EP0922924A1 - Sealing and guiding arrangement for high speed protection element which activate at a certain distance - Google Patents

Abstract

Protection is given by enclosed units such that the mass of defensive elements (14) is 1 - 2 times that of the threat (16c) against which action is taken. The defensive elements are accelerated to a speed of 100 to 500 m/s. Elements may be accelerated chemically, mechanically, pneumatically or by a hybrid combination and two or more elements can be accelerated in different directions (15).

Description

The invention relates to a sealing and guiding device for highly dynamic Accelerate distance-effective, weight-optimized protective elements against impact (KE) projectiles, shaped charge ammunition (HL) and explosive-shaped Projectiles (EFP) according to the preamble of claim 1.

Over the past few decades, the breakthrough performance of both Hollow charge (HL) and balancing (KE) projectiles raised in such a way that with inert protective structures, even with heavy armored vehicles a measure of basis weights that can hardly be realized is required. Since this trend will continue to increase in the future, there have been a number for years of special armor, which compared to steel of the same mass have increased protection.

In addition to the use of special protective materials, it has been particularly since In the early 1970s, so-called reactive armor (ERA) was tested decisive improvements in the especially against HL projectiles Protection performance and thus a reduction in the basis weight. The The principle is that in a sandwich structure made of e.g. Steel sheet / explosives / Steel sheet through the impacting or penetrating projectile of the explosives is initiated and by the correspondingly accelerated steel sheets (plates) lateral effects on the penetrating projectile (HL beam or KE penetrator) be achieved. Because of the very short available This acceleration process must not only be initiated very quickly but also correspondingly high plate speeds can be achieved. For end ballistic reasons e.g. for KE projectiles at such surface configurations, depending on the angle of inclination, the disk speed 15% to 30% of the projectile speed to be sufficient To achieve protection performance. This limits the ones to be realized Sheet thicknesses, which are usually for shaped charges in the mm range, against force (KE) In special cases, storeys are a few centimeters thick.

Both required conditions, both ignition without any significant time delay, as well as a very high disk speed, can be used in flat and simple structures can only be reached with explosives.

Since, in particular due to the fact that the point of impact of the projectile on the reactive protective element is not known precisely enough and the reactive elements have to act on the penetrating threat for a certain time, their area cannot be reduced arbitrarily. The lateral dimensions of such protective modules, which are already in use in a wide variety of battle tanks worldwide, are in the order of 0.1 to 0.3 m ² . Due to the above-mentioned conditions, explosive thicknesses of 4 mm to 8 mm result and therefore relatively high explosive masses. This means that in addition to the shock load, very substantial energies or impulses are also transmitted to the supporting structure. In the case of massive reactive defense systems, these can certainly be compared with those of the threat that is encountered. (Reference value: For a plate energy of approximately 1 MJ, approximately 1 kg of explosives are required for acceleration).

The so-called specific is of particular importance in this context Basis mass or the factor "equivalent" steel mass / actually required Steel mass per surface element (Em factor) too. It is a measure of efficiency (Mass) of armor.

The mentioned reactive armor with a larger surface area are with favorable end ballistic dimensioning over that with inert special materials achievable values, however, it should be for a realistic estimate at least some of those specifically required for the use of reactive elements Masses (fasteners, webs, etc.) are taken into account. This condition depending on the point of view, reduces the Em factor for large-area elements or unfavorable interpretations such that a mass-efficient and therefore meaningful use is questioned.

When using relatively small but highly effective defense elements (AR), how they are proposed with this invention, however, result relatively favorable mass coefficients. Because on the one hand only masses are accelerated that come into effect immediately, the other are the so-called dead or Loss masses due to the small modules and the low structural loads comparatively low when shot.

Another problem that is technically very difficult to solve is reactive Orders to limit the detonation to a certain flat element, without further damage or even a sympathetic detonation of the surrounding To cause protective elements. This fact, connected with the Demand for the longest possible exposure to the floor determines this the size of the defense plates, and the huge energy of the accelerated ones Defense elements has the consequence that such systems primarily as so-called modular reactive protective elements on the outer surface of the to be protected Vehicles can be applied.

A number of disadvantages and limitations when using uncontrolled reactive armouring can be caused by the transition to spark ignition reactive protective elements can be avoided. However, this must be sufficient precise information regarding the time and location of the persons to be defended Known threat. These are controlled by sensors and downstream Calculator determined. If this is guaranteed, significantly smaller areas for the defense units are realized. Such sensor-based systems are commonly referred to as active.

Another important aspect for the use of such systems is in their sensitivity to interference or targeted countermeasures. These can, for example, be fired at with smaller threats (machine gun) with the aim of a flat trigger or in the fire with Tandem - shot.

The relatively small areas of the solution proposed in this invention work counter these conceivable countermeasures. Furthermore, with always comparably low structural loads two or more defense elements be accelerated (e.g. for redundancy or multiple control). Furthermore the flat "small" acceleration systems are relatively well protected, e.g. by means of protective elements or protective covers, that of fragments or smaller ones Bullets are not penetrated.

But even the penetration of a fragment or projectile into a certain one Depth does not reduce the effectiveness of the defense elements. Because just theirs Spark ignition makes them opposite to an accidental or smaller one Insensitive to the desired trigger.

In any case, only a relatively small defense effective area, even with one Failure disabled, an essential argument for use smallest possible defense elements and especially for the possibility of use redundant systems.

Because of the ever increasing threat from more powerful penetrators in terms of impact geometry and kinetic or chemical energy and especially the values to be expected in the foreseeable future, e.g. is with KE ammunition an increase from currently about 8 MJ to 15 MJ and more was conceivable Developed concepts that match the threat with defense elements if possible outside of the objects to be protected. This is achieved with so-called "distance-effective" protective elements. Such Systems are used on the part of basic research in particular by the German-French Research institute (ISL) proposed since the mid-80s. Corresponding experiments with KE ammunition against HL ammunition are also already in progress known. Since the distance-effective protective elements a certain time before If the threat must be activated, they require a corresponding one Sensor technology in connection with a control and a triggering device.

Coming as acceleration media for active or distance-effective systems primarily explosives. Likewise, for a number of years now also electromagnetic acceleration devices in basic research examined. On the other hand, sensor-controlled systems open up the Possibility to use acceleration systems that take longer to initiate than with pure explosives. Here are deflagrating systems and certain propellant powder structures of importance. Are the ignition delay times with explosives in the order of a few microseconds (µs), see above for deflagrating systems they are currently in the order of 100 - 500 µs. Deflagrating components are e.g. porous hexogen-wax mixtures or classic LOVA powder in question. Deflagrating systems will has also been fundamentally examined in the ISL for a long time.

When using propellant powder (TLP) is with a minimal amount of time for calculate the ignition process in the order of 1000 µs. The efficiency of deflagrating systems as well as superstructures with TLP as a drive depends crucially on a precise ignition and one uniform ignition. That this is possible and that with such Systems can also achieve speeds of several 100 m / s, was demonstrated years ago in the ISL.

A combination of electromagnetic acceleration is also a hybrid drive and additional chemical energy, e.g. by using pressure sensitive substances such as perchlorates (e.g. potassium perchlorate). Here is due to the mechanical shot load of the defense element at the beginning the electromagnetic acceleration the perchlorate powder on the ground (in Pot) of the protective element or between the two coils initiated spontaneously: This generates a large amount of gas, which is also the defense element in the exhaust pot accelerates. Future-oriented hybrid drives are also conceivable where, for example, a plasma as a drive medium through electrical energy is produced.

Regarding a technical application in armored structures have acceleration systems a decisive one based on detonating explosives Disadvantage. They always cause a shock load. With that the dynamic yield limits of the surrounding materials are inevitable exceeded, so that there are permanent deformations. Farther are very large loads on the surrounding, but also in such systems of the supporting structure cannot be avoided. This requires compensation in the As a rule, considerable additional masses, which correspond to the gain in protection Reduce. At the same time, this makes it technically sensible to accelerate Mass limited or determined.

The shock load can be mitigated when using explosives by adding "thinning" components (inert powder, PU foam Etc.). This means that the plastic deformation in the near area can be particularly effective higher speeds of the defense elements can hardly be prevented, however is this with optimal design and coordination of speeds and Limit masses clearly. With such measures, however, the ignition of the explosive mixture difficult.

A number of proposals are known for reducing the protective composition to use "active armor" for vehicles and ships. Basically Such protection systems are characterized by the fact that the incoming threat a defensive mass is moved against. A focus of these considerations lies in the triggering of shaped charges (e.g. DE 9 77 984) or Cutting charges (US 3,895,368) perpendicular to the direction of the threat. Other Protection systems directly provide explosive charges for defense (e.g. DE 9 78 036).

However, the basic principle here is that relatively solid bodies, such as balancing projectiles, by shaped charges, cutting charges or by the explosion of explosives can hardly be adversely affected and can in no way be significantly destroyed.

A second class of such proposals can be summarized by that to defend against KE threats in relation to the penetrator diameter relatively large areas (armor plates) laterally against penetrating Projectiles are accelerated. The patent specifications DE 29 06 378 C1 and DE 27 19 150 C1. The same applies to all such solutions common that the moving plates also in relation to the protective compound constitute an integral part of the armor. Besides the fact that the acceleration such large masses is associated with the greatest problems the protective balance (efficiency) even against the simplest inert protective structures in any case worse if they are required for such constructions Dead masses are taken into account. Also is an acceleration with Explosives do not avoid the impacted edges of the moving Plates are significantly plastically deformed. It is also easy to estimate that the protective plates given energy or the impulse given at least in the order of magnitude of the projectile energy or the projectile impulse lie. If anything, such concepts can only be used once in action occur, especially after an interaction in which only a relatively small mass fraction the flying heavy armor plates usually come into effect also have to be caught again. All of these points leave such concepts seem unrealistic.

Another protective device against an approaching projectile is from DE 195 05 629 A1 known, in the sling plate modules no longer directly from the structure of the vehicle to be protected, but rather in a stem attached to the forehead of a main battle tank. When the protection module is triggered, the two heavy protection plates hurled in the opposite direction, only one of the two Protection plates come into interaction. This does make the reaction forces largely reduced to the armored vehicle structure, but the mass balance is due to the high dead masses (stem, second sling plate) very bad.

Other known proposals deal with controlled, reactive armor, as shown for example in the patent DE 44 40 120 A1. The effect here too, as with the simple reactive arrangements, which be initiated by the threat itself, by a flat against the side Threat accelerated disk. This principle basically requires a larger one Angle of attack of the armor, combined with larger air gaps as freedom of movement for the reactive components.

The solution specified in DE 44 40 120 A1 is also for reactive Systems unfavorable, because here the blasted plates have considerable counterweights would need. Also, the reactive elements should only be against one already disassembled storey, which significantly reduces the overall efficiency becomes. So there is no positive relationship between effort and benefit.

Basically, disruptive elements should be positioned as far as possible from the space or object to be protected, since the subsequent flight path (deflection path) of the disturbed penetrator is of great importance for efficiency due to the continued lateral movement. With large distances between the defense element / KE threat in front of the structure in the order of a few penetrator lengths, for example 2 to 5 m in relation to the 120 mm DM 33 (L _penetrator = 505 mm), such large projectile impairments can be expected that the subsequent armor structure can be carried out much easier. With smaller distances between the defense element / threat and follow structure in the order of magnitude of a penetrator length or less, the interaction between the defense element and the downstream armor plays a role that increases with decreasing distance, since both components are in engagement with the penetrator practically simultaneously.

In known active protective arrangements, the interference elements or their facilities mostly behind relatively massive pre-armor or behind upstream multi-plate armor, such as in DE 44 40 120 A1 shown. But this makes the overall effectiveness and only this is decisive, basically reduced, because the upstream armor only classic Achieve protection performance values. Only the use of the penetrator disassembling or the HL beam dissipating, distance effective and smallest possible Protective elements in connection with an adapted, passive subsequent armor takes into account the effective protection performance of an overall armor of the dead masses for the distance-effective component.

There is little impact on threats that are already broken or that have already been created difficult to control efficiently and in terms of time and location. It must also be taken into account that different threats from different directions ever penetrate through armor completely differently according to speed.

This basically means that a protective element effective from a distance to one protective structure or should be arranged in front of a main armor. Just then it is ensured that the defense element is still largely undamaged Threat hits and can therefore have an optimal effect. With more suitable Shape of the armored vehicle or angle of attack in the side area (Flank angle) can ensure a polyvalent mode of action the total armor the distance-effective protective element behind one be positioned thin buckling device. This ensures a high level of protection against heavy hollow loads or tandem HL guaranteed.

Another crucial characteristic for the quality of a protective arrangement is in their range of use. So the solutions known so far are mostly up very specific positions, e.g. tied to armored vehicles, such partly extremely heavy or large impulses, active or reactive Protection systems can wear at all. With that, they're usually up limited the vehicle bow area. But this is especially the case with armored vehicles Vehicles of all weight classes not only the smaller area proportion of one Armor, but is also special because of the spatial possibilities well with conventional technologies, e.g. to protect purely passively.

Figur 1

schematisierte Ansicht eines Fahrzeuges mit den Einsatzbereichen für abstandswirksame Schutzelemente gegen KE und HL;

Figur 1.1

schematisierte Ansicht eines Fahrzeuges mit dem Einsatzbereich für abstandswirksame Schutzelemente gegen EFP;

Figur 2

Anordnung und Bahnen der Abwehrelemente gegen HL und KE;

Figur 2.1

Anordnung und Bahnen der Abwehrelemente gegen EFP;

Figur 3

schematische Darstellung der Interaktion zwischen Abwehrelement und einem KE-Projektil;

Figur 4

Vektordiagramme für mitlaufende und gegenlaufende Schutzelemente;

Figur 5

geometrische Formen möglicher AWE;

Figur 5.1A

numerische 3D-Simulation von einem zylindrischen Abwehrelement und einem KE-Penetrator zum Beginn der Interaktion;

Figur 5.1B

numerische 3D-Simulation von dem zylindrischen Abwehrelement und KE-Penetrator nach der Interaktion von AWE und Penetrator:

Figur 5.2A

Diagramm zum Druck-Geschwindigkeitsverlauf am Beispiel eines scheibenförmigen Abwehrelementes bei Variation des Scheibendurchmessers,

Figur 5.2B

Diagramm zum Druck-Geschwindigkeitsverlauf am Beispiel eines scheibenförmigen Abwehrelementes bei Variation des Materials vom Abwehrelement (Dichte),

Figur 6

prinzipieller Aufbau diverser Beschleunigungseinheiten;

Figur 7

prinzipielle Führung von Abwehrelementen bei der Beschleunigung;

Figur 8

prinzipielle Darstellung der Volumenerhöhung bei der Bewegung eines AWE;

Figur 9

Beschleunigungseinheit mit Dichtzone und Abdeckbeispielen;

Figur 10

prinzipielle Darstellung von Dichtkonzepten für flächenhafte Abwehrelemente;

Figur 11

Dichtkonzepte für Rotationskörper;

Figur 12

prinzipielle Darstellung für modulare Antriebselemente;

Figur 13

prinzipielle Darstellung von ein- oder mehrfachen Ausstoßsystemen;

Figur 14

Ansichten von Mehrfachausstoßsystemen;

Figur 15

Prinzipdarstellung eines Abwehrelementes mit integrierten Elementen;

Figur 16

Prinzipdarstellung eines wahlweise schaltbaren Abwehrsystems.

Figur 17

numerische 3D-Simulation einer Interaktion von einem balkenförmigen Abwehrelement und einem KE-Penetrator bei einem kurzen Abstand des AWE vor einer massiven Panzerstahlplatte.

It is therefore the object of this invention to provide a practical and simple acceleration device for distance-effective protective elements in such a way that a very effective defense against the threat from KE, HL and EFP projectiles can be achieved with relatively little effort. The features, details and advantages result from the patent claims, the wording of which is incorporated by reference into the content of the description, and on the basis of the drawings. Here show:

Figure 1

schematic view of a vehicle with the areas of use for distance-effective protective elements against KE and HL;

Figure 1.1

schematic view of a vehicle with the area of use for distance-effective protective elements against EFP;

Figure 2

Arrangement and paths of the defense elements against HL and KE;

Figure 2.1

Arrangement and paths of the defense elements against EFP;

Figure 3

schematic representation of the interaction between the defense element and a KE projectile;

Figure 4

Vector diagrams for concurrent and counter-rotating protection elements;

Figure 5

geometric shapes of possible AWE;

Figure 5.1A

3D numerical simulation of a cylindrical defense element and a KE penetrator at the beginning of the interaction;

Figure 5.1B

Numerical 3D simulation of the cylindrical defense element and KE penetrator after the interaction of the AWE and penetrator:

Figure 5.2A

Diagram of the pressure-speed curve using the example of a disk-shaped defense element with variation of the disk diameter,

Figure 5.2B

Diagram of the pressure-speed curve using the example of a disk-shaped defense element with variation of the material from the defense element (density),

Figure 6

basic structure of various acceleration units;

Figure 7

basic management of defense elements during acceleration;

Figure 8

basic representation of the increase in volume when moving an AR;

Figure 9

Acceleration unit with sealing zone and covering examples;

Figure 10

basic representation of sealing concepts for flat defense elements;

Figure 11

Sealing concepts for rotating bodies;

Figure 12

basic illustration for modular drive elements;

Figure 13

basic representation of single or multiple ejection systems;

Figure 14

Views of multiple ejection systems;

Figure 15

Schematic representation of a defense element with integrated elements;

Figure 16

Schematic diagram of an optionally switchable defense system.

Figure 17

Numerical 3D simulation of an interaction between a bar-shaped defense element and a KE penetrator at a short distance from the AWE in front of a solid armored steel plate.

1A, 1B and 1C in Figure 1 show schematic side views of an armored Vehicle 1 with the different areas of application more effective distance Protection elements inside and outside the structure.

In Fig. 1A the inner working area of distance-effective devices, e.g. within of the vehicle bow area 2. It is triggered via a bow sensor 5a for the inner area or by contact.

1B characterizes the immediate detection close range 3 of armor with distance-effective elements and sensors 5b (roof sensor for the Close range) and 5c (close range bow sensor).

1C shows the adjoining area 4 remote from the vehicle, which here of a suitable roof sensor 5d is scanned. Of course this can The task can also be performed by several sensors.

In Figure 1.1 is the possible threat area of a vehicle in the roof area indicated by EFP or shaped charge missile. The release takes place here via correspondingly arranged sensors 5e.

2A, 2B and 2C in Figure 2 show the corresponding paths of the distance effective Protection elements (AWE).

The bow area 6 is determined by the upper front surface 7a and lower front surface 7b. The conclusion to the combat area in which the team is located forms an oblique or vertical passive (inert) basic protection 13. The possible paths 12 of the inner defense elements 11 are due to the geometry the front surfaces 7a, 7b and the base protection 13 are determined and can be inclined run according to the respective contour or vertically. The arrangement in The bow area can be designed very variably and so the needs can be optimally adapted to the respective passive base armor.

At the bow side area 9 or tower front area 8 or tower side area 10 is the basic arrangement of effective protective elements 14 with their possible tracks 15 to ward off a threat in the near-contour vehicle area 3 or area 4 remote from the vehicle. The threat from projectiles Missiles or warheads can be directly from the front 16a, from the Page 16b or from above 16c.

Figure 2.1 shows the possible defense against an explosive-shaped projectile (arrow 16c in the sketch) by a distance-effective defense element 14 or the external defense trajectory 15 outlined. With such a distance-effective protection system can also missiles that are in the so-called Top Attack, (the object of attack), fight very well.

In the following considerations according to FIG. 3 there is a vertical interaction between defense element 20 and a KE penetrator 18 (threat). Actual angles (inclination or inclination of the armor) are in a first approximation through transmission using the cosine law too to treat. According to FIG. 3A, there are two times three possibilities with regard to the Interaction angle.

The defense element 20 moves in the direction of the threat 18 with one component in flight direction 21 of the threat (17ac from above, 17bc from below) or with a component against the flight direction 21 of the threat (17aa from above, 17ba from below). The third possibility is to hit it vertically (17ab from above, 17bb from below).

3B shows the case for a vertical interaction (17bb), in which the speed at which the defense element 20 runs laterally into the penetrator 18 is set too high (greater than 0.2 to 0.3 v _penetrator ). Therefore, only a certain penetrator length 18b is punched out. Due to the inertia of the residual penetrator, the remaining pieces of the projectile 18a / 18c remain in their original flight axis. The end ballistic performance is only reduced approximately according to the punched-out penetrator length 18b.

FIG. 3C shows the case in which the transverse speed of the defense element 20 is too low (less than 0.1 to 0.15 v _penetrator ). There is only a slight distraction (19, α). Depending on the direction of movement of the defense element 20, the penetrator 18 can even be set in the direction of the target normal of a downstream inclined armor, so that the small gain in protection performance could be compensated for by the slightly inclined position of the penetrator due to a somewhat improved penetration performance.

In these considerations, however, both directions are always towards the threat take into account, as in connection with the following (usually employed Armor) there are different effective impact angles.

The vector diagrams in FIG. 4 show this relationship for a moving one Protection element and a counter-rotating protection element each for a system "resting defense element" and a system "resting floor".

In principle, all 6 directions of movement are still in the inner defense tracks 12 according to FIG. 2A the defense elements 11 conceivable, while in the outer Paths 15 of the defense elements 14 for the vehicle near or away from the vehicle Area just a single direction of movement against the threat makes sense.

a.) die Bedrohung (Geschoß, Penetrator) durchdringt die reaktive / abstandswirksame Schutzeinrichtung,

b.) das Abwehrelement beaufschlagt die Bedrohung seitlich an einer bestimmten Position.

When it comes to the final ballistic effect of the AWE against penetrating or penetrating penetrators, a distinction must be made between two cases:

a.) the threat (projectile, penetrator) penetrates the reactive / distance-effective protective device,

b.) the defense element acts laterally on the threat at a specific position.

Case a.) Requires a relatively high lateral velocity of the AR, since the plastically penetrating penetrator head a significantly larger crater diameter forms as its diameter itself (about 2 D penetrator). So that the side acting AWE with its crater rim the very quickly penetrating projectile can still interfere effectively, being as far forward as possible on the projectile should attack, it must be correspondingly fast. Simple kinematic Considerations show that at floor speeds of 1500 m / s to 2000 m / s lateral speeds of the defense elements of several 100 m / s are required become.

In case b.), The defense element acts immediately after contact with the penetrator. It must be taken into account here that a sufficient deflection force (lateral force) is generated becomes. It is particularly important to ensure that a penetrator to be disturbed as quickly as possible, i.e. in the front area, is disturbed or distracted, so its greatest possible transient deformation or deflection and thus reduction the breakthrough performance is achieved.

Kinematic considerations show that certain lateral velocities also apply in this case are required. With the current and expected in the future Threats can be assumed to be at least 150 m / s, better still 200 m / s.

For the lateral force causing a deflection is in addition to the lateral speed the area and density of the defense element is decisive. In addition, the The length of the AR can be limited to avoid dead mass. To achieve one good ratio of effort to effect (efficiency) or a large em factor only masses that are intended for direct distraction or Damage to the penetrator may be required.

According to the previous considerations and simulation calculations carried out in the ISL Defense elements in the speed range between 150 m / s and 500 m / s then reliably achieved a high deflection effect or deformation if their mass is of the order of magnitude with a favorable geometry from 1 to 2 penetrator masses, i.e. to ward off large caliber KE threats require masses of the AR between 4 and 10 kg.

The geometric elements shown in FIG. 5 are preferred as active elements (AWE) To use bodies that basically meet these conditions.

In Fig. 5A an AWE as a flat cuboid 30 with width B _Qua 30a, height H _Qua 30b and length L _Qua 30C.

In Fig. 5B a bar 31 as AWE with width B _Ba 31a, height H _Ba 31b and length L _Ba 32C.

A cylinder 32 according to FIG. 5C as AWE has the diameter D _cyl 32a and the length L _cyl 32b.

The following apply to the geometrical dimensions of a disk 33 according to FIG. 5D as AWE: height H _Sch 33a and diameter D _Sch 33b.

Beim Quader 30

H_Qua ≈ 1,5 - 2 * D_Penetrator
H_Qua< L_Qua, B_Qua
z.B. HQua ≈ L/2, B/2 bis L/4, B/4
L_Qua, B_Qua ≈ 3 - 8 * D_Penetrator

Beim Balken 31

L_Ba ≈ 5 - 10 * D_Penetrator
B_Ba, H_Ba ≈ 2 * D_Penetrator

Beim Zylinder 32

D_Zyl ≈ 1,5 - 2 * D_Penetrator
L_Zyl ≈ 4 - 6 * D_Penetrator

Bei der Scheibe 33

D_Sch ≈ 4 - 6 * D_Penetrator
H_Sch ≈ 1,5 - 2 * D_Penetrator

The main geometric characteristics for sufficient interaction with the penetrator and thus high efficiency are:

With the cuboid 30

H _Qua ≈ 1.5 - 2 * D _penetrator
H _Qua <L _Qua , B _Qua
e.g. H Qua ≈ L / 2, B / 2 to L / 4, B / 4
L _Qua , B _Qua ≈ 3 - 8 * D _penetrator

With the beam 31

L _Ba ≈ 5 - 10 * D _penetrator
B _Ba , H _Ba ≈ 2 * D _penetrator

For cylinder 32

D _cyl ≈ 1.5 - 2 * D _penetrator
L _cyl ≈ 4 - 6 * D _penetrator

With the disc 33

D _Sch ≈ 4 - 6 * D _penetrator
H _Sch ≈ 1.5 - 2 * D _penetrator

These geometric specifications are sufficient to generate a sufficiently large one Shear force necessary, with the cross-section laterally loading the penetrator must have at least the same basis weight (per longitudinal unit) as the Penetrator itself, so that a sufficient shear force in the available Period can be exercised.

If the penetrator position is the decisive defense criterion, one must sufficiently large lateral deflection distance after the exposure to the defense element are available. Under the diversion line is the Understand distance that the deflecting element perpendicular after the start of contact to the direction of movement of the threat as it passes. If a sufficient cross-sectional load is observed, this is A crucial point for the performance of a protective or defense element.

Ensuring a given collision point depends equally of a sufficiently precise detection as well as of a precise and sufficient Acceleration of the active body. The detection should be sufficient are precisely presupposed and is not the subject of this invention. Very however, it is important that the defense elements reach a certain speed at the collision point.

Through calculations carried out in the meantime in the ISL with the help of the numerical 3D simulation was able to demonstrate that the proposed here distance-effective protective elements with an appropriately set interaction speed to a decisive deformation or breakage and thus Significant performance degradation from those striking at high speed or penetrating penetrators are suitable.

5.1A is the case for a certain, optimally set transverse speed, in this case 200 m / s, and a cylinder 32 as a defense element at the moment the interaction as a starting point for the 3D simulation calculation, which is in the ISL was carried out. The pentrator speed is 1800 m / s. The The mass of the cylindrical AR corresponds to the mass of the projectile.

5.1B impressively demonstrates the deformation of the penetrator 18 as the result of the calculation, the load limits of the penetrator material, which was specified here as high-strength tungsten heavy metal (1800 N / mm ² ), being clearly exceeded in the middle area. This leads to a subsequent dismantling of the penetrator into several fragments, which due to the dynamic deflection of the pentrator also have different impingement positions in a downstream inert base armor.

In order to achieve the desired end ballistic effect, the appropriate ones Materials for the distance-effective protective elements (AR) can be selected. This is due to the fixed drive parameters such as pressure and drive area or acceleration path the density of the materials with the achievable exit speed closely linked.

Leave with given geometry of the drive and the acceleration energy Defense elements of light weight with the same geometric dimensions Accelerate material such as GRP, aluminum or titanium faster and to the desired one Bring interaction speed. However, it must then be checked whether e.g. in the case of massive balancing bullets, the mass or density of the EVU for generation sufficient shear force and thus deformation of the penetrator is sufficient. Such materials are preferably laterally more sensitive for defense Deploy threats.

Endballistically very effective materials such as tungsten heavy metal (WS), depleted Uranium (DU) or armored steel, on the other hand, achieve slower speeds Speeds, but achieve high due to their mass or density Shear forces and are therefore used to ward off massive threats such as KE bullets of high performance are particularly suitable.

Under the postulate of a required AWE mass of approximately 1 to 2 penetrator masses and the necessary speed range for the interaction of 100 to 500 m / s, the conditions for the drive unit of the AWE and the required material are strictly limited. For the case of the 120 mm DM 33 ammunition with a pentrator diameter of about 25 mm and a penetrator mass of 4.3 kg, the volume required for a defense element (e.g. cuboid, bar, cylinder, disc) according to the above statements from about 300 to 600 cm ³ . From the required mass of 1 to 2 penetrator masses (4.3 to 8.6 kg) there is a lower limit of 7 to 14 g / cm ³ for the required material density of the AWE material. The low-density materials are therefore ruled out if you want to give preference to the smallest possible defense elements. Hard tempered steel is probably the most suitable material for the defense elements (price).

In Figures 5.2A and 5.2B, this basic relationship is for a selected one Example shown in more detail.

The first diagram 5.2A shows the exit speed v of a defense element as a function of a constant working pressure p in the drive system. The example of a defense element in disk-shaped form for the interception process of the 120 mm DM 33 (D _penetrator ≈ 25 mm) was calculated. Simplified, a uniformly accelerated movement over the entire drive path (corresponding to H _Sch ) was _assumed . According to the above geometric features for high efficiency, 3 possible diameters of 4, 5 and 6 penetrator diameters (D _Sch = 100, 125 and 150 mm) and the average height of 1.75 penetrator diameters (H _Sch = 43.75 mm) were specified. From these geometric variables, the course of the AWE speed v shown in diagram 5.2A is obtained as a function of the constant drive pressure p and as a function of the disk diameter D _Sch . The respective acceleration times are in the order of 0.4 to 0.5 ms at the necessary minimum speed of 100 m / s and 0.1 to 0.2 ms in the high speed range. The required minimum densities ρ for the end-ballistic material of the disk-shaped defense elements are between 5.6 and 12.5 g / cm ³ , depending on the disk diameter.

The second diagram 5.2B shows the values for different AWE materials with different densities. A disk-shaped defense element with 5 penetrator diameters (D _Sch = 125 mm) was used as a basis. From the speed required for effective vertical interaction in this case of 150 to 300 m / s and the required AWE mass of approx. 4.3 kg, it follows that only steel and tungsten heavy metal (WS) or end ballistic materials with a Density between these two materials would be suitable for defense against the 120 mm DM 33 (hatched area). This only applies to this selected case of a disk-shaped defense element.

Larger defense elements that would allow the use of light materials, require due to the above geometric conditions for the AR larger drive area. This could cause ignition problems or a proper, reproducible departure situation of the AWE is more difficult to ensure (tilting etc.).

The required precision of the trajectory of a defense element for compliance of the specified collision point also results in smaller protective element masses a very precise departure position and above all a reproducible one Acceleration to get the same flight times.

This results in an imperative for the optimal design and the structure of the acceleration units and is the subject of this invention.

From the known circumstances for the very fast acceleration of Shot in cannons can be deduced that especially in the case of a pyrotechnic A good seal of the drive room is absolutely essential will be. Furthermore, the optimal guidance of the defense elements during the highly dynamic acceleration phase of great importance.

6 shows the basic structure of various acceleration units with the different drive media shown.

6A shows an AR 20 in the defense unit 34. Serves as the drive medium Explosives, in this case a thin foil 35. Between AWE and this film is a transmission or damping layer 36. Die Ignition device 37 receives the ignition signal via the transmission line 38.

6B shows a future technological solution, for example a working medium 39 as plasma from a corresponding energy supplier 44 is generated.

6C shows the case of electromagnetic acceleration with a primary coil 40 and the secondary coil 41. Between the two coils 40, 41 could if necessary, a pressure-sensitive chemical drive medium 45 is additionally arranged be (hybrid drive).

A structure is sketched in FIG. 6D in which chemical energy suppliers 42 have a Implementation rate below the detonation rate of Explosives (deflagrating explosives, very fast powder mixtures) in the drive room are arranged. The rapid energy conversion takes place after the Ignition by means of a transfer or booster charge 43.

The basic management of acceleration units is shown in FIG. 7. 7A is the case of a step-shaped or piston-shaped defense element 51 outlined. The piston part 52 is located in the base plate 49a, the drive chamber 53 of them. The entire AWE 51 sits in a sensor 50 on the outer surface the defense unit.

In contrast, in FIG. 7B there is a disk-shaped defense element 54 in the corresponding base plate 49b and pickup device 50 outlined.

Both concepts differ in the different volume increases after ignition and thus the working pressure or the drive power.

In Fig. 8A, the volume increase 56 is after a small movement of the AR Working space outlined in FIG. 7A. However, the upper volume is still without Gas pressure and therefore does not contribute to the drive. Only after passing the lower one The actual spontaneous volume increase takes place at the edge of the piston part 52 on the transducer 50 with the corresponding effects on gas pressure and drive power. Such a stepped piston concept is over the length of the piston part 52 and the diameter ratio of defense element 51 to piston 52 is very variable in terms of working pressure and drive power.

Accordingly, the volume increase 57 runs during the movement of the disk-shaped Defense element 54 linear with its movement, as in Figure 8B shown.

FIG. 9 shows an acceleration unit according to the invention with a sealing zone and Covering examples shown. The AWE 20 is located in the defense module 60 and is surrounded by a sealing and guiding element 61. Of the Drive room 53 is located below the AWE 20. The AWE 20 can with one Cover / cover 62 may be provided, which by means of screw fastening 63 on Defense module 60 has its housing fastened and has two holes 64 in the AWE 20 is centered. Of course, other cover options are also conceivable, for example a flat cover 65, which also acts as a seal and is glued or vulcanized.

FIG. 10 shows examples of sealing concepts from AWE according to the invention.

10A shows a defense module 70 with a sealing strip 69 on the AR, in FIG. 10B shows a module 71 with sealing rings 76, 77 on the AWE. Other According to FIG. 10C, solutions exist in a defense module 72, in which the AWE has a lateral sealing surface 78 or, as shown in FIG. 10D, a Defense module 73 with an AWE and sealing lip 79. Further sealing concepts are a floor seal 80 on the AWE according to FIG. 10E in the defense module 74 or a combined side-floor seal according to FIG. 10F and defense module 75.

Other examples of sealing concepts and rotationally symmetrical defense elements, for example cylinders, are outlined in FIG. 11.

In the example according to FIG. 11A, the sealing is carried out, for example, by a Sealing strip 86 in the case of a cylindrical defense element or by means of a sealing ring with a rotationally shaped AR (ball). In FIG. 11B, the sealing takes place via a flat floor seal adapted to the contour of the defense element 87. In contrast to the sealing strip according to FIG. 11A there is one in FIG. 11C lateral flat seal 88 outlined. Figure 11D shows the case of a revolving Seal 89 through which any position of the cylindrical defense element is made possible.

According to FIG. 12 there are various drive options, for example depending on the drive concept and the resulting structural load Lead designs.

In FIG. 12A there is a defense element 91 with a flat drive unit 97 and for comparison an AWE 92 with 3 cup-shaped drive units 95.

The defense element 92 is outlined in a multiple arrangement in FIG. 12B, at which was indicated that the respective left or right neighboring region 93 of the AWE 92 can be made shock-proof by means of webs or buffer elements 94 could.

Analogous to FIG. 12B, a multiple arrangement is sketched in FIG. 12C in which a defense element 98 is accelerated by 6 cup-shaped drive units.

FIG. 13 shows examples of options for designing the direct recording of Defense modules in an armor or structure.

The simplest way is to accommodate a defense element 20 or the corresponding one Defense module in a sack lock, a hole or a milling 100 in part of the armor structure 99 according to FIG. 13A. Particularly advantageous is the arrangement in a shock-absorbing material, for example GRP or rubber.

An inexpensive arrangement is shown in Figure 13B, in which the inclusion of Defense modules 102 takes place in a perforated plate 101. This perforated plate 101 is in this case, for example, arranged in front of or on a base armor 103.

Another design option is shown in Figure 13C, in which the defense element 20 is laterally supported or buffered by a sleeve 104. Also With such measures, the reactions can be selected with a suitable choice of materials limit strongly locally during the highly dynamic acceleration process.

Analogous to FIG. 13, FIG. 14 shows views of planar defense units shown. In FIG. 14A, the round receptacles 102 are each through the round sleeve 104, in FIG. 14B this is for a square receptacle 108 with a square sealing and guide sleeve 107 outlined. The mounting plate for the accelerator unit and AWE can also through a perforated plate 106 with quadrangular Holes or, for example, be formed from webs and strips.

In FIG. 15 there is a bar with integrated defense elements as the defense element 31 shown. In the left-hand arrangement, an active body 20a is inserted, which relates to its properties as much as possible from the material of the support beam 31 should distinguish. In the middle arrangement there are two active bodies 20b in the Carrier beam 31 integrated so that the overflowing penetrator 18 of the two inserted bodies 20 b hit practically simultaneously but in different places becomes. In the example on the right, the bar contains two consecutive ones Defense elements 20c.

The last two options, in particular, result from those employed at the ISL 3D simulation calculations significantly improve the effect of defensive defense elements.

Another very interesting defense is the one shown in FIG Arrangement of two or more mutually inclined drive units, which can be ignited individually or together, so that the defense elements 20 accelerated individually or together in different directions become. With such an arrangement, the most varied can be done without any effort Threats, e.g. Combat tandem bullets effectively. A single penetrator can also be used with an appropriately coordinated firing order and Defense elements can be subjected to multiple angular positions.

Since a variety of possible uses are conceivable, in which the distance effective Protective element at a relatively short distance from the subsequent armor is moved, this case is of particular endballistic interest. Because it is to be expected that an optimally disturbed penetrator, which with a certain lateral component penetrates into the successor structure (armor), is destroyed by this structure in a particularly small space. Here, e.g. the space required for reactive armor to deflect the penetrator quasi replaced by a high density deflection medium.

The 3D simulation calculations shown in FIGS. 17A to 17C and also carried out in the ISL confirm the high efficiency of such a protective combination even with a vertical structure. With an inclined protective arrangement this effect will intensify.

The deflection of a cylindrical penetrator made of tungsten heavy metal was calculated by interacting with a bar-shaped defense element, which at 200 m / s at a distance corresponding to the beam width in front of a homogeneous one Armor is moved at three different times. The impact speed of the WS penetrator is 1800 m / s. The values for height, width and length of the AWE made of high-hard steel are 2 and 8 storey diameters, respectively. The RHA armor is 5 penetrator thick.

At the time of the simulation result shown in Figure 17A is already detect a lateral disturbance of the penetrator due to the interaction with the AWE, the bullet has been around since it hit the armor plate is acted upon vertically by the bar-shaped defense element.

In Figure 17B, the penetrator is just passing the defense element. The dynamics of The lateral disorder caused by the AR was clearly visible in the armor decisively reinforced, so that it is still in this to break the penetrator and a job of the fragments came.

The comparatively very large crater (correspondingly a high proportion of the extracted projectile energy) in the armored steel plate, likewise the complete destruction of the penetrator on the relatively short flight path.

The position of the AWE is of particular importance. Because from the Sequences and representations according to FIGS. 17A to 17C follow that the defense element in this calculation example all its energy to the penetrator has given up and has practically come to rest. This is in view the structural load caused by the AWE is in an optimal condition executed, moving protective elements can never be reached.

By the technology presented with this invention in connection with the presented Technical proposals for solutions are protective elements effective at a distance energetically with masses optimized for final ball with sufficient precision cheap and thus accelerate with the least possible structural load.

Claims (36)

Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements to ward off threats from KE-HL or EFP ammunition in the front, side or roof area of armored and unarmored objects, in which defense elements (AR) from a container / housing are accelerated in a highly dynamic manner,
characterized,
that the devices each form a closed unit and the mass of the defense elements is in the order of magnitude (one to two times) of the mass of the threat to be warded off and the speed of the defense elements is approximately 100 to 500 m / s. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to claim 1,
characterized,
that the defense elements are accelerated by chemical, mechanical or pneumatic drives. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to claim 1,
characterized,
that the defense elements are accelerated by hybrid drives. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that two or more defense elements are accelerated in different directions by at least two drive systems enclosing an angle relative to one another. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the drives are triggered one or more times in a contact or detector-controlled manner depending on the threat (cascade connection). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the devices for accelerating the defense elements are attached in front of or on the main structure to be protected (main armor). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the devices for accelerating the defense elements are attached within a structured, overall armor to be protected. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the devices for accelerating the defense elements are integrated directly into the structure to be protected (armor). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the devices for accelerating the defense elements are designed as an insert for the structure to be protected (armor). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the devices for accelerating the defense elements with the subsequent structure (main armor) form a coordinated and effect-optimized unit. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the devices for accelerating the defense elements are rotatable, pivotable or tiltable. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the devices for accelerating the defense elements are properly arranged and controlled by detectors. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the defense elements are cuboid, beam, cylinder, or disk-shaped bodies. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to claim 13,
characterized,
that the height of a cuboid defense element is preferably 0.5 to 2 times the value and the length and width of the cuboid is approximately 4 to 6 times the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator; P charge). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to claim 13,
characterized,
that the length of a bar-shaped defense element is preferably 5 to 10 times the value and the width and height of the bar is approximately twice the value of the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator; P-charge). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to claim 13,
characterized,
that the length of a cylindrical defense element is preferably 4 to 6 times the value and the diameter of the cylinder is approximately 0.5 to 2 times the value of the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator; P charge). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to claim 13,
characterized,
that the height of a disk-shaped defense element is preferably 0.5 to 2 times the value and the diameter of the disk is approximately 4 to 6 times the diameter of the threat (KE penetrator: P charge). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the surface mass of a defense element coming into interaction lies in the order of the surface mass of the threat. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the material of the defense element has a high endballistic effective performance. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists entirely or partially of a light metal or its alloy. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists entirely or partially of titanium or its alloy. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists entirely or partially of fiber-reinforced plastics. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists entirely or partially of a sintered or pure high-density metal. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists entirely or partially of a brittle metal or a brittle metal compound of high density. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists entirely or partially of a steel of high hardness. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists of a mixture of the materials according to claims 20 to 25. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists of a laminated or fibrous structure. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element is constructed in one or more parts. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the defense element is fragmented. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective defense elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element is wholly or partly constructed from individual elements or fragments. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that a defense element consists of a structure, in which separately inserted one or more protective elements with material properties that differ greatly from the structure (eg density, strength) are integrated. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the defense elements are multi-stage or with an alternating diameter (piston-shaped). Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the defense elements are sealed by means of a sealing strip, sealing ring, sealing surfaces or sealing lips. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the sealing and guiding device is provided with a cover. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that the seal and guide on the drive side, in the middle, on the cover side or in combination. Sealing and guiding device for distance-effective protective elements according to one or more of the preceding claims,
characterized,
that there is a transmission or damping layer between the working medium (explosives) and the defense element.

Images