EP1109981B1 - Verfahren zum durchführen einer schlüssellosen zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung - Google Patents

Verfahren zum durchführen einer schlüssellosen zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1109981B1
EP1109981B1 EP99944439A EP99944439A EP1109981B1 EP 1109981 B1 EP1109981 B1 EP 1109981B1 EP 99944439 A EP99944439 A EP 99944439A EP 99944439 A EP99944439 A EP 99944439A EP 1109981 B1 EP1109981 B1 EP 1109981B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
transmitter
signal
sent
base station
transceiver unit
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
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EP99944439A
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German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
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EP1109981A1 (de
Inventor
Detlev Kramer
Volker Pretzlaff
Rainer Vens
Paul Vogels
Michael Fromm
Dirk Wolf
Peter Raab
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Leopold Kostal GmbH and Co KG
Original Assignee
Leopold Kostal GmbH and Co KG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from DE1998139695 external-priority patent/DE19839695C1/de
Priority claimed from DE1998139696 external-priority patent/DE19839696C2/de
Priority claimed from DE1999126234 external-priority patent/DE19926234A1/de
Application filed by Leopold Kostal GmbH and Co KG filed Critical Leopold Kostal GmbH and Co KG
Publication of EP1109981A1 publication Critical patent/EP1109981A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1109981B1 publication Critical patent/EP1109981B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
    • G07C2209/63—Comprising locating means for detecting the position of the data carrier, i.e. within the vehicle or within a certain distance from the vehicle

Definitions

  • the invention further relates to a keyless access authorization control device with one a transceiver units as well as a Control and evaluation element having a base station and a mobile, an identification transmitter (ID transmitter) having a transceiver unit to check the access authorization of the ID provider accompanying person, with which base station a distance determination to determine the distance from the base station to the ID transmitter is feasible.
  • ID transmitter identification transmitter
  • Keyless locking systems are used in numerous applications, used for example in motor vehicles to increase ease of use.
  • Infrared systems are traditionally used as remote control systems or radio systems used by the authorized user actively pressed the ID transmitter to send a signal to the base station, for example to a receiving unit provided in the motor vehicle for opening to transmit the vehicle.
  • passive access authorization control systems so that the authorized user carrying his motor vehicle with a valid ID transmitter can open without having to actively operate the ID transmitter.
  • a Such keyless access control device is for example described in DE 43 29 697 C2.
  • the one in this document disclosed method is arranged by a motor vehicle Transceiver unit sent a code signal which from the ID transmitter is received if it is in the reception area of this signal.
  • the ID transmitter as by the Receiving the code signal triggered action sent back a response signal which after receipt by the vehicle-side receiver unit its validity is checked.
  • the desired action is triggered on the motor vehicle side, namely unlocking the motor vehicle doors.
  • the invention lies on the basis of the state of the art discussed last on the one hand, the task of a generic method to perform keyless access control to suggest that not only adequate security with regard to the possibility of detecting a manipulated route extension has, but also with the use of simple means is feasible.
  • the invention has for its object a generic to propose a keyless entry control device, with the use of reasonable means a (manipulated) route extension is recognizable.
  • the process-related problem is solved according to the invention by that the distance determination based on a relative determination takes place in which the differences of a correlating with the signal transit time and path-dependent changing signal characteristics between one base station signal monitored by the base station and that of the Transceiver unit received response signal are evaluated.
  • the device-related task is achieved by the characterizing features of claim 23 solved.
  • the claimed invention is based on the knowledge that with sufficient Resolution a distance determination indirectly by detecting a signal quantity correlating with the transit time of a signal is possible using simple means.
  • This distance determination in contrast to the previously known method a relative determination, in the case of the base station a reference code signal monitored with regard to the intended signal characteristic sent and the signal characteristic of this reference code signal with the Signal characteristic of the returned by the ID transmitter and by the response signal received by the transceiver is compared.
  • the path-dependent change compared to the reference code signal Signal characteristics are then compared to that of the reference code signal Information about the distance covered by the code signal and the response signal.
  • the Reference code signal is, for example, the transmitted code signal, which beyond the transmission duration of the code signal by the base station is monitored.
  • the action triggered by the ID transmitter its detection limited by the base station, the measurement period, for example the return of the code signal received by the ID transmitter his.
  • the action triggered by the ID transmitter can also be another action detectable by the base station, such as switching off a transmitter and thus detection by the base station the time when such a transmitter by the ID transmitter has been turned off.
  • the use of hardware to carry out a such relative distance determination is compared to that to Perform an absolute runtime measurement very low.
  • Dependent on Numerous evaluation steps can be made from the method used can also be solved via data processing.
  • different signal characteristics can be used. Intended can be, for example, an oscillation count on the base station side the carrier wave of the transmitted code signal over a period of time until for example, receive a response signal from the transceiver has been.
  • the distance between the The base station and the ID transmitter are then calculated from half the signal runtime multiplied by the speed of light. This results in, that the term is not infinitely variable, but in multiples of the period can be determined.
  • a carrier wave in an ISM band for example with a frequency of 434 MHz, is due to the correspondingly shorter period time a resolution of about 0.35 m can be achieved.
  • the wireless communication expediently takes place in a frequency range which belongs to an ISM band.
  • the resolution of the distance determination using such a frequency is considerably higher than that required when using such a method for keyless access authorization control in a motor vehicle.
  • the resolving power when using such a method in motor vehicles is of the order of 5 to 10 meters. Due to the lower resolution required in such an application, compared to the possible resolution, the demands on the counter can be reduced by not counting every vibration, but only every xth, approximately every 2 xth vibration.
  • Such a selective vibration counting can be implemented, for example, by using a frequency divider or a frequency mixer, so that with a division ratio of 1:16, only every 16th vibration is counted.
  • a SEND ID TRANSMITTER command to the base station is sent.
  • This command switches on in the ID transmitter Transmitter to transmit on a first frequency.
  • a base signal on a second frequency Posted is by the transceiver a base signal on a second frequency Posted.
  • This code signal is the SENDER ID-GEBER command OUT.
  • the vibration count the carrier wave of this transmission signal started. Before that, too Receiving channel of the transceiver unit activated on the first frequency, so that the signal sent by the ID transmitter can be received is.
  • the vibration counting is stopped when by the transceiver the base station no longer sends the ID transmitter is detectable.
  • the vibration count is thus for a period of time is carried out, the transit time of the code signal from the base station to the ID transmitter and needed back.
  • the action signal detected by the base station of the ID transmitter is the reaction of the ID transmitter to the code signal out.
  • the code signal sent from the base station by the ID transmitter is sent back almost mirrored.
  • the vibration count is stopped in this embodiment when the code signal as a response signal from the ID transmitter again completely from the transceiver the base station has been received.
  • the Base station are assigned to two vibration counters, one first vibration count to send the code signal and one further vibration count to the receipt of that from the ID transmitter mirrored code signal is coupled.
  • the vibration count of the second, coupled to the reception of the code signal stopped when the counter associated with sending the code signal has reached a count that is twice the number of the code signal corresponding vibrations.
  • phase position of a wave transmitted over a radio link depending on the distance covered compared to the original transmitted phase position shifts.
  • Both the Phase position of the frequency as well as that of an amplitude change (Envelope) can be used individually or together, to the phase of the transmitted question signal with that of the compare the response signal sent back by the ID transmitter.
  • envelope an amplitude change
  • the response signal is sent from the ID transmitter to the Base station transceiver using a carrier wave he follows.
  • the carrier wave can be one contained in the question signal Wave, for example, the question signal itself, or by the to Modulating a carrier wave provided for transmitting the query signal be transmitted to the ID provider.
  • the ID transmitter is located within the predetermined reception range of the transmitted query signal, if the method is used in the automotive sector less than 3 m, is the distance covered (transmitter / receiver unit - ID transmitter - transceiver unit) short.
  • a phase shift between the demodulated response signal and the originally transmitted question signal is so small that within a predetermined tolerance range phase-locked signals (question signal and response signal) are assumed can be.
  • a manipulated route extension will constantly shift the phase position between the question signal and the answer signal, so that this is outside the tolerance range of the as phase-locked operation.
  • the probability that the received and demodulated response signal has a phase that that of the question signal is left to chance and therefore only extremely low.
  • the desired action such as that Opening a motor vehicle is only carried out if the ID transmitter is in the predetermined distance from the base station.
  • the question signal is sent on a different frequency than that Response signal.
  • the question signal on the frequency that is used to modulate the response signal is provided. This can be achieved, for example be that the question signal is sent on a low frequency link and this query signal received by the ID transmitter directly for modulation a carrier wave is used on a radio frequency link.
  • a question signal be sent on a NF route Wake-up signal to switch the ID transmitter from a rest or Be in sleep mode in its operating mode.
  • the oscillator used to vibrate freely so that its frequency is subject to certain fluctuations is. It can also be provided that the transmission frequency according to change a predetermined variation pattern so that the randomness for the realization of an unauthorized, yet phase-rigid extension is reduced even further.
  • a question signal from the transceiver one with Modulation mixture modulated from one or more modulation variables Carrier wave is sent. It can be provided either a modulation mix of different frequencies or from different amplitudes or a mixture of these two Sizes to use.
  • Response signal takes place after demodulation of the response signal filtering with regard to the original modulation mixture proportions, for example the individual frequency components.
  • the subsequent one Step of phase comparison of the question signal originally sent with the received response signal is then based on the individual, the components forming the modulation mixture, for example the Frequency shares carried out.
  • a frequency mix uses a fundamental frequency and this with a certain one Number of additional frequencies, each divided by two parts of the Fundamental frequency are mixed. This can be done easily with a Realize frequency dividers. It determines the size of the fundamental frequency the resolution of the distance measurement and the number of divisions the maximum recognizable distance.
  • a phase comparison between the question signal originally sent and the received response signal can be used, for example realize a phase comparator.
  • a modulated carrier wave transmitted over a radio link depending on the length of the radio path covered by this with regard to a change or an offset of the functional values of the used modulation variables compared to simultaneous function values of the originally sent signal can be evaluated.
  • the distance between the base station is used and ID transmitter-related temporal shift of the modulation curve of the response signal versus the identical modulation curve of the question signal.
  • Such a comparison is expediently carried out by the Step of forming a difference between the amounts or the squares of the Function values of the modulation variables at a predetermined point in time carried out.
  • This function value comparison can be done on virtually any Place of the modulation function and thus carried out continuously become.
  • the Frequency of the carrier wave provided for the query signal from that of the response signal differs. It is useful to ask and / or Send response signal on the route on which anyway a possibly cryptological data dialog between the base station and the ID transmitter takes place.
  • the carrier wave is frequency modulated, preferably linear frequency modulated for easier evaluation Posted.
  • the base station has means for transmission assigned such a carrier wave as a query signal and an FM demodulator, in which a demodulation of the received response signal he follows.
  • the mobile ID transmitter has an FM demodulator for demodulating of the received question signal.
  • The is expediently Output of the demodulator to an input of the for data communication provided transceivers connected, so that from the ID transmitter sent data signal simultaneously by its modulation that Represents or contains response signal to the transmitted question signal.
  • a difference frequency By comparing a function value of the modulation variable, for example the modulation frequency of the response signal received with the simultaneous function value of the modulation frequency a difference frequency.
  • the measure of this difference frequency is a measure for how long the radio path covered (base station - ID transmitter - Base station).
  • An authorization check is expediently carried out in such a way that a threshold value for the differential frequency is specified is a user authorization if this threshold value is exceeded is denied.
  • a frequency-modulated carrier wave can also be an amplitude-modulated carrier wave or a frequency and amplitude modulated carrier wave for characterization of the question and answer signal can be used.
  • a keyless access authorization control device 1 comprises a base station 2 and a mobile identification transmitter (ID transmitter) 3.
  • a base station 2 includes a transceiver unit 4 with a RF transmitter 5 and an RF receiver 6, each on different Frequencies work.
  • the base station is also a microcontroller 7 to control the transmission and to evaluate the received Signals connected.
  • a period counter 8 is connected to the HF receiver 6 connected to count the vibrations of the received carrier wave.
  • the period counter 8 has a start input 9 and one Stop input 10 on.
  • the start input 9 is with the microcontroller 7 connected via which the start signal for starting the vibration count is transmitted to the period counter 8.
  • the stop input is 10 via an AND gate 11 to both the RF receiver 6 and the Microcontroller 7 connected.
  • the stop input 10 of the period counter 8 is then with a stop signal to stop the vibration count acted upon by the RF receiver 6 after signal reception no signal is received anymore.
  • the ID transmitter 3 also comprises a transceiver unit 12 with a RF transmitter 13 and an RF receiver 14.
  • the RF transmitter 13 operates on the same frequency as the RF receiver 6 of the base station 2; the HF receiver 14 of the ID transmitter 3 operates on the same frequency like the RF transmitter 5 of the base station 2.
  • the RF link used between the base station 2 and the ID transmitter 3 is thus capable of duplexing.
  • the RF receiver 14 is for evaluating incoming signals to a microcontroller 15 connected.
  • the microcontroller 15 is via a data line 16 and connected to the RF transmitter 13 via a touch line 17. Parallel to the microcontroller 15 there is one in the ID transmitter 3 Evaluation logic 18 between the RF receiver 14 and the RF transmitter 13 arranged.
  • the evaluation logic 18 serves to recognize one of the Base station 2 sent code signal and for direct control the RF transmitter 13; without such a signal by the microcontroller 15 are evaluated and the RF transmitter 13 are controlled would. Since with the evaluation logic 18 only a very specific code signal must be recognized, the time required for evaluation is constant in Contrary to the computing time required by the microcontroller 15.
  • the evaluation logic 18 is connected to the microcontroller via a control line 15 connected for switching the evaluation logic 18 on and off.
  • the keyless access authorization control device 1 shown in FIG. 1 serves both to carry out a cryptological question-answer dialog to determine an access authorization and to determine the current distance of the ID transmitter 3 from the base station 2.
  • the distance determination between the base station 2 and the ID Transmitter 3 is carried out as follows, reference being made to the flowchart in FIG. 2:
  • the RF transmitter 5 of base station 2 sends the command to ID transmitter 3 at a predetermined time t 0 sent: TRANSMITTER ID TRANSMITTER ON.
  • the HF receiver 14 of the ID transmitter 3 received this command.
  • the RF transmitter 13 starts transmitting a carrier wave at frequency f 1 .
  • the carrier wave transmitted on the frequency f 1 is received by the RF receiver 6 of the base station at time t c .
  • the period counter 8 is set to zero.
  • a code signal from the RF transmitter 5, namely the command: TRANSMITTER ID TRANSMITTER OFF is sent at the same time and the start counter 9 starts the period counter 8 to count the vibrations received at the frequency f 1 .
  • the code signal has been transmitted by the RF transmitter 5 of the base station 2 on the frequency f 2 .
  • the HF transmitter 13 of the ID transmitter 3 is switched off, which point in time is identified in FIG. 2 by t d .
  • the RF receiver 6 of the base station 2 has received the carrier wave transmitted by the RF transmitter 13 of the ID transmitter 3 since the time t c . After the RF transmitter 13 has been switched off, the RF receiver 6 can no longer receive a carrier wave at the time t e . At this time, the period counter 8 is stopped to determine the counter reading.
  • the determined vibration counter reading is now a measure of the transit time of the signal between the base station 2 and the ID transmitter 3 and back, the dead times and also the signal length being taken into account when determining the transit time and the distance to be determined therefrom.
  • FIG. 3 shows a further keyless access authorization control device 19 in a block diagram with a base station 20 and a ID transmitter 21. Only the components are shown in this figure, to determine the distance between the base station 20 and the ID transmitter 21 are necessary. Some of the modules shown are integrated into the usual hardware for implementing a cryptological access authorization control.
  • the base station 20 comprises as a transceiver an antenna 22 for transmitting and receiving one Signals, which signal is a carrier wave.
  • the Carrier wave is generated in a signal generator 23, which then a power divider 24 is applied.
  • the power divider 24 leads the generated signal on the one hand the antenna 22 and on the other one first counter circuit 25 to.
  • An RF switch 26 is used for switching the operation of the base station 20 between transmission, as in FIG. 3 shown, and receiving.
  • the RF switch 26 When receiving the from the ID transmitter 21 returned code signal, the RF switch 26 is in its other Position in which to the RF switch 26, a second counter circuit 27 is connected. In both counter circuits 25 and 27 is in each case a counter 28 or 29 is provided, which counter 28, 29 to one Microcontroller 30 are connected.
  • the signal generated by the signal generator 23 is a carrier wave with a frequency within an ISM band, namely 434 MHz.
  • this a frequency dividing circuit 31 upstream which consists of the actual Frequency divider 32 with a division ratio 1:16, one downstream bandpass filter 33 and an amplifier 34 there.
  • On a correspondingly constructed frequency dividing circuit 35 is the counter circuit 27 assigned.
  • the ID transmitter 21 also has a transceiver unit Antenna 36, which is followed by an RF switch 37.
  • the reception mode as shown in FIG. 3, is at the RF switch 37
  • Amplifier 38 and another RF switch 39 connected downstream.
  • the received Code signal - the carrier wave - acts on a counter 40, a frequency dividing circuit 41 corresponding to the frequency dividing circuits 25 and 27 of the base station 20 is connected upstream.
  • Parallel to the amplifier 38 is a signal generator via a power divider 42 43 switched, the signals with the appropriate position of the RF switch 37, 39 can be sent via the antenna 36.
  • FIG. 4 shows another keyless entry control device 44, which is basically constructed like that described for FIG. 3 Keyless Access Control Device 19. Same Elements are in the two access authorization control devices 19 and 44 marked with the same reference numerals.
  • the difference to the access authorization control device 19 is the keyless one Access authorization control direction 44 instead of the actual one Frequency divider 32 each have a frequency mixer consisting of one Local oscillator 45 and a mixer 46 are provided.
  • the mode of operation of the keyless access authorization control device 19 is described below with regard to a determination of the distance from the base station 20 to the ID transmitter 21, reference being additionally made to FIG. The same applies to the keyless access authorization control device 44 of FIG. 4.
  • a constant RF carrier is generated via the signal generator 23.
  • the counter 28 is set to 0 and switched to the RF carrier for counting the vibrations, the RF switch 26 being switched to transmit at the same time.
  • the RF carrier wave is received by ID transmitter 21.
  • a predetermined number of oscillations namely 2048 oscillations, is provided as the code signal.
  • the base station is switched over to reception via the HF switch 26, so that further transmission of the HF carrier wave is prevented.
  • the counter reading of counter 40 of ID transmitter 21 corresponds to that of the number of oscillations transmitted, namely 2048.
  • the ID transmitter switches from its reception to its transmission mode, with the two RF switches 37 and 39 in the respective other position, not shown in Figure 3 are brought.
  • the signal generator 43 of the ID transmitter 21 has previously been switched on, so that a constant RF carrier is available for transmission.
  • the frequency of the RF carrier, generated by the signal generator 43 corresponds to that of the signal generator 23 of the base station 20.
  • the code signal - namely 2048 oscillations of the carrier - is now sent back by the ID transmitter 21 starting at time t 3 .
  • the start of the return of the code signal is received by the base station 20 at time t 4 .
  • the base station 20 in the receive mode passes the returned code signal to the counter circuit 27 so that the number of oscillations returned can be counted in the counter 29.
  • counter 28 has counted twice the number of vibrations corresponding to the code signal, namely 4096.
  • the counter reading of the counter 29 is stopped and the microcontroller 30 reads out which counter reading is only at 2042, for example.
  • the returned code signal has not yet been completely received. This "premature" stopping of the counter 29 serves to compensate for possible undetected vibrations in the communication between the ID transmitter 21 and the base station 20.
  • the difference between the number of oscillations provided for the code signal (here: 2048) and the number of oscillations (here: 2042) determined by the counter 29 corresponds to the signal transit time from the base station 20 to the ID transmitter 21 and back.
  • the ID transmitter 21 is again switched to its receive mode. Now it is possible to repeat the distance determination or to continue the query log.
  • the resolution with respect to the distance between the base station and the ID transmitter can be determined with an accuracy that is higher as a distance determination only by detecting the simple signal transit time. This accuracy can also be increased by the distance determination not only once, but repeated several times, also at different points within a transmission protocol, is made. The actual distance is determined then, for example, by averaging the individual distances determined.
  • a keyless entry control device 47 comprises a base station B with a transceiver 48.
  • the keyless one Access authorization control device 47 is used to check the Authorization to access a motor vehicle; therefore base station B arranged in a vehicle.
  • the access authorization control device 47 is also assigned a mobile ID transmitter ID, which is provided by a person authorized to use the motor vehicle is carried.
  • the transceiver 48 includes a transceiver 49 for transmission a question signal on a high-frequency radio link and one or several transmitters 50 for transmitting the low-frequency radio signal.
  • the transceiver 49 is connected to a processor 51, which the Transceiver 49 controls transceiver activity.
  • a phase comparator 52 At the exit of the Transceivers 49 is connected to a phase comparator 52 further input is connected to the low-frequency reference 53.
  • the output of the PLL circuit 52 acts on an input of the Processor 51. To implement the method according to the invention however, it is sufficient to use a receiver instead of the transceiver 49.
  • the ID transmitter ID essentially consists of a processor 54 and a transceiver 55 to which an LF antenna 56 is connected is.
  • a question signal is sent cyclically on an NF line.
  • the transmission power for sending this signal is designed so that this Signal from the ID transmitter ID within a radius of about 3 meters around the motor vehicle 57 can be received around.
  • the ID transmitter is located ID in the reception area of this LF interrogation signal is given by this signal woken up and switched to its operational state. Is the ID transmitter ID ready for operation, it sends a response data telegram on an HF link in ASK mode (amplitude shift keying mode). On a predetermined position within this data telegram changes the type of modulation of the ID transmitter from the ASK modulation to one pure amplitude modulation.
  • the amplitude modulation for transmission of the response signal used carrier wave is carried out with that of on the LF link received from the ID transmitter ID query signal.
  • this amplitude-modulated response signal is agreed and can between the base station B and the ID transmitter ID to increase operational safety according to a certain algorithm be changed. Is this amplitude modulated carrier wave for the predetermined period of time has been sent by the ID transmitter ID, changes its operating mode back to the one intended for data transmission ASK modulation. From this basic representation it becomes clear that with the operation of the access authorization control device 47 full duplex operation is temporarily implemented.
  • the response signal sent by the ID transmitter ID is sent by the transceiver 49 received the base station B.
  • the analog part of the received Data telegram namely the amplitude-modulated component acts on the PLL circuit 57 and is in terms of its phase position with the phase position of the question signal originally sent compared.
  • the ID transmitter ID is within the intended Both phase positions are operating range by the phase comparator 52 within a predetermined tolerance as constant to each other can be recognized if no further relay stations are connected are. It is clear that this method is a comparison of the phase positions in a relative way without determining the respective absolute Phasing takes place.
  • the NF oscillator 53 is in the embodiment shown in Figure 6 cantilever operated so that its natural frequency fluctuations accordingly also in the demodulated response signal find. This measure ensures the operational security of the access authorization control device 47 against manipulation further increased.
  • FIG. 8 Another access authorization control device 58 is schematized shown in Figure 8 in a block diagram.
  • the base station B this access authorization control device 58 essentially exists from a transceiver 59, a modulation unit 60 for providing a frequency mixture for modulating a carrier wave a question signal and a phase comparator 61 for corresponding filters of a modulated with the modulation mixture Carrier wave on a reply link.
  • the transceiver 59 comprises an RF transmitter 62 for transmitting one with a modulation mixture modulated carrier wave, a transceiver 64, the transmitter 62 and the transceiver 64 via a combiner network 65 to one common transceiver antenna 66 are connected. Furthermore is a reference 63 is assigned to the transceiver 59.
  • a demodulator 67 is also connected to the phase comparator 61.
  • a processor 68 is provided in transmitter 62.
  • a mobile ID transmitter ID belongs to the access authorization control device 58 and is authorized by one to use the motor vehicle Person carried.
  • the ID transmitter essentially consists of a Processor 69, a transceiver 70, a demodulator 71, a combiner network 72 and a transceiver antenna 73.
  • the transceiver antenna 73 can from the transceiver 59 of the base station B received question signals and received by the demodulator 26 can be demodulated.
  • the demodulator 71 is on the output side connected to an input of the transceiver 70 so that the demodulated Question signal can be used to modulate the response signal can.
  • a frequency mixture is provided with the modulation unit 60, with which a carrier wave is modulated to transmit a question signal.
  • the Modulation frequency mix consists of a basic frequency and several further frequency components, each divided by two components are the fundamental frequency. Such is shown in a diagram in FIG. 9a Representing the mixed frequency representing the question signal. The variation the amplitude profile of this frequency mixture is in Figure 9b shown.
  • the ID transmitter ID is in one predetermined distance from the motor vehicle, this signal is received and demodulated by means of the demodulator 71.
  • the response signal returned of the ID transmitter ID is done by modulating a carrier wave of, for example, 868 MHz in the transceiver 70 with the demodulated one Question signal and thus with the originally for modulating the Interrogation signal used frequency mix.
  • This response signal will Sent on the ID transmitter side and received by the transceiver 59, demodulated and then filtered in the phase comparator 61.
  • a diode detector is provided as demodulator 67.
  • the corner frequencies correspond to the filters contained in the phase comparator 61 the fundamental frequency and the other frequency components.
  • ID transmitter ID can be calculated by base station B.
  • Dependent on from the determined distance, which is a direct conclusion on the allows the radio path of the question and answer signal to be covered determine whether the response signal is sent directly by the ID transmitter ID has been received or whether the receipt of a response signal with interposition an unauthorized extension of the route has taken place.
  • the distance measurement can also to make it easier to find a motor vehicle, which, for example parked in a parking garage.
  • the ID transmitter ID triggered the sending of the question signal by the base station B. become. Accordingly, a user could be shown whether he is approaching his motor vehicle or whether he is moving away from it.
  • a not shown Motor vehicle is a transceiver 74 of the base station assigned to perform keyless entry control is provided.
  • the transceiver 74 exists essentially of a processor 75, a transceiver 76 which is intended for data communication with a mobile ID transmitter, a combiner network 77 and one connected to this network 77 Transceiver antenna 78.
  • Data communication with the ID transmitter takes place, for example, at 868 MHz.
  • This data communication contains question-and-answer dialogues, which depend on a received response code from the ID provider the authorization of person carrying this ID transmitter to open the motor vehicle derives. It is only to carry out the method according to the invention necessary that the base station instead of that shown in the figures Transceivers 76 a receiver for receiving the from the ID transmitter sent response signal is assigned.
  • the transceiver 74 further includes one shown in the Embodiment at 433 MHz transmitter 79.
  • the output of the transmitter 79 also acts on the combiner network 77, see above that both the transceiver 76 and the transmitter 79 die Transceiver antenna 78 is used.
  • the transmitter 79 is used Sending a linear frequency-modulated carrier wave as a query signal with after receiving it as a response signal to the distance of this Question signal returning ID transmitter can be closed.
  • An FM demodulator 80 is also connected to the combiner network 77, with that received via the transceiver antenna 78 frequency-modulated response signal is demodulated. Is on the output side the demodulator 80 connected to the processor 75, so that by processor 75 compares the received demodulated response signal possible with the previously sent modulated question signal is.
  • An ID transmitter comprises - as shown in FIG. 11 a processor 81 and one provided for data communication Transceiver 82.
  • the transceiver 82 is on the output side to the input a combiner network 83 connected to which network 83 also a transceiver antenna 85 is connected.
  • An FM demodulator 84 is also on the output side of the network 83 connected to demodulate one from the transceiver 74 transmitted question signal is provided. On the output side FM demodulator 84 is at an input of transceiver 82 connected. The purpose of this is that the FM demodulator 84 demodulated query signal immediately for modulation of the transceiver 82 is used. The one returned by the ID transmitter The response signal is then part of the data communication that is taking place anyway.
  • This question signal is sent when the ID transmitter is in a certain Distance to the transceiver 74 is received, demodulated and for modulating the transceiver 82 of the ID transmitter used.
  • the one sent back by the ID transmitter on the 868 MHz link Response signal is received by the transceiver 74 and demodulated in the demodulator 80.
  • a linear frequency-modulated carrier wave is reproduced as a question signal in a diagram in FIG. 12 (modulation curve shown as a solid line), the time axis being plotted on the x-axis and the frequency being plotted on the y-axis.
  • the maximum (f o + f HUBmax ) and the minimum (f o - f HUBmax ) of this frequency curve represent the frequency swing used to modulate the carrier wave (f 0 ).
  • the line that is mirrored by the ID transmitter and by the transceiver unit is dashed 74 received and demodulated response signal is plotted with the corresponding time offset reflecting the radio path covered.
  • a comparison of the function values of the carrier frequency curve of the question signal with that of the answer signal at a time t 0 can be carried out by subtracting the amounts of the two function values or by subtracting the two squared function values.
  • Such a comparison step can be implemented by the processor 75 with little effort on the hardware side or also on the software side. If the difference frequency ( ⁇ f) determined in this way exceeds a certain dimension, this means that the radio path covered (transceiver unit 74 - ID transmitter - transceiver unit 74) is larger than a predetermined functional range, for example with 5-10 meters around the transceiver 74. The ID transmitter is therefore not in the vicinity of the motor vehicle; the radio link is obviously manipulatively extended. In this case, access authorization is denied. If the difference frequency ( ⁇ f) is within the tolerated interval, the ID transmitter is considered to be in the functional area and the desired action is triggered accordingly - the motor vehicle doors are unlocked.
  • the resolution of this procedure with regard to the radio path covered is determined by the choice of the modulation frequency or by the frequency deviation certainly.
  • the modulation frequency that the measured values are avoided at regular intervals Repeat (every 360 °).
  • the lowest frequency is a measure of that consider the maximum distance to be measured; the highest frequency in the frequency mix determines the resolution of the system.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
  • Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)
EP99944439A 1998-09-01 1999-08-19 Verfahren zum durchführen einer schlüssellosen zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung Expired - Lifetime EP1109981B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (7)

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DE19839695 1998-09-01
DE1998139695 DE19839695C1 (de) 1998-09-01 1998-09-01 Verfahren zum Durchführen einer schlüssellosen Zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose Zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung
DE1998139696 DE19839696C2 (de) 1998-09-01 1998-09-01 Verfahren zum Durchführen einer schlüssellosen Zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose Zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung
DE19839696 1998-09-01
DE19926234 1999-06-10
DE1999126234 DE19926234A1 (de) 1999-06-10 1999-06-10 Verfahren zum Durchführen einer schlüssellosen Zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose Zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung
PCT/EP1999/006072 WO2000012848A1 (de) 1998-09-01 1999-08-19 Verfahren zum durchführen einer schlüssellosen zugangsberechtigungskontrolle sowie schlüssellose zugangsberechtigungskontrolleinrichtung

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EP1109981A1 EP1109981A1 (de) 2001-06-27
EP1109981B1 true EP1109981B1 (de) 2003-07-30

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DE (1) DE59906447D1 (es)
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DE59906447D1 (de) 2003-09-04
BR9913440A (pt) 2001-10-02
BR9913440B1 (pt) 2008-11-18
AU5737299A (en) 2000-03-21
WO2000012848A1 (de) 2000-03-09
JP2002523833A (ja) 2002-07-30
US6803851B1 (en) 2004-10-12
EP1109981A1 (de) 2001-06-27
ES2203174T3 (es) 2004-04-01

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