EP1031420A1 - Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus sûreté-appropriés aux machines - Google Patents
Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus sûreté-appropriés aux machines Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1031420A1 EP1031420A1 EP99103804A EP99103804A EP1031420A1 EP 1031420 A1 EP1031420 A1 EP 1031420A1 EP 99103804 A EP99103804 A EP 99103804A EP 99103804 A EP99103804 A EP 99103804A EP 1031420 A1 EP1031420 A1 EP 1031420A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- safety
- input
- output device
- security
- monitoring
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
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Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B41—PRINTING; LINING MACHINES; TYPEWRITERS; STAMPS
- B41F—PRINTING MACHINES OR PRESSES
- B41F33/00—Indicating, counting, warning, control or safety devices
- B41F33/0009—Central control units
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B41—PRINTING; LINING MACHINES; TYPEWRITERS; STAMPS
- B41F—PRINTING MACHINES OR PRESSES
- B41F33/00—Indicating, counting, warning, control or safety devices
- B41F33/0018—Protection means against injury to the operator
Definitions
- the main drive of the machine is also made up of two redundant systems monitored and in the event of a mismatch between safety-relevant states the drive is switched off.
- the redundant structure includes two computers, one of which controls the main drive and the other the actual machine control. If the main main drive computer fails the computer for the machine control takes over the control function of the Drive computer and leads the main drive to a standstill in a controlled manner.
- various protective contacts, emergency stop buttons ect. read, the one hand indirectly via an input card to the drive computer and redundant to this via direct pin inputs on the drive computer as well Drive computer supplied.
- the actual values of the main drive element read in via two separate incremental encoders, one of which is directly on the motor and the other on a rotating part of the printing press, for example on Plate cylinder is attached.
- the signals from the first incremental encoder on the motor are fed to the drive computer via separate signal lines and the signals of the Incremental encoder on the plate cylinder also via separate signal lines Drive computer, as well as the computer for the machine control.
- a disadvantage of the prior art according to DE 195 29 430 A1 is that in addition to the Monitoring of the drives no further monitoring for other security-relevant processes are taken into account. That means that none can Safety-relevant inputs read in and no redundant safety outputs be set.
- the object of the invention is to be seen in to create a more cost effective solution that extends safety-related functions is possible without additional cables.
- the object of the invention is that, by simplifying at the same time the BG prescribed conditions are met.
- the advantage of the invention is that the import of those relevant for security States does not take place centrally at a point that can be reached by means of a line, but instead decentralized directly at the point at which the state is created or changed.
- the means a bus system installed for the transmission of these status signals laid along the press and connecting several security devices installed on site Input / output devices with one or more, for a safety-critical Area of responsible safety monitoring controls.
- the connection to that Bus system takes place in the shortest possible way from the location to which the safety-relevant State is read.
- a simple extension to additional monitoring further safety-relevant states is possible in that each as modular safety monitoring controls and Security reading device can be connected anywhere on the bus system.
- the safety input / output devices are installed, for example, on site where there are emergency stop buttons or so-called limit switches of a protective device. Furthermore, the security reading device also queries analog signals such as For example, the temperature of a dryer, which when a Maximum value can cause a shutdown.
- the security The input / output device reads the status of the emergency stop button, limit switch or Temperature sensor and transmits this to a via bus system Security monitoring control.
- the security monitoring controller is for example attached to a drive element on site which is a continuous or discontinuous safety-critical movement. That is why the movement is safety-critical because an operator can get into the danger area. There is also one between the drive element and the safety monitoring control Safety input / output device switched, which the safety-relevant signals of the drive element and notifies the safety monitoring control.
- the safety input / output device and the safety monitoring control can in this case be integrated into one unit.
- the safety input / output device places its read-in state on the bus system, as a result of which all safety monitoring controls located on the bus system have access to the reported message. This process is called broadcast. It decides for itself whether a safety monitoring controller is interested in the reported message. This means that the message is ignored if the reported safety-critical state is not relevant for the drive monitored by the safety monitoring controller. However, appropriate measures are taken if the reported safety-critical drive is relevant for the drive monitored by the safety monitoring control. Thus, depending on their responsibility, each safety monitoring controller only takes over the essential. The targeted evaluation or utilization of only the important messages relieves Ballast's security system because only the necessary messages are processed.
- the above Emergency stop buttons and limit switches are doubled for redundancy Contacts equipped one of which through the safety input / output device and the other is read in via a separate operational input / output device becomes. But it is also possible to have both contacts with the same security Read input / output device, but via separate inputs.
- the operational The intended input / output device reports its message to the actual one Operational control that performs the corresponding functions. In the event that the Safety input / output device reads in both contacts, it becomes operational intended operation also carried out by the operational control. The This does not leave the security concept, it is simply read in by the same hardware means made.
- the security monitoring control on the Message of the security input / output direction has access, determines the permitted operating states and only becomes active if there is a faulty state.
- the redundancy is double Execution of the contacts of the respective switches and buttons and the double Execution of the input / output devices ("normal" input / output device and Safety input / output device).
- On the drive itself in addition to the encoder Motor, either an additional encoder is attached or the encoder on the motor is considered secure, which is then provided with a redundant evaluation. In any case The drive control and the Security monitoring control supplied.
- Safety monitoring control is the operational control as a monitoring body allocated. If the operational control fails or there is a malfunction, all safety-related functions through the safety monitoring control led into a safe state. This is possible because both Operation control, as well as the safety monitoring control via the safety-relevant operating states have the same information.
- the term "same Information" applies as long as the redundant monitoring of the safety-relevant Operating conditions provides identical results. If this is not the case, the Security monitoring control in place. Whether there is a match of the information in the operational control and the safety monitoring control, is by means of a consistency check checked. This check can be done in the operational control or in the Security monitoring control take place. If the various controls on separate bus systems connected via bus couplers, the Consistency check is also made in the bus coupler. The consistency check brings the advantage that a restart of the machine after a faulty Condition is only possible when the error has been rectified.
- Normal operation is always carried out by the actual operating control. Normal operation is when the safety monitoring control system does not detect a faulty operating control state. If there is a faulty state, the safety monitoring control intervenes and guides the actuator / drive element into the safe state in accordance with the specifications.
- the bus system does not have to be constructed redundantly, rather it is necessary that a failure of the bus system is reliably recognized. Since the safety monitoring control is directly assigned to the drive and if the bus system fails, a routine stored in the safety monitoring control leads the drive to the safe state. The same applies to the safety input / output device. If this detects a failure of the bus system, measures are also taken that bring about a safe state of the actuating elements to be controlled. These measures are also stored on the safety input / output device.
- a bus system in the transmission speed is impaired if a large number of participants are connected or if the distance that a bus system covers is very long, for example for the Safety route and the operating route separate bus systems are provided.
- one bus system is coupled to the other by means of a Bus coupling carried out.
- several bus systems to be provided by one Bus coupling can be connected. That a bus system regarding the Transmission speed is not affected, is avoided in the design. But there is also an impairment of the transmission speed of the bus system recognized and the machine brought into the safe state.
- Another variant of the invention provides for different operating states Machine to define different monitoring criteria. Will a machine at open protective grille in a creep speed that differs from the actual operating case operated, other safety requirements are imposed by the operator be defined by appropriate entries. For example, pressing a separate switch or button can initiate this creep speed. Because of this Creep speed is safety-relevant and the open protective grille from the safety Input / output device is recognized, there is a corresponding message Safety monitoring control is available. The In contrast to normal operation, safety monitoring control can now in which an open protective grille would lead to the machine coming to a standstill, also with open protective grille allow a maximum speed of the drive element. The means to release the drive for operation. Different Monitoring criteria can continue to relate to monitoring the angular position, the acceleration, the torque or something else. Thus, the Different safety regulations assigned to different operating modes become.
- this security input / output device has a universal structure with several possibly freely definable inputs and outputs, this facility can also do so used to manage non-safety related inputs or outputs.
- the safety input / output device has a double function. Not least Because of the above: double function, the system can be used as a redundancy to save effort be designated.
- the freely configurable inputs / outputs of the safety input / output device offer the advantage that they can be manufactured as modules in large numbers and are therefore inexpensive.
- An additional advantage of standardization is that the service technician only a small number of variants must be observed on site that this means a faster Exchange can be made and the availability of the machine quickly is restored.
- a safety input / output device is also conceivable a component that is used less or for different operating modes remove and replace with a defective one.
- the configuration of the module could through software import from the machine's operating computer respectively. In order to meet the regulations of the professional association, would be with this process requires a final safety acceptance, for example can look like that if the security is not configured correctly Input / output devices prevent the machine from starting.
- a machine not only from one Component consists, but as usual in the printing industry from a printing press which carries out the imaging of paper and one following this machine located further processing machine, for example from a folder.
- both components can have separate control units form, which, however, are to be regarded as uniform in the security concept.
- the respective separate bus systems are interconnected by a bus coupler to connect, so that the security-related messages from the security Input / output devices all connected to the two bus systems Security monitoring controls are accessible.
- the procedure regarding the handling of the message is identical to the type described at the beginning. Of course, a coupling of several bus systems is also conceivable.
- the operating control 1 for a number of drive and actuating processes a machine, not shown, preferably printing machine.
- This Operating control 1 is by means of bus system 2 with a number of Input / output devices 3, with security input / output devices 4, with a Drive control 5 and a safety monitoring control 6 connected.
- the task of operational control 1 is to coordinate the various Drives 7, which are the main drive of the machine, auxiliary drives for various Tasks such as Raising and lowering the stack of paper, driving the ink duct or Similar and also relates to actuators for example for adjusting registers.
- the interaction of Adjusting elements 8 coordinates the reading of switches 9, 10 or the displays 11.
- As Input / output devices serve the input / output devices 3 and Drive control 5.
- the safety-relevant adjustment processes is a safety Assigned input / output device 4, which controls these processes redundantly, or reads.
- the drive 7, which, as already mentioned, is a main drive, an auxiliary drive or also can be an actuator, which in turn can be driven by motors of various technologies ( DC motor, three-phase motor, brushless motor etc.) can be implemented, is put into operation by the drive control 5 by means of the power unit 12.
- the Connection between drive control 5 and power section 12 is bidirectional.
- On the Power section 12 also has the security input / output device 4 bidirectional Access.
- the drive control 5 also exists in each case and the safety input / output device a control option for a brake 15, which is in mechanical wiki connection to the drive 7 and this in an emergency can stop. If the drive controller 5 malfunctions, causing the Drive 7 is operated outside the predetermined speed, engages Safety monitoring device 6 directly towards the power unit 12, interrupts the Power supply for the drive 7 and the brake 15 are applied. The drive 7 is thus led to the safe state.
- the control element 8 which, for example, a pneumatic cylinder for starting and stopping of ink rollers can be activated by an input / output control 3. Redundant for this purpose, access is also provided via a security input / output device. If the safety input / output device brings faulty behavior here the control element 8 in the safe state.
- the switches 9, 10 are safety-relevant because they e.g. trigger an emergency stop, or the Represent the open state of a protective grille. Both status queries are considered Designates safety-relevant inputs, which is why redundant switch contacts 9a, 9b and 10a, 10b are required. These are separated through the Input / output device 3 and the safety input / output device 4 are read.
- the Safety input / output device 4 can be a common one for all applications Facility or be available separately for each application. This is dependent on the number of available inputs / outputs or on the spatial Assignment. If the switches 9, 10 function correctly, the switch contacts 9a, 9b and 10a, 10b each have the same states.
- the operation control 1 can also be used to access inputs or outputs can be operated by the safety input / output device 4.
- This one or Outputs are then defined as ordinary inputs or outputs, that is, they become not considered security relevant.
- the advantage is that free, not used Inputs or outputs on the safety input / output device can be used. These can be used, for example, for the display 16 or similar functions.
- FIG. 2 shows essentially the same arrangement of the safety devices as FIG. 1 but with separate bus systems.
- the bus system 2 for the Connection of the security input / output device 4 and the Safety monitoring device 6 is used while an additional bus system 17 the connection of the actual operating equipment input / output device 3 and Drive control 5 takes over.
- This constellation is advantageous when a high Number of bus participants (3,4,5,6) depends on the bus system or if the Line length of the bus system exceeds a certain length.
- the Bus systems 2, 17 coupled by a bus coupler 18. It can be seen that through the Bus coupler 18 can also be connected to further bus systems 19.
- the Operating control 1 is by a further bus system 20, which for example is a VME bus system can be connected to the bus coupler 18
Landscapes
- Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
- Inking, Control Or Cleaning Of Printing Machines (AREA)
- Operation Control Of Excavators (AREA)
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP04102212.0A EP1454747B1 (fr) | 1999-02-25 | 1999-02-26 | Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19908230 | 1999-02-25 | ||
DE19908230A DE19908230A1 (de) | 1999-02-25 | 1999-02-25 | Vorrichtung zur Überwachung von sicherheitsrelevanten Vorgängen an Maschinen |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP04102212.0A Division EP1454747B1 (fr) | 1999-02-25 | 1999-02-26 | Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1031420A1 true EP1031420A1 (fr) | 2000-08-30 |
EP1031420B1 EP1031420B1 (fr) | 2004-08-11 |
Family
ID=7898878
Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP99103804A Expired - Lifetime EP1031420B1 (fr) | 1999-02-25 | 1999-02-26 | Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus sûreté-appropriés aux machines |
EP04102212.0A Expired - Lifetime EP1454747B1 (fr) | 1999-02-25 | 1999-02-26 | Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines |
Family Applications After (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP04102212.0A Expired - Lifetime EP1454747B1 (fr) | 1999-02-25 | 1999-02-26 | Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US6832121B1 (fr) |
EP (2) | EP1031420B1 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP5052710B2 (fr) |
DE (2) | DE19908230A1 (fr) |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2001053099A1 (fr) * | 2000-01-20 | 2001-07-26 | Man Roland Druckmaschinen Ag | Dispositif de surveillance d'une machine d'impression |
EP1375140A2 (fr) | 2002-06-19 | 2004-01-02 | Koenig & Bauer Aktiengesellschaft | Commande pour machines d'impression rotatives |
WO2009021901A1 (fr) * | 2007-08-16 | 2009-02-19 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Procédé pour déclencher des actions d'une machine par des éléments d'entrée fiables |
DE102008001214A1 (de) | 2008-04-16 | 2009-11-05 | Koenig & Bauer Aktiengesellschaft | Maschineneinheit einer Druckanlage mit mindestens einem von einer Steuereinheit gesteuerten Aktor |
WO2011033027A3 (fr) * | 2009-09-17 | 2011-05-26 | Aeg Power Solutions B.V. | Circuit doté d'une partie onduleur comprenant une unité de commande centrale |
Families Citing this family (20)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2000038909A (ja) | 1998-07-22 | 2000-02-08 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | バルブタイミング可変装置 |
DE19927635B4 (de) * | 1999-06-17 | 2009-10-15 | Phoenix Contact Gmbh & Co. Kg | Sicherheitsbezogenes Automatisierungsbussystem |
WO2004070924A2 (fr) * | 2003-02-10 | 2004-08-19 | Lenze Drive Systems Gmbh | Surveillance de securite sans redondance pour un dispositif d'entrainement electrique (avec capteur de mesure) |
DE102004019284A1 (de) * | 2004-04-21 | 2005-11-10 | Aradex Ag | Vorrichtung zum Betrieb eines Synchronmotors |
DE102005046373B4 (de) * | 2005-09-28 | 2007-12-13 | Siemens Ag | Kommunikationssystem für ein technisches Gerät, insbesondere für ein Kraftfahrzeug |
DE102006011201B4 (de) * | 2006-03-10 | 2011-12-01 | Koenig & Bauer Aktiengesellschaft | Druckmaschine mit mehreren Antriebseinheiten |
DE102006037975A1 (de) * | 2006-08-14 | 2008-02-28 | Siemens Ag | Signalumsetzeinrichtung, Betriebsverfahren für eine Signalumsetzeinrichtung und Erstellverfahren für eine Programmierung für eine Signalumsetzeinrichtung |
DE102006053027A1 (de) * | 2006-11-10 | 2008-05-15 | Man Roland Druckmaschinen Ag | Verfahren zum Betreiben einer Druckmaschine |
CN101204871B (zh) * | 2006-12-23 | 2011-06-29 | 海德堡印刷机械股份公司 | 用于外围设备的基于浏览器的操作界面 |
US8285402B2 (en) * | 2008-07-14 | 2012-10-09 | Ge Intelligent Platforms, Inc. | Method and system for safety monitored terminal block |
AT509310B1 (de) * | 2009-12-16 | 2015-10-15 | Bachmann Gmbh | Verfahren zum betrieb einer speicherprogrammierbaren steuerung (sps) mit dezentraler, autonomer ablaufsteuerung |
US9459619B2 (en) * | 2011-06-29 | 2016-10-04 | Mega Fluid Systems, Inc. | Continuous equipment operation in an automated control environment |
DE102013000889B4 (de) * | 2012-02-10 | 2021-04-15 | Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Ag | Druckmaschinensteuerung mit eigenfehlersicherer Bremsenansteuerung |
US9798302B2 (en) * | 2013-02-27 | 2017-10-24 | Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. | Recognition-based industrial automation control with redundant system input support |
JP5642828B2 (ja) | 2013-03-28 | 2014-12-17 | ファナック株式会社 | 二つの軸を互いに同期させる同期制御装置 |
EP2899708B1 (fr) * | 2014-01-28 | 2017-05-17 | Siemens Schweiz AG | Combinaison de bus pour système de gestion de danger |
DE102018219331A1 (de) | 2018-11-13 | 2020-05-14 | Conti Temic Microelectronic Gmbh | Betreiben eines bürstenlosen Gleichstrommotors |
DE102019213752A1 (de) * | 2019-09-10 | 2021-03-11 | Vitesco Technologies Germany Gmbh | Verfahren zur Steuerung einer Motoreinheit und Motoreinheit zur Durchführung eines solchen Verfahrens |
DE102020118991A1 (de) | 2020-07-17 | 2022-01-20 | Viessmann Werke Gmbh & Co Kg | System zum Steuern eines Elektromotors |
US11774127B2 (en) | 2021-06-15 | 2023-10-03 | Honeywell International Inc. | Building system controller with multiple equipment failsafe modes |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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EP0436818A2 (fr) * | 1990-01-08 | 1991-07-17 | Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft | Système de diagnose pour un dispositif de commande digital |
DE19529430A1 (de) * | 1995-07-06 | 1997-01-16 | Baumueller Nuernberg Gmbh | Elektrisches Antriebssystem und Sicherheitsmodul insbesondere in einer Bogendruckmaschine |
DE19716457A1 (de) * | 1997-04-21 | 1998-10-29 | Baumueller Nuernberg Gmbh | Elektrisches Antriebssystem mit Lagekorrekturantrieben zur Kollisionsvermeidung |
Family Cites Families (11)
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US5086401A (en) * | 1990-05-11 | 1992-02-04 | International Business Machines Corporation | Image-directed robotic system for precise robotic surgery including redundant consistency checking |
DE59004817D1 (de) * | 1990-07-12 | 1994-04-07 | Elektronik Geraetewerk Gmbh | Vorrichtung zur Sicherheitsüberwachung bei Schutzeinrichtungen mit normaler und überhöhter Sicherheit von mehrachsigen Drehbewegungen durchführenden Maschinen. |
DE4225834A1 (de) * | 1992-08-05 | 1994-02-10 | Inter Control Koehler Hermann | Speicherprogrammierbare digitale Steuerungseinrichtung |
DE4312305C5 (de) * | 1993-04-15 | 2004-07-15 | Abb Patent Gmbh | Sicherheitsgerichtete speichergrogrammierbare Steuerung |
DE4433013A1 (de) * | 1994-09-15 | 1996-03-28 | Jochen Bihl | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Steuerung und Aktivierung von miteinander mittels eines Bussystems vernetzten Sensoren und/oder Aktuatoren |
DE19502499A1 (de) * | 1995-01-27 | 1996-08-01 | Pepperl & Fuchs | Bussystem zur Steuerung und Aktivierung von miteinander vernetzten ASI-Slaves, vorzugsweise binäre Sensoren oder Eingangsmodule und/oder Ausgangsmodule oder Aktuatoren eines Aktuator-Sensor-Interface |
DE19540069A1 (de) * | 1995-10-27 | 1997-04-30 | Elan Schaltelemente Gmbh | Anordnung zur Erfassung und/oder Verarbeitung von Signalen elektrischer Bauteile, die sicherheitstechnische Zwecke oder Auflagen für Geräte oder Anlagen erfüllen |
US5880954A (en) * | 1995-12-04 | 1999-03-09 | Thomson; Robert | Continous real time safety-related control system |
DE19606673C1 (de) * | 1996-02-22 | 1997-04-10 | Siemens Ag | Aktuator-Sensor-Interface-System |
US6047222A (en) * | 1996-10-04 | 2000-04-04 | Fisher Controls International, Inc. | Process control network with redundant field devices and buses |
JPH11299291A (ja) * | 1998-04-16 | 1999-10-29 | Sanyo Denki Co Ltd | 多軸モータ制御装置 |
-
1999
- 1999-02-25 DE DE19908230A patent/DE19908230A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 1999-02-26 EP EP99103804A patent/EP1031420B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1999-02-26 DE DE59910196T patent/DE59910196D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1999-02-26 EP EP04102212.0A patent/EP1454747B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1999-09-30 JP JP27891599A patent/JP5052710B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2000
- 2000-01-20 US US09/488,739 patent/US6832121B1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP0436818A2 (fr) * | 1990-01-08 | 1991-07-17 | Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft | Système de diagnose pour un dispositif de commande digital |
DE19529430A1 (de) * | 1995-07-06 | 1997-01-16 | Baumueller Nuernberg Gmbh | Elektrisches Antriebssystem und Sicherheitsmodul insbesondere in einer Bogendruckmaschine |
DE19716457A1 (de) * | 1997-04-21 | 1998-10-29 | Baumueller Nuernberg Gmbh | Elektrisches Antriebssystem mit Lagekorrekturantrieben zur Kollisionsvermeidung |
Cited By (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2001053099A1 (fr) * | 2000-01-20 | 2001-07-26 | Man Roland Druckmaschinen Ag | Dispositif de surveillance d'une machine d'impression |
US6725773B2 (en) | 2000-01-20 | 2004-04-27 | Man Roland Druckmaschinen Ag | Monitoring device for printer |
EP1375140A2 (fr) | 2002-06-19 | 2004-01-02 | Koenig & Bauer Aktiengesellschaft | Commande pour machines d'impression rotatives |
DE10227241A1 (de) * | 2002-06-19 | 2004-01-15 | Koenig & Bauer Ag | Steuerung für Rotationsdruckmaschinen |
EP1375140A3 (fr) * | 2002-06-19 | 2004-06-09 | Koenig & Bauer Aktiengesellschaft | Commande pour machines d'impression rotatives |
WO2009021901A1 (fr) * | 2007-08-16 | 2009-02-19 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Procédé pour déclencher des actions d'une machine par des éléments d'entrée fiables |
DE102008001214A1 (de) | 2008-04-16 | 2009-11-05 | Koenig & Bauer Aktiengesellschaft | Maschineneinheit einer Druckanlage mit mindestens einem von einer Steuereinheit gesteuerten Aktor |
DE102008001214B4 (de) * | 2008-04-16 | 2011-07-14 | KOENIG & BAUER Aktiengesellschaft, 97080 | Maschineneinheit einer Druckanlage mit mindestens einem von einer Steuereinheit gesteuerten Aktor |
WO2011033027A3 (fr) * | 2009-09-17 | 2011-05-26 | Aeg Power Solutions B.V. | Circuit doté d'une partie onduleur comprenant une unité de commande centrale |
US9188970B2 (en) | 2009-09-17 | 2015-11-17 | Aeg Power Solutions B.V. | Circuit assembly having a converter part comprising a central control unit |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1454747A2 (fr) | 2004-09-08 |
EP1454747A3 (fr) | 2007-10-10 |
JP5052710B2 (ja) | 2012-10-17 |
EP1031420B1 (fr) | 2004-08-11 |
JP2000246878A (ja) | 2000-09-12 |
EP1454747B1 (fr) | 2014-04-02 |
DE59910196D1 (de) | 2004-09-16 |
US6832121B1 (en) | 2004-12-14 |
DE19908230A1 (de) | 2000-08-31 |
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