EP0719224B1 - Systeme permettant de piloter le fonctionnement et l'ecoulement du trafic ferroviaire - Google Patents

Systeme permettant de piloter le fonctionnement et l'ecoulement du trafic ferroviaire Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0719224B1
EP0719224B1 EP94927600A EP94927600A EP0719224B1 EP 0719224 B1 EP0719224 B1 EP 0719224B1 EP 94927600 A EP94927600 A EP 94927600A EP 94927600 A EP94927600 A EP 94927600A EP 0719224 B1 EP0719224 B1 EP 0719224B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
traffic
information
control
train
computer
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP94927600A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0719224A1 (fr
Inventor
Martin Polke
Dietrich Balzer
Erich Leibnitz
Alexander Baer
Burkhard Cybulenski
Karl Richter
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
INSY INTEGRALE SICHERUNGS- UND INFORMATIONSSYSTEME
Original Assignee
INSY Integrale Sicherungs- und Informationssysteme GmbH
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Publication of EP0719224A1 publication Critical patent/EP0719224A1/fr
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Publication of EP0719224B1 publication Critical patent/EP0719224B1/fr
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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B61L23/22—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for controlling traffic in two directions over the same pair of rails
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a traffic control system for controlling driving operation and the traffic flow including the transport logistics for the rail-bound Traffic.
  • the routes to be traveled in conventional traffic systems are basically divided into route blocks, each of which is secured by interlockings and which control the operation.
  • the most common route protection for rail-bound traffic is by dividing the route into individual blocks, each of which is monitored separately.
  • Safety is ensured by the fact that only one vehicle (vehicle group / train) is in a block at a time. The information about free and occupied blocks is reported, usually wired to the signal boxes, where the railroad personnel actuate and display the corresponding safety devices, such as signals, switches, barriers, and influence or lock each other.
  • a modular and hierarchically structured system for controlling a needs-based and driverless driving is described in US 4,015,804 described.
  • This system consists of three hierarchy levels, MRP and Operation and operating facilities (especially vehicles).
  • the dispatch center gives instructions based on the requirements to the operation level, which consists of one or more operations centers, in which the security criteria are checked and appropriate commands sent to the Vehicles are output in the lowest hierarchy level.
  • a very similar system for managing and controlling train traffic is in the EP 0 108 363 described, the operation of the trains (in the lower level) via an information transmission line from control processor units (middle Level), which controls its instructions from an administrative processor unit (top level) received.
  • This system is also for driverless operation suitable.
  • the object of the invention is to provide a traffic control system for the rail-bound
  • a safe driving operation mainly single-track routes, in particular regional traffic, is guaranteed at which mainly supports the route protection and driving operations with computer technology and almost exclusively by the driver and / or vehicle computer realized directly from the locomotive and also comprehensive Transport logistics measures are taken into account and comprehensive Passenger information is provided.
  • the object of the invention is achieved by the first claim specified features solved. Thereafter it is provided that in a hierarchical built traffic control system with "safe" vehicle computers on each locomotive, a "safe" control computer and a master computer required real-time information regarding the vehicles, such as B. Location, direction of travel, speed and vehicle data are recorded and the host computer all incoming information from the vehicles, from the route, from fixed railway systems, as well Transport logistic data and external information recorded, processed and as recommendations the drivers as well as information for the train staff or passengers Provides.
  • the required information about the vehicles is obtained using the Satellite navigation obtained and / or at defined points via fixed Railway systems (e.g. identification beacons) recorded.
  • the exact Location determination can also be done, for example, via an exact path measurement respectively.
  • the data obtained is shared by all vehicle computers Vehicle computers that are within a defined range transfer. So everyone gets Vehicle calculator all the necessary information of all vehicles that are are within the defined range.
  • Safe driving and route protection are usually carried out the vehicle computers and the drivers realized by the data of the vehicles within the defined range and Track facilities can be used to derive the driving regime.
  • the Information is transmitted wirelessly.
  • the determined security-relevant Data for route protection and driving, as well as other recommending and informative data are provided to the respective driver provided via displays. Derives from this he carries out his actions for optimal, quick and safe driving.
  • the higher-level control computer which is also "safe", serves the Securing driving operations in exceptional situations.
  • the higher-level control computer transmits control commands and necessary information to the Vehicle computer and thus to the driver for driving in these exceptional situations.
  • the function of the control computer can be in one other computers can be integrated.
  • the host computer records all vehicle data, including the route Route protection, transport logistics and other passenger information processed these and provides them to the drivers, the railway staff and specifically available to customers.
  • the host computer does not intervene Track protection and driving operations, but serves an extended targeted information.
  • the central management takes place over the Master computer that provides all information regarding the vehicle computers Vehicles F1, F2, the route and the route facilities as well Transport logistics and regional information Information system gets transmitted and processed. These processed Information is sent to the vehicle computers for further processing and Display in the cab to derive actions from the Driver and selected information to inform the Provided to passengers.
  • the route is secured locally Communication of the vehicle computer with the route facilities.
  • This example also shows the coupling of the traffic control device to regional information system.
  • the host computer receives all information from the Vehicles, from the route as well as transport logistic information and external information, e.g. B. Tourism and advertising.
  • For this Information offer targeted information to passengers and customers via various information carriers at selected locations in the region made available.
  • Figure 2 shows the decentralized route and train protection.
  • the guarantee the signal-technically safe driving operation is carried out by the vehicle computer the vehicles F1, F2 and through the track facilities, the necessary security-relevant information through wireless transmission between the vehicle computers with each other and between the Vehicle computers and the route facilities within a defined range he follows.
  • To ensure optimal information processing on the vehicle computer guarantee only shipments of the vehicle computer and Track facilities evaluated that are within such a range who are responsible for ensuring the necessary security of the Driving operations and route protection is required. This range will defined and defined according to the specific circumstances.
  • the train location is determined, for example, with the aid of satellite navigation with a safe location correction at defined route points using identification beacons.
  • a diversified vehicle stop is triggered in the event of unauthorized onward travel on a section of the route either by the driver or by the secure vehicle computer.
  • the decentralized route protection system which is designed to be signal-safe, is described below.
  • At path crossings W1, W2 there is a precise location identification of the vehicle by means of identification beacons 5, 6, 11, 12 at the start of the transition as well as optionally at the end of the transition and S1.2 are sent and the input of the fuse feedback from S1.1 and S1.2 is monitored.
  • the transition W1 Upon receipt of the two backup confirmations, the transition W1 is entered. If one or both backup reports are missing, the onward journey can be permitted with an exception. Such an onward journey can be released as an exception by the vehicle computer or the higher-level control computer, depending on the specific conditions and the conditions of the following section of the route, if necessary under conditions (e.g. maximum speed).
  • the securing of the way crossing W1 is canceled by switching off the fixed railway systems S1.1 and S1.2.
  • transitional identifications and security requirements can according to local conditions also for two or more transitions be summarized.
  • Double-track routes are functionally divided into single-track routes, whereby in normal operation, each route is only traveled in one direction.
  • the Vehicle computer of the vehicle F1 or F2 determined by evaluating the Locations of other vehicles F2 or F1, within the defined range, the busy or free state of the in Direction of travel of the following section 2 - 5 or 7 - 6. According to the respective direction of travel of vehicles F1, F2 is encountered Vehicles the entire following single-track section and the itself subsequent double-track section for the continuation of the journey too consider.
  • the Vehicle F1 the route section 2-7 and a route section 7-8 or 9 - 10 be free.
  • the route section 7-2 and a route section 2 - 1 or 4 - 3 can be free.
  • the turnouts are controlled analogously to the control of the way crossings protection by a corresponding control request when the identification beacons 1, 2, 7, 8 are reached.
  • the point control is omitted and the number of route sections to be taken into account can be reduced because a change of direction is not possible. So z. B. for the vehicle F2, the sections 1-2 and for the vehicle F1, the sections 9-10 may be disregarded.
  • the Vehicle computer When determining the busy state of the following route section, the Vehicle computer issued a "stop" command to the driver.
  • a follow-up trip may be necessary with appropriate conditions, as approved.
  • Such Follow-up travel can be carried out by the higher-level control computer the corresponding vehicle computer can be released or by a Dispatcher via radio direct to the relevant driver be allowed.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Claims (2)

  1. Système permettant de piloter le fonctionnement et l'écoulement du trafic ferroviaire, y compris de la logistique des transports, tout particulièrement sur des tronçons à une seule voie de trafic faible ou modéré, alors que ce système de pilotage est assisté par ordinateurs et construit selon une hiérarchie, dont le niveau opérationnel inférieur de pilotage se compose d'ordinateurs "sécurisés" qui sont installés à bord de chaque véhicule ferroviaire, le niveau moyen qui lui est superposé est constitué d'un ordinateur de guidage "sécurisé" et le niveau supérieur, dominant les deux autres niveaux qui lui sont subordonnés, se compose d'un ordinateur central de contrôle, qui permet la saisie en temps réel des données relatives aux véhicules ferroviaires, telles que leur localisation, leur sens et vitesse de progression, et des informations spécifiques aux véhicules ferroviaires, qui sont transmises au moyen de la télédétection par satellite et/ou par des relais fixes le long du parcours (1-12), alors que toutes les informations transmises par les véhicules ferroviaires (F1, F2), par les équipements ferroviaires fixes (S1.1, S1.2) et par l'itinéraire parcouru ainsi que les informations à caractère logistique et de nature extérieure, comme les informations relatives au tourisme et à la promotion publicitaire, sont reçues par l'ordinateur central de contrôle pour être traitées et mises à la disposition des conducteurs des motrices à titre indicatif, pour servir d'information aux employés des services ferroviaires et pour viser directement les passagers des trains, et alors que la transmission de l'information se produit via un système de communication sans fil,
    ce système de pilotage étant caractérisé par le fait que
    les ordinateurs à bord des véhicules ferroviaires (F1, F2), en vue d'assurer la sécurité du trafic, récupèrent les informations relatives à la sécurité, qui sont transmises, via ce système de communication sans fil, par les autres véhicules ferroviaires et par les équipements ferroviaires placés le long du parcours, qui se trouvent situés à l'intérieur d'un périmètre bien défini, que ces ordinateurs pilotent les équipements ferroviaires fixes (S1.2, S1.2, S2.1, S2.2), qu'ils saisissent les messages concernant les informations sur le statut des équipements ferroviaires fixes qu'ils pilotent (S1.2, S1.2, S2.1, S2.2) afin de les utiliser dans l'exploitation normale du réseau pour piloter les véhicules ferroviaires et les équipements du trajet ferroviaire, que leurs écrans, en vue d'assurer la sécurité du trafic, affichent les informations relatives à la sécurité de même que les informations relatives à la position de tous les autres véhicules et qu'ils transmettent des informations à l'ordinateur central de contrôle,
    par le fait que l'ordinateur de guidage "sécurisé" les supervisant n'influence qu'à titre exceptionnel le traitement des questions relatives au trafic ferroviaire et à la sécurité sur l'itinéraire parcouru, que la sécurité de la ligne ferroviaire se trouve assurée par un système décentralisé s'appuyant sur la communication entre les ordinateurs installés à bord des véhicules ferroviaires et les équipements ferroviaires placés le long du parcours, c'est-à-dire sans que l'ordinateur central de contrôle n'intervienne dans les questions relatives à la sécurité sur l'itinéraire et au trafic ferroviaire, et par le fait que se réalise la transmission sans fil des informations tant à l'adresse de l'ordinateur central de contrôle qu'à celle des ordinateurs de guidage et de tous les véhicules ferroviaires (F1, F2) qui sont localisés à l'intérieur d'un périmètre défini.
  2. Système de pilotage du trafic ferroviaire d'après la revendication n°1, caractérisé par le fait que les données spécifiques relatives aux véhicules ferroviaires sont constituées d'un code d'identification ainsi que d'informations portant sur la capacité de transport et sur la vérification de l'état d'entretien du matériel.
EP94927600A 1993-09-13 1994-09-09 Systeme permettant de piloter le fonctionnement et l'ecoulement du trafic ferroviaire Expired - Lifetime EP0719224B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE4331431 1993-09-13
DE4331431A DE4331431C1 (de) 1993-09-13 1993-09-13 Verkehrsleiteinrichtung zur Steuerung des Fahrbetriebes und des Verkehrsablaufes für den schienengebundenen Verkehr
PCT/EP1994/003032 WO1995007832A1 (fr) 1993-09-13 1994-09-09 Systeme permettant de piloter le fonctionnement et l'ecoulement du trafic ferroviaire

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0719224A1 EP0719224A1 (fr) 1996-07-03
EP0719224B1 true EP0719224B1 (fr) 2000-01-19

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EP94927600A Expired - Lifetime EP0719224B1 (fr) 1993-09-13 1994-09-09 Systeme permettant de piloter le fonctionnement et l'ecoulement du trafic ferroviaire

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Country Link
EP (1) EP0719224B1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE188930T1 (fr)
DE (2) DE4331431C1 (fr)
WO (1) WO1995007832A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19529374A1 (de) * 1995-08-10 1997-02-13 Sel Alcatel Ag Verfahren zur Einbindung von Bahnübergängen in die automatische Steuerung und Sicherung von Schienenfahrzeugen
DE19630575A1 (de) * 1996-07-30 1998-02-05 Sel Alcatel Ag System zur semikontinuierlichen Steuerung von spurgeführten Fahrzeugen
DE19647461C2 (de) * 1996-11-16 2000-05-25 Deutsche Bahn Ag Einrichtung zur Erfassung von Eisenbahnfahrzeugen
DE19654621C1 (de) * 1996-12-20 1998-05-28 Elpro Ag Verfahren zur gleichmäßigen Lastverteilung in Unterwerken für elektrisch betriebene Fahrzeuge
DE19708559A1 (de) * 1997-03-04 1998-09-10 Alsthom Cge Alcatel Verfahren zur Steuerung spurgebundener Fahrzeuge sowie Fahrzeugrechner und Fahrzeugsteuerungssystem hierfür
DE19747198A1 (de) * 1997-10-25 1999-04-29 Tiefenbach Gmbh Eisenbahn-Betriebsverfahren
US6179252B1 (en) 1998-07-17 2001-01-30 The Texas A&M University System Intelligent rail crossing control system and train tracking system
DE19850051A1 (de) * 1998-10-30 2000-05-04 Abb Research Ltd Verfahren zur Steuerung der Energieverteilung auf einem Eisenbahnnetz
CN102139700B (zh) * 2010-02-01 2013-07-17 同济大学 一种轨道交通的车辆工况在线监测系统
CN102139701B (zh) * 2010-02-01 2013-07-17 同济大学 一种轨道交通的车辆工况在线监测方法
CN103786754A (zh) * 2014-02-26 2014-05-14 苏州缪斯信息科技有限公司 轨道交通信号故障应急系统
CN106504367B (zh) * 2016-11-02 2019-03-22 中车青岛四方机车车辆股份有限公司 车辆故障预警方法和装置

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DE3107102A1 (de) * 1981-02-21 1982-09-02 Licentia Patent-Verwaltungs-Gmbh, 6000 Frankfurt System zur zug-, fahrweg- und bahnstromsteuerung
DE3277806D1 (en) * 1981-10-03 1988-01-21 British Railways Board Control system for controlling the passage of vehicles
JPS5984663A (ja) * 1982-11-02 1984-05-16 川崎重工業株式会社 列車運行管理制御装置および方法
JPS59118567A (ja) * 1982-12-27 1984-07-09 日本国有鉄道 読取式通票閉そく方法
GB8728165D0 (en) * 1987-12-02 1988-01-06 Secr Defence Rail network monitoring and control

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
ATE188930T1 (de) 2000-02-15
WO1995007832A1 (fr) 1995-03-23
DE4331431C1 (de) 1995-03-02
DE59409091D1 (de) 2000-02-24
EP0719224A1 (fr) 1996-07-03

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