WO2018185397A1 - Procédé d'inhibition temporaire d'une activation à distance d'une fonction présente dans un véhicule automobile - Google Patents
Procédé d'inhibition temporaire d'une activation à distance d'une fonction présente dans un véhicule automobile Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2018185397A1 WO2018185397A1 PCT/FR2018/050742 FR2018050742W WO2018185397A1 WO 2018185397 A1 WO2018185397 A1 WO 2018185397A1 FR 2018050742 W FR2018050742 W FR 2018050742W WO 2018185397 A1 WO2018185397 A1 WO 2018185397A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- activation
- antenna
- attempts
- vehicle
- attempt
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
- B60R25/245—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user where the antenna reception area plays a role
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/209—Remote starting of engine
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00317—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks keyless data carrier having only one limited data transmission range
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
- G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
- G07C2209/63—Comprising locating means for detecting the position of the data carrier, i.e. within the vehicle or within a certain distance from the vehicle
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method of temporarily inhibiting remote activation of a function present in a motor vehicle.
- the activation is done between an activation means carried by a person authorized to perform this activation and an activation module present in the vehicle by transmission, reception and measurement of electromagnetic waves. between the activation means and the activation module.
- the activation module is able to recognize the activation means, to determine a mathematical position in an electromagnetic field space of the activation means located in a predetermined detection zone and to allow activation in this case.
- inhibition of activation occurs after a predetermined number of unsuccessful activation attempts being considered as located outside the detection zone and presumably malicious.
- the method according to the present invention makes it possible to differentiate, among the allegedly malicious attempts that have not succeeded, unsuccessful attempts to activate but which are not malicious by being carried out by an authorized person.
- These unsuccessful activation attempts are mainly due to detection errors of the activation means, in the possession of the authorized person, by the activation module present in the vehicle.
- the problem underlying the present invention is to design a method for inhibiting a remote activation of a function present in a motor vehicle by exchange between an activation means carried by a person and an activation module integrated in the motor vehicle that can more accurately account for failed activation attempts by avoiding inappropriate inhibition of activation for unsuccessful activation attempts by others causes only malicious actions.
- the subject of the present invention is a method of temporarily inhibiting a remote activation of a function present in a motor vehicle, the activation being between an activation means carried by a person authorized to operate this activation and an activation module present in the vehicle by transmission, reception and measurement of electromagnetic waves between the activation means and the activation module, the activation module being able to recognize the activation means, determining a mathematical position in an electromagnetic field space of the activating means for a detection zone and allowing activation in this case, the inhibition of activation occurring after a predetermined number of activation attempts failing to be considered localized outside the detection zone, remarkable in that the respective mathematical positions of the activation attempts not having are memorized and that only activation attempts that have not resulted in activation attempts whose position differs from a certain threshold of at least one position of an activation attempt have been taken into account. not completed already memorized.
- the solution proposed by the present invention aims at memorizing the positions of the activation means or means and not incrementing the unsuccessful activation attempts and leading to an inhibition of the activation of the function present in the vehicle. which if the mathematical positions of these activation attempts change compared to the activation attempts already stored.
- the present invention makes it possible to safely differentiate unsuccessful activation attempts made by an authorized person and that are not deemed to be malicious attempts, unlike other activation attempts. having failed.
- the person authorized to activate the function present in the vehicle will persist in his request for activation of the function until seeking the means of activation it carries, preferably in the form of a badge, take it out, take it by hand and move it while keeping the same position.
- the activation means will thus leave a possible zone of non-detection: the next start request will be positive.
- the means activation remains in a zone of non-detection, which is due for example to external electromagnetic disturbances, as the authorized person has moved the activation means while remaining in place, the means activation remains in a position close to the position it previously occupied, more precisely in an environment within reach of this position it occupied. This makes it possible to differentiate an unsuccessful activation attempt caused by a person authorized to maliciously provoked activation. Indeed, in the latter case, the malicious person will move with a device similar to an activation means to find a detection zone that can lead to activation of the system.
- the maximum distance threshold corresponds to a displacement of the activation means for a position of the authorized person remaining the same and due to movement of an arm of the person, that is to say that the activation means remains within the reach of the person and therefore from his initial position.
- the activation module is associated with at least one antenna for transmitting and receiving electromagnetic waves on or in the motor vehicle.
- the antennas are arranged at different locations of the vehicle, the antennas or groups of antennas emitting electromagnetic waves in turn. The entire environment of the vehicle is then covered by the antennas by providing a sufficient detection area of the activation means by the activation module.
- each mathematical position of the activation means is determined by at least one reception power measurement received by the antenna or each antenna of an electromagnetic wave in return for the activation means.
- the physical position of the activation means is not known and only its electromagnetic position equivalent to a mathematical position is known.
- each reception power measurement received from an electromagnetic wave in return for the activation means is subjected to a processing so as to reduce an amplitude dynamic as a function of the distance of the activation means to the antenna or to each antenna. This could distort the comparison between the mathematical coordinates of a new unsuccessful activation attempt position with one or more activation attempts already stored as unsuccessful.
- attempts to remotely activate the vehicle that have not been stored are grouped together in at least one software memory (or a memory directory) integrated in the activation module, the antenna or each antenna having a software memory respectively.
- the coordinates resulting in electromagnetic wave power measurements of the different stored positions of the activation means in the electromagnetic space are grouped for each antenna.
- the activation module performs a comparison of the position of the new activation attempt with the positions of the activation attempts that have not succeeded. of the or each memory by antenna and if none of the positions of the activation attempts that have not already resulted in memory (s) is identical to the position of the new activation attempt by considering a margin of error predetermined, the position of the new activation attempt is described as different and this position is entered in the respective memory or memories.
- n is greater than or equal to 1:
- MES_mémoire 1 and MES_mémoire n being the power measurements received for the memory of the first antenna and the n th antenna
- MES_nouv 1 and MES_nouv n being the received power measurements for the new activation attempt for the memory of the first antenna and the nth antenna
- the inhibition of the remote activation is operated and remains valid for a predetermined inhibition period and after a successful activation of a vehicle function.
- the car where appropriate considering a latency and / or a distance traveled by the vehicle after the successful activation, at least a part of the memorized positions of the unsuccessful activation attempts are erased.
- This maximum number may be, for example, from 3 to 6. It may be less than that for an inhibition method according to the state of the art because the determination of unsuccessful activation attempts is more reliable in the method according to the invention than that of the state of the art due to the retrenchment of unsuccessful activation attempts triggered by a person authorized stored attempts, which increases the security of inhibition by making more selective the inhibition criteria.
- the invention also relates to a method of remote activation of a function of a motor vehicle, the activation being between an activation means carried by a person authorized to perform this activation and an activation module present in the vehicle by emission, reception and measurement of electromagnetic waves between the medium activation and the activation module, remarkable in that it includes such a temporary inhibition method.
- the activation method is made more efficient and safer according to the present invention with inhibitions of the activation process actually due to intrusive attempts and not to false detections of intrusive attempts.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a view from above of a motor vehicle equipped with a remote activation system of the free hand type of a function present in the vehicle, the inhibition method according to the present invention; invention that can be applied for such a motor vehicle,
- FIG. 2 is a schematic representation of a remote activation system of the free hand activation type of a function present in a motor vehicle, the inhibition method according to the present invention being applicable to such a device; free hand activation system. It will firstly be described the characteristics of a method of remote activation of a function present in a motor vehicle, these features serving to implement the inhibition method of the present invention but not specifically related to inhibition of activation according to the present invention.
- FIG. 1 An example of a system for detecting a position of an activation means at a predetermined distance from a vehicle is illustrated in FIG. 1.
- a system for detecting a position of an activation means at a predetermined distance from a vehicle is illustrated in FIG. 1.
- Such a system is partially integrated into a vehicle 10 by a communicating activation module 12. remote with an activation means 20 in this example in the form of an access badge "hands free" to the vehicle 10.
- the activation module 12 is frequently in the form of an electronic unit provided with or associated with means for transmitting and receiving electromagnetic waves.
- FIG. 1 there is shown a left side antenna L and a right side antenna R, respectively disposed in each of the door handles front left and right front, and a rear antenna T disposed in the rear area at the bumper rear or rear trunk lock, vehicle 10.
- the antennas L, R and T emit electromagnetic waves inducing an electromagnetic field defining a zone of emission, respectively ZL, ZR and ZT.
- the activation means 20 is identified as belonging to the vehicle 10, being for example recognizable by an identifier and is configured, on the one hand, to detect the presence of at least one of the antennas L, R and T and to measure the total amplitude of the electromagnetic field received, from at least one antenna and, secondly, to transmit the values thus measured to the activation module 12.
- the function that may be involved in the activation may be the closing and / or opening of an opening, for example a door or the trunk of the vehicle.
- the function can also be the starting of the vehicle 10.
- the authorized person carrying the activation means 20 can be outside or inside the vehicle when the activation is triggered, this depending on the function to activate.
- a fixed position of the activation means 20 can be detected or the activation means 20 can follow a predetermined path by undergoing several detections.
- the activation module 12 is able to recognize the activation means 20, to determine a mathematical position in an electromagnetic field space of the activation means for a predetermined detection zone and to allow the activation in this case.
- this remote activation system is associated with an inhibition system implementing an inhibition process that takes place after a predetermined number of unsuccessful activation attempts.
- the respective mathematical positions of the unsuccessful activation attempts are memorized and only the activation attempts that have not resulted in activation attempts whose position differs from a certain one are taken into account.
- the invention takes into account that a specific characteristic of an unsuccessful activation attempt made by an authorized person takes place at the same place, the authorized person not moving but trying to find the best position of operation of its activation means 20 by grasping and moving it with his hand. It follows that the movement of the activation means 20 is low and takes place around the position of the authorized person and within reach of this person.
- an attempted activation by a malicious person involves a consequent movement of a device acting as an activation means 20 and therefore a series of activation attempts at different locations.
- the invention thus makes it possible to focus the activation inhibition decision on unsuccessful activation attempts which differ from each other by their positions and not to include in the unsuccessful attempts the attempts in similar positions that are more the act of an authorized person than of an evil person.
- a vehicle 10 comprises an activation module 12 remote from a function provided in the vehicle 10.
- the activation system comprises at minus an omnidirectional antenna 14 mounted on the vehicle 10 and not only at the rear of the vehicle.
- This antenna 14 is coupled to said activation module 12 and configured, on the one hand, to emit, preferably periodically, electromagnetic waves inducing an electromagnetic field in an electromagnetic emission space 1 around the vehicle 10 and, on the other hand, on the other hand, to receive electromagnetic waves from the activation means 20.
- FIG. 2 it is shown a single antenna 14, the system can be equipped with several antennas. As follows with respect to FIG. 2, only one antenna is mentioned, but what is described can be applied to each antenna of an activation system comprising several antennas. There can also be several antennas with a main antenna that communicates with the activation module 12.
- the antennas can be arranged at different locations of the vehicle, the antennas or groups of antennas being able to emit electromagnetic waves in turn. .
- the electromagnetic waves emitted by the antenna 14 or each antenna may comprise information grouped together in a so-called “detection" frame notably comprising a vehicle identification code 10 or information grouped together in a so-called “measurement request” frame comprising a request for an activation means 20 associated with the vehicle 10 for the measurement by this activation means 20 of the components of the magnetic field induced by the electromagnetic waves emitted by the antenna 14 or each antenna.
- the electromagnetic field induced by the waves emitted by the antenna 14 or each antenna can be quantified at any point in the emission space.
- the activation module 12 comprises or is connected to a computer configured to determine the mathematical position in an electromagnetic field space of the activation means 20.
- the activation means 20 may firstly be configured to emit electromagnetic waves comprising information grouped together in a "wake-up" frame intended for the antenna 14 or each antenna and comprising in particular an identification code of the activation means 20.
- the activation module 12 can send the antenna 14 or the antennas low frequency waves, for example around 125 kHz, and the activation means can respond with radio frequency waves, for example at 433 MHz or 315 MHz, but this is not limiting.
- the activation means 20 is furthermore configured to emit, preferably periodically, electromagnetic waves comprising information grouped in a so-called "measurement" frame intended for the antenna 14 and comprising a set of values of the spatial components of the electromagnetic field. measured by the activating means 20 at a point in the emission space of the antenna 14.
- the activation means 20 is also configured to send, periodically, these measurement frames to the activation module 12.
- the activation means 20 comprises antenna-type transmission means.
- the activation means 20 is preferably in the form of a badge or an electronic key, without this being limiting to the scope of the present invention.
- the activation module 12 of the vehicle 10 may emit periodically, for example every 300 to 500 ms, electromagnetic waves which may comprise a detection frame in an electromagnetic emission space via its antenna 14 or each antenna.
- an activation means 20 associated with the vehicle 10 When an activation means 20 associated with the vehicle 10 enters said transmission space and receives at least one of the detection frames transmitted by the antenna 14, it can determine, for example using a identification code of the vehicle 10, that it is in the emission space of an antenna 14 or antennas coupled to an activation module 12 with which it is associated remotely.
- the activation means 20 then sends in turn electromagnetic waves comprising a so-called wake frame to the activation module 12 via the antenna 14 or at least one of the antennas serving as main antenna.
- the activation module 12 analyzes the received wake-up frame and determines, from the identification code of the activation means 20 that it contains, that this frame has been sent by an activation means 20 associated with it . This being done, the activation module 12 sends, again via the antenna 14 or each antenna, electromagnetic waves comprising a measurement request frame destined for the activation means 20.
- the activation means 20 When it receives the measurement request frame, the activation means 20 will then perform, preferably periodically, during a predetermined detection time interval, a measurement of the power of the electromagnetic waves received having been emitted by the antenna. 14 or each antenna associated with the activation module 12 and sends the measurements to the activation module 12.
- the detections can be done periodically and the electromagnetic waves can be sent offset by the antenna 14 or each antenna associated with the activation module 12.
- the activation module 12 can determine a mathematical position in an electromagnetic field space of the activation means 20 for a detection zone and allow activation in this case. In the opposite case, the activation attempt relating to this position is considered as unsuccessful and is placed in a list of unsuccessful activation attempts, the inhibition of the activation occurring after a predetermined number of failed activation attempts.
- the activation module 12 when its mathematical position is close to another of the unsuccessful activation attempts stored, the activation module 12 does not proceed to the memorization of this new attempt as unsuccessful attempt and this new attempt does not affect the inhibition of the activation process.
- the activation means has not undergone any displacement or only a slight displacement relative to the position of a memorized attempt, for example resulting from a movement of an arm of a person holding the means of movement.
- activation 20 This suggests that the activation medium carrier 20 has not changed position something that would not make a malicious person who will undoubtedly move to find a possible activation position that is in the predetermined detection zone.
- Each mathematical position of the activation means can be determined by at least one received power measurement received by the antenna 14 or each antenna of an electromagnetic wave in return for the activation means.
- a received receive power measurement provides an indication of the intensity of a received signal for measuring the signal. We can estimate a mathematical distance of the object that emitted this signal with respect to the antenna according to the value of the intensity.
- the power measurement in reception corresponds to what is known by the abbreviation Anglo-Saxon RSSI in English-language correspondent to "Received Signal Strength Indication" whose power measurement in reception is the commonly used translation.
- Each reception power measurement received from an electromagnetic wave back from the activation means may be processed to reduce amplitude dynamics as a function of the distance of the activation means to the antenna or each antenna. .
- the magnetic field has a very strong amplitude dynamic as a function of the distance to the antenna.
- nT represents nano tesla.
- the unsuccessful remote activation attempts of the vehicle are grouped together in at least one software memory integrated in the activation module, the antenna or each antenna having a respective software memory, in the case where these attempts to activation are not close to each other. There is a maximum number of activation attempts in each memory which, once exceeded, causes the inhibition of the activation process.
- the memory or memories contain the n power measurements of the position of each unsuccessful activation attempt T1 to T3. For a five-antenna system, for example, there will be five measurements for each position. If there are several similar activation means for the same vehicle, the one or more software memories will be advantageously duplicated.
- the activation module For a new activation attempt that has not been successful, the activation module performs a comparison of the position of the new activation attempt with the positions of the activation attempts that did not result in the activation. or each memory per antenna. If none of the positions of the activation attempts that have not already resulted in memory (s) are identical to the position of the new activation attempt by considering a predetermined margin of error, the position of the new attempt to activation is described as different and this position is entered in the respective memory or memories.
- the position of the activation means is in fact stored in the form of n power measurements, where n is the number of antennas corresponding to this position.
- the power measurements come from the fields measured for each transmitting antenna of the system. A variation of these n measures will be interpreted as a variation of position.
- MES_mémoire 1 being the power measurement received for the memory of the single antenna and MES_nouv 1 the power measurement received for the new activation attempt.
- MES_mémoire 1 and MES_mémoire n being the power measurements received for the memory of the first antenna 14 and the n th antenna
- MES_nouv 1 and MES_nouv n being the power measurements received for the new activation attempt for the memory of the first antenna 14 and the nth antenna.
- the position of the new activation attempt is qualified as identical and is not counted in the list or lists.
- the new position is qualified as different and this position is entered in the respective memory or memories.
- the inhibition of remote activation is made and remains valid for a predetermined inhibition time. This represents a security knowing that all unsuccessful activation attempts are likely to be malicious activation attempts, other unsuccessful activation attempts having been subtracted from unsuccessful failed attempts.
- This temporary inhibition can be for example one hour without new request for activation of the function present in the vehicle, for example a start.
- the latency time may be 1 minute and / or the distance traveled may be 1 km for all memory means available activation are emptied of one or more of their oldest positions of unsuccessful activation attempts.
- the invention also relates to a method of remote activation of a function of a motor vehicle, the activation being between an activation means carried by a person authorized to perform this activation and an activation module present in the vehicle by transmitting, receiving and measuring electromagnetic waves between the activation means and the activation module.
- the activation method comprises a temporary inhibition method as previously described.
- Such an activation method is less likely to be wrongly locked while it has at least the same security vis-à-vis the detection of malicious attempts that the method of the state of the art.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US16/481,880 US10640088B2 (en) | 2017-04-04 | 2018-03-27 | Method for temporarily inhibiting remote activation of a function present in a motor vehicle |
JP2019554649A JP6835982B2 (ja) | 2017-04-04 | 2018-03-27 | 自動車両に設けられている機能のリモート起動を一時的に禁止する方法 |
KR1020197027868A KR102274650B1 (ko) | 2017-04-04 | 2018-03-27 | 자동차에 존재하는 기능의 원격 활성화를 일시적으로 억제하기 위한 방법 |
CN201880022111.9A CN110461659B (zh) | 2017-04-04 | 2018-03-27 | 用于暂时禁止机动车辆中存在的功能的远程激活的方法 |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1752899 | 2017-04-04 | ||
FR1752899A FR3064572B1 (fr) | 2017-04-04 | 2017-04-04 | Procede d’inhibition temporaire d’une activation a distance d’une fonction presente dans un vehicule automobile |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2018185397A1 true WO2018185397A1 (fr) | 2018-10-11 |
Family
ID=59253684
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/FR2018/050742 WO2018185397A1 (fr) | 2017-04-04 | 2018-03-27 | Procédé d'inhibition temporaire d'une activation à distance d'une fonction présente dans un véhicule automobile |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
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US (1) | US10640088B2 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP6835982B2 (fr) |
KR (1) | KR102274650B1 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN110461659B (fr) |
FR (1) | FR3064572B1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2018185397A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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DE102017011879A1 (de) * | 2017-12-21 | 2019-06-27 | Metirionic Gmbh | Funkfeld basierte Authentifizierung von Knoten innerhalb einer Funkverbindung |
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2018
- 2018-03-27 KR KR1020197027868A patent/KR102274650B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2018-03-27 US US16/481,880 patent/US10640088B2/en active Active
- 2018-03-27 CN CN201880022111.9A patent/CN110461659B/zh active Active
- 2018-03-27 WO PCT/FR2018/050742 patent/WO2018185397A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2018-03-27 JP JP2019554649A patent/JP6835982B2/ja active Active
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KR20190120308A (ko) | 2019-10-23 |
JP2020518502A (ja) | 2020-06-25 |
US10640088B2 (en) | 2020-05-05 |
JP6835982B2 (ja) | 2021-02-24 |
US20190389427A1 (en) | 2019-12-26 |
KR102274650B1 (ko) | 2021-07-07 |
FR3064572B1 (fr) | 2019-03-22 |
FR3064572A1 (fr) | 2018-10-05 |
CN110461659A (zh) | 2019-11-15 |
CN110461659B (zh) | 2022-02-11 |
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