WO2007072793A1 - 真贋判別可能なカード - Google Patents
真贋判別可能なカード Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2007072793A1 WO2007072793A1 PCT/JP2006/325224 JP2006325224W WO2007072793A1 WO 2007072793 A1 WO2007072793 A1 WO 2007072793A1 JP 2006325224 W JP2006325224 W JP 2006325224W WO 2007072793 A1 WO2007072793 A1 WO 2007072793A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- authentication
- card
- information
- chip
- encrypted data
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
- G06K19/06037—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking multi-dimensional coding
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
- G06K19/06046—Constructional details
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/08—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
- G06K19/083—Constructional details
- G06K19/086—Constructional details with markings consisting of randomly placed or oriented elements, the randomness of the elements being useable for generating a unique identifying signature of the record carrier, e.g. randomly placed magnetic fibers or magnetic particles in the body of a credit card
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/08—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
- G06K19/10—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards
- G06K19/16—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards the marking being a hologram or diffraction grating
Definitions
- the invention according to this application relates to a structure of an object that requires forgery and authentication immediately, such as a card, a banknote, and a securities, and a method for determining the authenticity of the object.
- FIG. 1 shows an example of the current cash card processing flow.
- a sensor at the card entrance detects that and takes the card into the apparatus.
- the terminal When the card is taken in, the terminal reads the magnetic recording unit power card information of the card.
- card information such as bank code, branch code, account type and account number.
- card identification number, an expiration date, an account type, and an account number are recorded as card information in the magnetic recording unit.
- personal identification numbers may be recorded on cash cards or credit cards. In such cases, personal identification numbers are also read.
- the terminal device determines whether the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal device.
- the terminal device ejects the card as an incorrect card that can not be handled.
- the card user In response to a request from the host computer, the card user enters a personal identification number
- the host computer When the card user inputs a PIN in response to a request from the host computer, the host computer reads the input PIN stored in the host computer. Compare with the corresponding PIN.
- the host computer determines that the card user is the correct card holder, and requests input of the withdrawal amount.
- the transaction is performed as if the password is correct, but then the password is erased from the magnetic recording unit.
- FIG. 2 (a) shows an example of a cash card used in the current cash card processing flow shown in FIG.
- reference numeral 1 denotes a cash card body which is also plastic, and on the front side thereof, a magnetic stripe 2 in which information is recorded and an arrow 3 indicating the insertion direction of the cache card are formed. Although illustration is omitted, the required items are posted as embossed letters.
- the information written on the magnetic stripe can be easily read using a device called a skimmer, so counterfeit cards are created, which often results in the use of counterfeit cards.
- the cash card and the credit card are provided with information such as the name of the holder by embossing, and such information is also used for the magnetic information, the embossed information is forged. It has become a key to card creation.
- a security code consisting of four digits has been used as a means for determining the propriety of a card user, which is not a means of preventing unauthorized use by preventing card forgery.
- This secret code is often based on analogical numbers and has caused a lot of damage so far.
- Recently, not only analogical reasoning but also stealing of PINs by means such as voyeurism has been carried out, and unauthorized use prevention by PINs has become extremely difficult.
- biometrics biometrics
- pattern recognition technology In order to prevent damage due to counterfeit cards, biometrics (biometrics) technology using pattern recognition technology is adopted in part.
- biometric identification techniques include iris discrimination, fingerprint discrimination, palm print discrimination, finger vein discrimination, palm vein discrimination and hand-back vein discrimination, and there are contact type and non-contact type in discrimination other than this inner iris discrimination. But all patterns in advance Because it takes time and effort to register patterns, and it takes time to make decisions, the operation cost increases.
- biometric identification systems that can not use cardholders themselves can not be used even if they try to ask an agent to handle the card because the time to use the card or the card processing device is not familiar. This point is also inconvenient for the user.
- an embossed hologram in which irregularities are formed on a plastic is attached to a credit card, a bill, securities, and the like. Since this embossed hologram is very difficult to duplicate, it is virtually impossible to fake cards with embossed holograms, but in the present usage form, it can be read by human being at a glance. Therefore, it is possible to forge and use cards etc. using similar embossed holograms.
- Fig. 2 (b) shows an example of a credit card with a hologram on which card authentication of authenticity is performed by a sensory function.
- 1 is a credit card main body made of plastic or the like, and on the front side thereof, an arrow 3 indicating the insertion direction of a magnetic stripe 2 and a cash card in which information is recorded is formed.
- illustration is omitted, the required items are posted as embossed characters.
- the cash card 1 is inserted into the terminal device with the portion marked with the arrow 3 first, but an authentication verifying chip 4 made of, for example, an embossed hologram is attached near its tip.
- the magnetic stripe has the same insertion direction to the terminal device of the power card provided on the back of the card, and as a result, the magnetic information of the credit card is read.
- the direction is opposite to that of a cash card.
- the authentication verifying chip 4 has a pattern “A” exemplified by the operator who inserts the card into the terminal device, which is visually or sensibly confirmed by the function and read by the card terminal device. There is nothing to do.
- Sensory authentication is considered to be a major factor for primary screening due to variations in the ability of the individual making the determination, and variations due to the determination environment, mental state, physical condition, etc., even for the same individual. Effective but less reliable.
- the authentication of authentication by auxiliary equipment may be performed by using a magnifying tool such as a fine line, a special drawing, a micro character, a special shape screen, a loupe or the like, or using a special filter that generates optical interference. To authenticate the authenticity.
- a magnifying tool such as a fine line, a special drawing, a micro character, a special shape screen, a loupe or the like, or using a special filter that generates optical interference.
- materials exhibiting special optical properties such as a light-emitting substrate, a light-emitting laminate film, a light-emitting ink, a thermochromic ink, a photochromic ink, etc. are mixed into the substrate 'laminate film' ink etc.
- auxiliary tools such as UV lamps, but these are also unreliable because the final discrimination relies on human sensuality.
- the authentication by mechanical processing is performed by mechanically detecting the characteristics of the material to perform authentication, and detection targets include detection of magnetic and optical characteristics.
- a light emitting material, a magnetic material, and the like are mixed in a substrate 'laminate film' ink, etc., and a detection device is used, and specific information coded by an OCR character or magnetic bar code is magnetically detected.
- a detection device is used, and specific information coded by an OCR character or magnetic bar code is magnetically detected.
- an artifact-metric system (artifact-metric system) using an artifact, which is randomly placed in a medium instead of information unique to living body
- Business and Artifacts Meritas "Bank of Japan Financial Research Institute (http: ⁇ ⁇ .imes.bo j.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdl) and the 6th Information Security ⁇ Symposium It is shown in the "pattern of artifact meritatus in the financial field" (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kiny u / 2004 / kk23-2-6.pdl)!
- Matters subject to fraudulent use or forgery of the card include when the card is issued to the user There are “card description information” given to the “card body information” given in the manufacturing process of the card. (Refer to "Linkage IC card ticket side forgery prevention technology note book” Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (http: ⁇ w ww. Npo. Go. Jp / en / info / lcnb. Pdl))
- the card entry information is information which is given to the card body at the time of issuance of the card, and corresponds to information on issue such as holder information, expiration date and the like.
- the falsification which is a typical form of unauthorized use, is an act of rewriting all or part of the card entry information, and is performed by deleting the legitimate information and adding the incorrect entry.
- the card body information is information that the card itself has information obtained by removing the card description information from the issued card, and the physical shape of the card, mainly the background pattern given in the pre-printing step, and the printing of the background.
- Information associated with the card substrate such as layers and protective laminate layers.
- Forgery is an illicit act performed on the card body, and is performed by copying or imitating a design, a pattern, etc., which is information attached to the card body, to produce a card having an appearance similar to that of the card body.
- the pattern, pattern, etc. given to the genuine card note is read by a scanner, etc., processed, corrected, etc., and carried out using a printer, etc.
- the authentication methods for discriminating forgery are roughly classified into sensory, sensory, and mechanical processing methods.
- Authentication of authenticity by sensuality is to discriminate authenticity with human's sensuality such as visual sense and touch sense, and for visual sense, the color, the watermark of the main body, the pattern or the color imparted by changing the viewing angle
- sensuality such as visual sense and touch sense, and for visual sense, the color, the watermark of the main body, the pattern or the color imparted by changing the viewing angle
- There are holograms etc. that change etc., and the ones by touch include detection of given concave / convex shape, detection of texture of card body etc.
- logo marks special fonts, copy preventing lines, special color inks, holograms, optically variable materials, latent image patterns, etc. are difficult to copy and copy, and it is easy to visually identify the authenticity.
- authenticity discrimination such as emboss processing, concavo-convex formation, perforation, etc., in a finger touch and visually.
- FIG. 3 shows a conventional example of a card having an artificial material metric-chip attached with metal particles disclosed in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 10-44650.
- (a) is an overall view
- b) Is a sectional view
- (C) is an enlarged view of an authentication verifying chip.
- This card 1 is a thin plate-like artifact metrics' that is a light transmitting resin in which metal particles 5 are mixed on a card base 7 which is light impermeable, in which an opening 8 for identification is formed.
- An opaque card face plate 6 in which the chip 4 is stacked and an opening is formed at the same position as the opening formed in the card base 7 and the magnetic stripe 2 and the arrow 3 are formed is stacked.
- the arrangement pattern of the metal particles 5 observed through the opening is an artifact metric 'Tip 4 is unique to each.
- the arrangement pattern of the metal particles 5 is observed by photographing the light passing through the artifact metric 'chip 4 through the aperture, and the individual artifact metrics' chip 4 Identify the card.
- FIG. 4 shows another conventional example of an authentic identification card to which a fiber-based artifact metric 'chip disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2003-29636 is attached.
- (a) is a full view
- (b) is a cross-sectional view
- (c) is an enlarged view of the artifact metrics * chip.
- an artifact-metrics chip 8 in which the mesh member 9 and the short small fibers 10 are three-dimensionally mixed in the transparent resin at the opening of the card base 1 which is light impermeable.
- the magnetic stripe 2 and the arrow 3 are formed on the surface of the card base 1 by being inserted.
- An interference pattern is generated in the artifact metric chip 8 due to the pattern of the mesh member 9 and the short and small fibers 10.
- This interference pattern is unique to the artifact metrics * chip 8, ie, each card, and this is used to transmit the identification pattern of the artifact metric chip '8 of the authentication verifying chip. Alternatively, take a picture with reflected light to identify the card.
- Machine reading of patterns such as psychometrics or artifact metrics is generally read by an imaging device and determined by pattern recognition technology. Therefore, there is a possibility of forgery by copying technology.
- the artifact metricus 'chip is composed of entities that are not images, it is impossible to arrange the elements constituting the artifact metrics' chip to be forged in the same form as the genuine one. It is possible. However, even if it is even the same pattern by the same component There is no denying the possibility that the oon will appear, and the gifts obtained by chance in this way pass as genuine ones. Therefore, it is dangerous to confirm whether the card etc. is authentic only with artifact metrics' chips.
- Patent Document 1 Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 10-44650
- Patent Document 2 Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2003-29636
- Non Patent Literature 1 "Financial Services and Artifacts", Bank of Japan, Research Institute for Finance (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdl)
- Non-Patent Document 2 "The Sixth Information Security 'Symposium: Patterns of Artifacts in the Financial Field” (http: //www•imes.boi.or.jp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23- 2 — 6. pdf)
- Non-Patent Document 3 “Handling Technology for Preventing Counterfeit of IC Card Cards”, Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (http:
- the present application provides the invention of a card / card processing method capable of enhancing security without making fundamental changes to a cash card or credit card conventionally used widely.
- An object of the invention according to the present application is to reduce the burden of the authentication process and to eliminate the possibility that false gifts obtained by chance will pass as genuine ones.
- a true authentication chip which is difficult to forge for authentication of a card is fixed, and a true authentication device is added in an apparatus for processing a card.
- the authentication verifying chip includes particles such as metal dispersed in a transparent medium, pieces of fibers dispersed in a transparent medium, a regular pattern arranged in a transparent medium, and the transparent medium. Interference pattern by dispersed fiber pieces, embossed hologram, dispersed in transparent media Phosphor particles, radioactive material particles dispersed in any medium can be adopted
- the authentication chip is provided with another chip, and the chip digitizes the information written on the authentication chip, and the encrypted data obtained by encrypting the digitized data is written on the chip. It is taken as a proof of truth chip.
- the image of the authentication verifying chip on the card is read and digitally encoded, and at the same time, the encrypted data of the authentication verifying chip attached on the same card is decrypted, and the authentication verifying chip is The decrypted data and the data of the authentication verifying chip are compared, and if they match, the card is judged to be authentic, and if they are not matched, the card is judged to be faked.
- an encryption key system uses a secret key system which is known only to the card issuer most conveniently and which is different from the encryption key and the decryption key
- a public key system it is also possible to use a public key system. It can be used.
- the public key and the private key are used, but it is possible to use either key for encryption and decryption.
- hash algorithms such as MD5 (Message Digest 5), SAH-1 (Se cure Hash Algorithm-1), SAH-2 etc. are used.
- the ID of the card or the like, the information of the owner is added to or mixed with the digitally encoded data, and the whole is encrypted.
- insert digital penetration notes into the digitized data Hashing of digital data, ID, addition of owner's information, and insertion of digital watermark are used by using only one or a combination of several.
- the device processing the card determines the authenticity of the power card before specific operation such as input of the personal identification number is started, and ejects the forged card, issues an alarm, or outputs the forged card. Load in processing equipment.
- Particles of metal or the like dispersed in a transparent medium, pieces of fibers dispersed in a transparent medium, interference by a pattern of regularity arranged in a transparent medium and the pieces of fibers dispersed in the transparent medium are obtained only by chance, so they should be copied. And impossible.
- the embossed hologram has a three-dimensional structure, it is impossible to copy other than directly producing a replica from the prototype.
- FIG. 1 The present cash card processing flow diagram.
- FIG. 2 An explanatory view of a conventional cash card.
- FIG. 3 An example of a conventional card using artifact metric.
- FIG. 4 Another example of a conventional card using artifact metric.
- FIG. 5 An example of a card with an authentication chip attached.
- FIG. 6 Another example of a card with an authentication chip attached.
- FIG. 8 An explanatory view of an example of an authentication verifying chip mounting position.
- FIG. 9 An explanatory view of another example of the authentication verifying chip mounting position.
- FIG. 10 An illustration of an alignment mark.
- FIG. 13 An example of the arrangement of random numbers used for the authentication chip.
- FIG. 14 An example in which the random number used for the authentication chip is binary.
- FIG. 15 An example of arranging random numbers to be used for an authentication chip as binary numbers.
- FIG. 17 An example in which the additional random number used for the authentication chip is binary.
- FIG. 18 An example in which the additional random number used for the authentication chip is a quaternary number.
- FIG. 19 An example of arranging random numbers used for the authentication chip as quaternary numbers.
- FIG. 20 An example of obtaining another authentication chip from an authentication chip created based on random numbers ⁇ 21] An example of a card with an authentication chip and an authentication chip attached.
- FIG. 22 Proof flow of the card shown in Fig. 21.
- FIG. 23 Another example of a card with an authentication chip and an authentication chip attached.
- FIG. 25 Yet another example of a card with an authentication chip and an authentication chip attached.
- FIG. 26 Proof flow of the card shown in Fig. 25.
- FIG. 28 Proof flow of the card shown in Fig. 27.
- FIG. 29 A flow chart of cash card processing of the present invention.
- FIG. 30 Another cash card processing flow diagram of the present invention.
- FIG. 31 A flow chart of still another cash card processing of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 shows Example 1 of the basic configuration of a card having an embossed hologram chip attached as an authentication verifying chip.
- (a) is a general view
- (b) is a cross-sectional view
- (c) to (e) are enlarged views of the embossed hologram chip.
- This card 11 is a face plate having an opening formed on a card base 13 which is light impermeable.
- the magnetic stripe 2 and the arrow 3 are formed on the surface plate 14.
- the embossed hologram has holes and holes at a depth of 1Z4 wavelength of laser light to be used.
- the laser beam is not detected because the emission laser beam is extinguished by the incident laser beam at the portion where the hole exists, and the emission laser beam is incident at the portion without the hole.
- the outgoing laser light is detected without being canceled by the light.
- ⁇ Z4 is 101.25 ⁇ m, 87.75 nm, 66.5 respectively. nm.
- the structure shown in (c) is the most basic structure, and the holes 16 of the 1Z4 wavelength depth of the used laser light and the portions 17 where the holes are not formed at appropriate intervals in the hologram chip 15 Is placed.
- the solid line indicated by the double-headed arrow indicates that both the incident light and the emitted light are present
- the broken line indicated by the one-way arrow indicates that the incident light is present but the emitted light is absent.
- the example shown in (d) is an example in which the direction of the laser light is inclined, and it is difficult to read the written data without the information of the inclination angle.
- inclined holes 19 with a depth of 1Z4 wavelength of the used laser light and inclined portions 20 without holes are arranged at appropriate intervals on the hologram chip 18.
- the solid line indicated by the bi-directional arrow indicates that both the incident light and the emitted light are present, and the broken line indicated by the one-way arrow indicates that there is incident light but no emitted light. Represents that. It is almost impossible to get a duplicate of this structure.
- the example shown in (e) is an example using laser light of a plurality of wavelengths, and it is difficult to read the written data if there is no information on all the wavelengths of the laser light used.
- the hologram chip 21 has a hole 22 at a depth of 1Z4 wavelength of red (R) laser light, a hole 23 at a depth of 1Z4 wavelength of green (G) laser light, and 1Z4 wavelength of blue (B) laser light
- R red
- G green
- B blue
- the solid line indicated by the bi-directional arrow represents that both the incident light and the outgoing light are present
- the dashed line indicated by the one-way arrow indicates the incident light. It indicates that there is no outgoing light. It is even more nearly impossible to obtain duplicates of this structure.
- FIG. 6 shows Example 2 of the authentication verifying chip.
- (a) is a view of the card from above
- (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof
- (c) is an enlarged view of the cross-sectional view.
- This card 31 has a face plate 34 having an opening formed on a card base 35 which is light impermeable, and is constituted by mixing the phosphor particles 33 in the resin at the opening.
- Authentication chip 32 is inserted. It is also possible to laminate another surface plate on the authentication verifying chip 32 and the surface plate 34.
- the card substrate 35 is a synthetic resin thick plate used for a cash card or the like which has been widely used conventionally, or a synthetic resin thin plate used for a prepaid card or the like.
- the authentication verifying chip 32 has an area and a thickness to fit in the opening of the face plate 34, and the phosphor particles 33 are mixed therein.
- the material of the face plate 35 is a synthetic resin that is transparent to the incident light and the outgoing light of the card, it is opaque to the incident light and Z or the outgoing light of the force card and opaque to other visible light. Both synthetic resins can be used.
- a synthetic resin transparent to incident light and outgoing light is used for the front plate laminated on the authentication chip 32 and the front plate 34 made of synthetic resin.
- FIG. 7 shows Example 3 of the authentication verifying chip.
- (a) is a view of the card from above
- (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof
- (c) is an enlarged view of the cross-sectional view.
- This card 41 has a face plate 44 having an opening formed on a card base 45 which is light impermeable, and is constituted by mixing radioactive substance particles 20 in the resin at the opening.
- Authentication chip 42 is inserted. Further, on the surface plate 44, the magnetic stripe 2 and the arrow 3 are formed.
- the arrangement pattern of the mixed radioactive material particles is unique to the authentication verifying chip 42, that is, the card 41, and this is used to identify the card.
- Fig. 8 shows an example of the mounting position of the authentication verifying chip having the above structure to the card.
- the mounting position of the authentication verifying chip 46 is in addition to the middle stage head position shown in FIG. , (C), the lower end head position shown in (d), the lower center position shown in (e), (f)
- the lower rear position shown is possible.
- the upper position is also possible, it is desirable to avoid the upper position if it may affect the information reading from the magnetic stripe.
- the use of IC chips as information storage media has also been promoted in order to strengthen card security, and in some ways, to enhance convenience.
- the IC chip has a semiconductor memory inside, and the semiconductor memory may be rewritten when it is irradiated with radiation, particularly a line which is an electron beam.
- alignment marks 48 shown in FIG. 10 it is desirable to form alignment marks 48 shown in FIG. 10 on the authentication verifying chip.
- the number of alignment marks may be one in the simplest way, a plurality of alignment marks may be provided for more accurate alignment.
- some marks may be used on the reading start position and reading end position of the authentication verifying chip, for example, as shown in FIG. A reading end line 50, and further, end instruction lines 51 and 52 are provided.
- Reading start 'end line and mark for Z or synchronization signal can also be used for signal integrity in signal processing.
- These alignment marks, reading start and ending lines, and marks for Z or synchronization signals are all made of phosphors and can be formed by an appropriate printing means such as an ink jet printer.
- the card authentication chip shown in FIGS. 6 to 7 is an artifact metric. Artifacts can not be forged, but they can not be controlled in production. 11 to 20 show configuration examples of an authentication verifying chip created by a computer which is binary data suitable for machine reading.
- 1024 pieces of binary data are arranged in a 32 ⁇ 32 matrix, and in this figure, the place where the binary data “0” is written is blank and empty. The part where the binary data "1" is written is displayed as "*".
- FIG. 12 shows an example of a true 256-digit hexadecimal real number obtained by detecting radiation emitted by the nuclear decay of radioactive material, and the random numbers used for encryption keys etc. are usually It is supplied as such a hexadecimal number.
- Figure 13 shows the hexadecimal random numbers shown in Figure 12 arranged in a matrix of 8 columns and 32 rows.
- This hexadecimal number can be expressed by replacing it with a 4-digit binary number. That is, hexadecimal “0” is binary “0000”, “1” is “0001”, “2” is “0010”, “3” is “0011”, “4". Is “0100”, “5” is “0101”, “6” is “0110”, “7” is “0111”, “8” is “1000”, “9” is “1001” , “A” is “1010”, “B” is “1011”, “” is “1100”, “D” is “1101”, “E” is “1110”, “F” is “1111” Are expressed respectively
- This is arranged in a matrix of 8 columns and 32 rows shown in FIG. 13, and further arranged in a matrix of 32 columns and 32 rows in binary digit units is shown in FIG.
- the embossed hologram shown in FIG. 5 (c) and the fluorescent material shown in FIG. 6 can use light of multiple wavelengths.
- the pit configuration of a card that uses general red (R), green (G) and blue (B) light, which is created by a computer, suitable for machine reading, which is binary data, An example is shown.
- FIG. 16 shows the 256-digit hexadecimal random number preceding the 256-digit hexadecimal random number shown in FIG. 12 together.
- hexadecimal random number sequence a is the same random number sequence as in FIG. 12, and “hexadecimal random number sequence b” is a random number sequence preceding “hexadecimal random number sequence a”. is there.
- FIG. 17 shows a random number sequence divided into two bits for converting this hexadecimal random number sequence into a binary random number sequence and converting it into a quaternary number represented as 0, R, G, B.
- the binary number “00” is made a quaternary number “0”
- the binary number “01” is made a quaternary number “R”
- the binary number “10” is a quaternary number “G”
- the binary number “11” shows the result of conversion to a quaternary number "B”.
- the quaternary number obtained in this manner is 32 columns X similar to the binary number shown in FIG. 11 or FIG.
- FIG. 20 illustrates a method of obtaining a plurality of authentication verifying chips with one random number sequence force.
- (a), (b), (c), and (d) are respectively 16 ⁇ 16 matrix patterns obtained based on the 32 ⁇ 32 matrix pattern shown in FIG.
- a) takes the coordinates (0, 0) as the origin, (a) the coordinates (0, 0) as the origin, (b) the coordinates (1, 0) as the origin, and (c) the coordinates (0, 1) ) Is the origin, and (d) is the origin of coordinates (1, 1).
- one matrix pattern force obtained from the random number sequence shown in FIG. 12 can also obtain a plurality of matrix patterns.
- One random number sequence force In order to obtain a plurality of matrix patterns, in addition to this, the usage start position of the random number sequence shown in FIG. 12 is changed, or the creation of the matrix pattern shown in FIG. Various methods are available.
- the card issuer it becomes possible for the card issuer to keep one random number sequence in secret as a master random number sequence, and to obtain a plurality of matrix patterns based on the master random number sequence. Also, multiple matrix patterns can be automatically managed by origin information.
- FIG. 11 and FIG. 15 record the authentication information by binary numbers represented by 1 bit
- the embodiment shown in FIG. 19 shows the authentication information by binary numbers represented by 2 bits. Are recorded.
- an octal number represented by 3 bits and a hexadecimal number represented by 4 bits can also be used.
- FIG. 21 and 22 show an embodiment of a card for proving the card itself.
- Figure 21 shows the card, and
- Figure 22 shows the functions of the authentication chip and the authentication chip.
- the card 60 has an authentication verifying chip 61 in which card authentication information “A” (Authentication) such as artificial substance mettas etc. is stored, and digitized data “M” (Message) of the authentication authentication information “A”. Is encrypted and designated as encrypted data "C”, and an authentication proof chip 62 storing the encrypted data "C” is attached in a structure that can not be separated from the card body.
- a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 are formed on the upper surface of the card 60.
- the authentication chip 61 and the authentication chip 62 are in different positions as shown in FIG. 21. It may be placed, but it may be placed adjacent or integral.
- the information of the authentication verifying chip 61 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to read correctly when using the card, it is desirable to read after attaching the authentication verifying chip 61 to the card 60.
- a secret-key cryptosystem (Public-key Cryptosystem) and a public-key cryptosystem can be used.
- the secret key used for secret key cryptosystem (Secret-key Cryptosystem) is called the secret key (Secret-key)
- secret key (Secret-key)
- Public key cryptosystems have become popular with the spread of public key cryptosystems.
- the number of people who call private keys (Private-key) used by the system is called Secret-key, so it is sometimes called Common-key to avoid confusion.
- the card 60 is an IC card on which an IC chip is mounted, encrypted data can be stored in the IC chip.
- IC card on which an IC chip is mounted
- encrypted data can be stored in the IC chip.
- one-piece construction or welding method is adopted. Also, you may store encrypted data on the card itself rather than attaching a proof card to the card.
- the encrypted data “C” is decrypted using a predetermined encryption algorithm and an encryption key to obtain decrypted data “M”.
- the information “A ′” of the authentication verifying chip 61 is read.
- the reading means it is most common to use a camera.
- the decoded data “ ⁇ ” is compared with the digitized data “ ⁇ ′”. If they are identical, the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 62 is judged to be valid. If they are different, the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 62 is judged to be incorrect. The card is determined to be fraudulent. In this way, the legitimacy of the authentication chip 61 is proved by the authentication chip 62 existing on the card.
- the power of comparing the data “ ⁇ ” read from the authentication verifying chip 61 with the data “ ⁇ ” decoded from the authentication verifying chip 62 is reversely read from the authentication verifying chip 61. It is also possible to configure so as to compare encrypted data "B” obtained by encrypting the captured data "B” with encrypted data "C” read from the authentication proof chip 62. .
- the data of the proof of authenticity chip 62 is encrypted.
- the encryption system can adopt either a secret key (or common key) encryption system using a single encryption key or a public key system using two encryption keys.
- a combination of a public key and a private key (private key) or a combination of a private key and a public key can be adopted as a key used for encryption and decryption in the public key system.
- an encryption key for decryption is used, but there are a storage place of the encryption key in the server and in the terminal device. If an encryption key is stored in the server and the necessary encryption key is distributed to the terminal device each time authentication of the card is required, a highly secure method can be realized online. If the cryptographic key is stored in the terminal device, authentication of the card can be performed off-line only by the terminal device. However, if the terminal device is stolen, the encryption key will also be stolen. In order to prevent such a situation, the encryption key is stored in the DRAM in the terminal device, and if the power is cut off by destruction or theft of the terminal device, it is stored in the DRAM, If the encryption key is lost, theft of the encryption key can be prevented.
- MD5 Message Digest, which is a representative hash algorithm
- FIGS. 23 and 24 show an example of a card using a hash algorithm.
- Figure 23 shows the card
- Figure 24 shows the functions of the authentication chip and the authentication chip.
- This card 63 hashes an authentication verifying chip 61 in which card authentication authentication information "A" (Authentication) such as artifact metric is stored, and digitized data "M" (Message) of authentication information "A”. It can be converted into a hash value “I”, and the hash value “I” can be encrypted into encrypted data “Ch”, and the authenticity proof chip 64 storing the encrypted data “Ch” can not be separated from the card body. It is attached with the following structure. Also, a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 are formed on the top of the surface of the card 63. It is also possible to use an IC chip in place of or together with the magnetic stripe 2. Further, the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 64 may be disposed at different positions as shown in FIG. 23, but may be disposed adjacent to or integral with each other.
- card authentication authentication information "A" Authentication
- M Message
- 32 bits ⁇ 32 bits 1024 bits (in decimal number) according to the method shown in FIGS. 11 to 20.
- the information of the authentication verifying chip 61 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to read correctly when using the card, it is desirable to read after attaching the authentication verifying chip 61 to the card 63.
- the hash value "H” is encrypted to obtain encrypted data "Ch”.
- a secret key cryptosystem public key cryptosystem
- a public key cryptosystem public key cryptosystem
- the encrypted data “Ch” is recorded and stored in the authentication proof chip 64, and is attached to the card body 63 in a non-separable structure. Recording and storage of encrypted data.
- An appropriate method such as an optical reading and recording method such as a bar code or a two-dimensional bar code, magnetic recording, etc. may be adopted.
- the card 63 is an IC card on which an IC chip is mounted, encrypted data can also be stored in the IC chip.
- encrypted data can also be stored in the IC chip.
- one-piece construction or welding method is adopted. Also, instead of attaching a chip, it may be recorded on the card itself.
- the combination is the same, it is determined that the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 64 is correct. If the combination is different, it is determined that the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 64 is not correct. , The card is determined to be fraudulent. In this way, the legitimacy of the authentication chip 61 is proved by the authentication chip 64 present on the card together with the authentication chip 61.
- the hash value “ ⁇ ′” obtained by hashing the data “ ⁇ ′” read from the authentication verifying chip 61 and the encrypted hash value “Ch” read from the authentication verifying chip 64 are also decoded.
- the encrypted hash value "Ch '” obtained by encrypting the hash value " ⁇ '” obtained by hashing the data " ⁇ '” read from the authentication verifying chip 61 It is also possible to configure to compare the encrypted data "Ch” read from the authentication proof chip 64.
- the authentication chip may be damaged or corrupted, making it impossible to read the authentication information. Then, even if the card is valid, it can not be used. The configuration for preparing for such a situation will be described.
- FIG. 25 and 26 show an example of a card using the ID of the card.
- Figure 25 shows the card
- Figure 26 shows the functions of the authentication chip and the authentication chip shown in Figure 25.
- This card 65 includes an authentication verifying chip 61 storing card authentication authentication information “A” (Authentication) such as artificial substance mettas, and digitized data “M” (Messa ge) of authentication authentication information “A”. Add ID and other information of the card to ID added data "I”, encrypt ID added data "I” and encrypt encrypted data "Ci”, and encrypted data “Hi” It is mounted in a non-separable structure from the stored authentication proof chip 66 1S card body. Also, a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 are formed on the top of the surface of the card 65. It is also possible to use an IC chip instead of the magnetic stripe 2 or together. In addition, although the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 66 may be disposed at different positions as shown in FIG. 25, they may be disposed adjacently or integrally. ! /.
- the information of the authentication verifying chip 61 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to read correctly when using the card, it is desirable to read after attaching the authentication verifying chip 61 to the card 65.
- the ID attached data “I” is encrypted to obtain encrypted data “Ci”.
- a secret key cryptosystem Public Key Cryptosystem
- a public key cryptosystem Public Key Cryptosystem
- the card 65 is an IC card on which an IC chip is mounted, encrypted data can also be stored in the IC chip.
- encrypted data can also be stored in the IC chip.
- one-piece construction or welding method is adopted. Also, instead of attaching a chip, it may be recorded on the card itself.
- Encryption Decrypts the data “Ci” using a predetermined encryption algorithm and encryption key to obtain the decrypted data “I”.
- the information “A ′” of the authentication verifying chip 61 is read.
- the reading means it is also possible to use a reading head or a scanner other than a force camera which most commonly uses a camera.
- the decoded data “I” and the ID added data “ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ” are compared. If the combination is identical, the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 66 is determined to be valid, and if different, the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 66 is determined not to be valid. ,Power Is judged to be fraudulent.
- the legitimacy of the authentication verifying chip 61 is proved by the authentication verifying chip 66 which is both present on the card.
- the data recorded in the authenticity verifying chip 66 is obtained by encrypting the data obtained by adding an ID to the data based on the information of the authenticity verifying chip 61.
- the information “A,” read from the authentication verifying chip 61 is digitally decoded to obtain digital data " ⁇ ” and data " ⁇ ” with card information attached thereto, and the authentication proof chip
- the encrypted data “hi” read from the V.66 is compared with the decrypted data "I”.
- the data “I” obtained by decrypting the data “Ci” read from the authenticity verification chip 66 is also read from the authenticity verification chip 61 and the digital data “M” obtained by removing the mode information. It is also possible to configure the information “ ⁇ ′” to be compared with the digital data “ ⁇ ′” that is digitized.
- the card in which the authenticity verification chip and the authenticity verification chip coexist is managed by the user. Further, in the authentication verifying chip, the authentication verifying information to be encrypted exists in a naked state, and in the authentication verifying chip, encrypted data of the authentication verifying information exists. In such a situation, if the card falls into the hands of a malicious person or if the user is a malicious person, the encryption is broken and the encryption key is known. We will explain the configuration to prevent such a situation.
- FIG. 27 and FIG. 28 show an embodiment of a card using an electronic permeability.
- the card is shown in FIG. 27, and the functions of the authentication verifying chip and the authentication verifying chip shown in FIG. 27 are shown in FIG.
- This card 67 includes an authentication verifying chip 61 in which card authentication authentication information “A” (Authentication) such as artificial substance mettas and the digitized data “M” of authentication authentication information “A” (Messa (Messa Digital watermarking (Water Marking) is added to "ge” to create digital watermarked data “W”, and the digital watermarked data “W” is encrypted to encrypt data "Cw” and encrypted.
- An authentication proof chip 68 in which data "Cw” is stored is attached in a structure that can not be separated from the card body. Also, a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 are formed on the top of the surface of the card 67. It is also possible to use an IC chip in place of or together with the magnetic stripe 2.
- the authentication chip 61 and the authentication chip 68 may be disposed at different positions as shown in FIG. ,.
- the information of the authentication verifying chip 61 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to read correctly when using the card, it is desirable to read after attaching the authentication verifying chip 61 to the card 67.
- a digital watermark is attached to the digital data "M” to obtain digital watermarked data "W”.
- the digitally watermarked data “W” is encrypted to obtain encrypted data “Cw”.
- the encrypted data “Cw” is recorded and stored in the authentication proof chip 68, and is attached to the card body 55 in a non-separable structure. Recording and storage of encrypted data.
- An appropriate method such as an optical reading and recording method such as a bar code or a two-dimensional bar code, magnetic recording, etc. may be adopted.
- the card 67 is an IC card on which an IC chip is mounted, encrypted data can also be stored in the IC chip.
- encrypted data can also be stored in the IC chip.
- one-piece construction or welding method is adopted. Also, instead of attaching a chip, it may be recorded on the card itself.
- the encrypted data “Cw” is decrypted using a predetermined encryption algorithm and an encryption key to obtain decrypted data “W”.
- the information “A ′” of the authentication verifying chip 61 is read.
- the reading means it is also possible to use a reading head or a scanner other than a force camera which most commonly uses a camera.
- a digital watermark is attached to the digital data “ ⁇ ′” to obtain digital watermark added data “W ′”.
- Decrypted data “W” is compared with hash value “W,”. If the combination is the same, the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 68 is determined to be valid, and if different, the combination of the authentication verifying chip 61 and the authentication verifying chip 68 is determined not to be valid. Ru.
- the legitimacy of the authentication verifying chip 61 is proved by the authentication verifying chip 68 which is both present on the card.
- the data recorded in the authenticity verifying chip 68 is obtained by encrypting data obtained by adding an electronic permeability to data based on the information of the authenticity verifying chip 61.
- the information "A,” read from the authentication verifying chip 61 is digitized to obtain digital data " ⁇ '", and the data "W,” to which the digital watermark is added, and the authentication verifying chip 68
- the encrypted data "Cw” read from is compared with the decrypted data "W”.
- this is the data [W] obtained by decrypting the data "Cw” read from the authentication proof chip 68, and the digital data "M” obtained by removing the card information and the reading from the authentication test chip 61. It is also possible to configure the information " ⁇ '" to be compared with the digital data " ⁇ '" which is digitalized.
- the example of the proof chip described above has the basic configuration shown in the first example of the proof chip.
- the hash algorithm is used in the second example of the proof chip.
- the ID of a card or the like is used in the third example of the proof chip.
- forging is made difficult by the addition of electronic permeability.
- a sensor at the entrance of the card senses that and takes the card into the device.
- the terminal When loading a card, the terminal reads the card information of the magnetic recording unit of the card. (3) The terminal determines whether the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal.
- the terminal device ejects the card as an improper card which can not be handled.
- the terminal device performs mechanical scanning using the movement of the card at the time of loading the card, or reads the authentication information of the authentication chip when the card is stopped.
- the terminal device determines whether the read card authentication information is correct.
- the terminal determines that the card authentication information is not correct, it is determined that the inserted card is not legitimate, the card is discharged, and the process is terminated.
- the terminal device determines that the card authentication information is legitimate, it requests the user to perform further input operation such as payment amount.
- the user performs an input operation such as a withdrawal amount according to the request.
- the host computer determines whether or not the content of the input operation such as the amount of withdrawal is appropriate.
- the host computer determines that the contents of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount are appropriate, the host computer outputs it by withdrawal and the like, discharges the card from the terminal device, and ends the processing.
- the card in the first embodiment of the card authentication processing flow, when the card authentication information is not correct, the card is also discharged while the authentication information is not correct. , Take the card to the terminal and issue an alarm. This makes it easy to detect fraudulent cards.
- a sensor at the entrance of the card senses that and takes the card into the device. .
- the terminal When loading a card, the terminal reads the magnetic recording unit power card information of the card.
- the terminal determines whether the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal.
- the terminal device ejects the card as an improper card which can not be handled.
- the terminal device performs mechanical scanning using the movement of the card at the time of loading the card, or reads the authentication information of the authentication chip when the card is stopped.
- the terminal device determines whether the read card authentication information is correct.
- the terminal determines that the card authentication information is not correct, it determines that the inserted card is not legitimate, stores the card in the terminal and issues an alarm.
- the terminal device determines that the card authentication information is legitimate, it requests the user to perform an additional input operation such as a payment amount.
- the host computer determines whether or not the content of the input operation such as the amount of withdrawal is appropriate.
- the host computer has determined that the contents of the input operation such as withdrawal amount are appropriate At the same time, the card is output by withdrawal, etc., the card is discharged, and the processing is completed.
- the card in the second embodiment of the card authentication processing flow, when the card authentication information is not correct, the card is immediately taken into the terminal and only an alarm is issued, Have the person perform the operation.
- the sensor at the entrance of the card senses that and takes the card into the device.
- the terminal When loading a card, the terminal reads the magnetic recording unit power card information of the card.
- the terminal device determines whether the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal device.
- the terminal device ejects the card as an improper card which can not be handled.
- the terminal device performs mechanical scanning that uses the movement of the card when loading the card, or reads the authentication information of the authentication chip when the card is stopped.
- the terminal device determines whether the read card authenticity authentication information is correct or not.
- the terminal device determines that the card authentication information is not correct, it requests the user to perform further input operation such as withdrawal amount.
- the card is stored in the terminal device and an alarm is issued.
- the user performs an input operation such as withdrawal amount according to the request.
- the host computer determines whether or not the content of the input operation such as the amount of withdrawal is appropriate.
- the card having the card authentication chip and the card authentication chip described above can be adopted as a bank cash card, credit card, prepaid card, point card, securities, ID card, entry card, certificate, etc. is there.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP06834934A EP1965341A4 (en) | 2005-12-19 | 2006-12-19 | CARD WITH THE ABILITY TO AUTHENTICATE |
JP2007551081A JP5274020B2 (ja) | 2005-12-19 | 2006-12-19 | 真贋判別可能なカード |
US12/097,914 US8235286B2 (en) | 2005-12-19 | 2006-12-19 | Card capable of authentication |
Applications Claiming Priority (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2005-365416 | 2005-12-19 | ||
JP2005365416 | 2005-12-19 | ||
JP2006-200823 | 2006-07-24 | ||
JP2006200823 | 2006-07-24 | ||
JP2006287714 | 2006-10-23 | ||
JP2006-287714 | 2006-10-23 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2007072793A1 true WO2007072793A1 (ja) | 2007-06-28 |
Family
ID=38188570
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2006/325224 WO2007072793A1 (ja) | 2005-12-19 | 2006-12-19 | 真贋判別可能なカード |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8235286B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1965341A4 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP5274020B2 (ja) |
RU (1) | RU2011130614A (ja) |
TW (1) | TWI438698B (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2007072793A1 (ja) |
Cited By (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2009075711A (ja) * | 2007-09-19 | 2009-04-09 | Toppan Printing Co Ltd | 偽造防止用icラベル |
WO2009072387A1 (ja) | 2007-12-03 | 2009-06-11 | International Frontier Technology Laboratory, Inc. | 真贋証明部材 |
JP2011002938A (ja) * | 2009-06-17 | 2011-01-06 | Univ Of Aizu | 認証カード、カード認証端末、カード認証サーバおよびカード認証システム |
JP2011526113A (ja) * | 2008-06-27 | 2011-09-29 | コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ | アイテムの真正性、完全性、及び/又は物理的状態を検証するための装置、システム、及び方法 |
WO2014016883A1 (ja) * | 2012-07-23 | 2014-01-30 | 昌栄印刷株式会社 | Icカード真贋判定システム及びそのシステムで使用されるicカード |
JP2018515048A (ja) * | 2015-04-06 | 2018-06-07 | ビットマーク, インコーポレイテッドBitmark, Inc. | 非集中型のタイトル記録および認証のためのシステムならびに方法 |
Families Citing this family (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7162035B1 (en) | 2000-05-24 | 2007-01-09 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
US8171567B1 (en) | 2002-09-04 | 2012-05-01 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
US7995196B1 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2011-08-09 | Tracer Detection Technology Corp. | Authentication method and system |
ES2411529B1 (es) * | 2012-01-04 | 2014-08-18 | José MARTINEZ MARTINEZ | Dispositivo y método de identificación de personas |
US9135543B2 (en) * | 2012-06-20 | 2015-09-15 | Apple Inc. | Compression and obfuscation of three-dimensional coding |
US9514594B1 (en) | 2015-08-11 | 2016-12-06 | Comdata, Inc. | Metallic stored value token and method of manufacture |
CN108038694B (zh) * | 2017-12-11 | 2019-03-29 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | 一种具有指纹验证功能的金融卡及其工作方法 |
TWI626595B (zh) * | 2017-12-27 | 2018-06-11 | 中華電信股份有限公司 | 晶片內容與卡片防偽印刷結合的驗證方法 |
CN109711219A (zh) * | 2018-12-27 | 2019-05-03 | 厦门中控智慧信息技术有限公司 | 一种检测集成电路复制卡的方法、装置及存储介质 |
DE112021002823T5 (de) | 2020-05-18 | 2023-03-02 | Fanuc Corporation | Robotersteuervorrichtung und Robotersystem |
Citations (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH0632091A (ja) * | 1992-07-14 | 1994-02-08 | Nhk Spring Co Ltd | 感磁性ワイヤを含有した被検出物とこの被検出物の真偽を判別する方法および処理装置 |
JPH08194790A (ja) * | 1995-01-18 | 1996-07-30 | Apo Syst Kk | 2次元コードカードシステム |
JPH106673A (ja) * | 1996-06-21 | 1998-01-13 | Japan Exlan Co Ltd | 真正さがチェックされる被検出物とその製造方法 |
JPH1016458A (ja) * | 1996-07-02 | 1998-01-20 | Micro Denshi Syst:Kk | データ記録媒体及びその真偽判定システム |
JPH1044650A (ja) * | 1996-08-05 | 1998-02-17 | Otax Kk | データキャリア |
JPH11259623A (ja) * | 1998-03-10 | 1999-09-24 | Shinsei Kagaku Kogyo Co Ltd | 構造体 |
JP2001022907A (ja) * | 1999-07-13 | 2001-01-26 | Oki Electric Ind Co Ltd | カード状媒体処理装置 |
JP2004171109A (ja) * | 2002-11-18 | 2004-06-17 | Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> | デバイス認証システム |
Family Cites Families (57)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3793489A (en) * | 1972-05-22 | 1974-02-19 | Rca Corp | Ultradirectional microphone |
US4400724A (en) * | 1981-06-08 | 1983-08-23 | The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Army | Virtual space teleconference system |
US4494144A (en) * | 1982-06-28 | 1985-01-15 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Reduced bandwidth video transmission |
US4750123A (en) * | 1985-08-30 | 1988-06-07 | Texas Instruments Incorporated | Method for predicting tracking cameras for free-roaming mobile robots |
US5136652A (en) * | 1985-11-14 | 1992-08-04 | Ncr Corporation | Amplitude enhanced sampled clipped speech encoder and decoder |
US4827253A (en) * | 1987-05-18 | 1989-05-02 | Dubner Computer Systems, Inc. | Video compositing using a software linear keyer |
US5145212A (en) | 1988-02-12 | 1992-09-08 | American Banknote Holographics, Inc. | Non-continuous holograms, methods of making them and articles incorporating them |
US4890314A (en) * | 1988-08-26 | 1989-12-26 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Teleconference facility with high resolution video display |
US5003532A (en) * | 1989-06-02 | 1991-03-26 | Fujitsu Limited | Multi-point conference system |
US5020098A (en) * | 1989-11-03 | 1991-05-28 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Telephone conferencing arrangement |
US5255211A (en) * | 1990-02-22 | 1993-10-19 | Redmond Productions, Inc. | Methods and apparatus for generating and processing synthetic and absolute real time environments |
US5268734A (en) * | 1990-05-31 | 1993-12-07 | Parkervision, Inc. | Remote tracking system for moving picture cameras and method |
US5374954A (en) * | 1990-10-11 | 1994-12-20 | Harry E. Mowry | Video system for producing video image simulating the appearance of motion picture or other photographic film |
FR2671210A1 (fr) | 1990-12-28 | 1992-07-03 | Villa Pierre | Procede d'identification et d'authentification d'informations caracterisant un individu. |
US5200818A (en) * | 1991-03-22 | 1993-04-06 | Inbal Neta | Video imaging system with interactive windowing capability |
US5506992A (en) * | 1992-01-30 | 1996-04-09 | Saxenmeyer; George | Distributed processing system with asynchronous communication between processing modules |
DE69327501D1 (de) * | 1992-10-13 | 2000-02-10 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | Schallumgebungsimulator und Verfahren zur Schallfeldanalyse |
US5337363A (en) * | 1992-11-02 | 1994-08-09 | The 3Do Company | Method for generating three dimensional sound |
US5359362A (en) * | 1993-03-30 | 1994-10-25 | Nec Usa, Inc. | Videoconference system using a virtual camera image |
US5448287A (en) * | 1993-05-03 | 1995-09-05 | Hull; Andrea S. | Spatial video display system |
FR2738971B1 (fr) * | 1995-09-19 | 1997-10-10 | Schlumberger Ind Sa | Procede de determination d'une cle de cryptage associee a un circuit integre |
JPH0990887A (ja) * | 1995-09-26 | 1997-04-04 | Toppan Printing Co Ltd | 磁気記録体及び磁気記録体の記録消去方法並びに磁気記録体の記録消去装置 |
DE19541071A1 (de) * | 1995-11-03 | 1997-05-07 | Bundesdruckerei Gmbh | Verfahren zur Herstellung von nachahmungssicheren, Echtheitsmerkmale aufweisenden Hologrammen und Lesegerät zum Prüfen der Echtheit |
JP3117122B2 (ja) * | 1996-03-13 | 2000-12-11 | 勉 松本 | 認証式セキュリティシステム |
US6904525B1 (en) | 1997-07-01 | 2005-06-07 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Method for preventing counterfeiting of articles of manufacture |
US6182892B1 (en) * | 1998-03-25 | 2001-02-06 | Compaq Computer Corporation | Smart card with fingerprint image pass-through |
US6325420B1 (en) * | 1998-08-17 | 2001-12-04 | Inspectron Corporation | Method for embedding non-intrusive encoded data in printed matter and system for reading same |
JP4489251B2 (ja) * | 1999-06-17 | 2010-06-23 | 大日本印刷株式会社 | くじの製造方法、くじの製造装置、ならびにくじ付刊行物 |
JP2001052143A (ja) | 1999-08-09 | 2001-02-23 | Mega Chips Corp | 認証用記録媒体および認証システム |
DE19940341A1 (de) | 1999-08-25 | 2001-03-01 | Kolja Vogel | Verfahren zum Schutz von Daten |
US7306158B2 (en) | 2001-07-10 | 2007-12-11 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Clear contactless card |
WO2001024107A2 (en) * | 1999-09-30 | 2001-04-05 | Dna Technologies, Inc. | Product authentication system |
EA003919B1 (ru) | 1999-12-08 | 2003-10-30 | Валентин Александрович Мищенко | Способ и система для маркировки и идентификации изделий |
DE19962790A1 (de) * | 1999-12-23 | 2001-06-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Sicherheitspapier mit aufgebrachter Codierung aus lumineszierenden Melierfasern |
JP4370721B2 (ja) | 2000-04-06 | 2009-11-25 | ソニー株式会社 | 情報記録装置、情報再生装置、情報記録方法、情報再生方法、キー更新端末装置、世代管理キー更新方法、および情報記録媒体、並びにプログラム提供媒体 |
DE60042317D1 (de) | 2000-04-11 | 2009-07-16 | Stephen P Mcgrew | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Lesen und Überprüfen von Hologrammen |
JP4608769B2 (ja) * | 2000-12-05 | 2011-01-12 | 凸版印刷株式会社 | ホログラム・チェック用プレート |
US6601771B2 (en) * | 2001-04-09 | 2003-08-05 | Smart Card Integrators, Inc. | Combined smartcard and magnetic-stripe card and reader and associated method |
US20020157002A1 (en) | 2001-04-18 | 2002-10-24 | Messerges Thomas S. | System and method for secure and convenient management of digital electronic content |
US8543823B2 (en) | 2001-04-30 | 2013-09-24 | Digimarc Corporation | Digital watermarking for identification documents |
JP2003029636A (ja) | 2001-07-16 | 2003-01-31 | Yatsuka Nakamura | 識別用タグ |
JP2003058055A (ja) * | 2001-08-13 | 2003-02-28 | Shiseido Co Ltd | 積層体 |
JP2003085525A (ja) * | 2001-09-13 | 2003-03-20 | Konica Corp | Icカード及びカード認証方法 |
JP2003108958A (ja) * | 2001-09-28 | 2003-04-11 | Konica Corp | Icカード及びicカードの製造方法 |
US20050212657A1 (en) * | 2001-11-07 | 2005-09-29 | Rudy Simon | Identity verification system with self-authenticating card |
JP2005521798A (ja) * | 2001-12-20 | 2005-07-21 | ハネウェル・インターナショナル・インコーポレーテッド | 多重応答物理的着色剤を含む不正防止物品 |
US7054007B2 (en) * | 2002-02-08 | 2006-05-30 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Calibration wafer for a stepper |
US7529906B2 (en) | 2003-08-18 | 2009-05-05 | Cray Incorporated | Sharing memory within an application using scalable hardware resources |
EP1475242B1 (en) * | 2003-04-30 | 2008-10-08 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Authentication method and system |
JP2005055735A (ja) * | 2003-08-06 | 2005-03-03 | Id Technica:Kk | Dna塩基配列を識別情報として使用する識別情報保持物、識別対象物及び認証方法 |
US7672475B2 (en) | 2003-12-11 | 2010-03-02 | Fraudhalt Limited | Method and apparatus for verifying a hologram and a credit card |
US20050194454A1 (en) * | 2004-02-06 | 2005-09-08 | T-Ink, Llc | Personal card system featuring integrated circuit |
JP2005228445A (ja) | 2004-02-16 | 2005-08-25 | Nichia Chem Ind Ltd | 有価保証物 |
GB0403569D0 (en) * | 2004-02-18 | 2004-03-24 | Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd | Apparatus and method for identifying an object having randomly distributed identification elements |
US20080154751A1 (en) * | 2004-07-30 | 2008-06-26 | Earth Class Mail Corporation | Sortation and extraction system for item management systems and associated methods |
USD626103S1 (en) * | 2010-03-21 | 2010-10-26 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Video unit with integrated features |
USD626102S1 (en) * | 2010-03-21 | 2010-10-26 | Cisco Tech Inc | Video unit with integrated features |
-
2006
- 2006-12-19 JP JP2007551081A patent/JP5274020B2/ja active Active
- 2006-12-19 US US12/097,914 patent/US8235286B2/en active Active
- 2006-12-19 TW TW095147699A patent/TWI438698B/zh active
- 2006-12-19 EP EP06834934A patent/EP1965341A4/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2006-12-19 WO PCT/JP2006/325224 patent/WO2007072793A1/ja active Application Filing
-
2011
- 2011-07-21 RU RU2011130614/08A patent/RU2011130614A/ru unknown
Patent Citations (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH0632091A (ja) * | 1992-07-14 | 1994-02-08 | Nhk Spring Co Ltd | 感磁性ワイヤを含有した被検出物とこの被検出物の真偽を判別する方法および処理装置 |
JPH08194790A (ja) * | 1995-01-18 | 1996-07-30 | Apo Syst Kk | 2次元コードカードシステム |
JPH106673A (ja) * | 1996-06-21 | 1998-01-13 | Japan Exlan Co Ltd | 真正さがチェックされる被検出物とその製造方法 |
JPH1016458A (ja) * | 1996-07-02 | 1998-01-20 | Micro Denshi Syst:Kk | データ記録媒体及びその真偽判定システム |
JPH1044650A (ja) * | 1996-08-05 | 1998-02-17 | Otax Kk | データキャリア |
JPH11259623A (ja) * | 1998-03-10 | 1999-09-24 | Shinsei Kagaku Kogyo Co Ltd | 構造体 |
JP2001022907A (ja) * | 1999-07-13 | 2001-01-26 | Oki Electric Ind Co Ltd | カード状媒体処理装置 |
JP2004171109A (ja) * | 2002-11-18 | 2004-06-17 | Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> | デバイス認証システム |
Cited By (9)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2009075711A (ja) * | 2007-09-19 | 2009-04-09 | Toppan Printing Co Ltd | 偽造防止用icラベル |
WO2009072387A1 (ja) | 2007-12-03 | 2009-06-11 | International Frontier Technology Laboratory, Inc. | 真贋証明部材 |
JPWO2009072387A1 (ja) * | 2007-12-03 | 2011-04-21 | 国際先端技術総合研究所株式会社 | 真贋証明方法、真贋証明部材及び真贋証明部材の製造方法 |
US9202328B2 (en) | 2007-12-03 | 2015-12-01 | International Frontier Technology Laboratory, Inc. | Authentication verifying method, authentication verifying member and authentication verifying member producing method |
JP2011526113A (ja) * | 2008-06-27 | 2011-09-29 | コーニンクレッカ フィリップス エレクトロニクス エヌ ヴィ | アイテムの真正性、完全性、及び/又は物理的状態を検証するための装置、システム、及び方法 |
JP2011002938A (ja) * | 2009-06-17 | 2011-01-06 | Univ Of Aizu | 認証カード、カード認証端末、カード認証サーバおよびカード認証システム |
WO2014016883A1 (ja) * | 2012-07-23 | 2014-01-30 | 昌栄印刷株式会社 | Icカード真贋判定システム及びそのシステムで使用されるicカード |
JPWO2014016883A1 (ja) * | 2012-07-23 | 2016-07-07 | 昌栄印刷株式会社 | Icカード真贋判定システム及びそのシステムで使用されるicカード |
JP2018515048A (ja) * | 2015-04-06 | 2018-06-07 | ビットマーク, インコーポレイテッドBitmark, Inc. | 非集中型のタイトル記録および認証のためのシステムならびに方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
TWI438698B (zh) | 2014-05-21 |
EP1965341A4 (en) | 2010-04-28 |
JP5274020B2 (ja) | 2013-08-28 |
US8235286B2 (en) | 2012-08-07 |
US20100044431A1 (en) | 2010-02-25 |
RU2011130614A (ru) | 2013-01-27 |
JPWO2007072793A1 (ja) | 2009-05-28 |
EP1965341A1 (en) | 2008-09-03 |
TW200805172A (en) | 2008-01-16 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
JP5274020B2 (ja) | 真贋判別可能なカード | |
US11924356B2 (en) | Authentication method and system | |
US8408470B2 (en) | Object for authentication verification, authentication verifying chip reading device and authentication judging method | |
RU2435218C2 (ru) | Карта с возможностью аутентификации | |
US7080041B2 (en) | System and method for production and authentication of original documents | |
JPWO2007072795A1 (ja) | 蛍光体粒子チップにより真贋判別可能なカード | |
AU682778B2 (en) | Authentication technique | |
CN101395619A (zh) | 能够判别真伪的卡 | |
KR100821080B1 (ko) | 유가증권, 이의 제조 방법 및 검사 방법 | |
WO2007072796A1 (ja) | 放射性物質チップにより真贋判別可能なカード | |
JP2005193584A (ja) | 偽造防止情報担体およびその認証方法 |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 200680047647.3 Country of ref document: CN |
|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application | ||
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2007551081 Country of ref document: JP |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2006834934 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2008129804 Country of ref document: RU |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 12097914 Country of ref document: US |