EP0719224B1 - Verkehrsleitsystem zur steuerung des fahrbetriebes und des verkehrsablaufes für den schienengebundenen verkehr - Google Patents
Verkehrsleitsystem zur steuerung des fahrbetriebes und des verkehrsablaufes für den schienengebundenen verkehr Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP0719224B1 EP0719224B1 EP94927600A EP94927600A EP0719224B1 EP 0719224 B1 EP0719224 B1 EP 0719224B1 EP 94927600 A EP94927600 A EP 94927600A EP 94927600 A EP94927600 A EP 94927600A EP 0719224 B1 EP0719224 B1 EP 0719224B1
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- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- traffic
- information
- control
- train
- computer
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000003137 locomotive effect Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 abstract 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000007704 transition Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000004888 barrier function Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000007096 Glaser coupling reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000969 carrier Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000010365 information processing Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
- B61L23/22—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for controlling traffic in two directions over the same pair of rails
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
Definitions
- the invention relates to a traffic control system for controlling driving operation and the traffic flow including the transport logistics for the rail-bound Traffic.
- the routes to be traveled in conventional traffic systems are basically divided into route blocks, each of which is secured by interlockings and which control the operation.
- the most common route protection for rail-bound traffic is by dividing the route into individual blocks, each of which is monitored separately.
- Safety is ensured by the fact that only one vehicle (vehicle group / train) is in a block at a time. The information about free and occupied blocks is reported, usually wired to the signal boxes, where the railroad personnel actuate and display the corresponding safety devices, such as signals, switches, barriers, and influence or lock each other.
- a modular and hierarchically structured system for controlling a needs-based and driverless driving is described in US 4,015,804 described.
- This system consists of three hierarchy levels, MRP and Operation and operating facilities (especially vehicles).
- the dispatch center gives instructions based on the requirements to the operation level, which consists of one or more operations centers, in which the security criteria are checked and appropriate commands sent to the Vehicles are output in the lowest hierarchy level.
- a very similar system for managing and controlling train traffic is in the EP 0 108 363 described, the operation of the trains (in the lower level) via an information transmission line from control processor units (middle Level), which controls its instructions from an administrative processor unit (top level) received.
- This system is also for driverless operation suitable.
- the object of the invention is to provide a traffic control system for the rail-bound
- a safe driving operation mainly single-track routes, in particular regional traffic, is guaranteed at which mainly supports the route protection and driving operations with computer technology and almost exclusively by the driver and / or vehicle computer realized directly from the locomotive and also comprehensive Transport logistics measures are taken into account and comprehensive Passenger information is provided.
- the object of the invention is achieved by the first claim specified features solved. Thereafter it is provided that in a hierarchical built traffic control system with "safe" vehicle computers on each locomotive, a "safe" control computer and a master computer required real-time information regarding the vehicles, such as B. Location, direction of travel, speed and vehicle data are recorded and the host computer all incoming information from the vehicles, from the route, from fixed railway systems, as well Transport logistic data and external information recorded, processed and as recommendations the drivers as well as information for the train staff or passengers Provides.
- the required information about the vehicles is obtained using the Satellite navigation obtained and / or at defined points via fixed Railway systems (e.g. identification beacons) recorded.
- the exact Location determination can also be done, for example, via an exact path measurement respectively.
- the data obtained is shared by all vehicle computers Vehicle computers that are within a defined range transfer. So everyone gets Vehicle calculator all the necessary information of all vehicles that are are within the defined range.
- Safe driving and route protection are usually carried out the vehicle computers and the drivers realized by the data of the vehicles within the defined range and Track facilities can be used to derive the driving regime.
- the Information is transmitted wirelessly.
- the determined security-relevant Data for route protection and driving, as well as other recommending and informative data are provided to the respective driver provided via displays. Derives from this he carries out his actions for optimal, quick and safe driving.
- the higher-level control computer which is also "safe", serves the Securing driving operations in exceptional situations.
- the higher-level control computer transmits control commands and necessary information to the Vehicle computer and thus to the driver for driving in these exceptional situations.
- the function of the control computer can be in one other computers can be integrated.
- the host computer records all vehicle data, including the route Route protection, transport logistics and other passenger information processed these and provides them to the drivers, the railway staff and specifically available to customers.
- the host computer does not intervene Track protection and driving operations, but serves an extended targeted information.
- the central management takes place over the Master computer that provides all information regarding the vehicle computers Vehicles F1, F2, the route and the route facilities as well Transport logistics and regional information Information system gets transmitted and processed. These processed Information is sent to the vehicle computers for further processing and Display in the cab to derive actions from the Driver and selected information to inform the Provided to passengers.
- the route is secured locally Communication of the vehicle computer with the route facilities.
- This example also shows the coupling of the traffic control device to regional information system.
- the host computer receives all information from the Vehicles, from the route as well as transport logistic information and external information, e.g. B. Tourism and advertising.
- For this Information offer targeted information to passengers and customers via various information carriers at selected locations in the region made available.
- Figure 2 shows the decentralized route and train protection.
- the guarantee the signal-technically safe driving operation is carried out by the vehicle computer the vehicles F1, F2 and through the track facilities, the necessary security-relevant information through wireless transmission between the vehicle computers with each other and between the Vehicle computers and the route facilities within a defined range he follows.
- To ensure optimal information processing on the vehicle computer guarantee only shipments of the vehicle computer and Track facilities evaluated that are within such a range who are responsible for ensuring the necessary security of the Driving operations and route protection is required. This range will defined and defined according to the specific circumstances.
- the train location is determined, for example, with the aid of satellite navigation with a safe location correction at defined route points using identification beacons.
- a diversified vehicle stop is triggered in the event of unauthorized onward travel on a section of the route either by the driver or by the secure vehicle computer.
- the decentralized route protection system which is designed to be signal-safe, is described below.
- At path crossings W1, W2 there is a precise location identification of the vehicle by means of identification beacons 5, 6, 11, 12 at the start of the transition as well as optionally at the end of the transition and S1.2 are sent and the input of the fuse feedback from S1.1 and S1.2 is monitored.
- the transition W1 Upon receipt of the two backup confirmations, the transition W1 is entered. If one or both backup reports are missing, the onward journey can be permitted with an exception. Such an onward journey can be released as an exception by the vehicle computer or the higher-level control computer, depending on the specific conditions and the conditions of the following section of the route, if necessary under conditions (e.g. maximum speed).
- the securing of the way crossing W1 is canceled by switching off the fixed railway systems S1.1 and S1.2.
- transitional identifications and security requirements can according to local conditions also for two or more transitions be summarized.
- Double-track routes are functionally divided into single-track routes, whereby in normal operation, each route is only traveled in one direction.
- the Vehicle computer of the vehicle F1 or F2 determined by evaluating the Locations of other vehicles F2 or F1, within the defined range, the busy or free state of the in Direction of travel of the following section 2 - 5 or 7 - 6. According to the respective direction of travel of vehicles F1, F2 is encountered Vehicles the entire following single-track section and the itself subsequent double-track section for the continuation of the journey too consider.
- the Vehicle F1 the route section 2-7 and a route section 7-8 or 9 - 10 be free.
- the route section 7-2 and a route section 2 - 1 or 4 - 3 can be free.
- the turnouts are controlled analogously to the control of the way crossings protection by a corresponding control request when the identification beacons 1, 2, 7, 8 are reached.
- the point control is omitted and the number of route sections to be taken into account can be reduced because a change of direction is not possible. So z. B. for the vehicle F2, the sections 1-2 and for the vehicle F1, the sections 9-10 may be disregarded.
- the Vehicle computer When determining the busy state of the following route section, the Vehicle computer issued a "stop" command to the driver.
- a follow-up trip may be necessary with appropriate conditions, as approved.
- Such Follow-up travel can be carried out by the higher-level control computer the corresponding vehicle computer can be released or by a Dispatcher via radio direct to the relevant driver be allowed.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
Description
Die gebräuchlichste Streckensicherung des schienengebundenen Verkehrs erfolgt durch Aufteilung der Strecke in einzelne Blöcke, die jeder für sich gesondert überwacht werden. Die Sicherheit wird dadurch gewährleistet, daß sich jeweils nur ein Fahrzeug (Fahrzeugverband/Zug) in einem Block befindet. Die Informationen über freie und belegte Blöcke werden, in der Regel drahtgebunden zu den Stellwerken gemeldet, wo durch das Bahnpersonal die entsprechenden Sicherungseinrichtungen, wie beispielsweise Signale, Weichen, Schranken betätigt und angezeigt und gegenseitig beeinflußt bzw. verriegelt werden.
- Fig. 1
- Grundkonzept der Verkehrsleiteinrichtung
- Fig. 2
- Dezentrale Strecken- und Zugsicherung
- Empfehlungen an die Triebfahrzeugführer,
- Informationen und Steuerbefehle für die Bahnstromversorgung,
- Informationen für das regionale Informationssystem, und
- Informationen für die Transportlogistik
Es erfolgt eine diversitäre Fahrzeughalt-Auslösung bei unerlaubter Weiterfahrt auf einen Streckenabschnitt entweder durch den Triebfahrzeugführer oder durch den sicheren Fahrzeugrechner.
An Wegübergängen W1, W2 erfolgt jeweils am Übergangsanfang als auch wahlweise am Übergangsende eine genaue Standortidentifikation des Fahrzeuges durch Identifikationsbaken 5, 6, 11, 12. Bei Annäherung des Fahrzeugs F1 an den Wegübergang W1 wird bei 5 eine Sicherungsanforderung an die ortsfesten Bahnanlagen S1.1 und S1.2 gesendet und der Eingang der Sicherungs-Rückmeldung von S1.1 und S1.2 überwacht. Bei Erhalt der beiden Sicherungs-Rückmeldungen erfolgt das Befahren des Überganges W1.
Bleibt eine oder beide Sicherungs-Rückmeldungen aus, kann die Weiterfahrt mit einer Ausnahmeregelung gestattet werden. Eine solche Weiterfahrt kann entsprechend den konkreten Bedingungen sowie den Gegebenheiten des folgenden Streckenabschnittes durch den Fahrzeugrechner oder den übergeordneten Steuerrechner, gegebenenfalls unter Festlegung von Bedingungen (z. B. Höchstgeschwindigkeit) als Ausnahme freigegeben werden.
Bei Erreichen von 6 wird die Sicherung des Wegüberganges W1 durch Ausschalten der ortsfesten Bahnanlagen S1.1 und S1.2 aufgehoben.
Bei der Verwendung von Rückfallweichen an den Ausweichstellen der Strecke entfällt die Weichensteuerung und die Anzahl der zu berücksichtigenden Streckenabschnitte kann reduziert werden, da ein Richtungswechsel nicht möglich ist. So kann z. B. für das Fahrzeug F2 der Abschnitt 1 - 2 und für das Fahrzeug F1 der Abschnitt 9 - 10 außer Betracht gelassen werden.
Claims (2)
- Verkehrsleitsystem zur Steuerung des Fahrbetriebes und des Verkehrsablaufes einschließlich der Transportlogistik für den schienengebundenen Verkehr, insbesondere für eingleisige Strecken mit schwachem oder mäßigem Verkehr, wobei das Verkehrsleitsystem rechnerunterstützt und hierarchisch aufgebaut ist, wobei die unterste, prozeßnahe Ebene aus "sicheren" Fahrzeugrechnern, die auf jedem Fahrzeug angeordnet sind, die mittlere, erste übergeordnete Ebene aus einem "sicheren" Steuerrechner und die oberste, übergeordnete Ebene aus einem Leitrechner besteht, wobei; eine Echtzeiterfassung von Fahrzeugdaten, wie Standort, Fahrtrichtung und Geschwindigkeit, durch Satellitenortung und/oder ortsfeste Informationspunkte (1-12), und fahrzeugspezifischer Daten erfolgt, wobei der Leitrechner alle eingehenden Informationen von den Fahrzeugen (F1, F2), von ortsfesten Bahnanlagen (S1.1, S1.2), von der Strecke, sowie transportlogistische Informationen und externe Informationen, z. B. Fremdenverkehr und Werbung erhält und verarbeitet und den Triebfahrzeugführern als Empfehlungen, dem Bahnpersonal als Information und den Fahrgästen zur Information gezielt zur Verfügung stellt, und wobei eine Informationsübertragung drahtlos erfolgt,
dadurch gekennzeichnet,daß die Fahrzeugrechner der Fahrzeuge (F1, F2) sicherheitsrelevante Informationen für einen sicheren Fahrbetrieb aus von, sich innerhalb einer definierten Reichweite befindenden, anderen Fahrzeugen und Streckeneinrichtungen drahtlos empfangenen Informationen ermitteln, ortsfeste Bahnanlagen (S1.1, S1.2, S2.1, S2.2) steuern, Meldungen von Zustandsinformationen der angesteuerten ortsfesten Bahnanlagen (S1.1, S1.2, S2.1, S2.2) erfassen um sie im Regelbetrieb für die Fahrzeug- sowie Fahrwegsteuerung zu nutzen, die sicherheitsrelevanten Informationen für den sicheren Fahrbetrieb sowie die Standortinformationen aller anderen Fahrzeuge auf einem Display darstellen, und Information an den Leitrechner übermitteln,daß der übergeordnete "sichere" Steuerrechner den Fahrbetrieb und die Streckensicherung nur in Ausnahmesituationen beeinflußt,daß die Streckensicherung dezentral durch Kommunikation der Fahrzengrechner mit den Streckeneinrichtungen erfolgt, d.h. ohne daß der Leitrechner in die Streckensicherung und den Fahrbetrieb eingreift,und daß die drahtlose Informationsübertragung an den Leitrechner und an den Steuerrechner sowie an alle Fahrzeuge (F1, F2) in definierter Reichweite, erfolgt. - Verkehrsleitsystem nach Patentanspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die fahrzeugspezifischen Daten aus einer Kennung, sowie transportkapazitäts- und instandhaltungsorientierten Daten bestehen.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE4331431 | 1993-09-13 | ||
DE4331431A DE4331431C1 (de) | 1993-09-13 | 1993-09-13 | Verkehrsleiteinrichtung zur Steuerung des Fahrbetriebes und des Verkehrsablaufes für den schienengebundenen Verkehr |
PCT/EP1994/003032 WO1995007832A1 (de) | 1993-09-13 | 1994-09-09 | Verkehrsleiteinrichtung zur steuerung des fahrbetriebes und des verkehrsablaufes für den schienengebundenen verkehr |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP0719224A1 EP0719224A1 (de) | 1996-07-03 |
EP0719224B1 true EP0719224B1 (de) | 2000-01-19 |
Family
ID=6497832
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP94927600A Expired - Lifetime EP0719224B1 (de) | 1993-09-13 | 1994-09-09 | Verkehrsleitsystem zur steuerung des fahrbetriebes und des verkehrsablaufes für den schienengebundenen verkehr |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP0719224B1 (de) |
AT (1) | ATE188930T1 (de) |
DE (2) | DE4331431C1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO1995007832A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE19529374A1 (de) * | 1995-08-10 | 1997-02-13 | Sel Alcatel Ag | Verfahren zur Einbindung von Bahnübergängen in die automatische Steuerung und Sicherung von Schienenfahrzeugen |
DE19630575A1 (de) * | 1996-07-30 | 1998-02-05 | Sel Alcatel Ag | System zur semikontinuierlichen Steuerung von spurgeführten Fahrzeugen |
DE19647461C2 (de) * | 1996-11-16 | 2000-05-25 | Deutsche Bahn Ag | Einrichtung zur Erfassung von Eisenbahnfahrzeugen |
DE19654621C1 (de) * | 1996-12-20 | 1998-05-28 | Elpro Ag | Verfahren zur gleichmäßigen Lastverteilung in Unterwerken für elektrisch betriebene Fahrzeuge |
DE19708559A1 (de) * | 1997-03-04 | 1998-09-10 | Alsthom Cge Alcatel | Verfahren zur Steuerung spurgebundener Fahrzeuge sowie Fahrzeugrechner und Fahrzeugsteuerungssystem hierfür |
DE19747198A1 (de) * | 1997-10-25 | 1999-04-29 | Tiefenbach Gmbh | Eisenbahn-Betriebsverfahren |
US6179252B1 (en) | 1998-07-17 | 2001-01-30 | The Texas A&M University System | Intelligent rail crossing control system and train tracking system |
DE19850051A1 (de) * | 1998-10-30 | 2000-05-04 | Abb Research Ltd | Verfahren zur Steuerung der Energieverteilung auf einem Eisenbahnnetz |
CN102139700B (zh) * | 2010-02-01 | 2013-07-17 | 同济大学 | 一种轨道交通的车辆工况在线监测系统 |
CN102139701B (zh) * | 2010-02-01 | 2013-07-17 | 同济大学 | 一种轨道交通的车辆工况在线监测方法 |
CN103786754A (zh) * | 2014-02-26 | 2014-05-14 | 苏州缪斯信息科技有限公司 | 轨道交通信号故障应急系统 |
CN106504367B (zh) * | 2016-11-02 | 2019-03-22 | 中车青岛四方机车车辆股份有限公司 | 车辆故障预警方法和装置 |
Family Cites Families (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US4015804A (en) * | 1974-05-15 | 1977-04-05 | International Standard Electric Corporation | System for the demand-dependent control of guided vehicles |
DE3107102A1 (de) * | 1981-02-21 | 1982-09-02 | Licentia Patent-Verwaltungs-Gmbh, 6000 Frankfurt | System zur zug-, fahrweg- und bahnstromsteuerung |
ATE31267T1 (de) * | 1981-10-03 | 1987-12-15 | British Railways Board | Steueranlage zur kontrolle der durchfahrt von fahrzeugen. |
JPS5984663A (ja) * | 1982-11-02 | 1984-05-16 | 川崎重工業株式会社 | 列車運行管理制御装置および方法 |
JPS59118567A (ja) * | 1982-12-27 | 1984-07-09 | 日本国有鉄道 | 読取式通票閉そく方法 |
GB8728165D0 (en) * | 1987-12-02 | 1988-01-06 | Secr Defence | Rail network monitoring and control |
-
1993
- 1993-09-13 DE DE4331431A patent/DE4331431C1/de not_active Revoked
-
1994
- 1994-09-09 DE DE59409091T patent/DE59409091D1/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1994-09-09 WO PCT/EP1994/003032 patent/WO1995007832A1/de active IP Right Grant
- 1994-09-09 EP EP94927600A patent/EP0719224B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1994-09-09 AT AT94927600T patent/ATE188930T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE4331431C1 (de) | 1995-03-02 |
WO1995007832A1 (de) | 1995-03-23 |
DE59409091D1 (de) | 2000-02-24 |
ATE188930T1 (de) | 2000-02-15 |
EP0719224A1 (de) | 1996-07-03 |
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