Classifications

• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
  • B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
  • B61L27/33—Backup systems, e.g. switching when failures occur
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B61—RAILWAYS
  • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
  • B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
  • B61L21/10—Arrangements for trains which are closely following one another

Definitions

• the invention relates to a method for operating a railway safety system with a control center processing complex states and at least one fallback system and a device relating thereto.
• the state z of the operation can be described from the point of view of the operation control center in a complex state space Z, which contains not only the route topology, but also all issued MA as well as the state of all rail vehicles.
• This complex state z is normally difficult to manage for an operator in the control center, especially if manual intervention is rarely required.
• the use of the existing fallback system in an emergency is associated with a high risk of error and thus significant risk for the reliability of the overall system.
• the invention is based on the object to simplify the operation of the relapse system such that even in an emergency, a sufficiently high reliability is guaranteed.
• the object is achieved by transforming the complex states z into simpler states r, which can be processed manually, and transmitting them to the fallback system.
• the object is also achieved by a device which has a transformation device for transforming the complex states z into simpler states r, which can be processed manually, and a transmission device for transmitting the simpler states r to the fallback system.
• the transformation assigns a quasi-traditional state r from a state space R of the fallback system to each complex state z in the state space Z of the operation control center.
• the state power of the transformed Zu- space R correspond to a relay interlocking.
• the MA are mapped to traditional track sections and the positions of the rail vehicles to the occupancy in these sections.
• the track sections do not have to be predetermined, but can be derived dynamically from the MA. If several fallback systems are present, they communicate with each other, which of the fallback systems should act as a master system. To Termination of the emergency situation, that is, in case of reusability of the operation control center, the operation authorization is transmitted back to the operation control center together with the last current state.
• each new complex state z is transformed and transmitted with timestamp and authenticated to the fallback system.
• the authentication can be carried out, for example, cryptographically, whereby the reception of the status data by the fallback system to the operations control center is confirmed.
• the new MA which the operator has generated by means of the fallback system, is either transmitted automatically from the fallback system to the rail vehicle or transmitted by telephone to the driver.
• an authentication code is generated by the fallback system, which must be accepted by the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle. Only upon acceptance will the new MA become valid.
• At least one rail vehicle is a direct data transmission to the fallback system. This excludes sources of error, whereby the current status data, in particular the position and speed of the rail vehicle, are processed by the fallback system.
• the fallback system is preferably designed as a conventional computing system, which has a
• Radio connection is connected to the operation control center.
• the conventional computer system may be, for example, a mobile device such as a tablet.
• the life-character telegrams are transmitted and monitored via the radio link with the operation control center.
• the railway safety system essentially comprises a number of rail vehicles 1, which are controlled by a control center 2 in normal operation and by a fallback system 3 in the event of an error.
• the operation control center 2 processes complex states z, which comprise the current driving data, for example position and speed, of the rail vehicles 1 in a complex state space Z.
• the driving data of the rail vehicles 1 are constantly transmitted by means of radio antennas 4 to the operation control center 2. From these driving data and other data, in particular timetable data, the operating control center 2 generates a movement authority MA for each rail vehicle 1, which contains specifications for a speed profile up to a certain position to be approached by the rail vehicle 1. At the same time, the complex states z are transferred from the operation control center 2 or a peripheral system into simpler states r and transmitted to the fallback system 3. Preferably, along with the transferred states r life character telegrams, time stamps and authentication features are exchanged between the operation control center 2 and the fallback system 3. The driving data of the rail vehicle 1, in particular satellite position 5 determined position data are also transmitted by radio directly to the fallback system 3.
• the fallback system 3 is informed at all times about the current state r of the railway safety system, so that a replacement of the operation control center 2 by the fallback system 3 is possible at any time in the event of a relevant error in the operation control center 2, for example in the absence of life signs telegrams .
• the states r which are displayed and processed on the fallback system 3, correspond to the Zu- stand space R at a relay interlocking and are thus - in contrast to the complex states z in the operation control center 2 - manageable by an operator 6.
• the operator 6 takes over the control of the rail vehicles 1 in a conventional manner with track section analysis only as long as the error of the operation control center 2 consists.
• the usually very high safety standards in railway safety systems can be met in this way, with an implementation of at least some functions of the operation control center 2 and / or the fallback system 3 in a cloud can be possible in addition to a hardware implementation.

Landscapes

• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
• Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
• Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Publications (1)

Family

ID=53610888

Family Applications (1)

Country Status (2)

Families Citing this family (1)

Family Cites Families (3)

• 2014
  • 2014-07-30 DE DE102014214918.5A patent/DE102014214918A1/de not_active Ceased
• 2015
  • 2015-07-15 WO PCT/EP2015/066157 patent/WO2016016003A2/fr active Application Filing

Also Published As

Similar Documents

Legal Events