EP1454747B1 - Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines - Google Patents

Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP1454747B1
EP1454747B1 EP04102212.0A EP04102212A EP1454747B1 EP 1454747 B1 EP1454747 B1 EP 1454747B1 EP 04102212 A EP04102212 A EP 04102212A EP 1454747 B1 EP1454747 B1 EP 1454747B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
safety
input
output device
bus system
actuating
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP04102212.0A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1454747A3 (fr
EP1454747A2 (fr
Inventor
Reinhard Janzer
Kai Albrecht
Ulrich Grimm
Michael Pritschow
Georg Roessler
Andreas Wagner
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG
Original Assignee
Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG filed Critical Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG
Publication of EP1454747A2 publication Critical patent/EP1454747A2/fr
Publication of EP1454747A3 publication Critical patent/EP1454747A3/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1454747B1 publication Critical patent/EP1454747B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B41—PRINTING; LINING MACHINES; TYPEWRITERS; STAMPS
    • B41F—PRINTING MACHINES OR PRESSES
    • B41F33/00—Indicating, counting, warning, control or safety devices
    • B41F33/0009—Central control units
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B41—PRINTING; LINING MACHINES; TYPEWRITERS; STAMPS
    • B41F—PRINTING MACHINES OR PRESSES
    • B41F33/00—Indicating, counting, warning, control or safety devices
    • B41F33/0018—Protection means against injury to the operator

Definitions

  • the main drive of the machine is also monitored by two redundant systems and in the event of a mismatch of safety-related conditions is a shutdown of the drive.
  • Redudant structure includes two computers, one of which takes over the control of the main drive and the other the actual machine control. In case of failure of the actual main drive computer takes over the computer for the machine control, the control function of the drive computer and controls the main drive controlled to a standstill.
  • a safety module various protective contacts, emergency stop ect. read in, on the one hand via an input card indirectly to the drive computer and redundantly to direct input to the drive computer as well as the drive computer supplied.
  • the actual values of the main drive element are read in via two separate incremental encoders, one of which is mounted directly on the motor and the other on a rotating part of the printing press, for example on the plate cylinder.
  • the signals of the first incremental encoder on the motor are supplied to the drive computer via separate signal lines and the signals of the incremental encoder on the plate cylinder also via separate signal lines both the drive computer, as well as the computer for the machine control.
  • a disadvantage of this technology is that of all safety-relevant devices each have a line to the actual control modules and an additional line to the central security module must be performed to keep reading the state redundant.
  • This solution is on the one hand consuming and expensive and on the other hand offers only limited expansion options.
  • the expansion options are also associated with high overhead lines and an extension is only as far as possible, as the central security module provides free inputs for reading the security-relevant state.
  • a disadvantage of the prior art according to the DE 195 29 430 A1 is that in addition to the monitoring of the drives no further monitoring for other security-related operations are taken into account. This means that no safety-relevant inputs can be read in and no redundant safety outputs can be set.
  • the object of the invention is to provide a more cost-effective solution with which an extension of safety-related functions is possible without additional cable expense. Furthermore, the object of the invention is that at the same time the prescribed by the BG conditions are met in the simplification.
  • the advantage of the invention is that the read-in of the states relevant for safety does not take place centrally at a location reachable by means of a line, but rather decentrally directly at the point at which the state is generated or changed. That is, a bus system installed for the transmission of these status signals is routed along the press and connects a plurality of field mounted security I / O devices to one or more security monitoring controls responsible for a security critical area. The connection to the bus system is made by the shortest route from the place to which the safety-relevant state is read. A simple extension to the additional monitoring of other safety-related conditions is possible in that each designed as a modular design safety monitoring controls and safety read device can be connected anywhere to the bus system.
  • the safety input / output devices are installed, for example, on site where emergency stop buttons or so-called limit switches of a protective device are located. Furthermore, the safety reading device also interrogates analog signals, for example the temperature of a dryer, which can cause a shutdown when a maximum value is exceeded.
  • the safety input / output device reads in the status states of the emergency stop buttons, limit switches or temperature sensors and transmits these via a bus system to a safety monitoring controller.
  • the safety monitoring control is mounted, for example, on-site to a drive element that performs a continuous or discontinuous safety-critical movement. The movement is safety-critical because an operator can get into the danger zone.
  • a safety input / output device is also connected, which reads in the safety-relevant signals of the drive element and notifies the safety monitoring control.
  • the safety input / output device and the safety monitoring control can in this case be integrated into one unit.
  • the safety input / output device sets its read-in state to the bus system, as a result of which all safety monitoring controls located on the bus system have access to the reported message. This process is called a broadcast. Whether a security monitoring controller is interested in the reported message is decided by itself. That is, the message is ignored if the reported security critical state is not relevant to the drive monitored by the security monitor controller. However, appropriate measures are taken if the reported safety-critical is relevant for the drive monitored by the safety monitoring controller. Thus, depending on their responsibility, each safety monitoring control only takes over the essential. By targeted evaluation, or use of only the important News will relieve the security system of ballast, because only the necessary messages are processed.
  • the o.g. Emergency stop switches and limit switches are equipped with double contacts for redundancy, one of which is read in by the safety input / output device and the other via a separate operational input / output device. But it is also possible to read in both contacts with the same safety input / output device, but via separate inputs.
  • the operationally provided input / output device reports its message to the actual operation control, which executes the corresponding functions. In the event that the safety input / output device reads in both contacts, the operatively provided process is also carried out by the operation control. The security concept is not abandoned by this, it is only made the reading through the same hardware means.
  • the safety monitoring control which has access to the message of the safety input / output direction determines therefrom the permitted operating states and only becomes active when a faulty state is present.
  • a faulty state is present, for example, when a drive is outside the command specification of the operation control.
  • the redundancy lies in the double design of the contacts of the respective switches and buttons and the double execution of the input / output devices ("normal" input / output device and safety input / output device).
  • On the drive itself in addition to the encoder on the motor, either an additional encoder attached or the encoder on the motor is considered safe, which is then provided with a redundant evaluation.
  • the duplicate signals in each case are supplied to the drive control and the safety monitoring control.
  • the security control controller is the operation controller as the supervisory body allocated. If the operation control fails, or if there is a malfunction, all safety-relevant functions are guided by the safety monitoring control in a safe state. This is possible because both the operation control and the safety monitoring control have the same information about the safety-relevant operating states.
  • the term "same information" applies as long as the redundant monitoring of the safety-relevant operating states provides identical results. If this is not the case, the safety monitoring control comes into force. Whether there is a match of the information in the operation control and the security monitoring control is checked by means of a consistency check.
  • This check can take place in the operation control or in the safety monitoring control. If the various controllers are connected to separate bus systems connected by means of bus couplers, the health check can also be carried out in the bus coupler.
  • the consistency check has the advantage that a restart of the machine after a faulty state is only possible if the error is corrected.
  • the bus system does not have to be redundant, it is necessary that a failure of the bus system is reliably detected. Since the safety monitoring control is assigned directly to the drive and in case of failure of the bus system in the Safety monitoring control stored routine leads the drive in the safe state. The same applies to the safety input / output device. If this detects a failure of the bus system, measures are also carried out, which cause a safe state of the actuating elements to be controlled. These measures are also stored on the safety input / output device.
  • a bus system is affected in the transmission speed when a large number of subscribers are connected, or if the distance covering a bus system is very long, that for example provided for the safety path and the operating path separate bus systems.
  • a coupling of one bus system with the other is performed by means of a bus coupling.
  • several bus systems are connected by such a bus coupling. That a bus system is not affected in terms of transmission speed, is avoided in the design. But also an impairment of the transmission speed of the bus system is detected and the machine is in the safe state.
  • a further variant of the invention provides for different monitoring criteria to be defined for different operating states of the machine. If a machine is operated with the grille open in a creep mode deviating from the actual operating situation, other safety requirements are set for this, which are defined by the operator by means of appropriate inputs. For example, pressing a separate switch or button can initiate this creep speed. Since this creep speed is safety-relevant and the opened protective grid is recognized by the safety input / output device, a corresponding message is available to the safety monitoring controller.
  • the safety monitoring control can now, in contrast to the normal operating case, in which an open protective grid would lead to a standstill of the machine, even with the protective grille open a maximum speed of the drive element. That is, grant a release for operation of the drive.
  • Different monitoring criteria may continue to refer to angular position monitoring, acceleration, torque or otherwise. Thus, different safety regulations can be assigned to the different operating modes.
  • the task of operation control is to manage and issue commands.
  • the now monitoring the operation control and the drives safety monitoring control is therefore also associated with the actuator / drive element, because in the case of an error, a down to the safe state can be performed directly on the actuator / drive element, even without commands over the bus system must be sent ,
  • the safety monitoring controller uses redundant signals to set the actuator / drive element in the safe state.
  • the spatial assignment of the safety input / output device is provided similarly. This is also attached directly on site where a reading or an output is made.
  • this safety input / output device has a universal structure with several possibly freely definable inputs / outputs, this device can also be used to manage non-safety-relevant inputs or outputs.
  • the safety input / output device has a dual function. Not least because of the o.g: dual function, the system can be described as an effort-saving redundancy.
  • the freely configurable inputs / outputs of the safety input / output device offer the advantage that they can be manufactured as modules in large quantities and are therefore inexpensive.
  • An additional advantage of standardization is the fact that the service technician on site only has to pay attention to a small number of variants, as a result of which rapid replacement can be carried out and the availability of the machine is quickly restored. It is also conceivable to remove a safety input / output device on a component that is less used or not used for different operating modes and to replace it with a defective one.
  • the configuration of the module could be done by a software input made by the machine's operating computer. To the To meet regulations of the trade association, this process a final safety inspection would be required, for example, can be such that when improper configuration of the safety input / output devices starting the machine is prevented.
  • a machine consists not only of a component, but as usual in the printing industry from a printing machine which undertakes the imaging of paper and a downstream of this machine further processing machine, for example from a folder.
  • both components can form separate control units, but these are to be regarded as uniform in the safety concept.
  • it is provided to connect the respective separate bus systems to one another by means of a bus coupler so that the safety-related messages from the safety input / output devices are accessible to all safety monitoring controllers coupled to the two bus systems.
  • the procedure regarding the handling of the message is identical to the type described above. Of course, a coupling of multiple bus systems is conceivable.
  • Fig. 1 shows an operating control 1 for a number of driving and actuating operations on a machine, not shown, preferably printing press.
  • This operation control 1 is connected by means of bus system 2 with a number of input / output devices 3, with safety input / output devices 4, with a drive control 5 and a safety monitoring control 6.
  • the task of the operation control 1 consists of the coordination of the various drives 7, which relates to the main drive of the machine, auxiliary drives for various tasks such as lifting and lowering the paper stack, driving the ink fountain roller or the like and also actuators, for example, for adjusting registers.
  • the interaction of control elements 8, the reading of switches 9, 10 or the displays 11 are coordinated by the operation control 1.
  • the input / output devices 3 and the drive controller 5 serve as input / output devices.
  • the safety-related adjustment processes are assigned a safety input / output device 4, which controls or reads these processes in a redundant manner.
  • the drive 7 which, as already mentioned, can be a main drive, an auxiliary drive or also an actuator, which in turn can be embodied by motors of various technologies (DC motor, three-phase motor, brushless motor, etc.), is started by the drive control 5 by means of the power section 12 set.
  • the connection between drive control 5 and power unit 12 is bidirectional.
  • On the power unit 12 and the safety input / output device 4 has bidirectional access.
  • On the drive 7 are each an encoder 13, 14 which consists of a transmitter and an evaluation circuit, whereby the position, possibly also the speed of the drive 7 is detected. This information is supplied by both encoders 13,14 on the one hand the drive control 5 and on the other hand, the safety input / output device 4.
  • each of the drive control 5 and the safety input / output device is a possible drive to a brake 15, which is in mechanical Wiktress to the drive 7 and can shut down in an emergency. If a faulty behavior of the drive control 5 occurs, as a result of which the drive 7 is operated outside the predetermined speed, the safety monitoring device 6 directly accesses the power unit 12, interrupts the power supply for the drive 7 and causes the brake 15 to occur. The drive 7 is thus guided in the safe state.
  • the adjusting element 8 which may be, for example, a pneumatic cylinder for turning on and off of ink rollers, is activated by an input / output control 3. Redundant to the access is also provided via a security input / output device. If there is a faulty behavior, the safety input / output device brings the actuator 8 in the safe state.
  • the switches 9, 10 are safety relevant because they are e.g. trigger an emergency stop, or represent the opened state of a protective grid. Both status requests are referred to as security-relevant inputs, which is why redundant switch contacts 9a, 9b and 10a, 10b are required. These are read in a separate way through the input / output device 3 and the safety input / output device 4.
  • the safety input / output device 4 can be present for all applications, a common device or separately for each application. This depends on the number of available inputs / outputs or on the spatial allocation. In faultless operation of the switch 9,10 have the switch contacts 9a, 9b and 10a, 10b respectively the same states.
  • the operating control 1 can also be used to access inputs or outputs which are operated by the safety input / output device 4. These inputs or outputs are then defined as ordinary inputs or outputs, ie they are not considered to be safety-relevant.
  • the advantage is that free, unused inputs or outputs can be used on the safety input / output device. These can be used for display 16 or similar functions, for example.
  • Fig. 2 shows essentially the same arrangement of safety devices as Fig. 1 however, with separate bus systems.
  • the bus system 2 is used for the connection of the safety input / output device 4 and the safety monitoring device 6, while an additional bus system 17 takes over the connection of the actual operating devices input / output device 3 and drive control 5.
  • This constellation is advantageous if a high number of bus subscribers (3, 4, 5, 6) are connected to the bus system or if the line length of the bus system exceeds a certain length.
  • the bus systems 2, 17 are coupled by a bus coupler 18. It can be seen that further bus systems 19 can be connected by the bus coupler 18.
  • the operation control 1 is connected to the bus coupler 18 by a further bus system 20, which may be, for example, a VME bus system.

Landscapes

  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
  • Inking, Control Or Cleaning Of Printing Machines (AREA)
  • Operation Control Of Excavators (AREA)

Claims (8)

  1. Dispositif pour la surveillance de processus importants pour la sécurité sur des éléments d'actionnement/d'entraînement d'une machine, en particulier d'une machine d'impression avec un contrôle de fonctionnement pour un certain nombre d'opérations d'entraînement et de réglage, et au moins une commande de surveillance de sécurité associée à un dispositif d'entrée et de sortie
    caractérisé en ce
    que les signaux des éléments d'actionnement/d'entraînement peuvent être lus par le dispositif d'entrée et de sortie de sécurité (4), qu'il est prévu un système de bus (2) pour transmettre les signaux à la commande de surveillance de sécurité (6),
    et que les éléments d'actionnement / d'entraînement peuvent être amenés d'un entraînement pour la détection d'un état de défaut peuvent être amenés par le dispositif d'entrée et de sortie (4) à un état de sécurité à la détection d'un état défectueux par la commande de surveillance de sécurité et en ce que le dispositif d'entrée et de sortie de sécurité (4) et/ou la commande de surveillance de sécurité (6) est disposée excentrée sur les éléments de réglage/d'entraînement (7, 8, 9, 10) exécutant la procédure de sécurité.
  2. Dispositif selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce
    que le système de bus (2) est conçu comme un bus VME.
  3. Dispositif selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce
    que le système de bus (2) de sécurité relie plusieurs dispositifs de sortie et d'entrée de sécurité (4) avec une ou plusieurs commandes responsables (6) de la surveillance d'un secteur de sécurité critique.
  4. Dispositif selon la revendication 1,
    caractérisé en ce
    que la commande de surveillance de sécurité (6) est conçue comme une construction modulaire.
  5. Processus de surveillance d'opérations pertinentes en termes de sécurité sur des éléments de réglage/entraînement sur une machine, de préférence une machine à imprimer et un système d'entrée et de sortie redondant pour des opérations pertinentes en termes de sécurité
    caractérisé en ce
    que des signaux sont amenés par un dispositif d'entrée et de sortie de sécurité (4) provenant des opérations liées à la sécurité sont lus localement et sont amenés au moyen d'un système de bus (2) d'une commande de surveillance de sécurité(6),
    en ce que lors de la détection d'un état critique pour la sécurité, des mesures correspondantes sont amenées au moyen du système de bus (2) de la commande de surveillance de sécurité (4) et y sont exécutées et en ce que le dispositif d'entrée et de sortie de sécurité (4) et/ou la commande de surveillance de sécurité (6) est disposée décentralisée sur l'élément de réglage/d'entraînement (7, 8, 9, 10) exécutant la procédure de sécurité respectivement pouvant être saisie.
  6. Procédé selon la revendication 5,
    caractérisé en ce
    que le dispositif d'entrée et de sortie de sécurité (4) dépose son état lu sur le système de bus (2) en fonction d'un procédé de diffusion.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 5,
    caractérisé en ce
    que des informations sont envoyées à une cadence définie par les différents utilisateurs du bus (3, 4, 5, 6).
  8. Procédé selon la revendication 7,
    caractérisé en ce
    qu'en cas de défaillance du système de bus (2), une routine stockée dans le dispositif d'entrée et de sortie de sécurité (4) amène à l'état de sécurité.
EP04102212.0A 1999-02-25 1999-02-26 Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines Expired - Lifetime EP1454747B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19908230A DE19908230A1 (de) 1999-02-25 1999-02-25 Vorrichtung zur Überwachung von sicherheitsrelevanten Vorgängen an Maschinen
DE19908230 1999-02-25
EP99103804A EP1031420B1 (fr) 1999-02-25 1999-02-26 Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus sûreté-appropriés aux machines

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP99103804A Division EP1031420B1 (fr) 1999-02-25 1999-02-26 Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus sûreté-appropriés aux machines

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1454747A2 EP1454747A2 (fr) 2004-09-08
EP1454747A3 EP1454747A3 (fr) 2007-10-10
EP1454747B1 true EP1454747B1 (fr) 2014-04-02

Family

ID=7898878

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP04102212.0A Expired - Lifetime EP1454747B1 (fr) 1999-02-25 1999-02-26 Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines
EP99103804A Expired - Lifetime EP1031420B1 (fr) 1999-02-25 1999-02-26 Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus sûreté-appropriés aux machines

Family Applications After (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP99103804A Expired - Lifetime EP1031420B1 (fr) 1999-02-25 1999-02-26 Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus sûreté-appropriés aux machines

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US6832121B1 (fr)
EP (2) EP1454747B1 (fr)
JP (1) JP5052710B2 (fr)
DE (2) DE19908230A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (25)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2000038909A (ja) 1998-07-22 2000-02-08 Mitsubishi Electric Corp バルブタイミング可変装置
DE19927635B4 (de) * 1999-06-17 2009-10-15 Phoenix Contact Gmbh & Co. Kg Sicherheitsbezogenes Automatisierungsbussystem
DE20000919U1 (de) * 2000-01-20 2000-03-09 MAN Roland Druckmaschinen AG, 63075 Offenbach Überwachungseinrichtung für eine Druckmaschine
DE10227241A1 (de) * 2002-06-19 2004-01-15 Koenig & Bauer Ag Steuerung für Rotationsdruckmaschinen
DE112004000326D2 (de) * 2003-02-10 2005-11-24 Lenze Drive Systems Gmbh Sicherheitsüberwachung ohne Redundanz für einen elektrischen Antrieb (mit Messgeber)
DE102004019284A1 (de) * 2004-04-21 2005-11-10 Aradex Ag Vorrichtung zum Betrieb eines Synchronmotors
DE102005046373B4 (de) * 2005-09-28 2007-12-13 Siemens Ag Kommunikationssystem für ein technisches Gerät, insbesondere für ein Kraftfahrzeug
DE102006011201B4 (de) * 2006-03-10 2011-12-01 Koenig & Bauer Aktiengesellschaft Druckmaschine mit mehreren Antriebseinheiten
DE102006037975A1 (de) * 2006-08-14 2008-02-28 Siemens Ag Signalumsetzeinrichtung, Betriebsverfahren für eine Signalumsetzeinrichtung und Erstellverfahren für eine Programmierung für eine Signalumsetzeinrichtung
DE102006053027A1 (de) * 2006-11-10 2008-05-15 Man Roland Druckmaschinen Ag Verfahren zum Betreiben einer Druckmaschine
CN101204871B (zh) * 2006-12-23 2011-06-29 海德堡印刷机械股份公司 用于外围设备的基于浏览器的操作界面
DE102007038722A1 (de) * 2007-08-16 2009-02-26 Siemens Ag Verfahren zum Auslösen von Aktionen einer Maschine durch sichere Eingabeelemente
DE102008001214B4 (de) 2008-04-16 2011-07-14 KOENIG & BAUER Aktiengesellschaft, 97080 Maschineneinheit einer Druckanlage mit mindestens einem von einer Steuereinheit gesteuerten Aktor
US8285402B2 (en) * 2008-07-14 2012-10-09 Ge Intelligent Platforms, Inc. Method and system for safety monitored terminal block
DE102009041632A1 (de) 2009-09-17 2011-03-24 Aeg Power Solutions B.V. Schaltungsanordnung mit einem Umrichterteil umfassend eine zentrale Steuereinheit
AT509310B1 (de) * 2009-12-16 2015-10-15 Bachmann Gmbh Verfahren zum betrieb einer speicherprogrammierbaren steuerung (sps) mit dezentraler, autonomer ablaufsteuerung
US9459619B2 (en) * 2011-06-29 2016-10-04 Mega Fluid Systems, Inc. Continuous equipment operation in an automated control environment
DE102013000889B4 (de) * 2012-02-10 2021-04-15 Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Ag Druckmaschinensteuerung mit eigenfehlersicherer Bremsenansteuerung
US9798302B2 (en) * 2013-02-27 2017-10-24 Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. Recognition-based industrial automation control with redundant system input support
JP5642828B2 (ja) 2013-03-28 2014-12-17 ファナック株式会社 二つの軸を互いに同期させる同期制御装置
EP2899708B1 (fr) * 2014-01-28 2017-05-17 Siemens Schweiz AG Combinaison de bus pour système de gestion de danger
DE102018219331A1 (de) * 2018-11-13 2020-05-14 Conti Temic Microelectronic Gmbh Betreiben eines bürstenlosen Gleichstrommotors
DE102019213752A1 (de) 2019-09-10 2021-03-11 Vitesco Technologies Germany Gmbh Verfahren zur Steuerung einer Motoreinheit und Motoreinheit zur Durchführung eines solchen Verfahrens
DE102020118991A1 (de) 2020-07-17 2022-01-20 Viessmann Werke Gmbh & Co Kg System zum Steuern eines Elektromotors
US11774127B2 (en) 2021-06-15 2023-10-03 Honeywell International Inc. Building system controller with multiple equipment failsafe modes

Family Cites Families (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4000295C2 (de) * 1990-01-08 1994-05-19 Heidelberger Druckmasch Ag Vorrichtung zur Diagnose eines Steuersystems einer Druckmaschine
US5086401A (en) * 1990-05-11 1992-02-04 International Business Machines Corporation Image-directed robotic system for precise robotic surgery including redundant consistency checking
DE59004817D1 (de) * 1990-07-12 1994-04-07 Elektronik Geraetewerk Gmbh Vorrichtung zur Sicherheitsüberwachung bei Schutzeinrichtungen mit normaler und überhöhter Sicherheit von mehrachsigen Drehbewegungen durchführenden Maschinen.
DE4225834A1 (de) * 1992-08-05 1994-02-10 Inter Control Koehler Hermann Speicherprogrammierbare digitale Steuerungseinrichtung
DE4312305C5 (de) * 1993-04-15 2004-07-15 Abb Patent Gmbh Sicherheitsgerichtete speichergrogrammierbare Steuerung
DE4433013A1 (de) * 1994-09-15 1996-03-28 Jochen Bihl Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Steuerung und Aktivierung von miteinander mittels eines Bussystems vernetzten Sensoren und/oder Aktuatoren
DE19502499A1 (de) * 1995-01-27 1996-08-01 Pepperl & Fuchs Bussystem zur Steuerung und Aktivierung von miteinander vernetzten ASI-Slaves, vorzugsweise binäre Sensoren oder Eingangsmodule und/oder Ausgangsmodule oder Aktuatoren eines Aktuator-Sensor-Interface
DE19529430C2 (de) * 1995-07-06 2000-07-13 Baumueller Nuernberg Gmbh Elektrisches Antriebssystem zur Verstellung von mehreren dreh- und/oder verschwenkbaren Funktionsteilen
DE19540069A1 (de) * 1995-10-27 1997-04-30 Elan Schaltelemente Gmbh Anordnung zur Erfassung und/oder Verarbeitung von Signalen elektrischer Bauteile, die sicherheitstechnische Zwecke oder Auflagen für Geräte oder Anlagen erfüllen
US5880954A (en) * 1995-12-04 1999-03-09 Thomson; Robert Continous real time safety-related control system
DE19606673C1 (de) * 1996-02-22 1997-04-10 Siemens Ag Aktuator-Sensor-Interface-System
US6047222A (en) * 1996-10-04 2000-04-04 Fisher Controls International, Inc. Process control network with redundant field devices and buses
DE19716457C2 (de) * 1997-04-21 1999-07-01 Baumueller Nuernberg Gmbh Steuerungsverfahren für ein elektrisches Antriebssystem zum synchronen Verstellen mehrerer bewegbarer Funktionsteile
JPH11299291A (ja) * 1998-04-16 1999-10-29 Sanyo Denki Co Ltd 多軸モータ制御装置

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP1454747A3 (fr) 2007-10-10
EP1454747A2 (fr) 2004-09-08
JP5052710B2 (ja) 2012-10-17
JP2000246878A (ja) 2000-09-12
DE59910196D1 (de) 2004-09-16
EP1031420A1 (fr) 2000-08-30
EP1031420B1 (fr) 2004-08-11
DE19908230A1 (de) 2000-08-31
US6832121B1 (en) 2004-12-14

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP1454747B1 (fr) Dispositif pour la surveillance des processus importants pour la sécurité dans des machines
EP0681715B1 (fr) Commande et regulation d'une porte entrainee par un moteur electromecanique
EP0243728B2 (fr) Système de sécurité pour une machine à imprimer
DE102005014804A1 (de) Bordnetzsystem für ein Kraftfahrzeug sowie Steuergerät und intelligentes Energieversorgungsgerät für ein Bordnetzsystem eines Kraftfahrzeugs
DE19834870A1 (de) Fehlertoleranter elektromechanischer steer-by-wire-Lenksteller
DE19529430C2 (de) Elektrisches Antriebssystem zur Verstellung von mehreren dreh- und/oder verschwenkbaren Funktionsteilen
EP2859226B1 (fr) Système de sécurité pour éolienne
EP1375140B1 (fr) Commande pour machines d'impression rotatives
EP1266147B1 (fr) Systeme fluidique a fonction de securite
EP1040073A1 (fr) Installation de securite pour escaliers et trottoirs roulants
EP1969435B1 (fr) Dispositif pour commander au moins une machine
EP1216912A1 (fr) Dispositif de commande électromécanique tolérant les défauts
EP2099164B1 (fr) Dispositif de sécurité destiné à la commande sécurisée d'actionneurs raccordés
CH692358A5 (de) Steuervorrichtung für eine Produktionsmaschine, insbesondere Spinnereimaschine.
EP2433184B1 (fr) Système de commande permettant de commander un processus
DE102008038131B4 (de) Redundantes Steuerungssystem und Verfahren zur sicherheitsgerichteten Ansteuerung von Aktoren
EP1197418B1 (fr) Pocédé de commande pour un processus à sécurité critique dans le service ferroviaire et dispositif pour mettre en oeuvre ce procédé
EP1252020B1 (fr) Dispositif de surveillance d'une machine d'impression
DE102008008449B4 (de) Elektrische Presse
DE10052046B4 (de) Steuerung für Rotationsdruckmaschinen
DE19732764B4 (de) Übertragungseinrichtung für Steuersignale, insbesondere in Fahrzeugen
DE10344070B4 (de) Antriebsmodul für eine Druckmaschine
EP1692578A1 (fr) Unite peripherique d'un systeme de commande redondant
WO2011113405A1 (fr) Groupement d'appareils de commande
DE102008001214B4 (de) Maschineneinheit einer Druckanlage mit mindestens einem von einer Steuereinheit gesteuerten Aktor

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

AC Divisional application: reference to earlier application

Ref document number: 1031420

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: P

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): BE CH DE FR GB IT LI NL

PUAL Search report despatched

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009013

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A3

Designated state(s): BE CH DE FR GB IT LI NL

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20080206

AKX Designation fees paid

Designated state(s): BE CH DE FR GB IT LI NL

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20130417

GRAP Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1

INTG Intention to grant announced

Effective date: 20130819

RIN1 Information on inventor provided before grant (corrected)

Inventor name: PRITSCHOW, MICHAEL

Inventor name: WAGNER, ANDREAS

Inventor name: GRIMM, ULRICH

Inventor name: ROESSLER, GEORG

Inventor name: ALBRECHT, KAI

Inventor name: JANZER, REINHARD

GRAS Grant fee paid

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3

GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

AC Divisional application: reference to earlier application

Ref document number: 1031420

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: P

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): BE CH DE FR GB IT LI NL

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: NOT ENGLISH

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: EP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R096

Ref document number: 59915404

Country of ref document: DE

Effective date: 20140515

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: NL

Ref legal event code: VDEP

Effective date: 20140402

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: NL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20140402

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R097

Ref document number: 59915404

Country of ref document: DE

PLBE No opposition filed within time limit

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT

26N No opposition filed

Effective date: 20150106

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20140402

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R097

Ref document number: 59915404

Country of ref document: DE

Effective date: 20150106

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: BE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20150228

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: PL

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: LI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20150228

Ref country code: CH

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20150228

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 18

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Payment date: 20160223

Year of fee payment: 18

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 19

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20170228

Year of fee payment: 19

Ref country code: FR

Payment date: 20170221

Year of fee payment: 19

GBPC Gb: european patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee

Effective date: 20170226

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20170226

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R119

Ref document number: 59915404

Country of ref document: DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: ST

Effective date: 20181031

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20180901

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20180228