WO2023231181A1 - 列车运行安全防护方法及系统 - Google Patents

列车运行安全防护方法及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023231181A1
WO2023231181A1 PCT/CN2022/111588 CN2022111588W WO2023231181A1 WO 2023231181 A1 WO2023231181 A1 WO 2023231181A1 CN 2022111588 W CN2022111588 W CN 2022111588W WO 2023231181 A1 WO2023231181 A1 WO 2023231181A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
train
identification number
safety protection
atp
target
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PCT/CN2022/111588
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
郑志敏
刘鲁鹏
赵安安
韩冰倩
耿鹏
朱波
袁重阳
许玲玲
于磊
Original Assignee
中国铁路通信信号股份有限公司
通号城市轨道交通技术有限公司
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Publication of WO2023231181A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023231181A1/zh

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B61L23/08—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for controlling traffic in one direction only
    • B61L23/14—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for controlling traffic in one direction only automatically operated
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/04—Indicating or recording train identities
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/04—Automatic systems, e.g. controlled by train; Change-over to manual control
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/204—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using Communication-based Train Control [CBTC]
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02T—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO TRANSPORTATION
    • Y02T90/00—Enabling technologies or technologies with a potential or indirect contribution to GHG emissions mitigation
    • Y02T90/10—Technologies relating to charging of electric vehicles
    • Y02T90/16—Information or communication technologies improving the operation of electric vehicles

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the technical field of rail transportation, and in particular, to a method and system for safety protection of train operation.
  • the communication-based train control (CBTC) system consists of automatic train protection system (Automatic Train Protection, ATP), automatic train operation system (Automatic Train Operation, ATO), computer interlocking (CI), regional It is composed of Zone Controller (ZC), Automatic Train Supervision (ATS), and Data Communication System (DCS).
  • the CBTC system controls all trains running on the line and provides safety protection for train operations.
  • Each train on the line needs to be configured with ATP.
  • the ATP deployed on different trains needs to be configured with different train identification numbers (Vehicle ID, VID).
  • VID train identification numbers
  • the CBTC system can identify different trains and control them separately.
  • hardware of the same type is allowed to be replaced with each other. However, if the VID does not match the actual train when replacing the hardware, the VID needs to be modified manually and the correctness of the configuration must be ensured manually.
  • the train operation safety protection method and system provided by the present invention are used to solve the above-mentioned problems existing in the prior art.
  • the first train identification number of the first train before going online is calibrated based on the ATP deployed at the head end and tail end of the train.
  • the configuration verification of the train identification number is completed, thereby realizing the safety protection inspection of the train and eliminating manual inaccuracies. Correctly configuring the train identification number brings safety hazards to train operations.
  • a train operation safety protection method provided by the invention includes:
  • the ATP is deployed at the head end and the tail end of the first train
  • the ZC communicates with the ATP deployed at the head end and tail end of each second train.
  • the safety protection inspection of the first train is performed based on the verification result of the first train identification number of the first train before the train is put into operation by the automatic train protection system ATP.
  • the ATP verification result of the first train identification number in the head-end dual series and the tail-end dual series of the first train determine the first train identification number in the head-end dual series and the tail-end dual series. , the target single-ended with the same first train identification number;
  • the first preset requirements include:
  • the train unit number of the target single end is consistent with the real unit number of the train
  • the train group numbers at the beginning and end of the first train are the same;
  • the train numbers at the beginning and end of the first train are inconsistent.
  • a train operation safety protection method provided according to the present invention also includes:
  • an alarm message is generated on the human-machine interface HMI, and emergency braking is applied to the first train until the first train identification number meets the first preset requirement.
  • the first preset requirement is to ease the emergency braking.
  • the safety protection inspection of the second train is carried out based on the verification result of the second train identification number of each second train when the zone controller ZC goes online.
  • the second preset requirements include:
  • the ATP at the head end and tail end of the second train sends the train to the ZC in the opposite direction;
  • the train position envelopes sent by the ATP at the head end and tail end of the second train to the ZC completely overlap or the non-overlapping portion is smaller than the first preset threshold range;
  • the train position sent to the ZC by the ATP at the head end and tail end of the second train is on the same return track.
  • a train operation safety protection method provided according to the present invention also includes:
  • the driving mode of the first target train is downgraded to the restricted manual RM driving mode, and an alarm is generated on the HMI. information.
  • the safety protection inspection of the second train is carried out based on the verification result of the second train identification number of each second train when the zone controller ZC goes online.
  • ,Also includes:
  • the ATP at the head end and the tail end of the second target train have the same second train identification number
  • the third preset requirements include:
  • the running direction of the second target train in the adjacent valid information received by the ZC is opposite;
  • the previous position envelope of the second target train received by the ZC and the current position envelope are on the same return track.
  • a train operation safety protection method provided according to the present invention also includes:
  • the driving mode of the third target train is downgraded to the RM driving mode, and Alarm information is generated on the HMI.
  • the invention also provides a train operation safety protection system, which includes: a first protection module and a second protection module;
  • the first protection module is used to perform safety protection inspection on the first train based on the verification result of the first train identification number of the first train before the automatic train protection system ATP goes online;
  • the second protection module is used to perform safety protection inspection on the second train based on the verification result of the second train identification number of each second train when the zone controller ZC goes online;
  • the ATP is deployed at the head end and the tail end of the first train
  • the ZC communicates with the ATP deployed at the head end and tail end of each second train.
  • the present invention also provides an electronic device, including a processor and a memory storing a computer program.
  • the processor executes the computer program, it implements any of the above-mentioned train operation safety protection methods.
  • the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored.
  • the computer program When executed by a processor, it implements any one of the above-mentioned train operation safety protection methods.
  • the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program.
  • a computer program product which includes a computer program.
  • the computer program When executed by a processor, it implements any one of the above train operation safety protection methods.
  • the train operation safety protection method and system provided by the present invention is based on the verification results of the first train identification number of the first train before the online operation based on the ATP deployed at the head end and the tail end of the train and the online operation based on the ZC communicating with the train.
  • the verification result of the second train identification number of the second train at that time is completed to complete the configuration verification of the train identification number, thereby realizing the safety protection inspection of the train and eliminating the safety of the train operation caused by manual incorrect configuration of the train identification number. Hidden danger.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic flow chart of the train operation safety protection method provided by the present invention.
  • Figure 2 is a schematic structural diagram of the train operation safety protection system provided by the present invention.
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the physical structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic flow chart of the train operation safety protection method provided by the present invention. As shown in Figure 1, the method includes:
  • Step 100 Conduct a safety protection inspection on the first train based on the verification result of the automatic train protection system ATP on the first train identification number of the first train before going online;
  • Step 200 Carry out safety protection inspection on the second train according to the verification result of the second train identification number of each second train when the zone controller ZC goes online;
  • ATP is deployed at the beginning and end of the first train
  • ZC communicates with ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of each second train.
  • execution subject of the above method may be a computer device.
  • the train operation safety protection method provided by the present invention is suitable for trains deploying CBTC systems (for example, the ATP equipment deployed at the head end and tail end all adopt two-passenger
  • the train identification number VID configuration of the train with a two-out-of-two redundant structure is verified to implement safety protection inspection of the train, specifically:
  • VID of ATP contains the following key information:
  • the train unit numbers at the head end and the tail end are the same, and the train unit numbers at the head end and the tail end are different;
  • the train unit numbers at the head and tail ends are consistent with the actual unit numbers of the train.
  • the train identification number VID of the train is verified based on the ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of the train before going online to obtain the verification result, and the safety protection inspection of the train is carried out based on the verification result.
  • the zone controller ZC which communicates with the ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of the train when it is put into operation, verifies the train identification number VID of the train, obtains the verification result, and performs safety protection on the train based on the verification result. examine.
  • the train before going online is called the first train
  • the train before going online is called the second train.
  • the train identification number of the first train is called the first train identification number
  • the train of the second train is called the first train identification number.
  • the identification number is called the second train identification number.
  • the train operation safety protection method provided by the present invention uses the ATP deployed at the head end and the tail end of the train to verify the first train identification number of the first train before going online and the ZC that communicates with the train to verify the first train identification number during online operation.
  • the verification result of the second train identification number of the second train completes the configuration verification of the train identification number, thereby realizing the safety protection inspection of the train and eliminating the safety hazards to train operation caused by manual incorrect configuration of the train identification number.
  • step 100 may specifically include:
  • Step 1001. Based on the ATP verification results of the first train identification number in the first train's head-end dual series and the tail-end dual series, determine the first train identification number in the first train's head-end dual series and tail-end dual series. No. consistent target single-ended;
  • Step 1002 Perform a safety protection check on the first train identification number based on the verification result of whether the first train identification number meets the first preset requirement by the ATP deployed at the target single end;
  • the first preset requirements include:
  • the train unit number of the target single-ended train is consistent with the real unit number of the train
  • the train group numbers at the beginning and end of the first train are the same;
  • the train numbers at the beginning and end of the first train are inconsistent.
  • the above method may also specifically include:
  • an alarm message is generated on the human-machine interface HMI, and emergency braking is applied to the first train until the first train identification number meets the first preset requirement.
  • Emergency braking is applied to the first train until the first train identification number meets the first preset requirement.
  • the safety protection inspection of the first train before going online refers to the detection of the identification number of the first train during the self-inspection of the train, including the following:
  • the first preset requirements are specifically: 1) The train unit number configured at the end is consistent with the train’s real unit number information (the train’s real unit number is obtained by ATP through TCMS); 2) The head-end and tail-end The train group numbers of the VID are the same; 3) The train car numbers at the head end and the tail end are the two ends of the same car, that is, the train car numbers at the head end and the tail end are inconsistent; if any of 1), 2) and 3) If the item verification fails, ATP applies emergency braking to the first train and generates an alarm message on the Human Machine Interface (HMI) to prompt an alarm, prompting the operator that the first train identification number configuration is incorrect and requires maintenance. Only when the first train identification number is configured correctly can emergency braking be relieved and the prompt alarm on the HMI cleared.
  • HMI Human Machine Interface
  • the ATP headend of the first train When the ATP headend of the first train is started, it checks that the VID configurations of the two series at the headend are consistent, and starts the dual systems at this end normally. After the headend is started, ATP determines that the train unit number configured at the headend is inconsistent with the real unit number of the train. ATP An irrelievable emergency brake is applied and an alarm is prompted on the HMI, prompting the operator that the train group number is incorrect and requires maintenance. Only when the train unit number of the head-end VID is configured to be consistent with the actual train unit number and the head-end ATP is restarted can the emergency braking be relieved.
  • train group numbers at the beginning and end of the first train before it goes online do not belong to the same train:
  • the ATP head-end When the ATP head-end starts, it checks that the VID configurations of the two systems at the head-end are consistent. Start the dual systems at this end normally. After the head-end starts, ATP determines that the train unit number configured at the head-end is consistent with the real unit number of the train, but checks the VID at the tail end. Different from the train group number of the head-end VID, ATP applies irreversible emergency braking and prompts an alarm on the HMI, prompting the operator that the train group number is wrong and requires repair. This emergency braking can only be alleviated after ATP is restarted only if the train unit number of the tail end VID is configured to be consistent with the head unit unit number and the train unit number is different, and is consistent with the train's real unit number.
  • the train operation safety protection method provided by the present invention can reduce the operational impact caused by train degradation due to incorrect VID configuration after the train goes online by verifying the train identification number of the train before the train goes online, and ensures the operation safety of the train.
  • step 200 may specifically include:
  • Step 2001 When the second train identification numbers of each second train communicating with ZC are all different, based on ZC's verification result of whether the second train identification number of each second train meets the second preset requirement, Conduct safety protection inspection on the second train identification number;
  • the second preset requirements include:
  • the ATP at the head and tail ends of the second train sends the train to ZC in the opposite direction;
  • the train position envelopes sent to ZC by ATP at the head and tail ends of the second train completely overlap or the non-overlapping portion is smaller than the first preset threshold range
  • the train position sent to ZC by ATP at the head and tail ends of the second train is on the same return track.
  • the above method may also specifically include:
  • the driving mode of the first target train is downgraded to the restricted manual RM driving mode, and an alarm message is generated on the HMI.
  • the regional controller ZC verifies the verification results of the second train identification numbers of each second train running on the line to complete the safety protection inspection of each second train, specifically:
  • ZC protects the trains running on the line. ZC checks the VID value of the ATP system that communicates with it. It prohibits ATPs with the same VID (the same train group number and terminal number) from establishing communication with ZC to ensure that the ATP system that communicates with ZC is established. VID is unique.
  • ZC allows the first and last ends of the same train to The terminal communicates with it at the same time. At this time, ZC performs same-train verification and protection on the second train based on the verification results of whether the second train identification number of each second train meets the second preset requirements.
  • the second preset requirements include the following three item:
  • ZC determines that the second train sent to it by the first-end ATP and the tail-end ATP is running in the opposite direction;
  • ZC determines that the position envelope of the second train sent to it by the head-end ATP and the tail-end ATP completely overlaps or the non-overlapping part is smaller than the first preset threshold range;
  • the first preset threshold range can be flexibly set according to the actual scenario , the present invention does not specifically limit this;
  • ZC determines that the position of the second train in the position report of the second train sent to it by the head-end ATP and the tail-end ATP is on the same return track.
  • ZC determines that the same train verification is successful (that is, the safety protection check of the second train identification number of the second train passes), otherwise it is judged that the same train verification fails (that is, the second train identification number safety protection check is passed) (the train's second train identification number safety protection check failed), when the same train verification fails, it is determined that there is a first target train whose second train identification number does not meet the second preset requirements, and passes the ZC to the first target train
  • the train's ATP sends a special control message to downgrade the driving mode of the first target train to the restricted manual RM mode, and generates an alarm message in the HMI to prompt an alarm and prompt the operator to go offline for maintenance.
  • the position envelope is determined based on the area between the front end of the actual position of the train + the redundant amount and the rear end of the actual train position + the redundant amount.
  • the redundant amount is calculated by ATP in real time.
  • the present invention does not make any calculation method for the redundant amount. Specific limitations.
  • ZC determines that the head and tail ends of the same train are communicating with it at the same time, it performs same-car verification protection.
  • the same-car verification content includes the following three items: 1) ZC determines the train running direction sent to it by the head-end ATP and the tail-end ATP. On the contrary; 2) ZC determines that the position envelope of the train sent to it by the head-end ATP and the tail-end ATP completely overlaps or the non-overlapping part is smaller than the first preset threshold range; 3) ZC determines that the head-end ATP and the tail-end ATP send it to it The position is reported on the same return track.
  • ZC determines that any of the above second preset requirements is not met, it determines that the same train verification has failed.
  • ZC sends a special control message to ATP to downgrade the driving mode of the first target train to RM mode, and the HMI prompts Alarm, prompting operators to go offline for maintenance.
  • the train operation safety protection method provided by the present invention can verify the second train identification number of the second train using different train identification numbers at the beginning and end when the train is on the line, reducing the operational impact caused by train degradation due to VID configuration errors. The safety of train operation is ensured.
  • step 200 may also specifically include:
  • Step 2002 When there is a second target train among the second trains communicating with ZC, based on ZC's verification result of whether the second train identification number of the second target train meets the third preset requirement, the second train identification number of the second target train meets the third preset requirement.
  • the second train identification number of the second target train is inspected for safety protection;
  • the ATP at the head end and the tail end of the second target train have the same second train identification number
  • the third default requirements include:
  • the running direction of the second target train in the adjacent valid information received by ZC is opposite;
  • the previous position envelope of the second target train received by ZC and the current position envelope are on the same return track.
  • the above method may also specifically include:
  • the driving mode of the third target train is downgraded to the RM driving mode, and an alarm message is generated on the HMI.
  • the ATP at the head end and the tail end may use the exact same second train identification number.
  • the second train identification number of the second target train is safely Protection check.
  • the third preset requirements specifically include the following three items:
  • ZC determines that the running direction of the second target train in the adjacent valid information sent by ATP at the head end and tail end of the second target train is opposite;
  • ZC determines that the same vehicle verification is successful (that is, the safety protection check of the train identification number of the second target train is passed), otherwise it is judged that the same vehicle verification fails (that is, the safety protection check of the second target train's train identification number is passed). If the safety protection check of the second train identification number of the target train fails), determine the train corresponding to the second train identification number of the second target train that does not meet the above third preset requirements (i.e., the third target train), as the same train When the verification fails, according to the special control message sent by ZC to ATP, the driving mode of the third target train is downgraded to RM mode, and an alarm message is generated in the HMI to prompt an alarm.
  • the train operation safety protection method provided by the present invention can verify the train identification numbers of trains with the same train identification number at the beginning and end when the train is running online, reduce the operational impact caused by train degradation due to VID configuration errors, and ensure the safety of the train. Operational security.
  • the train operation safety protection system provided by the present invention will be described below.
  • the train operation safety protection system described below and the train operation safety protection method described above can be mutually referenced.
  • FIG 2 is a schematic structural diagram of the train operation safety protection system provided by the present invention. As shown in Figure 2, it includes:
  • the first protection module 210 is used to perform safety protection inspection on the first train based on the verification result of the first train identification number of the first train before the automatic train protection system ATP goes online;
  • the second protection module 211 is used to perform safety protection inspection on the second train based on the verification result of the second train identification number of each second train when the zone controller ZC goes online;
  • ATP is deployed at the beginning and end of the first train
  • ZC communicates with ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of each second train.
  • the train operation safety protection system verifies the first train identification number of the first train before going online based on the ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of the train and the verification result during online operation based on the ZC that communicates with the train.
  • the verification result of the second train identification number of the second train completes the configuration verification of the train identification number, thereby realizing the safety protection inspection of the train and eliminating the safety hazards to train operation caused by manual incorrect configuration of the train identification number.
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the physical structure of an electronic device provided by the present invention.
  • the electronic device may include: a processor (processor) 310, a communication interface (communication interface) 311, a memory (memory) 312 and a bus. (bus) 313, in which the processor 310, the communication interface 311, and the memory 312 complete communication with each other through the bus 313.
  • the processor 310 can call logical instructions in the memory 312 to perform the following methods:
  • ATP is deployed at the beginning and end of the first train
  • ZC communicates with ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of each second train.
  • the above-mentioned logical instructions in the memory can be implemented in the form of software functional units and can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when sold or used as an independent product.
  • the technical solution of the present invention essentially or the part that contributes to the existing technology or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product.
  • the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to cause a computer power panel (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network power panel, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program code. .
  • the present invention discloses a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes a computer program stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer program includes program instructions. When the program instructions are executed by a computer , the computer can execute the train operation safety protection method provided by each of the above method embodiments, including, for example:
  • ATP is deployed at the beginning and end of the first train
  • ZC communicates with ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of each second train.
  • the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored.
  • the computer program is implemented when executed by a processor to execute the train operation safety protection method provided by the above embodiments, for example include:
  • ATP is deployed at the beginning and end of the first train
  • ZC communicates with ATP deployed at the head and tail ends of each second train.
  • the system embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated.
  • the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in One location, or it can be distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment. Persons of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement the method without any creative effort.
  • each embodiment can be implemented by software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware.
  • the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM/RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions to cause a computer power panel (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network power panel, etc.) to execute the methods described in various embodiments or certain parts of the embodiments.

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  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Abstract

一种列车运行安全防护方法，包括：根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对第一列车进行安全防护检查（100）；根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对第二列车进行安全防护检查（200）。根据部署在列车首端以及尾端的ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果以及根据与列车通信的ZC对上线运行时的第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，完成对列车识别号的配置校验，进而实现对列车的安全防护检查，消除人工未正确配置列车识别号对列车运营带来的安全隐患。还提供一种列车运行安全防护系统、一种电子设备和一种非暂态计算机可读存储介质。

Description

列车运行安全防护方法及系统 技术领域
本发明涉及轨道交通技术领域，尤其涉及一种列车运行安全防护方法及系统。
背景技术
基于通信的列车控制(Communication Based Train Control，CBTC)系统由列车自动防护系统(Automatic Train Protection，ATP)、列车自动驾驶系统(Automatic Train Operation，ATO)、计算机联锁(Computer Interlocking，CI)、区域控制器(Zone Controller，ZC)、列车自动监控系统(Automatic Train Supervision，ATS)、数据通信系统(Data Communication System，DCS)构成。CBTC系统对线上运行的所有列车进行管控，对列车的运行进行安全防护。每一辆上线的列车均需配置ATP，不同列车上部署的ATP需要配置不同的列车识别号(Vehicle ID，VID)，根据不同的VID，CBTC系统可识别不同的列车并进行分别控制。在工程维护时为实现备用硬件的充分利用，允许同一类型的硬件进行互相更换，但在更换硬件时若VID与实际列车不匹配需要由人工对VID进行修改，并由人工确保配置的正确性。
由于需要由人工对ATP配置的VID的正确性进行确认，若配置错误，既有CBTC系统无相应的防护手段，降低了CBTC系统的安全性和可用性，从而给列车运行带来安全隐患。
发明内容
本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法及系统，用于解决现有技术中存在的上述问题，根据部署在列车首端以及尾端的ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果以及根据与列车通信的ZC对上线运行时的第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，完成对列车识别号的配置校验，进而实现对列车的安全防护检查，消除人工未正确配置列车识别号对列车运营带来的安全隐患。
本发明提供的一种列车运行安全防护方法，包括：
根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第一列车进行安全防护检查；
根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查；
其中，所述ATP部署在所述第一列车的首端和尾端；
所述ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的所述ATP进行通信。
根据本发明提供的一种列车运行安全防护方法，所述根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第一列车进行安全防护检查，包括：
根据所述ATP对所述第一列车的首端双系和尾端双系中所述第一列车识别号的校验结果，确定所述第一列车的首端双系和尾端双系中，所述第一列车识别号一致的目标单端；
根据部署在所述目标单端的ATP对所述第一列车识别号是否满足第一预设要求的校验结果，对所述第一列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
其中，所述第一预设要求包括：
所述目标单端的列车车组号和列车的真实车组号一致；
第一列车的首端和尾端的列车车组号一致；
第一列车的首端和尾端的列车车端号不一致。
根据本发明提供的一种列车运行安全防护方法，还包括：
若所述第一列车识别号不满足所述第一预设要求，则在人机界面HMI上生成报警信息，并对所述第一列车施加紧急制动，直至所述第一列车识别号满足所述第一预设要求缓解所述紧急制动。
根据本发明提供的一种列车运行安全防护方法，所述根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查，包括：
在与所述ZC进行通信的各所述第二列车的第二列车识别号均不同的情况下，根据所述ZC对各第二列车的所述第二列车识别号是否满足第二预设要求的校验结果，对所述第二列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
其中，所述第二预设要求包括：
第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向所述ZC发送的列车运行方向相反；
第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向所述ZC发送的列车位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第一预设阈值范围；
第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向所述ZC发送的列车位置处于同一折返轨。
根据本发明提供的一种列车运行安全防护方法，还包括：
若存在所述第二列车识别号不满足所述第二预设要求的第一目标列车，则将所述第一目标列车的驾驶模式降级为受限人工RM驾驶模式，并在HMI上生成报警信息。
根据本发明提供的一种列车运行安全防护方法，所述根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查，还包括：
在与所述ZC进行通信的各所述第二列车中存在第二目标列车的情况下，根据所述ZC对第二目标列车的第二列车识别号是否满足第三预设要求的校验结果，对所述第二目标列车的第二列车识别号进行 安全防护检查；
其中，所述第二目标列车的首端和尾端的ATP具有相同的第二列车识别号；
所述第三预设要求包括：
所述ZC接收到的相邻有效信息中的第二目标列车的运行方向相反；
所述ZC接收到的第二目标列车的上一位置包络与当前位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第二预设阈值范围；
所述ZC接收到的第二目标列车上一位置包络与所述当前位置包络处于同一折返轨。
根据本发明提供的一种列车运行安全防护方法，还包括：
若所述第二目标列车中存在所述第二列车识别号不满足所述第三预设要求的第三目标列车，则将所述第三目标列车的驾驶模式降级为RM驾驶模式，并在HMI上生成报警信息。
本发明还提供一种列车运行安全防护系统，包括：第一防护模块以及第二防护模块；
所述第一防护模块，用于根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第一列车进行安全防护检查；
所述第二防护模块，用于根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查；
其中，所述ATP部署在所述第一列车的首端和尾端；
所述ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的所述ATP进行通信。
本发明还提供一种电子设备，包括处理器和存储有计算机程序的存储器，所述处理器执行所述计算机程序时实现如上述任一种所述列车运行安全防护方法。
本发明还提供一种非暂态计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该计算机程序被处理器执行时实现如上述任一种所述列车运行安全防护方法。
本发明还提供一种计算机程序产品，包括计算机程序，所述计算机程序被处理器执行时实现如上述任一种所述列车运行安全防护方法。
本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法及系统，根据部署在列车首端以及尾端的ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果以及根据与列车通信的ZC对上线运行时的第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，完成对列车识别号的配置校验，进而实现对列车的安全防护检查，消除人工未正确配置列车识别号对列车运营带来的安全隐患。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作一简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1是本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法的流程示意图；
图2是本发明提供的列车运行安全防护系统的结构示意图；
图3是本发明提供的电子设备的实体结构示意图。
具体实施方式
为使本发明的目的、技术方案和优点更加清楚，下面将结合本发明中的附图，对本发明中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例是本发明一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于 本发明中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本发明保护的范围。
图1是本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法的流程示意图，如图1所示，方法包括：
步骤100、根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对第一列车进行安全防护检查；
步骤200、根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对第二列车进行安全防护检查；
其中，ATP部署在第一列车的首端和尾端；
ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的ATP进行通信。
需要说明的是，上述方法的执行主体可以是计算机设备。
可选地，ATP系统列车识别号VID配置错误将导致列车运行安全风险，降低系统可用性。VID配置错误通常发生在更换ATP板卡时未配置正确的VID数值，本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法适用于对部署CBTC系统的列车(例如首端和尾端部署的ATP设备均采用二乘二取二冗余结构的列车的列车识别号VID配置进行校验，以实现对列车的安全防护检查，具体地：
一般而言，ATP的VID包含以下关键信息：
列车车组号和列车车端号。
对于VID配置正确的列车应同时满足以下要求：
单端双系(左、右系)VID配置一致；
首端和尾端的列车车组号一致，且首端、尾端的列车车端号不同；
首端、尾端的列车车组号和列车的真实车组号一致。
需要说明的是，上述列车的真实车组号可以由ATP通过列车控制管理系统(Train Control and Management System，TCMS)获取的。
根据部署在上线运行前的列车的首端和尾端的ATP对列车的列车识别号VID进行校验，得到校验结果，并根据该校验结果对列车 进行安全防护检查。
根据与部署在上线运行时的列车的首端和尾端的ATP进行通信的区域控制器ZC对列车的列车识别号VID进行校验，得到校验结果，并根据该校验结果对列车进行安全防护检查。
为了便于区分，将上线运行前的列车称为第一列车，将上线运行时的列车称为第二列车，相应地，第一列车的列车识别号称为第一列车识别号，第二列车的列车识别号称为第二列车识别号。
本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法，根据部署在列车首端以及尾端的ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果以及根据与列车通信的ZC对上线运行时的第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，完成对列车识别号的配置校验，进而实现对列车的安全防护检查，消除人工未正确配置列车识别号对列车运营带来的安全隐患。
进一步地，在一个实施例中，步骤100可以具体包括：
步骤1001、根据ATP对第一列车的首端双系和尾端双系中第一列车识别号的校验结果，确定第一列车的首端双系和尾端双系中，第一列车识别号一致的目标单端；
步骤1002、根据部署在目标单端的ATP对第一列车识别号是否满足第一预设要求的校验结果，对第一列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
其中，第一预设要求包括：
目标单端的列车车组号和列车的真实车组号一致；
第一列车的首端和尾端的列车车组号一致；
第一列车的首端和尾端的列车车端号不一致。
进一步地，在一个实施例中，上述方法还可以具体包括：
若第一列车识别号不满足第一预设要求，则在人机界面HMI上生成报警信息，并对第一列车施加紧急制动，直至第一列车识别号满足所述第一预设要求缓解紧急制动。
可选地，对上线运行前的第一列车进行安全防护检查，指列车上线自检时对第一列车识别号的检测，包括以下内容：
部署在第一列车首端和尾端的ATP任一端启动时均需检查单端双系的VID配置是否一致，若不一致则禁止该端启动；若单端双系的VID配置一致(例如首端双系的VID配置一致，则将首端作为目标单端)并正常启动该端的双系，单端启动后进一步检查：根据部署在目标单端的ATP对第一列车识别号是否满足第一预设要求进行校验得到校验结果。
其中，第一预设要求具体为：1)该端配置的列车车组号与列车的真实车组号信息一致(列车的真实车组号由ATP通过TCMS获取)；2)首端和尾端的VID的列车车组号一致；3)首端和尾端的列车车端号为同一车的两端，即首端和尾端的列车车端号不一致；若1)、2)和3)有任一项校验未通过则ATP通过对第一列车施加紧急制动并在人机界面(Human Machine Interface，HMI)上生成报警信息以提示报警，提示运营人员第一列车识别号配置错误需要进行维修，只有第一列车识别号配置正确才能缓解紧急制动并清除HMI上的提示报警。
例如，对于上线运行前的列车车组号与列车的真实车组号不同的第一列车：
第一列车的ATP首端启动时检查首端两系的VID配置一致，正常启动该端的双系，首端启动后ATP判断首端配置的列车车组号与列车的真实车组号不一致，ATP施加不可缓解的紧急制动并在HMI上提示报警，提示运营人员列车车组号错误需要进行维修。只有将首端的VID的列车车组号配置为与列车真实车组号一致时，重启首端ATP后才可缓解该紧急制动。
例如，上线运行前第一列车的首、尾端的列车车组号不属于同一列车：
ATP首端启动时检查首端两系的VID配置一致，正常启动该端 的双系，首端启动后ATP判断首端配置的列车车组号与列车的真实车组号一致，但检查尾端VID与首端VID的列车车组号不同，ATP施加不可缓解的紧急制动并在HMI上提示报警，提示运营人员列车车组号错误需要进行维修。只有将尾端的VID的车组号配置为与首端车组号一致且列车车端号不同，并且与列车真实车组号一致时，重启ATP后才可缓解该紧急制动。
本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法，通过在列车上线运行前对列车的列车识别号进行校验，可减少列车上线后因VID配置错误列车降级引起的运营影响，保障了列车的运营安全。
进一步地，在一个实施例中，步骤200可以具体包括：
步骤2001、在与ZC进行通信的各第二列车的第二列车识别号均不同的情况下，根据ZC对各第二列车的第二列车识别号是否满足第二预设要求的校验结果，对第二列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
其中，第二预设要求包括：
第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向ZC发送的列车运行方向相反；
第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向ZC发送的列车位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第一预设阈值范围；
第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向ZC发送的列车位置处于同一折返轨。
进一步地，在一个实施例中，上述方法还可以具体包括：
若存在第二列车识别号不满足第二预设要求的第一目标列车，则将第一目标列车的驾驶模式降级为受限人工RM驾驶模式，并在HMI上生成报警信息。
可选地，由区域控制器ZC对上线运行的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，完成对各第二列车的安全防护检查，具体地：
ZC对上线运行的列车进行防护，ZC检查与之通信的ATP系统VID值，禁止具有相同VID(车组号和车端号均相同)的ATP与ZC 建立通信，确保与ZC建立通信的ATP系统VID具有唯一性。
在确定与ZC进行通信的各第二列车的第二列车识别号均不同情况下，在特殊区域(即允许ATP进行折返换端的区域，以下简称折返轨)，ZC允许同一列车的首端、尾端同时与之通信，此时ZC对各第二列车的第二列车识别号是否满足第二预设要求的校验结果对第二列车进行同车校验防护，第二预设要求包括以下三项：
1)ZC判断首端ATP和尾端ATP向其发送的第二列车的运行方向相反；
2)ZC判断首端ATP和尾端ATP向其发送的第二列车的位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第一预设阈值范围；其中第一预设阈值范围可以根据实际场景进行灵活设置，本发明对此不作具体限定；
3)ZC判断首端ATP和尾端ATP向其发送的第二列车的位置报告中第二列车的位置在同一折返轨。
当同时满足第二预设要求中的以上三项时，ZC判断同车校验成功(即第二列车的第二列车识别号安全防护检查通过)，否则判断同车校验失败(即第二列车的第二列车识别号安全防护检查未通过)，当同车校验失败时，确定存在第二列车识别号不满足第二预设要求的第一目标列车，并通过ZC向与第一目标列车的ATP发送特殊控制报文，将第一目标列车的驾驶模式降级为受限人工RM模式，并在HMI进行生成报警信息以提示报警，提示运营人员下线维修。
其中，位置包络是根据列车实际位置前端+冗余量与列车实际位置后端+冗余量之间的区域确定的，冗余量由ATP实时计算，本发明对冗余量的计算方法不作具体限定。
例如，上线运行时ZC同车校验防护：
ZC判断同一列车的首、尾端同时与之通信时，进行同车校验防护，同车校验内容包括以下三项：1)ZC判断首端ATP和尾端ATP向其发送的列车运行方向相反；2)ZC判断首端ATP和尾端ATP向 其发送的列车的位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第一预设阈值范围；3)ZC判断首端ATP和尾端ATP向其发送的位置报告在同一折返轨上。当ZC判断以上第二预设要求有任一个不满足时，判断同车校验失败，此时ZC向ATP发送特殊控制报文，将第一目标列车的驾驶模式降级为RM模式，HMI进行提示报警，提示运营人员下线维修。
本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法，能够对列车上线运行时首尾端采用不同的列车识别号的第二列车的第二列车识别号进行校验，减少因VID配置错误列车降级引起的运营影响，保障了列车的运营安全。
进一步地，在一个实施例中，步骤200还可以具体包括：
步骤2002、在与ZC进行通信的各第二列车中存在第二目标列车的情况下，根据ZC对第二目标列车的第二列车识别号是否满足第三预设要求的校验结果，对第二目标列车的第二列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
其中，第二目标列车的首端和尾端的ATP具有相同的第二列车识别号；
第三预设要求包括：
ZC接收到的相邻有效信息中的第二目标列车的运行方向相反；
ZC接收到的第二目标列车的上一位置包络与当前位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第二预设阈值范围；
ZC接收到的第二目标列车上一位置包络与当前位置包络处于同一折返轨。
进一步地，在一个实施例中，上述方法还可以具体包括：
若第二目标列车中存在第二列车识别号不满足第三预设要求的第三目标列车，则将第三目标列车的驾驶模式降级为RM驾驶模式，并在HMI上生成报警信息。
可选地，对于互通互联线路中其他厂家上线运行的第二列车，其首端和尾端的ATP可能采用的是完全相同的第二列车识别号，对于该类型的第二列车(即第二目标列车)，根据ZC对第二目标列车的第二列车识别号是否满足第三预设要求的校验结果(即对同车校验结果)，对第二目标列车的第二列车识别号进行安全防护检查。
其中，第三预设要求具体包括以下三项：
1)ZC判断第二目标列车首端和尾端的ATP发送的相邻有效信息中的第二目标列车的运行方向相反；
2)ZC接收到的第二目标列车上一有效位置包络与当前位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第二阈值范围；
3)ZC接收到的第二目标列车的上一位置包络与当前位置包络完全在同一折返轨。
当同时满足第三预设要求的三项时，ZC判断同车校验成功(即对第二目标列车的列车识别号的安全防护检查通过)，否则判断同车校验失败(即对第二目标列车的第二列车识别号的安全防护检查未通过)，确定第二目标列车中不满足上述第三预设要求的第二列车识别号对应的列车(即第三目标列车)，当同车校验失败时，根据ZC向ATP发送的特殊控制报文，将第三目标列车的驾驶模式降级为RM模式，并在HMI进行生成报警信息以提示报警。
通过对列车上线运行前和列车上线运行过程中执行上述列车运行安全防护方法，可消除ATP系统VID配置错误带来的安全风险。
本发明提供的列车运行安全防护方法，能够对列车上线运行时首尾端采用相同的列车识别号的列车的列车识别号进行校验，减少因VID配置错误列车降级引起的运营影响，保障了列车的运营安全。
下面对本发明提供的列车运行安全防护系统进行描述，下文描述的列车运行安全防护系统与上文描述的列车运行安全防护方法可相互对应参照。
图2是本发明提供的列车运行安全防护系统的结构示意图，如图2所示，包括：
第一防护模块210以及第二防护模块211；
第一防护模块210，用于根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对第一列车进行安全防护检查；
第二防护模块211，用于根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对第二列车进行安全防护检查；
其中，ATP部署在第一列车的首端和尾端；
ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的ATP进行通信。
本发明提供的列车运行安全防护系统，根据部署在列车首端以及尾端的ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果以及根据与列车通信的ZC对上线运行时的第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，完成对列车识别号的配置校验，进而实现对列车的安全防护检查，消除人工未正确配置列车识别号对列车运营带来的安全隐患。
图3是本发明提供的一种电子设备的实体结构示意图，如图3所示，该电子设备可以包括：处理器(processor)310、通信接口(communication interface)311、存储器(memory)312和总线(bus)313，其中，处理器310，通信接口311，存储器312通过总线313完成相互间的通信。处理器310可以调用存储器312中的逻辑指令，以执行如下方法：
根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对第一列车进行安全防护检查；
根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对第二列车进行安全防护检查；
其中，ATP部署在第一列车的首端和尾端；
ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的ATP进行通信。
此外，上述的存储器中的逻辑指令可以通过软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本发明的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机电源屏(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络电源屏等)执行本发明各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(ROM，Read-only Memory)、随机存取存储器(RAM，Random Access Memory)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
进一步地，本发明公开一种计算机程序产品，所述计算机程序产品包括存储在非暂态计算机可读存储介质上的计算机程序，所述计算机程序包括程序指令，当所述程序指令被计算机执行时，计算机能够执行上述各方法实施例所提供的列车运行安全防护方法，例如包括：
根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对第一列车进行安全防护检查；
根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对第二列车进行安全防护检查；
其中，ATP部署在第一列车的首端和尾端；
ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的ATP进行通信。
另一方面，本发明还提供一种非暂态计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该计算机程序被处理器执行时实现以执行上述各实施例提供的列车运行安全防护方法，例如包括：
根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对第一列车进行安全防护检查；
根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对第二列车进行安全防护检查；
其中，ATP部署在第一列车的首端和尾端；
ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的ATP进行通信。
以上所描述的系统实施例仅仅是示意性的，其中所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部模块来实现本实施例方案的目的。本领域普通技术人员在不付出创造性的劳动的情况下，即可以理解并实施。
通过以上的实施方式的描述，本领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到各实施方式可借助软件加必需的通用硬件平台的方式来实现，当然也可以通过硬件。基于这样的理解，上述技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，如ROM/RAM、磁碟、光盘等，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机电源屏(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络电源屏等)执行各个实施例或者实施例的某些部分所述的方法。
最后应说明的是：以上实施例仅用以说明本发明的技术方案，而非对其限制；尽管参照前述实施例对本发明进行了详细的说明，本领域的普通技术人员应当理解：其依然可以对前述各实施例所记载的技术方案进行修改，或者对其中部分技术特征进行等同替换；而这些修改或者替换，并不使相应技术方案的本质脱离本发明各实施例技术方案的精神和范围。

Claims (10)

  1. 一种列车运行安全防护方法，其特征在于，包括：
    根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第一列车进行安全防护检查；
    根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查；
    其中，所述ATP部署在所述第一列车的首端和尾端；
    所述ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的所述ATP进行通信。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的列车运行安全防护方法，其特征在于，所述根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第一列车进行安全防护检查，包括：
    根据所述ATP对所述第一列车的首端双系和尾端双系中所述第一列车识别号的校验结果，确定所述第一列车的首端双系和尾端双系中，所述第一列车识别号一致的目标单端；
    根据部署在所述目标单端的ATP对所述第一列车识别号是否满足第一预设要求的校验结果，对所述第一列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
    其中，所述第一预设要求包括：
    所述目标单端的列车车组号和列车的真实车组号一致；
    第一列车的首端和尾端的列车车组号一致；
    第一列车的首端和尾端的列车车端号不一致。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的列车运行安全防护方法，其特征在于，还包括：
    若所述第一列车识别号不满足所述第一预设要求，则在人机界面HMI上生成报警信息，并对所述第一列车施加紧急制动，直至所述第一列车识别号满足所述第一预设要求缓解所述紧急制动。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的列车运行安全防护方法，其特征在于， 所述根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查，包括：
    在与所述ZC进行通信的各所述第二列车的第二列车识别号均不同的情况下，根据所述ZC对各第二列车的所述第二列车识别号是否满足第二预设要求的校验结果，对所述第二列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
    其中，所述第二预设要求包括：
    第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向所述ZC发送的列车运行方向相反；
    第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向所述ZC发送的列车位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第一预设阈值范围；
    第二列车的首端与尾端的ATP向所述ZC发送的列车位置处于同一折返轨。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的列车运行安全防护方法，其特征在于，还包括：
    若存在所述第二列车识别号不满足所述第二预设要求的第一目标列车，则将所述第一目标列车的驾驶模式降级为受限人工RM驾驶模式，并在HMI上生成报警信息。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的列车运行安全防护方法，其特征在于，所述根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查，还包括：
    在与所述ZC进行通信的各所述第二列车中存在第二目标列车的情况下，根据所述ZC对第二目标列车的第二列车识别号是否满足第三预设要求的校验结果，对所述第二目标列车的第二列车识别号进行安全防护检查；
    其中，所述第二目标列车的首端和尾端的ATP具有相同的第二列车识别号；
    所述第三预设要求包括：
    所述ZC接收到的相邻有效信息中的第二目标列车的运行方向相反；
    所述ZC接收到的第二目标列车的上一位置包络与当前位置包络完全重叠或未重叠部分小于第二预设阈值范围；
    所述ZC接收到的第二目标列车上一位置包络与所述当前位置包络处于同一折返轨。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的列车运行安全防护方法，其特征在于，还包括：
    若所述第二目标列车中存在所述第二列车识别号不满足所述第三预设要求的第三目标列车，则将所述第三目标列车的驾驶模式降级为RM驾驶模式，并在HMI上生成报警信息。
  8. 一种列车运行安全防护系统，其特征在于，包括：第一防护模块以及第二防护模块；
    所述第一防护模块，用于根据列车自动防护系统ATP对上线运行前的第一列车的第一列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第一列车进行安全防护检查；
    所述第二防护模块，用于根据区域控制器ZC对上线运行时的各第二列车的第二列车识别号的校验结果，对所述第二列车进行安全防护检查；
    其中，所述ATP部署在所述第一列车的首端和尾端；
    所述ZC与部署在各第二列车的首端和尾端的所述ATP进行通信。
  9. 一种电子设备，包括处理器和存储有计算机程序的存储器，其特征在于，所述处理器执行所述计算机程序时实现权利要求1至7任一项所述列车运行安全防护方法。
  10. 一种非暂态计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，其特征在于，该计算机程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1至7任 一项所述列车运行安全防护方法。
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