EP0265728A2 - Dispositif électronique de commande à distance application aux installations centralisées de verrouillage pour véhicule automobile - Google Patents

Dispositif électronique de commande à distance application aux installations centralisées de verrouillage pour véhicule automobile Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0265728A2
EP0265728A2 EP87114656A EP87114656A EP0265728A2 EP 0265728 A2 EP0265728 A2 EP 0265728A2 EP 87114656 A EP87114656 A EP 87114656A EP 87114656 A EP87114656 A EP 87114656A EP 0265728 A2 EP0265728 A2 EP 0265728A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
code word
cdw
receiver
code
transmitter
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP87114656A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0265728A3 (fr
Inventor
Herbert Keller
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Wilhelm Ruf KG
Original Assignee
Wilhelm Ruf KG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Wilhelm Ruf KG filed Critical Wilhelm Ruf KG
Publication of EP0265728A2 publication Critical patent/EP0265728A2/fr
Publication of EP0265728A3 publication Critical patent/EP0265728A3/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/0023—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks with encription of the transmittted data signal
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00238—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed
    • G07C2009/00253—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmittted data signal containing a code which is changed dynamically, e.g. variable code - rolling code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means

Definitions

  • the invention relates to an electronic remote control device according to the preamble of claim 1.
  • a remote-controlled central locking system for motor vehicles of the type mentioned above is known, in which the same series of code bits are stored in the transmitter and receiver which represents a number of ordered code words, each of which has several bits.
  • the code bits in the transmitter and receiver are changed by a constant number of bit positions, which corresponds to the length of a code word, switched on. The last word switches back to the first word.
  • it is checked whether the transmitted code word and the current code word pending in the receiver match. If there is a match, the door is opened. With this system, synchronization between transmitter and receiver is absolutely necessary.
  • the known system provides that the transmitter and receiver are synchronized to a defined word again by pressing a special key.
  • code forwarding The security advantage of a constantly changing code (so-called code forwarding) is thus considerably weakened again by the need for synchronization, since the synchronization as a result makes the code forwarding invalid. This becomes particularly clear when considering the limit value. You synchronize with every over wear, you can see that changeable code and synchronization contradict each other.
  • the object of the invention is to improve the generic electronic remote control device in such a way that it offers greater security while requiring little storage space for the ordered amount of code words.
  • the invention also works on the principle of code advancement. However, only very little storage space is required, since the individual code words are continuously determined anew from a single original word, which results in an enormous number of possible combinations. Furthermore, the transmitter and receiver need not be rigidly synchronized in the invention. Rather, the receiver automatically synchronizes itself with the transmitter without the need for external measures by the user. In principle, any "pseudo-random generator" can be used as a predetermined function for the logic operation, provided that the "random sequence" is clearly determined, so that two independent pseudo-random generators generate the same random sequence in a transmitter / receiver pair.
  • the security is further increased. If someone tries to open the lock without authorization using the wrong code, the system switches to increased security. If the probability of finding the correct code word by chance is 1/2 n , then with increased security it becomes 1/2 2n . It should be pointed out that in a sub-combination of claims 1 and 2, the number n (of claim 1) can be zero, with which the increased security of double-word matching is then continuously used.
  • third-party systems for example keys of other car brands that work on the same principle, do not trigger code advancement in the receiver, and also the possibilities of providing several functions that are independent of one another, such as Opening and closing the door, switching additional alarm devices on and off, etc.
  • different key types can also be provided for a transmitter / receiver pair, as is already common with mechanical car door keys. For example, one key only closes the doors, but not the trunk, a second key only closes the trunk but not the doors and a third key closes all the locks.
  • the memory 1 is connected to a circuit 2 which generates a current code word (hereinafter referred to as CDW) from the key code word according to a predetermined logical function, which is stored in a further memory 3.
  • CDW current code word
  • the circuit 2 is implemented by a chain of exclusive OR gates which, according to the method of the generator polynomial or polynomial ring, consists of the key code word alone or the key code word and the previous one CDW generates a new code word.
  • An initial word (key code word) "0110" is stored in a feedback shift register with 4 bit digits.
  • An exclusive-OR gate is connected between the first and the second bit position (seen from the right), which links the current bit positions of the first and second bits with one another and writes the result of the combination into the first bit position, then all Bit positions are shifted one place to the right and the first bit position moves to the fourth bit position.
  • the polynomial ring has 15 different states.
  • the originally saved key code word changes continuously. If you know the logical combination or the formation law of the "sequence", you can determine the next CDW from any CDW. This code can therefore still be easily decrypted. From the table above it can also be seen that from CDW 2 to CDW 5 only one 1 traverses from left to right. If someone unauthorizedly records CDW 2 and CDW 3, it is relatively easy to infer CDW 4 and CDW 5. The code is therefore particularly easy to "crack" at certain execution points of this code advance. Therefore, the invention further provides that the logic operation is only carried out if a certain bit, which acts as a control bit, has a logical 1.
  • this is carried out in such a way that the exclusive OR operation with the corresponding bit position of the CDW is carried out only at the points where the key code word has a logical 1.
  • switches 9 and 10 are connected to the control unit, via which other functions, e.g. Opening or closing a door etc. can be selected. If one of these switches is actuated, only one or more system bits are changed, while the rest of the sequence is carried out unchanged.
  • the light emitted by LED 8 is transmitted in the form of coded light pulses.
  • a pulse-distance modulation can be selected in which the distances between two adjacent light pulses are of different lengths at a logical 1 and a logical 0 (cf. FIG. 4).
  • other known modulation methods can also be used.
  • These light pulses are detected in the receiver (FIG. 1B) by a photo sensor 11, decoded and amplified in a pulse processing unit 12 and then, under the control of a control unit 14, first checked whether the pulse sequence can be a valid CDW in terms of its format . The following are checked, for example: number of bits, minimum length of a pause after the last received bit, match of certain system bits, etc.
  • This check is carried out in a unit 15. If the test result is positive, the CDW received is written into a receive buffer memory 13 (I-buffer). Under the control of the control unit 14, the next CDW is then determined in the same way as at the transmitter and written into a temporary memory 21 (T-buffer). Then the content of the T-buffer 21, that is to say the current code word generated in the receiver and the received word stored in the I-buffer 13, that is to say generated by the transmitter, are compared with one another in a comparator 18. If these two words match, it will reported to the control unit 14, which emits an actuation signal, for example a door opening signal.
  • an actuation signal for example a door opening signal.
  • a memory 19 for the key code word is also provided there, as well as a logical link 20 (here: exclusive OR link).
  • the basic procedure for generating the current CDW in the receiver corresponds to that of the transmitter.
  • the transmitter and receiver switch one code word each time they are pressed. You can also say they run in sync.
  • the control unit 14 triggers a code advance in the receiver, so that the next successive code words are progressively determined there, however at most a predetermined number n, that is to say the code words CDW x to CDW x + n.
  • n a predetermined number
  • CDW x + 1 the received code word
  • the CDW currently determined in the transmitter is only stored in the T-buffer 21.
  • the content of the T buffer 21 is only transferred to the N buffer 17 if there is a match.
  • the received CDW can also be transferred from the I-buffer 13 into the N-buffer 17.
  • the receiver recalculates so-called lost code words, so that the transmitter and receiver synchronize themselves automatically, without synchronization pulses, which can be recorded without authorization, having to travel over the transmission path. The user is not aware of this synchronization.
  • the transmitter has experienced more than n idle operations. No match is found within the n CDWs recalculated by the recipient (CDW x to CDW x + n). According to a further feature of the invention, the receiver then switches to increased security, in which two immediately successive CDWs must match.
  • the lock then has to be opened with a mechanical key, for example, and the CDW received last is transferred from the I-buffer 13 to a further reception memory 16 (X-buffer).
  • the receiver calculates all code options until a match has been found, in extreme cases the full circle of FIG. 2. If one calculates with an average of ten actuations of a car lock per day, only 36500 code increments are carried out in the course of ten years. Compared to the 4.2 ⁇ 109 theoretical code increments for a 32-bit CDW, this is a relatively small number. Even after ten years of operation, the receiver and transmitter will still be relatively close to zero CDW. So that the full circle of FIG.
  • the number n can also be set to "zero". In this case, increased security is always used. It can then also be provided that when the button 6 (FIG. 1A) is pressed once, two successive CDWs are always determined and sent out.
  • both memories 1 and 19 for the key code word are designed as EEPROMs (electrically erasable, programmable memories).
  • EEPROMs electrically erasable, programmable memories
  • the flow chart of FIG. 3 again illustrates the process steps, the corresponding reference numerals of the steps also being entered in FIG. 1B.
  • the current CDW N-buffer 17
  • the current CDW is pushed into the T-buffer 21 in step 22.
  • step 23 whether the system is based on simpler security or higher security. If the focus is on simple security, the content of the T buffer 21 is logically linked to the content of the key memory 19 in step 24, the result being the new CDW that is stored in the T buffer 21.
  • step 25 If, on the other hand, the test in step 25 yields a negative result, a query is made in step 27 as to whether the number of n attempts has already been carried out. If the result is negative, the loop goes back to step 24; if the result is positive, step 28 switches to increased security.
  • step 23 branches to step 29, where it is checked whether the content of the T-buffer 21 matches the content of the I-buffer 13. If this is not the case, a new CDW is determined in step 30, this process being repeated up to m times in accordance with step 31. If these m attempts do not match according to step 29, the content of the I buffer becomes 13 transferred to the X buffer 16. If, on the other hand, the check in step 29 shows a match, then the next CDW is calculated in step 32 and a check is carried out in step 33 to determine whether this new (second) CDW also matches the content of the I buffer 13 transmitted in the second transmission step. If this is the case, the desired function is triggered again and in step 26 the system switches back to simple security and finally the content of the I-buffer 13 is also written into the N-buffer 17.
  • FIG. 3A shows a section of FIG. 3 with the additional variant of resynchronization in the complete code stock. If it is found in step 31 with the higher security that the number of m attempts has expired, then the code advance would be terminated according to the variant in FIG. 3. It would no longer be possible to open the door. According to the variant of FIG. 3A, it is checked in step 35 in this case whether the door is open. If this is not the case, the code advance is canceled again (step 34). If, on the other hand, this is the case, then a check is carried out in step 36 to determine whether the further criterion is met, for example if the ignition is switched on. If this is not the case, the process is terminated again (step 34). If this is the case, the system switches back to step 29. The loop of steps 29, 30, 31, 35, 36 is then continued until a match has been reached. If the pair of transmitters and receivers is working properly, then a synchronous run will certainly be achieved again.
  • Fig. 4 illustrates the transmission format.
  • a pre-pulse is sent out as a so-called wake-up pulse, which the receiver in Willingness to receive.
  • the actual data is then sent out in the form of the code word (FIG. 4a).
  • the data is organized in such a way that eight system bits are sent first and then the actual CDW (Fig. 4b).
  • the logical states "1" and "0" are represented here by a so-called pulse distance modulation.
  • For each bit several individual pulses in which the light-emitting diode 8 is switched on are emitted, specifically as shown in FIGS. 4c and 4d, at the beginning and at the end of a bit, a constant number of pulses, for example 6.
  • the time interval between the Pulse groups at the beginning and end of a bit then determine whether the bit is a logic "1" or a logic "0".
  • the described method of the generator polynomial can be viewed more generally as generating a "pseudo-random sequence". It is clear that all other known methods for generating "pseudo-random sequences" can also be used in the invention, provided that it is ensured that - in the transmitter and receiver - starting from a and the same key code word the same "pseudo-random sequence" is generated. It is also important to ensure that the cycles for the n and m steps are not too long, so that the receiver is not blocked for too long by third-party transmitters, and thus the probability that an unauthorized person with a function generator that plays through all bit combinations, the Door does not open, does not become too small.
  • the receiver is blocked for a predetermined period of a few seconds after each CDW received, which increases the period for playing through all combinations to several years. In the case of resynchronization through the entire code stock (FIG. 3A), however, no artificial time delay should be provided.
  • Code words of almost any length can be provided, the storage space requirement nevertheless remaining within narrow limits.
  • code words In the subject of the prior art, not all code words have to be permanently stored; Even if someone knows the algorithm for determining a new code word and has recorded previous code words without authorization, he cannot determine the next code word because he does not know the key code word. However, he cannot record this without authorization, since it is not transmitted via the "transmission path"; the receiver automatically synchronizes itself with the transmitter without the need for commands that are sent over the transmission path and thus recordable.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
EP87114656A 1986-10-29 1987-10-07 Dispositif électronique de commande à distance application aux installations centralisées de verrouillage pour véhicule automobile Withdrawn EP0265728A3 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE3636822 1986-10-29
DE3636822A DE3636822C2 (de) 1986-10-29 1986-10-29 Elektronische Fernbetätigungseinrichtung, insbesondere für Zentralverriegelungsanlagen von Kraftfahrzeugen

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0265728A2 true EP0265728A2 (fr) 1988-05-04
EP0265728A3 EP0265728A3 (fr) 1989-02-01

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EP87114656A Withdrawn EP0265728A3 (fr) 1986-10-29 1987-10-07 Dispositif électronique de commande à distance application aux installations centralisées de verrouillage pour véhicule automobile

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US (1) US4847614A (fr)
EP (1) EP0265728A3 (fr)
DE (1) DE3636822C2 (fr)

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WO1996007994A1 (fr) * 1994-09-09 1996-03-14 Banksys Procede et agencement pour donner selectivement un acces dans un systeme de securite
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WO1997030424A1 (fr) * 1996-02-15 1997-08-21 Misko, Patrick Procede pour faire autoriser par un serveur l'acces a un service a partir de dispositifs portatifs a microcircuits electroniques du type carte a memoire par exemple
US6393567B1 (en) 1996-02-15 2002-05-21 Elva Sa Method of enabling a server to authorize access to a service from portable devices having electronic microcircuits, e.g. devices of the smart card type
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US6756878B2 (en) 1999-12-16 2004-06-29 Mannesmann Vdo Ag Apparatus for activating and/or deactivating a security device
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US4847614A (en) 1989-07-11
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DE3636822C1 (de) 1987-10-15

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