data of the pixel memory areas I and II have been printed out, that is to say the item of mail has been franked completely. If this is the case, then point f 1 is reached. Otherwise, the sub-step 501 branches and the bit count variable 1 is reset to zero, in order to then branch back to the point e 1 . Now the next print column can be created.
  • Step 49 which is now beginning - already shown in FIG. 6 - comprises sub-steps 491 to 497 and sub-steps 4990 to 4999. Sub-steps 491 to 497 run with the same result in the same order as sub-steps 481 to 487 have already been explained in connection with FIG.
  • sub-step 4991 becomes.
  • the source address is incremented.
  • the compressed window data for the windows FE k of type 2, in particular for the marking data are loaded from the predetermined data record (stored in the corresponding sub-memory areas B j ) into the registers 200 of the volatile main memory 7a in sub-step 4992.
  • control code is also detected here. Is a window column to be printed which is printed with non-colored, i.e. pixels that are not to be printed, a "color change" control code would be in the first place in the data record.
  • step 4993 the process branches back to step 4991 in order to carry out the color change. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 4994.
  • sub-step 4994 it is determined whether there is a "column end" control code. If this is not yet the case, the register content must be decoded and thus decompressed.
  • step 4996 the address is then incremented and a corresponding next hexadecimal number is selected in the data record, which is stored in the non-volatile working memory 5 in subarea B 5 , and the bits converted during the decoding of the run length coding are determined in order to form a window column run length variable W j with which the destination address is incremented. The new destination address for reading is thus generated. and branching back to sub-step 4991.
  • sub-steps 4997 to 4999 follow in order to then branch back to point e 2 .
  • the sub-steps 4998 and 4999 run similarly to the sub-steps 4895 and 4894 shown in FIG.
  • sub-step 497 the print column that has been loaded is printed.
  • the sub-steps 491 to 497 run similarly to the sub-steps 481 to 487 shown in FIG.
  • a printer module applies a fully electronically generated franking image to a mail piece, corresponding to the current inputs or data made via an input means and an input / output control module, which can be checked with a display unit ,
  • the data for the constant parts of the franking image which relate to at least the frame of an advertising slogan, are stored in a first memory area Ai of the program memory 11, that the non-volatile memory 5 has a plurality of memory areas and that the data for the variable or semi-variable parts of the franking image are stored in second memory areas B k or B j of the non-volatile memory 5.
  • the selectable cost center numbers for the cost centers can be assigned the names of the advertising slogan frames in a third memory area C of the non-volatile memory 5.
  • the names of the advertising slogan frames correspond to advertising slogan frame numbers WRN.
  • the print pattern is generated from fixed data and current data. It is provided that according to the name or the advertising slogan frame number WRN, which are stored in memory areas of the non-volatile memory 5, and which are current mark the set frame of an advertising cliché. Frame data are taken from the first memory area of the program memory 11, decompressed and stored in a first area I of a pixel memory 7C. Semivariable window data from the second memory area B j are subsequently embedded in the aforementioned constant data.
  • billing is carried out in a sub-step 470 under the aforementioned cost center number in the cost center memory 10 and then variable window data from the second memory area B k for the marking data are embedded during printing, the embedding being carried out while the print register 15 is being loaded he follows.
  • step 47 if a print request has been made, steps 48 and 49, which contain a print routine, and if a print request has not yet been made, the print request is waited for in a waiting loop by - in the manner shown in FIGS. 5 and 6 - the beginning of the step 47 is decreased directly, this has a further temporal advantage according to the invention, since crypto numbers do not have to be continuously generated again according to the DES algorithm.
  • the next recordable point in time after generation of the marking symbol row can already trigger printing. However, as already mentioned, other branches are possible.
  • Step 47 can be preceded by an additional step 61 in order to branch to a standby mode (step 62), for example at the current time, if a missing print request is found in step 61 and / or to display the date and / or to carry out error checks automatically. From the standby mode 62, the process branches back to the start step 40 directly or indirectly via further steps or modes.
  • step 45 can be placed between steps 53 and 54.
  • step 54 following step 45 the data of a data record for the row of marking symbols after their decompression are embedded in the remaining pixel data of the pixel memory area I. A further pixel memory area is then not required.
  • Another opposite variant stores only the frame pixel data in the pixel memory area and embeds all window pixel data immediately in the corresponding columns read into the print register 15, without the need for a pixel memory for window data in between.
  • memory areas D and E can be omitted.
  • the unchangeable image information for a finished cliché is stored in a read-only memory (ROM), e.g. in the program memory 11.
  • ROM read-only memory
  • the ONLY read memory 11 is accessed, it being possible to dispense with the intermediate storage of cliché parts.
  • the program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least one advertising slogan frame, being stored in a first memory area A i .
  • An assigned name identifies the advertising slogan frame.
  • the non-volatile working memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the semi-variable parts of the Franking image are stored in the second memory area Bj and an assigned name identifies the semi-variable part.
  • a first assignment of the names of the semi-variable parts to the names of the constant parts exists according to the saved program.
  • a second assignment is made in accordance with the cost center number stored in a third memory area C, so that an advertising cliché is optionally assigned to each cost center KST.
  • a microprocessor is provided in the control device 6 in order to encrypt the marker pixel image data before it is embedded in columns in the remaining pixel image data.
  • a volatile working memory 7 is therefore connected to the microprocessor, a printer controller 14 is connected to print register 15, with which the marker pixel image data are inserted into the remaining fixed and variable pixel image data during printing under the control of the microprocessor in accordance with a program stored in the program memory 11.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)

Claims (21)

  1. Procédé de production d'une impression de sécurité qui est appliquée par le dispositif d'impression (1) d'une machine à affranchir, sur un produit à affranchir, dans l'impression d'affranchissement, en plus du cachet de valeur et du cachet de date, le microprocesseur du dispositif de commande (6) de la machine à affranchir, avant une demande d' impression (étape 47), exécutant une étape (45a, 45) qui comprend les sous-étapes suivantes :
    a) génération d'un nombre combinaison (KOZ1), une grandeur (G4) à variation constante monotone et une grandeur (G3) représentant la valeur de port à imprimer étant mises à disposition pour former respectivement des premiers chiffres associés et des deuxièmes chiffres associés du nombre combinaison (KOZ1) ;
    b) codage du nombre combinaison (KOZ1) pour former un nombre crypté (KRZ1),
    c) conversion du nombre crypté (KRZ1) à l'aide d'un jeu (SSY1) prédéterminé de symboles en au moins une série de symboles de marque (MSR1) exploitables visuellement et mécaniquement.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que la grandeur (G4) à variation constante monotone est un paramètre machine, dont la valeur augmente ou diminue au cours de la durée de vie de la machine à affranchir.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, caractérisé par le fait que le paramètre machine est dépendant du temps.
  4. Procédé selon une des revendications 1 à 3, caractérisé par le fait que pour la grandeur à variation constante monotone on utilise les grandeurs suivantes :
    • valeur totale instantanée des affranchissements,
    • valeur totale instantanée des affranchissements depuis la date du dernier rechargement ;
    • valeur de crédit résiduelle encore disponible, utilisable pour l'affranchissement ;
    • données instantanées de date et d'heure ;
    • données instantanées de date et d'heure, depuis la date du dernier rechargement ;
    • nombre de plis affranchis ou leur complément.
  5. Procédé selon une des revendications 1 à 3, caractérisé par le fait que la grandeur à variation constante monotone est un nombre décroissant, qui correspond à l'espace temporel jusqu'à la date de l'inspection suivante.
  6. Procédé selon une des revendications 1 à 5 caractérisé par le fait que la grandeur à variation constante monotone est représentée sous la forme d'un premier nombre qui peut être combiné à un deuxième nombre représentant l'une des grandeurs suivantes :
    date du dernier rechargement,
    données de rechargement du crédit à la date du dernier rechargement,
    une grandeur physique déterminée qui a été mesurée à la date du dernier rechargement et est connue seulement de la machine à affranchir et de la centrale de données.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 6, caractérisé par le fait qu'une grandeur servant à former le deuxième nombre est mémorisée avec possibilité d'interrogation dans la centrale de données et par le fait que la grandeur à variation monotone n'est utilisée que dans sa partie à variation maximale dans la formation du premier nombre.
  8. Procédé selon une des revendications 1 à 7, caractérisé par le fait qu'on introduit un nombre supplémentaire (KOZ) dans la formation du nombre combinaison, lequel nombre contient une information sur le numéro d'identification (numéro de série) de la machine d'affranchissement concernée.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 8, caractérisé par le fait que l'information à vérifier est imprimée en complément ou seule sous forme de code à barres.
  10. Procédé selon une des revendications 1 à 9, caractérisé par le fait que le dispositif d'impression (15) de la machine à affranchir applique sur le courrier, par un procédé d'impression contrôlé par microprocesseur, une image d'affranchissement entièrement électronique, conformément aux entrées ou aux données actuelles saisies à l'aide d'un moyen d'entrée et d'un module d'entrée/sortie et contrôlables sur une unité d'affichage, une commande d'impression (14) produisant le motif à imprimer à partir de données fixes et de données actuelles, par le fait que les données pour la partie constante de l'image d'affranchissement, qui concernent au moins le cadre d'un cliché publicitaire, sont stockées dans une première zone de mémoire (Ai) d'une mémoire de programme (11), par le fait qu'une mémoire non volatile (5) comporte plusieurs zones de mémoire, les données pour des parties variables ou semi variables de l'image d'affranchissement étant mémorisées dans des deuxièmes zones de mémoire (Bk) ou (Bj) de la mémoire non volatile (5), par le fait que les noms des cadres de clichés publicitaires peuvent être associés aux numéros de valeur sélectionnables dans une troisième zone de mémoire (C) de la mémoire non volatile (5), par le fait qu'aux noms de cadres de clichés publicitaires correspondent des numéros de cadre de cliché publicitaire (WRN), par le fait qu'en relation avec le nom des numéros de cadre de cliché publicitaire qui sont mémorisés dans des zones de mémoire de la mémoire non volatile (5) et caractérisent le cadre actuel sélectionné d'un cliché publicitaire, des données de cadre sont prélevées dans la première zone de mémoire de la mémoire de programme (11), sont décompressées et mémorisées dans une première zone (I) d'une mémoire de pixels (7c), des données de fenêtre semi variables provenant de la deuxième zone de mémoire (Bj) étant intégrées ensuite dans les données constantes précitées, par le fait qu'en cas de demande d'impression, un calcul est effectué sous le numéro de valeur dans la mémoire de dépense (10) avant l'impression et par le fait qu'ensuite des données de fenêtre variables en provenance de la deuxième zone de mémoire (Bk) sont introduites pendant le chargement du registre d'impression pour la formation des données cliché.
  11. Procédé selon la revendication 10, caractérisé par le fait que dans une quatrième zone de mémoire (D) de la mémoire non volatile (5) est mémorisé un nom qui caractérise le cadre de cliché publicitaire actuel sélectionné, par le fait que dans une cinquième zone de mémoire (E) sont mémorisées des données pour une autre association sélectionnable d'au moins une partie de cliché publicitaire supplémentaire avec un cadre de cliché publicitaire conforme au nom précité, et par le fait qu'une sixième zone de mémoire (F) contient des données pour la production de données de fenêtre de code à barres à partir d'un nombre combinaison, taille ou nombre crypté, lesquelles données sont utilisées pour la formation de données de marque et par le fait que les données des zones de mémoire, dans certaines limites d'association librement choisies, sont combinées pendant l'impression pour former une image globale d'une impression de sécurité, les données dans les troisième, quatrième et cinquième zones de mémoire (C, D et E) pouvant être modifiées à l'aide des moyens de saisie (2) et du dispositif de commande (6).
  12. Procédé selon la revendication 10 ou 11, caractérisé par le fait qu'avec les moyens de saisie (2) on mémorise dans une septième zone de mémoire (G) de la mémoire non volatile (5) les données qui ont été collectées lors d'une inspection et qui comprennent entre autres le nombre total d'affranchissements et/ou la prochaine date d'inspection, par le fait qu'on utilise ces données pour former le nombre combinaison (KOZ) et par le fait que consécutivement au codage du nombre combinaison (KOZ) pour former un nombre crypté (KRZ), on mémorise des données de fenêtre pour la conversion en symboles de marque et on les mémorise dans la deuxième zone de mémoire (BK).
  13. Procédé selon une des revendications 10 à 12, caractérisé par le fait que dans une huitième zone de mémoire (K) de la mémoire non volatile (5) un nombre crypté (KRZ2) est mémorisé temporairement et est utilisé pour former des données de marque.
  14. Procédé selon une des revendications 10 à 13, caractérisé par le fait que pour la formation de données de marque, au moins un jeu (SSY) de symboles de marque est mémorisé dans une neuvième zone de mémoire (M) de la mémoire non volatile (5).
  15. Procédé selon la revendication 14, caractérisé par le fait qu'on utilise des symboles de marque qui se différencient chacun par une valeur donnée d'indice de noircissement et sont délimités chacun par des bords mutuellement orthogonaux.
  16. Procédé selon une des revendications 10 à 15, caractérisé par le fait que une dixième zone de mémoire (S) de la mémoire non volatile (5) sont mémorisés au moins une clé (Key 1, Key 2) pour un algorithme de codage et l'algorithme de codage lui-même.
  17. Procédé selon une des revendications 10 à 16, caractérisé par le fait que dans une onzième zone de mémoire (ST) de la mémoire non volatile (5) sont mémorisées les données contenant des chaînes de nombres (strings) pour toutes les grandeurs d'entrée et par le fait que le numéro actuel de cadre de cliché publicitaire (WRN), qui est mémorisé dans la onzième zone de mémoire (ST), est utilisé pour la formation des données de marque.
  18. Procédé selon une des revendications 10 à 17, caractérisé par le fait que dans une douzième zone de mémoire (VA) de la mémoire non volatile (5) est mémorisé un algorithme de compression, qui convertit la représentation numérique compressée BCD pour la base 10 en une autre représentation numérique compressée pour une base supérieure à 10, aux fins de représenter au moins un nombre crypté (KRZ1) pour la compression d'informations à l'aide d'une suite de symboles de marque (MSR1).
  19. Procédé selon une des revendications 10 à 18, caractérisé par le fait que des moyens de sécurité qui sont prévus pour coopérer avec les moyens de saisie (2) et se présentent sous la forme d'une clé matérielle et/ou d'une carte à puce, lors d'une inspection de la machine à affranchir, permettent d'accéder aux septième, neuvième, dixième et douzième zones de mémoire (GSM ou VA), de sorte que lors d'une inspection de la machine à affranchir une nouvelle clé (key), un jeu de symboles de marque (SSY), un algorithme de codage ou un algorithme de compression peuvent être chargés.
  20. Procédé de vérification d'une impression de sécurité à l'intérieur d'une impression d'affranchissement par un contrôle par échantillons ou par contrôle géré de manière centralisée chez une autorité postale ou une autre institution similaire agréée, aux fins d'obtenir les différentes informations à partir d'une marque imprimée dans une impression de sécurité et de les comparer avec les informations imprimées en clair sur le courrier, comprenant les étapes suivantes :
    détection d'une série de symboles de marque (étape 71),
    conversion de la série de symboles de marque en un nombre crypté (étape 72),
    décryptage (étape 73) du nombre crypté à l'aide d'une clé de codage mémorisée dans un appareil de traitement (29) et conversion en un nombre combinaison (KOZ), qui contient une combinaison de chiffres d'au moins deux grandeurs, l'une des grandeurs étant représentée par les chiffres supérieurs du nombre combinaison (KOZ) et l'autre grandeur par les chiffres inférieurs du nombre combinaison (KOZ), une grandeur à variation constante monotone représentant des premiers chiffres associés et au moins une grandeur correspondant à la valeur d'affranchissement à imprimer représentant des seconds chiffres associés du nombre combinaison,
    traitement de la marque de l'impression de sécurité en liaison avec les données en clair de l'impression de sécurité.
  21. Procédé selon la revendication 20, caractérisé par le fait qu'on mémorise en colonnes et en lignes dans une mémoire d'image (28a) d'un appareil de traitement (29), les données binaires fournies par une caméra ligne à ligne lors de la lecture de l'impression de sécurité, par le fait qu'à l'aide d'un programme de traitement on détecte le changement des contenus de données binaires de un à zéro ou de zéro à un et on mémorise les adresses du premier changement binaire et du changement binaire suivant (premier point d'image non imprimé) dans une mémoire de caractéristique (28b), par le fait qu'on répète l'opération pour toutes les colonnes d'un champ de symbole et par le fait qu'on compare les 2n données dans la mémoire de caractéristique (28b) pour chaque champ de symbole à n colonnes avec les jeux de données mémorisés dans une mémoire de référence (28c), afin d'obtenir une combinaison univoque.
EP94250259A 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour générer et vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité Expired - Lifetime EP0660270B1 (fr)

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EP01250023A EP1113403A1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité
EP01250022A EP1118964B1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité

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DE4344471 1993-12-21
DE4344471A DE4344471A1 (de) 1993-12-21 1993-12-21 Verfahren und Anordnung zur Erzeugung und Überprüfung eines Sicherheitsabdruckes

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EP01250022A Division-Into EP1118964B1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité
EP01250022A Division EP1118964B1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité
EP01250023A Division-Into EP1113403A1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité
EP01250023A Division EP1113403A1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité

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EP0660270A2 EP0660270A2 (fr) 1995-06-28
EP0660270A3 EP0660270A3 (fr) 1995-09-06
EP0660270B1 true EP0660270B1 (fr) 2004-12-29

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EP01250023A Ceased EP1113403A1 (fr) 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé pour générer un motif destiné à la sécurité
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US5970151A (en) 1999-10-19
DE4344471A1 (de) 1995-08-17
US5734723A (en) 1998-03-31
DE59410399D1 (de) 2005-02-03
EP0660270A2 (fr) 1995-06-28
EP0660270A3 (fr) 1995-09-06
US5680463A (en) 1997-10-21
EP1118964A1 (fr) 2001-07-25
EP1113403A1 (fr) 2001-07-04
EP1118964B1 (fr) 2008-08-20
US5991409A (en) 1999-11-23
DE59410458D1 (de) 2008-10-02
US5712916A (en) 1998-01-27

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