EP0212046B1 - Système destiné à verrouiller et/ou déverrouiller un dispositif de sécurité - Google Patents

Système destiné à verrouiller et/ou déverrouiller un dispositif de sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0212046B1
EP0212046B1 EP86102629A EP86102629A EP0212046B1 EP 0212046 B1 EP0212046 B1 EP 0212046B1 EP 86102629 A EP86102629 A EP 86102629A EP 86102629 A EP86102629 A EP 86102629A EP 0212046 B1 EP0212046 B1 EP 0212046B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
coded information
algorithm
information
transmitting device
transmitter
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP86102629A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0212046A3 (en
EP0212046A2 (fr
Inventor
Gerhard Rössler
Klaus Rathmann
Ruppert Janofske
Hans-Joachim Schröder
Heinz Allerdist
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Mannesmann VDO AG
Original Assignee
Mannesmann VDO AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
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Application filed by Mannesmann VDO AG filed Critical Mannesmann VDO AG
Publication of EP0212046A2 publication Critical patent/EP0212046A2/fr
Publication of EP0212046A3 publication Critical patent/EP0212046A3/de
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Publication of EP0212046B1 publication Critical patent/EP0212046B1/fr
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/0042—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks the transmitted data signal containing a code which is changed
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00785—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by light

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for locking and / or unlocking a remote-controlled locking device, in particular for motor vehicles, with a transmitting device and a receiving device, each a data storage and comparator at the time of sending and receiving, the receiving device also comprising a switchable signal generator and a transmitter and the Transmitting device also has a receiver and wherein coded information is exchanged, compared and, if they match, a control signal is generated for the locking device.
  • a control device for locking and / or unlocking a security device has therefore already been proposed, in which the receiver has a signal generator for generating further coded information and the further coded information can be stored in the memory of the receiver device and by one Transmitter of the receiver device can be emitted, and that the transmitter device has a receiver for receiving the further coded information and the further coded information can be stored in the memory of the transmitter device.
  • This object is achieved in that when the transmitter device is actuated, the signal generator is switched on and a plurality of further coded information items are generated which, after deletion of the previously stored coded information, are stored in the data memories of the transmitter and receiver device in order to be activated the next time the closing device is actuated Avoid code repetition.
  • the additional security gained with the invention is that, firstly, a large number of codings are provided and that the selection of the coding used from this large number is incomprehensible to an unauthorized person.
  • a large number of codings are provided and that the selection of the coding used from this large number is incomprehensible to an unauthorized person.
  • a transcoding sequence in which it is impossible to infer from a intercepted and decrypted coding to the "valid" coding on the next actuation.
  • the generation and transmission as well as the storage of the further coded information can preferably be switched on by a switch of the receiver device. If the switch is the ignition switch (terminal 15) of the motor vehicle, a completely new coding takes place automatically with each starting process or at a later point in time, which coding is stored both in the receiver and in the transmission device.
  • Several completely independent random numbers can serve as code.
  • an algorithm can also be generated, which is also stored with the random number or numbers in the receiver and in the transmitting device. This increases the number of codes which can be used until the next recoding, without having an excessively large memory in the transmitting device for storing a correspondingly large number of Random numbers is required.
  • the algorithm and the number of its applications can be chosen such that it is impossible to calculate the coding to be used next with the previously recorded coded information before applying a new random number.
  • the determination of the algorithm is made more difficult by the fact that, in the event of an unauthorized recording of the coded information transmitted by the transmitting device, it does not appear whether two coded information items recorded in succession either two by the one-time application of the algorithm Coded information that is different from one another is whether there is two pieces of information that differ due to repeated application of the algorithm (this would be the case if one or more coded information were not recorded) or whether one of the coded information recorded represents a new random number.
  • the storage of a corresponding number of random numbers and / or the derivation of further codes with the aid of an algorithm enables the unlocking and locking process to be carried out many times without the need to generate a new code in the receiver device, that is to say: the code used is changed from one unlocking or locking process to the next even if no recoding takes place. It is thus possible to open and close a motor vehicle several times using a different code, without the ignition switch in between to operate. This is necessary, for example, at campsites if the holiday maker rarely uses his vehicle to drive, but opens and closes the doors several times a day.
  • the algorithm can be designed to be variable in that it is dependent on the applicable random number. This makes it possible, for example, to use a first algorithm for varying the first random number stored after recoding and a second algorithm after the second random number, etc.
  • the transmission of the random number generated for the recoding and the algorithm must be protected against unauthorized recording.
  • the transmission takes place when the ignition key, which is physically combined with the transmission device, is in the ignition lock.
  • the transmission can then take place over a very short distance in the closed motor vehicle, so that an unauthorized reception of the coded information from the outside becomes practically impossible.
  • the random numbers and the algorithm can be transmitted at a point in time which is also determined from random numbers and is therefore not known to third parties. Because a relatively large number of codes are stored after transcoding, the system according to the invention maintains its safe function even if a transcoding which is provided and initiated per se ultimately does not take place, for example because the driver of a vehicle switches the motor vehicle off again before the above-mentioned point in time for transmission of the recoding determined from random numbers has been reached.
  • a microcomputer 3 which is preferably designed as a one-chip computer and to which a quartz crystal 4 is assigned for clock generation.
  • a battery 7 is used for the power supply, which is designed as a button cell to achieve a small size of the device according to FIG. 1.
  • a push button switch 6 is used to switch on the transmission device.
  • An output 8 of the microcomputer 3 leads via an amplifier 9 to a light-emitting diode 10.
  • a receiver 11 formed by a phototransistor is connected via a further amplifier 12 to a coding input 13 of the microcomputer 3. Furthermore, the receiver 11 is also connected to an activation input 14 of the microcomputer 3. This activation input 14 can also be controlled by the switch 6 via a diode 15.
  • the receiver device 2 also has a microcomputer 16 with a quartz crystal 17.
  • the microcomputer 16 is connected to the power source of the motor vehicle (terminal 30) via the connection 18.
  • the connection 19 is connected to the ignition switch (terminal 15) of the motor vehicle, so that the microcomputer 16 is actuated each time the vehicle is started.
  • the inputs 20 of the microcomputer 16 are each assigned to a locking device arranged in a door of the motor vehicle and can be used to actuate the microcomputer 16 by mechanical actuation by means of a key if the normal function of the control device is disturbed.
  • a generator 22 generating a random pulse sequence is connected to a further input 21 of the microcomputer 16.
  • a transmitter 24 formed by a light-emitting diode is connected to an output of the microcomputer 16 via an amplifier 23. Furthermore, in the case of an amplifier 25, a further transmitter 26 formed by a further light-emitting diode is connected to an output of the microcomputer 16.
  • Receiving means 27 formed by a phototransistor are connected to an input of the microcomputer 16 via an amplifier 28.
  • Each of the three inputs 29 of the microcomputer 16 leads to a locking device for the central locking of the motor vehicle and transmits the control signal emitted by the microcomputer 16.
  • the program stored in the microcomputer 3 of the transmitting device is started at 31 (FIG. 3) when the microcomputer 3 receives a corresponding command by actuating the key switch 6.
  • Coded information is then sent out at 33 (with the aid of the light-emitting diode 10 in FIG. 1).
  • the program continues in the receiver device. As long as no information is received, this program goes into a waiting loop via the program part 36.
  • an acknowledgment signal B is transmitted to the transmitting device at 39 via the light-emitting diode 24 (FIG. 2), which signal is received by the phototransistor 11 (FIG. 1).
  • the program of the transmitting device from sending the coded information at 33 via a delay at 40, which determines the duration of the readiness to receive, to a branch 41, at which it is decided, depending on the receipt of an acknowledgment signal, whether a repetition at 42 of the transmitted coded information or at 43 the code is advanced. If no receipt has been received by the sending device, the transmitted code is repeated four times, which is registered in a branch 45. However, if a receipt has been received, then the code is advanced at 43, which is explained in more detail in connection with FIG. 4. In the case of a further branch 44, the program is led to the program part 42 when an acknowledgment signal B has been sent out by the receiver device, which indicates the receipt of the previous code.
  • the receiver device acknowledges unlocking or locking the doors by sending an acknowledgment signal A
  • the branch 44 forwards the program to branch 46, which depends on whether the doors are locked or not. or unlocked.
  • a correspondingly different acoustic signal is triggered at 47 and 48, whereupon the program leads to the end 51 via the point 49 and via a program part 50 which switches off the microcomputer 3.
  • program part 43 or 57 it is first determined whether the next code is to be carried out by using algorithm A or by reading out the next random number Z n from the memory. If k is less than K, the algorithm has not yet been used as often as intended, so that the algorithm is applied at 62 and the index k is subsequently increased by 1 at 63. If, however, k is K, a new random number Z n, 0 is read from the memory with the aid of the program part 64, the index n is increased by 1 at 65 and the index k is set to 0 at 66.
  • the program parts 67 to 71 are addressed when the transmitter device transcodes, in which new random numbers Z 1 to Z N and a new algorithm are determined and transferred to the memory of the transmitter and receiver device.
  • the determined random numbers and the algorithm are stored at 68.
  • the running random number (code) present in the program as a variable is set equal to the first random number, and at 70 and 71 the indices k and n are set to their initial values brought.
  • a further security against an unauthorized determination of the code can be achieved in that the algorithm can be changed.
  • several algorithms can be stored which are used in a predetermined order.
  • the application of the algorithms can also be made dependent on the respective random number. For example, a first algorithm can be applied when a particular bit of the random number is 0, and a second algorithm when this bit is 1.
  • FIG. 5 shows a schematic illustration of an exemplary embodiment of a transmitting device 1, which is accommodated in the grip part 80 of an ignition key 81.
  • the ignition can be switched on in a manner known per se and the engine of the motor vehicle can be started. This generates random numbers and an algorithm in the receiver device (FIG. 2), which are emitted via the light-emitting diode 26 and received by a phototransistor 11 in the transmitter device.
  • the transmission of the further coded information according to the invention can be made even more "bug-proof", for example, by sending it after a random period of time after actuation of the ignition lock.
  • the invention is also not limited to the fact that the transmission of the further coded information is triggered by the actuation of the ignition lock. For example, exceeding a specified speed can trigger the transmission.
  • a system according to the invention can be designed such that the transmission by the user can be triggered deliberately - for example by pressing a key on the key.
  • the second transmitter of the receiver device can possibly be omitted and the first transmitter, for example attached to the vehicle side, can carry out the transmission. The user can then occasionally re-encode if he is safe from unauthorized recording.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Claims (13)

  1. Procédé de verrouillage et de déverrouillage d'un dispositif de fermeture télécommandé, en particulier pour véhicules motorisés, comportant un dispositif émetteur (1) et un dispositif récepteur (2), une mémoire de données et un comparateur de données, respectivement côté émetteur et côté récepteur, étant précisé que le dispositif récepteur (2) présente en outre un générateur de signaux qui peut être mis en circuit et un émetteur et que le dispositif émetteur (1) présente en outre un récepteur et étant précisé que des informations codées sont échangées, comparées et qu'en cas de coïncidence est produit un signal d'excitation pour le dispositif de fermeture, procédé caractérisé par le fait que, lors de la manoeuvre du dispositif émetteur (1), le générateur de signaux est mis en circuit et que sont produites plusieurs autres informations codées qui, après effacement des informations codées précédemment mémorisées, sont mémorisées dans les mémoires de données du dispositif émetteur et du dispositif récepteur (1,2), pour éviter une répétition du code lors de la manoeuvre suivante du dispositif de fermeture.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que les autres informations codées sont formées à partir de nombres aléatoires.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que les autres informations codées sont formées à partir d'un ou plusieurs nombres aléatoires et d'un algorithme de modification du nombre aléatoire ou des nombres aléatoires.
  4. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que l'algorithme est utilisé pour modifier plusieurs fois un nombre aléatoire.
  5. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que l'algorithme est modifié d'un nombre aléatoire à un autre nombre aléatoire.
  6. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que pour le verrouillage du dispositif de fermeture, c'est la même information codée qui est émise par le dispositif émetteur (1) que celle qui avait été précédemment émise pour le déverrouillage.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que, pour le déverrouillage du dispositif de fermeture par le dispositif émetteur (1), une information codée est extraite des autres informations codées mémorisées, émise et mémorisée dans le dispositif émetteur (1) jusqu'à l'extraction suivante.
  8. Procédé selon la revendication 7, caractérisé par le fait que l'extraction des informations codées à émettre cesse jusqu'à ce qu'un signal d'accusé de réception, émis par le dispositif récepteur (2), soit reçu par le dispositif émetteur (1).
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que le dispositif récepteur dispose de deux émetteurs (24,26) dont un premier (24) est prévu pour l'accusé de réception des informations codées reçues par le dispositif émetteur (1) et un second (26), pour l'émission des autres informations codées.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 9, caractérisé par le fait que le second émetteur (26) émet les autres informations codées de façon à en empêcher une saisie non autorisée.
  11. Procédé selon la revendication 3, caractérisé par le fait que l'on choisit le nombre des codes, que l'on dérive respectivement d'un même nombre aléatoire par emploi (multiple) d'un algorithme, plus petit de un, que le nombre de codes dérivés nécessaire pour pouvoir calculer l'algorithme et par le fait que l'on emploie ensuite un autre nombre aléatoire.
  12. Application du procédé selon la revendication 10 sur le dispositif de fermeture d'un véhicule motorisé comportant une serrure d'allumage, caractérisée par le fait que le second émetteur (26) est disposé au voisinage immédiat de la serrure d'allumage (82) et par le fait que les autres informations codées sont produites après manoeuvre de la serrure d'allumage (82) et sont ensuite émises.
  13. Application selon la revendication 12, caractérisée par le fait que les autres informations codées sont émises après un intervalle de temps aléatoire après la manoeuvre de la serrure d'allumage (82).
EP86102629A 1985-08-21 1986-02-28 Système destiné à verrouiller et/ou déverrouiller un dispositif de sécurité Expired - Lifetime EP0212046B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE3529882 1985-08-21
DE19853529882 DE3529882A1 (de) 1985-08-21 1985-08-21 System zum ver- und / oder entriegeln einer sicherheitseinrichtung

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0212046A2 EP0212046A2 (fr) 1987-03-04
EP0212046A3 EP0212046A3 (en) 1988-05-04
EP0212046B1 true EP0212046B1 (fr) 1991-08-21

Family

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EP86102629A Expired - Lifetime EP0212046B1 (fr) 1985-08-21 1986-02-28 Système destiné à verrouiller et/ou déverrouiller un dispositif de sécurité

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US4758835A (fr)
EP (1) EP0212046B1 (fr)
JP (1) JPS6245875A (fr)
DE (2) DE3529882A1 (fr)
ES (1) ES8703565A1 (fr)

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ES553589A0 (es) 1987-02-16
US4758835A (en) 1988-07-19
EP0212046A3 (en) 1988-05-04
ES8703565A1 (es) 1987-02-16
JPS6245875A (ja) 1987-02-27
DE3680971D1 (de) 1991-09-26
DE3529882A1 (de) 1987-02-26
EP0212046A2 (fr) 1987-03-04

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