EP0350082B1 - Sicherheits- und Notfahrverfahren für eine Brennkraftmaschine mit Selbstzündung und Einrichtung zu dessen Durchführung - Google Patents

Sicherheits- und Notfahrverfahren für eine Brennkraftmaschine mit Selbstzündung und Einrichtung zu dessen Durchführung Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0350082B1
EP0350082B1 EP19890116695 EP89116695A EP0350082B1 EP 0350082 B1 EP0350082 B1 EP 0350082B1 EP 19890116695 EP19890116695 EP 19890116695 EP 89116695 A EP89116695 A EP 89116695A EP 0350082 B1 EP0350082 B1 EP 0350082B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signal
speed
controller
control path
control
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP19890116695
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German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0350082A2 (de
EP0350082A3 (en
Inventor
Rainer Dipl.-Ing. Buck
Werner Dipl.-Ing. Fischer
Hermann Dr.-Ing. Kull
Albrecht Dipl.-Ing. Sieber
Wolf Ing.Grad. Wessel
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Robert Bosch GmbH
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Robert Bosch GmbH
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Filing date
Publication date
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Publication of EP0350082A3 publication Critical patent/EP0350082A3/de
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Classifications

    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
    • F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
    • F02D41/2406—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using essentially read only memories
    • F02D41/2425—Particular ways of programming the data
    • F02D41/2429—Methods of calibrating or learning
    • F02D41/2451—Methods of calibrating or learning characterised by what is learned or calibrated
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D11/00—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated
    • F02D11/06—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance
    • F02D11/10—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance of the electric type
    • F02D11/106—Detection of demand or actuation
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D11/00—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated
    • F02D11/06—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance
    • F02D11/10—Arrangements for, or adaptations to, non-automatic engine control initiation means, e.g. operator initiated characterised by non-mechanical control linkages, e.g. fluid control linkages or by control linkages with power drive or assistance of the electric type
    • F02D11/107—Safety-related aspects
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
    • F02D41/30—Controlling fuel injection
    • F02D41/38—Controlling fuel injection of the high pressure type
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
    • F02D41/22—Safety or indicating devices for abnormal conditions
    • F02D2041/224—Diagnosis of the fuel system
    • F02D2041/226—Fail safe control for fuel injection pump
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
    • F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
    • F02D41/2406—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using essentially read only memories
    • F02D41/2425—Particular ways of programming the data
    • F02D41/2429—Methods of calibrating or learning
    • F02D41/2441—Methods of calibrating or learning characterised by the learning conditions
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
    • F02D41/24—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means
    • F02D41/2406—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents characterised by the use of digital means using essentially read only memories
    • F02D41/2425—Particular ways of programming the data
    • F02D41/2429—Methods of calibrating or learning
    • F02D41/2451—Methods of calibrating or learning characterised by what is learned or calibrated
    • F02D41/2474—Characteristics of sensors
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F02—COMBUSTION ENGINES; HOT-GAS OR COMBUSTION-PRODUCT ENGINE PLANTS
    • F02D—CONTROLLING COMBUSTION ENGINES
    • F02D41/00—Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
    • F02D41/30—Controlling fuel injection
    • F02D41/38—Controlling fuel injection of the high pressure type
    • F02D41/40—Controlling fuel injection of the high pressure type with means for controlling injection timing or duration
    • F02D41/406—Electrically controlling a diesel injection pump
    • F02D41/407—Electrically controlling a diesel injection pump of the in-line type

Definitions

  • the invention is based on a method and a device according to the type of the independent claims. It is known to use electrical signal boxes controlled by electrical signals for the electronic control of the operation of self-igniting internal combustion engines (diesel engines), a central control unit generating the necessary control signals instead of mechanical fuel metering and control systems.
  • Electrical fuel metering systems in diesel engines are reliable in terms of their reliability, but they may be less and less able to take into account the multitude of different operating conditions and environmental influences today.
  • EDC electronic diesel control
  • a safety device for an internal combustion engine with auto-ignition it is known (DE-OS 3301742) to continuously determine certain signals relating to the operation of the internal combustion engine, such as accelerator pedal position, calculated setpoint of the control path, speed, brake pedal position and the like. and to create a corrected control path setpoint by selecting the minimum value and feeding it to the controller of the EDC system.
  • This corrected control path setpoint also serves to determine a control path deviation, including a feedback of the control path actual value signal. If the predetermined limits are exceeded, the known safety device either reacts by switching off the injection pump, de-energizing the output stage of the controller or introducing emergency operation. Problems may arise with this known safety device, however, because not all conceivable boundary conditions are included in the detection of the safety conditions. Thus, an idle signal can be obtained by a corresponding idle contact on the accelerator pedal - but this is not valid if, for example, the internal combustion engine is equipped with a cruise control.
  • EDC electronic diesel control
  • the invention solves this problem with the characterizing features of the independent claims and has the advantage that a safety case is reliably recognized in connection with a vehicle speed control and, when a safety case occurs, a control path (the injection pump) that is harmless both for the internal combustion engine and for driving operation. is switched over, sharp torque jumps are avoided in the event of incorrect quantity signals specified by the main computer. It is also advantageous that, even if you have to switch to a minimum characteristic curve of the control path, the automatic start quantity control is enabled at a cold start, for example, and is only reset to the normal minimum control path characteristic after the so-called normal start release speed has been exceeded for the first time (RWmin characteristic).
  • Another advantage of the present invention is that when a faulty setting of the control path is detected, either the control is switched to a second branch in the input of the control, or a second, redundant control is applied at the same time, thereby also protecting defects in the control that is normally present .
  • the switchover to emergency operation can take place either on the basis of separate monitoring of the main computer function by a dedicated monitoring system (watchdog) or by detection of a special redundant idle signal which, in conjunction with a feedback of the actual position of the control rod position (RWist), causes the switchover to the redundant control controller, to which additional, minimum setpoint generating blocks are assigned, which can also be acted upon by their own speed sensor.
  • a dedicated monitoring system watchdog
  • RWist control rod position
  • the internal combustion engine with auto-ignition (diesel engine) is designated 10; it has an intake pipe 11 and an exhaust pipe 12.
  • a fuel injection pump 13 is connected via a pressure line 15 to an injection valve 14, which is shown here schematically as representative of the required quantity of injection valves.
  • the injection valve 14 can comprise an injection initiator 16, which feeds a redundant speed signal to a speed signal detection and processing block 17 via a connecting line 16a indicated by dashed lines, or which conveys this speed signal to further processing blocks.
  • a speed sensor 18 is provided, which detects the speed of the internal combustion engine, for example, via a ring gear 19 driven by its crankshaft, and its output with the speed signal detection block 17 is connected.
  • the manner in which the signals used for the security system according to the invention are obtained is only shown by way of example in FIG. 1 and the subsequent figures; the signals used in each case can also be derived in a different way from the operating states of the internal combustion engine.
  • the block diagrams shown in the drawings which indicate the inventions on the basis of discrete switching stages, do not limit the invention, but rather serve in particular to illustrate the basic functional effects of the invention and to indicate special functional sequences in a possible form of implementation.
  • the block diagram representation of FIG. 1 also shows, in addition to the speed signal N present at the output of the speed detection block 17, further means for signal acquisition.
  • the actual value of the control path RW is, which from the position of the control rod 13a
  • Fuel pump 13 is generated for example via an actual value transmitter or converter for the control path, an accelerator pedal position signal FFG (foot pedal), for example detected by the position of a tap of a potentiometer 22 which is mechanically connected to the foot pedal 21, from which signal also an accelerator pedal idle signal FFG-LL can be derived, but this can also be generated in the same way by an idle contact switch on the foot pedal.
  • FFG foot pedal
  • a brake contactor 24 assigned to the brake pedal 23 is also of importance, which can also operate the brake lights 25 or generates the brake signal separately.
  • a brake contactor can also be part of a pressure switch arranged in the brake cylinder.
  • a central control unit 26 which contains a main computer and further peripheral circuits, is provided for electronic control and guidance of the injection pump 13. As indicated at 27, the control unit 26 is supplied with a large number of external operating signals, circulation signals and setpoints and the main computer contained in the control unit 26 then uses these input values to generate at least one signal for the setpoint of the control path RWsoll, which is supplied to a downstream control controller 27 which has a predetermined control behavior and is usually a so-called PID controller, which controls the actuator 28 via a current controller output stage (not shown in FIG. 1), which moves the control rod 13a into the respectively desired position.
  • a downstream control controller 27 which has a predetermined control behavior and is usually a so-called PID controller, which controls the actuator 28 via a current controller output stage (not shown in FIG. 1), which moves the control rod 13a into the respectively desired position.
  • FIG. 2 A block diagram of the safety and emergency driving device 29 is shown in detail in FIG. 2 and its structure is first explained below. Components of the central control device 26 and the safety and emergency driving device 29 are shown in an interlocking manner in FIG. 2 - the main computer is designated 30, a monitoring function (watchdog) controlling only essential functions of the main computer is designated 30a.
  • a monitoring function watchdog
  • a first speed signal N comes from a normal speed sensor 31, for example formed by a disk 32 with signal markings that rotates synchronously with the internal combustion engine, a sensor 33 that responds to this, a downstream pulse shaper stage 34 to the main computer 30, which receives the speed signal and the input 35 Accelerator pedal signal FFG, usually evaluated with further variables that are not of interest in this context and generates a control path setpoint RWsoll and supplies it to a first control controller 36 via the output line 30b.
  • a current controller 37 connected to the output of the controller 36 (PID controller) directly controls the actuator 38 for the control rod position with its output stage.
  • a feedback actual value of the control path RWist reaches line 39 to the input of the controller 36, whereby the loop is closed for the execution of the normal functions.
  • At least one auxiliary speed sensor or replacement speed sensor 31 ' is provided, which can also be a spray start sensor (SB sensor), the output signal of which can be used as a replacement speed signal if the normal speed sensor 31 fails.
  • SB sensor spray start sensor
  • the starting quantity is output as the setpoint for the interlocking control, but the output is only carried out if a fault in the measurement of the internal resistance of the replacement speed sensor has not been detected by a replacement speed sensor monitoring.
  • a fault detection of the sensor internal resistance only leads to the release of the starting quantity when a predetermined speed threshold is reached, determined from pulses from the normal speed sensor.
  • any other speed sensor 31 ' can be used, for example, as a speed sensor on the starter ring gear.
  • the pulse shaping circuit 34 ' is one Divider circuit 42 connected downstream, which is provided for the safety and emergency driving case and in this respect reduces redundant speed signals to approximately the same frequency as the SB signal.
  • the main computer 30 receives normal and substitute speed signal, but the safety and emergency driving devices are supplied with speed information by the normal speed sensor via the speed processing block 41. It is equally possible to supply the S + N device or part of it with speed information from the replacement speed sensor.
  • FIG. 2 The further safety and emergency driving arrangements of FIG. 2 are explained below in connection with the safety cases that occur in each case and the functions resulting therefrom.
  • the actual value of the control path RWist therefore reaches a comparator 43 via a branch line 39 ', the other input of which supplies an RWmin specification relating to the respective speed from an RWmin characteristic block 44.
  • the output signal of this comparator then represents a first and necessary signal, which is included in this check.
  • EDC electronic diesel control
  • the accelerator pedal is in the LL position and nevertheless the internal combustion engine is supplied with a high injection quantity as required, which corresponds to a large control path RWist.
  • FFG-LL detection that is to say the detection and evaluation of the idle position of the pedestrian, must be prevented in the FGR vehicle speed control.
  • the linkage takes place by means of a linkage circuit 46, which consists of two AND gates 46a, 46b and a downstream OR gate 47.
  • the redundant idle signal LL * results only if there is either no vehicle speed control function (is recognized by the negation at the corresponding input of the AND gate 46b) and at the same time an idle signal FFG-LL is present by the pedestrian the vehicle speed control function is available, but the brake is applied.
  • Such a combination must not occur in normal operation because the FGR function must be eliminated when the brake is actuated.
  • Both signals arrive at the same input via the OR gate 47 as an LL * signal on the one input of a further gate circuit connected downstream, namely an AND gate 48, which then serves together with the redundant idle signal LL * and the check for that If necessary, the comparator 43 supplied RWmin signal to switch over to a control path that is safe for the engine and driver.
  • the AND gate 48 is followed by a delay block 49, which only controls a downstream reaction element for immediate actuation when a predetermined time period T has expired.
  • the reaction element is shown to illustrate the function as a bistable flip-flop 50 with the inputs S / R, but can also be implemented differently in a computer be (e.g. setting a flag).
  • the flip-flop 50 is set at its input S when the security event occurs with consequences to be explained below and is reset at its input R, as can be seen, via an OR gate 51 immediately when the redundant idle signal LL * and moreover when a signal is supplied from a start hysteresis block 52 which indicates a start process, as will be explained below.
  • the limit speed threshold concept is therefore replaced by a speed-dependent control path characteristic for minimum control path RWmin, as indicated in the characteristic block 44 in FIG. 2 and shown in detail in the diagram in FIG. 3.
  • the RWmin curve over the speed is shown in Fig. 3 in solid lines, it should be added that all the functions described in the form of characteristic curves can also be equipped with more or less complex and each and also here a minimum level that is found to be useful is described.
  • the RWmin characteristic curve over the speed consists of three branches a), b) and c), the branch a) being above a threshold speed n limit already mentioned and specifying control paths that are below the zero load quantity requirement of the engine, but above that Control path which is output by the main computer for the idle position of the foot pedal in undisturbed operation; the below the limit rotation Number increasing branch b) allows idling control in emergency driving mode, but is above the idling control characteristic for normal operation, while the third branch c) allows control paths that enable a cold start.
  • this RWmin characteristic curve can jeopardize an automatic start quantity control by the electronic diesel control EDC, which wants to release more start quantity (correspondingly larger control path RW) than the RWmin characteristic curve in FIG. 3 allows during a cold start.
  • this RWmin characteristic curve is provided with a hysteresis for the start case, which is recognized by block 52 in FIG. 2, which can also be responsible for the change in the RWmin curve to be explained below is shown in dashed lines in Fig. 2 as RWmin 'and causes a shift towards higher speeds when switched on for the first time.
  • the diagram in FIG. 3 also has a dash-dot line and I denotes the normal starting quantity curve over the rotational speed.
  • RWmin ′ After exceeding the normal take-off speed for the first time (plus a safety margin), RWmin ′, i.e. from the expanded hysteresis configuration, then resets to the normal RWmin characteristic.
  • the comparator 43 compares the RWmin value taken from the RWmin characteristic with the actual RWist value If an incorrect setting of the control path RW is determined, that is, if RWist is greater than RWmin and the idle condition LL * occurs at the same time, then after the delay time specified by the delay block 49, the flip-flop 50 is set, which via its output FFA and a downstream OR- Link 53 switches the control of the control path to a second branch, which then, when this security event occurs, regulates to the RWmin characteristic curve just described in detail, and at the same time, via return line 54, notifies the main computer 30 of this security event that has occurred.
  • the input of the control regulator 36 can then be switched to the output of the RWmin characteristic curve generation block 44, which is not shown in the drawing in FIG. 2, i.e. you continue to work with the same controller 36 or you can (alternatively) switch to a second redundant controller 36 ', namely by actuating a switch 55 from the output of the flip-flop 50, since in this way defects of the normal controller 36 are secured.
  • Such a switchover via the OR gate 53 is also carried out when it is ascertained, namely via the watchdog 30a monitoring circuit of the main computer 30, that the main computer 30 itself is not operational, that is to say is defective, has a too low voltage or the like. Then watchdog 30a also switches switch 55 via line 56.
  • the safety flip-flop 50 is reset in any case if, as already mentioned, the empty running condition LL * is lifted again, or in order to bring the flip-flop 50 into the defined starting position via the start hysteresis block 52 under starting conditions.
  • the feedback of the switch over the line 54 to the main computer 30 is necessary because the latter itself (if necessary) carries out monitoring for system deviation or to manipulate the main computer 30 in the desired sense, since otherwise this additional redundant switch-off via an additional Actuator (e.g. shut-off valve for the fuel), even the system could shut down altogether.
  • an additional Actuator e.g. shut-off valve for the fuel
  • An additional measure for pure operation via the RWmin characteristic curve is to additionally supply the RWmin characteristic curve generation block via the partial line 57a to the line 57 from the foot transmitter of a pedestrian signal FFG, which, added to the generated RWmin signal, allows any RW position to be regulated , so that an extended emergency drive is possible in a simple manner in the event of a main computer failure or failure of the components affected by the respective security case.
  • a detection switch block 58 is provided for failure of the control transmitter; This detection circuit 58 is therefore additionally supplied with the actual value signal of the control path RWist generated and reported by the control path transmitter.
  • any input signals linked to the actual position of the control path are fed to the detection circuit 58, the control path sensor failure detection then being carried out by a measure known per se Signal range check is carried out. If the control path encoder is found to be defective, then according to a feature of the present invention, the real control path signal RWist (which is, however, no longer applicable) is no longer reported back to the position control (the control controller 36, 36 ') or to the main computer 30, but rather a simulated signal which is generated by switching a switch 59 to an RWist * generation block 60 caused by the detection circuit 58.
  • This simulated signal is derived either from the controller output, as shown in FIG. 2, or from other available variables, for example also the output of the current controller 37 connected downstream of the controller. In this respect, however, the RWist generation block is an observer for the general case Position 38.
  • an overspeed protection circuit 61 which acts directly on the output stage of the current regulator 37 past all blocks and prevents overspeeds.
  • Essential features therefore consist in the fact that, in addition to the redundant speed sensor 31 'or the start of injection sensor, a redundant idle signal LL * is generated, as is an RWmin characteristic curve, which can additionally be displaced by signals from the driving foot sensor for extended emergency operation.
  • the RWmin characteristic curve is supplemented by a start hysteresis function, so that in addition to the extended emergency driving mode, starting processes are still possible.
  • Switching to emergency operation is optional by acting on a reaction element, namely the flip-flop 50 or also via the watchdog directly assigned to the computer when the flip-flop switchover is reported.
  • a redundant control controller is preferably provided, which is controlled by the RWmin characteristic curve generation for the safety case and switchover to emergency operation. Furthermore, by generating a simulated control path signal, an actual value that can be evaluated for emergency operation can be obtained.
  • the actuator behavior can also be checked by including the actuator observer in accordance with the RWist * generation block 60 in the monitoring program.
  • Another problem for general safety and emergency operation in self-igniting internal combustion engines is that the foot pedal can jam or can no longer return to idle position or if the signal evaluation of the accelerator pedal sensor in the control unit is defective or the signal is interpreted incorrectly by the computer; In this case, there is a risk that, even though the driver has taken his foot off the accelerator pedal, that is to say that there is an FFG-LL signal, the accelerator pedal is undesirable.
  • Such unwanted accelerating can be prevented by additionally including a brake signal BS, which is then caused by the normal reaction of the driver, as a redundant safety signal, as also happened in FIG.
  • the safety case should be canceled again if the LL position of the accelerator pedal is detected or the brake is released again, but not For example, if, after a triggered safety case and the conditions "brake applied, FFG ⁇ LL", the speed condition that may still be required is no longer applicable.
  • the evaluation blocks 62 and 63 shown in FIG. 4 are therefore circuit means which can detect a time assignment or a successive occurrence of events and only emit a signal if the conditions indicated in the blocks are met.
  • the safety case corresponding to the assuming high-going signal at an output gate (AND circuit 64) therefore only arises if the signal "accelerator pedal is not in idle position" is supplied to one input, while a signal is sent from the upstream OR gate 65 to the other input either according to condition 2a) or 2b) above.
  • FIG. 6 A further addition to the present invention can finally be seen in the illustration in FIG. 6. This is the possibility, already mentioned above, of arranging a second control regulator or replacement regulator, which is designated by 66 in FIG. 6. As in FIG. 2, the normal regulator bears the reference symbol 36.
  • the safety and emergency driving system in the representation of Figure 2 also has a second and therefore redundant controller 36 '; In this system, however, this can also be optionally provided, since in the event of a safety situation, only the regulating control of the control path to the second one Branch formed from blocks 44 and 52 switches so that the RWmin characteristic continues. This second branch can also be connected to the original actuator.
  • the redundant control controller 66 which is effectively provided in accordance with FIG. 6 increases the availability of the entire system and thus also of the vehicle. The following considerations form the basis for this.
  • the injection quantity is metered via the electromagnetic actuator 38 '(see FIG. 6) with position feedback (position of the control rod RWist encoder) and an actuator 36 in the control unit. If one of these regulators fails, quantity metering can no longer be carried out, so that the vehicle equipped with such an internal combustion engine also stops.
  • the invention here provides a second substitute controller 66 or redundant controller and also provides means which recognize whether the normal actuator 36 is inoperable so that it is possible to switch to the substitute controller 66. It goes without saying that such measures can also be applied to other regulators for other sizes, for example exhaust gas recirculation rate ARF, start of injection or the like.
  • the actual controller (PID) itself, and in extension also assigned subsequent stages including the final stage (current controller 37) can be regarded as belonging to such a control controller. Since, as already mentioned, a control controller generally contains an I component, it can be assumed that the control controller is in good working order, if there is a control deviation, the controller output is at the maximum possible position for correcting the deviation goes, he runs to the stop, the direction of the deviation and the direction of the controller at the stop are mutually assigned. This assignment and the requirement that the controller runs to the stop allow the control controller and possibly subsequent stages to be checked, taking into account the principle that if there is a control deviation and if this control deviation is present, it is possible to determine whether the controller output is correct for a given fixed time at the appropriate stop.
  • the invention provides a comparison device 67, to which the control deviation is fed at input 67a and the controller starting position at input 67b.
  • the control deviation is obtained in the usual way at a summation point 68, to which the control rod setpoint RWsoll is supplied by the main computer and the feedback of the control rod actual value is supplied by the RWist encoder.
  • the comparator switches over to the replacement controller 66 via the switch 69, which can then either continue to work with the previous setpoint (supplied via line 70) or a separate setpoint value derived from this can also be supplied from an emergency driving device via line 71 as RWsetpoint-Not (see block 44, FIG. 2).
  • a failure of the normal setting controller 36 always means a complete switchover to the emergency travel branch in the latter case, which in some circumstances represents a simplification of the logic.
  • the target input of the controller 36 (initially recognized as defective) is switched to a fixed setpoint, likewise from the output of the comparator 67 by actuation of a switching device 72, this fixed setpoint preferably in the Is in the middle of the normal operating range.
  • the comparator 67 continues to monitor the output of the normal controller 36.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Electrical Control Of Air Or Fuel Supplied To Internal-Combustion Engine (AREA)
  • Combined Controls Of Internal Combustion Engines (AREA)
EP19890116695 1985-08-31 1986-07-16 Sicherheits- und Notfahrverfahren für eine Brennkraftmaschine mit Selbstzündung und Einrichtung zu dessen Durchführung Expired - Lifetime EP0350082B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE3531198 1985-08-31
DE19853531198 DE3531198A1 (de) 1985-08-31 1985-08-31 Sicherheits- und notfahrverfahren fuer eine brennkraftmaschine mit selbstzuendung und einrichtung zu dessen durchfuehrung

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP86109719.4 Division 1986-07-16

Publications (3)

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EP0350082A2 EP0350082A2 (de) 1990-01-10
EP0350082A3 EP0350082A3 (en) 1990-04-11
EP0350082B1 true EP0350082B1 (de) 1991-11-13

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EP86109719A Expired - Lifetime EP0213349B1 (de) 1985-08-31 1986-07-16 Sicherheits- und Notfahrverfahren für eine Brennkraftmaschine mit Selbstzündung und Einrichtung zu dessen Durchführung
EP19890116695 Expired - Lifetime EP0350082B1 (de) 1985-08-31 1986-07-16 Sicherheits- und Notfahrverfahren für eine Brennkraftmaschine mit Selbstzündung und Einrichtung zu dessen Durchführung

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EP86109719A Expired - Lifetime EP0213349B1 (de) 1985-08-31 1986-07-16 Sicherheits- und Notfahrverfahren für eine Brennkraftmaschine mit Selbstzündung und Einrichtung zu dessen Durchführung

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US (1) US4791900A (ja)
EP (2) EP0213349B1 (ja)
JP (1) JP2504421B2 (ja)
DE (3) DE3531198A1 (ja)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US4791900A (en) 1988-12-20
JPS6251737A (ja) 1987-03-06
DE3531198A1 (de) 1987-03-12
DE3670344D1 (de) 1990-05-17
DE3682510D1 (de) 1991-12-19
JP2504421B2 (ja) 1996-06-05
EP0350082A2 (de) 1990-01-10
EP0213349A2 (de) 1987-03-11
EP0213349A3 (en) 1988-03-02
EP0213349B1 (de) 1990-04-11
EP0350082A3 (en) 1990-04-11

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