WO2015002219A1 - 車載器、及びスプーフィング検知方法 - Google Patents
車載器、及びスプーフィング検知方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2015002219A1 WO2015002219A1 PCT/JP2014/067622 JP2014067622W WO2015002219A1 WO 2015002219 A1 WO2015002219 A1 WO 2015002219A1 JP 2014067622 W JP2014067622 W JP 2014067622W WO 2015002219 A1 WO2015002219 A1 WO 2015002219A1
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- vehicle
- spoofing
- position information
- positioning
- gnss
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a vehicle-mounted device using GNSS (Global Navigation Satelite System).
- GNSS Global Navigation Satelite System
- GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
- GPS Global Positioning System
- GLONASS Global Positioning System
- Galileo System Galileo System
- a charging process can be performed on a vehicle traveling in an area set as a toll road based on the positioning result of the vehicle position by the artificial satellite.
- spoofing In a satellite positioning system, a technique called spoofing is known in which an estimated position is misidentified as a position different from an actual position by spoofing a positioning signal transmitted from an artificial satellite. In order to legitimately charge a vehicle on a toll road, a technique capable of detecting spoofing is desired.
- Patent Documents 1 and 2 are examples of techniques for dealing with spoofing.
- the vehicle-mounted device outputs a first position information indicating the current position of the vehicle based on the positioning signal received from the artificial satellite, and a radio signal different from the positioning signal, A second position information indicating the current position is acquired, and a processing unit that detects spoofing based on the position indicated by the first position information and the position indicated by the second position information is provided.
- a spoofing detection method for an in-vehicle device includes a step of outputting first position information indicating a current position of a vehicle based on a positioning signal received from an artificial satellite, and a radio signal different from the positioning signal. A step of acquiring second position information indicating the current position of the vehicle, and a step of detecting spoofing based on the position indicated by the first position information and the position indicated by the second position information.
- the present invention provides a technique that enables detection of spoofing.
- FIG. 1 shows the configuration of a satellite positioning system.
- FIG. 2 shows the configuration of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 3 shows the configuration of the spoofing detection unit.
- FIG. 4 shows the operation of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 5 shows the configuration of the satellite positioning system.
- FIG. 6 shows the configuration of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 7 shows a base station ID table.
- FIG. 8 shows the operation of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 9 shows the configuration of the satellite positioning system.
- FIG. 10 shows the configuration of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 11 shows the configuration of the spoofing detection unit.
- FIG. 12 shows the operation of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 13 shows the operation of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 14 shows the operation of the vehicle-mounted device.
- FIG. 1 shows the configuration of the satellite positioning system in the first embodiment of the present invention.
- the position of the vehicle 1 is estimated using GNSS satellite information carried by positioning signals transmitted from a plurality of GNSS satellites 12 (only one is shown).
- the vehicle-mounted device 2 is mounted on the user's vehicle 1.
- the vehicle-mounted device 2 receives the GNSS satellite information by the GNSS antenna 6.
- the GNSS chip 7 included in the vehicle-mounted device 2 estimates the current position of the vehicle 1 based on the received GNSS satellite information, and outputs it as a positioning result.
- the vehicle-mounted device 2 further includes a processing unit 3 that is a computer that performs billing processing using the positioning result output from the GNSS chip 7.
- the vehicle 1 includes a battery and supplies the vehicle power supply voltage 17 from the battery to the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the vehicle power supply voltage 17 is supplied to the power supply circuit 4 provided in the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the vehicle 1 further outputs an ignition ON / OFF signal 18 indicating whether the ignition key is turned in the on direction and the engine is turned on or turned off and the engine is turned off to the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the ignition ON / OFF signal 18 is transmitted as an ignition ON / OFF signal 19 to the processing unit 3 via the power supply circuit 4.
- the processing unit 3 supplies a vehicle-mounted power supply voltage ON / OFF signal 20 that instructs to turn on the power of the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- 4 is output.
- the power supply circuit 4 outputs the onboard equipment power supply voltage 21 based on the vehicle power supply voltage 17 supplied from the vehicle 1 in response to the onboard equipment power supply voltage ON / OFF signal 20.
- the various circuits included in the vehicle-mounted device 2 are driven by the vehicle-mounted device power supply voltage 21.
- the in-vehicle device 2 further includes a DSRC communication processing unit 11 and a DSRC antenna 10.
- a roadside system 16 is installed on a roadside such as a road or a parking lot where the vehicle 1 travels.
- the roadside system 16 includes a DSRC antenna 15.
- the roadside system 16 and the DSRC communication processing unit 11 can perform DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) bidirectionally via the DSRC antenna 15 and the DSRC antenna 10.
- FIG. 2 shows the configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the vehicle-mounted device 2 includes a GNSS antenna 6, a GNSS chip 7, a DSRC antenna 10, a DSRC communication processing unit 11, a main processing unit 34, and a spoofing detection unit 31.
- the main processing unit 34 and the spoofing detection unit 34 correspond to the processing unit 3 in FIG.
- Each of these units included in the processing unit 3 may be realized by software executed by the CPU, or may be realized by hardware by separate devices having respective functions.
- the positioning result 35 (first position information) output from the GNSS chip 7 is input to the spoofing detection unit 31.
- the roadside system 16 transmits DSRC position information (second position information) indicating the position of the DSRC antenna 15 (roadside device).
- the DSRC communication processing unit 11 passes the DSRC position information received by the DSRC antenna 10 to the spoofing detection unit 31 as a DSRC positioning result.
- the spoofing detection unit 31 outputs a determination result 39 as to whether spoofing has been performed based on the positioning result 36 (GNSS positioning result) output from the GNSS chip 7 and the DSRC positioning result. Based on the positioning result 38 output from the GNSS chip 7 and the determination result 39 output from the spoofing detection unit 31, the main processing unit 34 performs a charging process when the vehicle 1 travels on a toll road.
- FIG. 3 shows functional blocks provided in the spoofing detection unit 31.
- the spoofing detection unit 31 in the present embodiment includes a determination unit 41 and a position information acquisition unit 45. These functional blocks can be realized by the main CPU included in the vehicle-mounted device 2 reading out a program stored in the storage device and operating according to the procedure described in the program.
- the operation of the spoofing detection unit 31 in this embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.
- the GNSS chip 7 is data indicating a three-dimensional position of the vehicle 1 on the earth based on the GNSS satellite information.
- Positioning results 36 and 38 are output (step C1).
- the position information acquisition unit 45 inputs the DSRC positioning result from the DSRC communication processing unit 11 in substantially real time (step C2).
- the determination unit 41 compares the current positioning result 36 (GNSS positioning result) output from the GNSS chip 7 with the DSRC positioning result (step C3).
- the determination unit 41 determines the magnitude relationship between the difference between the position indicated by the GNSS positioning result and the position indicated by the DSRC positioning result (the distance between the two) and a preset threshold value. As this threshold value, a distance that is equal to or larger than the communication range of the roadside unit of DSRC is set.
- the determination unit 41 proceeds to the process of step C5.
- the determination unit 41 proceeds to the process of step C6.
- step C6 the determination unit 41 determines that there is a suspicion of spoofing.
- the history of suspected spoofing is registered in the spoofing candidate database 51 in association with the current time.
- the determination unit 41 extracts the past suspected spoofing history from the spoofing candidate database 51. If the duration of suspected spoofing is shorter than a predetermined threshold (NO in step C7), it is determined that there is a short-term positioning error due to multipath or the like and spoofing is not performed (step C5). If the duration of suspected spoofing is longer than a predetermined threshold (YES in step C7), it is determined that spoofing has been performed (step C8).
- the determination unit 41 outputs a determination result indicating no spoofing generated in step C5 or spoofing generated in step C8 (step C9).
- the main processing unit 34 takes the determination result 39 into consideration when executing a charging process or the like based on the positioning result 38 output from the GNSS chip 7. For example, when it is determined that spoofing has been performed, normal charging processing is stopped, and data indicating the determination result 39 is stored in the storage device.
- the spoofing can be detected when the positioning result based on the GNSS satellite information is unnaturally separated from the position of the DSRC roadside device that is communicating.
- the spoofing detection by the means described above has an advantage that it can be easily mounted on the vehicle-mounted device 2. The advantages will be described below.
- a dedicated GNSS chip is mounted on the vehicle-mounted device.
- a function for verifying data received from the GNSS satellite inside the GNS chip.
- there is no need to change the GNSS chip and a technique that enables spoofing detection using a signal output from the GNSS chip is desirable.
- the standard of signals output from the GNSS chip is defined by NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association). Any type of chip can be adopted as long as spoofing detection can be performed based on an output signal defined in such a standard, and the degree of freedom in chip selection is high.
- the estimated position of the vehicle 1 output from the GNSS chip 7 is used as data generated by the satellite positioning system. According to the standard, such an estimated position is output by any type of GNSS chip 7. Detailed information such as orbit information of each GNSS satellite that is not necessarily output by the GNSS chip 7 is not required in the spoofing detection of FIG. Therefore, the spoofing detection process shown in FIG. 4 can be executed without changing the GNSS chip 7 itself, and has the advantage that it can be executed regardless of the type of the GNSS chip 7. Such advantages also have other embodiments of the present invention described below.
- FIG. 5 shows the configuration of the satellite positioning system in the second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 shows a configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 2 in the present embodiment.
- cellular communication is used instead of the roadside system 16 of the first embodiment.
- the satellite positioning system in this embodiment includes a cellular communication chip 9 and a cellular communication antenna 8, and a cellular communication network including a center system 14 and a cellular base station 13 is provided. Use.
- Cellular communication is a method generally used as one of mobile communication methods. The outline will be described below.
- cellular communication a communication area is divided into many small cells, and a base station is installed in each cell.
- the cell size is typically in the range of several kilometers to several tens of kilometers centering on the base station, but a method of dividing into smaller microcells is also used.
- the radio wave output of each base station is large enough to cover the cell to which the base station belongs as a communication range. In other words, each base station is installed away from other base stations so as not to cause radio wave interference. Therefore, the same frequency can be reused in different base stations, and the frequency can be effectively used.
- the cellular communication network can be used as a part of a charging system using the result of position estimation of the vehicle 1 by GNSS.
- the GNSS chip 7 estimates the position of the vehicle 1 based on the GNSS satellite information received from the GNSS satellite 12 and outputs it as a positioning result.
- the cellular communication chip 9 transmits the positioning result from the cellular communication antenna 8.
- the positioning result is transmitted to the center system 14 via the cellular base station 13 near the vehicle 1.
- processing such as billing using the positioning result of the vehicle 1 is performed.
- FIG. 7 shows a base station ID table 52 registered in advance in the spoofing detection unit 31 in the present embodiment.
- the base station ID table 52 associates a base station ID 53 that is an identifier that identifies each of a plurality of base stations with an area 54 that is information indicating a communication range covered by each base station.
- the spoofing detection unit 3 performs spoofing detection using the position of the cellular base station 13 instead of the DSRC positioning result in the operation of the first embodiment shown in FIG.
- the cellular communication network communicates with the vehicle-mounted device 2 for billing processing or the like via the cellular base station 13
- the cellular communication network provides the vehicle-mounted device 2 with a base station ID 53 that identifies the cellular base station 13 in communication with the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the base station ID 53 can be used to roughly know the position where the vehicle 1 is located and use it instead of the DSRC positioning result in the first embodiment.
- FIG. 8 shows the operation of the spoofing detection unit 31 in the present embodiment.
- the positioning result 36 by the satellite positioning system is input to the spoofing detection unit 31 (step C11).
- the cellular communication chip 9 extracts from the signal received from the cellular base station 13 via the cellular communication antenna 8 the base station ID 53 that identifies the cellular base station 13 in communication.
- the position information acquisition unit 45 inputs the base station ID 53 from the cellular communication chip 9 (step C12).
- the position information acquisition unit 45 searches the base station ID table 52 for an area 54 corresponding to the base station ID 53 acquired from the cellular communication chip 9 (step C13).
- the determination unit 41 compares the position indicated by the GNSS positioning result with the area 54 (cellular base station communication range) searched from the base station ID table 52 (step C14). If the GNSS positioning result is within the cellular base station communication range (step C15 NO), the determination unit 41 proceeds to the process of step C16, and if not (step C15 YES), the determination unit 41 proceeds to the process of step C17.
- the subsequent processing in steps C16 to C20 is the same as that in steps C5 to C9 in FIG.
- the spoofing detection unit 3 performs spoofing detection using the position of the cellular base station 13 in communication instead of the DSRC positioning result in the operation of the first embodiment shown in FIG. In such a satellite positioning system, spoofing detection can be performed even in an area where a DSRC roadside device is not installed.
- FIG. 9 shows the configuration of the satellite positioning system in the third embodiment.
- FIG. 10 shows a configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 2 in the present embodiment.
- the following processing is performed. (1) Spoofing detection based on past and present GNSS positioning results. (2) Spoofing detection based on comparison between GNSS time information and DSRC time information, or comparison between GNSS time information and cellular communication time information. (3) Spoofing detection based on a comparison between the GNSS positioning result and the position of the DSRC roadside unit, or a comparison between the GNSS positioning result and the communication area of the cellular base station. Among these, for (3), the processing shown in the first embodiment or the second embodiment is performed. In the present embodiment, processes (1) and (2) are further added.
- the processing unit 3 stores the positioning result based on the GNSS satellite information in the positioning result storage area 5 prepared in the storage device together with the positioning time indicating the time when the positioning is performed.
- the positioning result storage unit 32 stores the positioning result 35 in the positioning result storage area 5 together with the current time.
- the positioning result 35 is stored in association with the positioning time.
- the vehicle-mounted device 2 in the present embodiment includes a real-time clock 33.
- the information generated by the GNSS chip 7 based on the GNSS satellite information includes GNSS time information 37 indicating the current time.
- the GNSS chip 7 outputs the GNSS time information 37 to the real-time clock 33 inside the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the real-time clock 33 outputs GNSS time information 40 in a format that can be used as a time stamp or the like in processing in the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the GNSS time information 37 output from the GNSS chip 7 and the GNSS time information 40 output from the real-time clock 33 have substantially the same contents, although the formats are different.
- the roadside system 16 always generates DSRC time information indicating the current time.
- the DSRC communication processing unit 11 receives the DSRC time information via the DSRC antenna 10 and passes it to the spoofing detection unit 31.
- the spoofing detection unit 31 includes past positioning results 35 and positioning times stored in the positioning result storage area 5, positioning results 36 (GNSS positioning results) output by the GNSS chip 7, and GNSS time information output by the real-time clock 33. 40 and a determination result 39 as to whether or not spoofing has been performed is output based on the DSRC time information output from the DSRC communication processing unit 11. Based on the positioning result 38 output from the GNSS chip 7 and the determination result 39 output from the spoofing detection unit 31, the main processing unit 34 performs a charging process when the vehicle 1 travels on a toll road.
- FIG. 11 shows functional blocks provided in the spoofing detection unit 31.
- the spoofing detection unit 31 in this embodiment further includes a threshold setting unit 42, an engine information collection unit 43, and a time information acquisition unit 44 in addition to the first embodiment shown in FIG.
- These functional blocks can be realized by the main CPU included in the vehicle-mounted device 2 reading out a program stored in the storage device and operating according to the procedure described in the program.
- FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing the operation of the spoofing detection unit 31 in the spoofing detection based on the past and current GNSS positioning results in the present embodiment.
- the GNSS chip 7 is a positioning result that is data indicating the three-dimensional position of the vehicle 1 on the earth based on the GNSS satellite information. 35, 36, and 38 are output.
- the positioning result storage unit 35 stores the positioning result 35 in the positioning result storage area 5 together with the positioning time indicating the current time (step A1).
- the determination unit 41 compares the current positioning result 36 output from the GNSS chip 7 with the past positioning result stored in the positioning result storage area 5. For this comparison, for example, a time deviation amount is set in advance, and the previous positioning result (for example, 10 seconds before) is read from the positioning result storage area 5 and compared with the current positioning result 36. (Step A2).
- the determination unit 41 determines the magnitude relationship between the difference between the past positioning result and the current positioning result, and a preset threshold value. As this threshold value, a distance that is considered unnatural for the vehicle 1 to move further is set between the set deviation amounts used in step A2. For example, if the amount of time difference is set to 10 seconds and the threshold is set to 500 meters, if the positioning result 10 seconds ago and the current positioning result are 500 meters or more, it is determined that the movement is unnatural.
- step A3 NO the determination unit 41 determines that there is no spoofing and that the positioning is performed normally (step A5). If the difference is greater than or equal to the threshold (YES in step A3), it is determined that spoofing has been performed (step A4).
- the determination part 41 outputs the determination result 39 regarding the presence or absence of spoofing (step A6).
- the main processing unit 34 performs processing such as billing based on the positioning result 38, the main processing unit 34 performs processing in consideration of the determination result 39 as well. For example, when it is determined that spoofing has been performed, normal charging processing is stopped, and data indicating the determination result 39 is stored in the storage device.
- a means for identifying a positioning error in a satellite positioning system such as multipath may be prepared.
- a positioning error due to multipath for example, the vehicle motion path based on satellite positioning temporarily shows an unnatural jump, and returns to the original correct positioning result again. Therefore, when the period in which the distance difference determined in step A3 is equal to or greater than the threshold is equal to or less than the predetermined period, it is determined that there is a possibility of positioning error due to multipath or the like, and it is not determined that spoofing has been performed. Processing may be performed.
- FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing the operation of such a spoofing detection unit 31.
- the GNSS chip 7 outputs positioning results 35, 36, and 38 as in step A1 of FIG.
- the positioning result storage unit 32 stores the positioning result 35 in the positioning result storage area 5 together with the positioning time indicating the current time (step A11).
- the threshold setting unit 42 sets the threshold with reference to the threshold database 50 stored in the storage device in the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the position change of the vehicle 1 is, for example, fast when traveling on a highway and slow while traveling on an urban area. Therefore, it is possible to determine whether or not the time-series changes in the positioning results 35, 36, and 38 of the vehicle 1 are unnatural by setting different threshold values for the moving speed according to the current position of the vehicle 1. .
- the threshold value database 50 stores an area on the map in association with the threshold value. For example, a high speed threshold is set for an area indicating a highway, and a low speed threshold is set for an area indicating an urban area.
- the threshold value setting unit 42 extracts a threshold value corresponding to the current position of the vehicle 1 indicated in the positioning result 36 output from the GNSS chip 7 from the threshold value database 50 and sets it as a threshold value for spoofing detection.
- Such threshold values can be set for, for example, vehicle speed, acceleration, angular velocity, and the like (step A12).
- the determination unit 41 determines the current speed, acceleration, and angular velocity of the vehicle 1 based on the positioning result 36 input from the GNSS chip 7 and the past positioning results and positioning time history stored in the positioning result storage area 5. Calculate (step A13).
- the determination unit 41 determines the magnitude relationship between the calculated speed of the vehicle 1 and the threshold value Vth of the speed set by the threshold setting unit 42. When the speed of the vehicle 1 is smaller than the threshold value (step A14 YES), the process proceeds to step A15. When the speed of the vehicle 1 is equal to or higher than the threshold (NO in step A14), it is determined that there is a suspicion that spoofing has been performed (step A18).
- the determination unit 41 determines the magnitude relationship between the calculated acceleration of the vehicle 1 and the acceleration threshold Ath set by the threshold setting unit 42.
- the process proceeds to step A16.
- the acceleration of the vehicle 1 is equal to or greater than the threshold (NO in step A15), it is determined that there is a suspicion that spoofing has been performed (step A18).
- the determination unit 41 determines the magnitude relationship between the calculated angular velocity of the vehicle 1 and the angular velocity threshold Ath set by the threshold setting unit 42.
- the process proceeds to step A17. If the acceleration of the vehicle 1 is greater than or equal to the threshold (NO in step A16), it is determined that there is a suspicion that spoofing has been performed (step A18). By this process, when the rate of change in the direction of the vehicle is unnaturally large, it can be determined that there is a suspected spoofing.
- steps A14 to A16 may be executed by arbitrarily changing the order, or only one or two of these three types of processing may be executed. In all of these processes, when the amount (speed, acceleration, angular velocity) indicating the motion of the vehicle is below the threshold, it is determined that spoofing is not performed (step A17).
- the history of suspected spoofing is registered in the spoofing candidate database 51 in association with the current time output by the GNSS chip 7 in step A18.
- the determination unit 41 extracts the past suspected spoofing history from the spoofing candidate database 51. If the duration of suspected spoofing is shorter than the predetermined threshold (NO in step A19), it is determined that there is a short-term positioning error due to multipath or the like and spoofing is not performed (step A17). When the period during which the spoofing suspicion has continued is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold (step A19 YES), it is determined that spoofing has been performed (step A20).
- the determination unit 41 outputs a determination result 39 indicating no spoofing generated in Step A17 or spoofing generated in Step A20 (Step A21).
- the main processing unit 34 takes into consideration the determination result 39 as in the first embodiment when executing the charging process or the like based on the positioning result 38 output from the GNSS chip 7.
- spoofing determination based on the operation of the engine information collection unit 43 in FIG. 11 may be added.
- the position of the vehicle 1 does not change. If the position estimated by the satellite positioning system changes more than a certain while the engine of the vehicle 1 is stopped, it is considered that spoofing is suspected.
- the engine information collection unit 43 monitors the ignition ON / OFF signal 19. If the engine information collecting unit 43 determines that the engine of the vehicle 1 has been stopped based on the ignition ON / OFF signal 19 (the ignition key has been turned off), the last GNSS chip 7 output before that Is stored in a storage device inside the vehicle-mounted device 2 as a positioning result when the engine is stopped.
- the first positioning result 36 output from the GNSS chip 7 is determined as the engine starting positioning result as the engine stopping positioning result.
- the result is passed to the determination unit 41.
- the determination unit 41 calculates the difference between the positioning result when the engine is stopped and the positioning result when the engine is started.
- the determination unit 41 determines that the difference is smaller than a predetermined threshold value, and determines that the spoofing has been performed when the difference is equal to or greater than the predetermined threshold value.
- the spoofing detection unit 31 further performs spoofing detection (the processing (2) described above) based on the comparison between the GNSS time and the DSRC time.
- FIG. 14 is a flowchart showing the operation of the spoofing detection unit 31 in the spoofing detection based on the comparison between the GNSS time information and the DSRC time information in the present embodiment.
- the GNSS chip 7 outputs GNSS time information 37 indicating the current time based on the GNSS satellite information.
- the real time clock 33 outputs the GNSS time information 40 corresponding to the GNSS time information 37 to the spoofing detection unit 31 in substantially real time (step B1).
- the time information acquisition unit 44 acquires DSRC time information from the DSRC communication processing unit 11 in substantially real time (step B2).
- the determination unit 41 compares the GNSS time information 40 with the DSRC time information (step B3). When the difference between the time indicated by the GNSS time information 40 and the time indicated by the DSRC time information is smaller than a predetermined threshold value (step B4 NO), the determination unit 41 determines that spoofing has not been performed (step B6). . If the difference between the time indicated by the GNSS time information 40 and the time indicated by the DSRC time information is greater than or equal to a predetermined threshold (step B4 YES), the determination unit 41 determines that spoofing has been performed (step B5).
- the determination part 41 outputs the determination result 39 regarding the presence or absence of spoofing (step B7).
- the main processing unit 34 performs processing such as billing based on the positioning result 38
- the main processing unit 34 performs processing in consideration of the determination result 39 as well. For example, when it is determined that spoofing has been performed, normal charging processing is stopped, and data indicating the determination result 39 is stored in the storage device.
- the time information included in the spoofing information may be different from the current time.
- spoofing can be detected by verifying the time by the satellite positioning system in comparison with the time provided by the roadside system 16.
- cellular communication may be used instead of the roadside system 16.
- the cellular communication network generates cellular communication time information indicating the current time.
- the cellular communication time information is transmitted from the cellular base station 13 to the vehicle-mounted device 2.
- the cellular communication chip 9 delivers the cellular communication time information received via the cellular communication antenna 8 to the spoofing detection unit 31 in almost real time.
- the spoofing detection unit 31 inputs cellular communication time information instead of inputting DSRC time information in step B2 of FIG.
- the other processes are the same as those in FIG.
- spoof detection is performed by verifying the reliability of the GNSS time information using the time supplied from the cellular communication network even in a region where the DSRC roadside device is not installed. Can do.
Abstract
Description
以下、添付図面を参照して、本発明の実施形態を説明する。図1は、本発明の第1実施形態における衛星測位システムの構成を示す。衛星測位システムにおいては、複数のGNSS衛星12(1つのみ図示)が発信する測位信号が搬送するGNSS衛星情報を用いて、車両1の位置が推定される。ユーザの車両1に、車載器2が搭載される。車載器2は、GNSS衛星情報をGNSSアンテナ6によって受信する。車載器2が備えるGNSSチップ7は、受信したGNSS衛星情報に基づいて車両1の現在位置を推定し、測位結果として出力する。車載器2は更に、GNSSチップ7から出力される測位結果を用いて課金処理等を行う計算機である処理部3を備える。
図5は、本発明の第2実施形態における衛星測位システムの構成を示す。図6は、本実施形態における車載器2の構成を示す。本実施形態においては、第1実施形態の路側システム16に替えて、セルラ通信が用いられる。図1に示された衛星測位システムと比べて、本実施形態における衛星測位システムは、セルラ通信チップ9とセルラ通信アンテナ8とを備え、センタシステム14とセルラ基地局13とからなるセルラ通信網を利用する。
次に、本発明の第3実施形態について説明する。図9は、第3実施形態における衛星測位システムの構成を示す。図10は、本実施形態における車載器2の構成を示す。本実施形態においては、以下の処理が行われる。
(1)過去と現在のGNSS測位結果に基づくスプーフィング検知。
(2)GNSS時刻情報とDSRC時刻情報との比較、又は、GNSS時刻情報とセルラ通信時刻情報との比較に基づくスプーフィング検知。
(3)GNSS測位結果とDSRC路側機の位置の比較、又は、GNSS測位結果とセルラ基地局の通信領域との比較に基づくスプーフィング検知。
これらのうち、(3)については、第1実施形態又は第2実施形態に示した処理が行われる。本実施形態においては更に、(1)と(2)の処理が追加される。
本実施形態における車載器2において、処理部3は、GNSS衛星情報に基づく測位結果を、測位が行われた時刻を示す測位時刻と共に、記憶装置に用意された測位結果記憶領域5に格納する。GNSSチップ7が測位結果35を出力すると、測位結果保存部32はその測位結果35を現在時刻と共に測位結果記憶領域5に格納する。測位結果記憶領域5には、測位結果35が測位時刻と対応づけられて格納される。
図10に示すように、本実施形態における車載器2は、リアルタイムクロック33を備える。GNSSチップ7がGNSS衛星情報に基づいて生成する情報の中には、現在時刻を示すGNSS時刻情報37が含まれる。GNSSチップ7はGNSS時刻情報37を車載器2の内部のリアルタイムクロック33に出力する。リアルタイムクロック33は、GNSSチップ7から受け取ったGNSS時刻情報37に応答して、車載器2内の処理においてタイムスタンプ等として利用できる形式のGNSS時刻情報40を出力する。GNSSチップ7が出力するGNSS時刻情報37と、リアルタイムクロック33が出力するGNSS時刻情報40とは、形式は異なるが、実質的には同一の内容を有している。
スプーフィング検知部31は、測位結果記憶領域5に格納された過去の測位結果35及び測位時刻と、GNSSチップ7が出力する測位結果36(GNSS測位結果)と、リアルタイムクロック33が出力するGNSS時刻情報40と、DSRC通信処理部11が出力するDSRC時刻情報とに基づいて、スプーフィングが行われたか否かの判定結果39を出力する。メイン処理部34は、GNSSチップ7が出力する測位結果38と、スプーフィング検出部31が出力する判定結果39とに基づいて、車両1が有料道路を走行した際の課金処理などを実行する。
次に、本実施形態におけるスプーフィング検知部31の動作について説明する。本実施形態では、スプーフィング検知部31は、過去と現在のGNSS測位結果に基づくスプーフィング検知(既述の処理(1))を行う。図12は、本実施形態における、過去と現在のGNSS測位結果に基づくスプーフィング検知におけるスプーフィング検知部31の動作を示すフローチャートである。
以上の処理に加えて、図11のエンジン情報収集部43の動作によるスプーフィング判定を追加してもよい。通常、車両1のエンジンが停止している場合は、車両1の位置は変化しない。もし車両1のエンジンが停止中に、衛星測位システムによって推定された位置がある程度以上変化した場合には、スプーフィングの疑いがあると考えられる。
本実施形態においては、スプーフィング検知部31は、更に、GNSS時刻とDSRC時刻との比較に基づくスプーフィング検知(既述の処理(2))を行う。図14は、本実施形態における、GNSS時刻情報とDSRC時刻情報との比較に基づくスプーフィング検知におけるスプーフィング検知部31の動作を示すフローチャートである。
図14に示したスプーフィング検知の変形例として、路側システム16に替えて、セルラ通信を用いてもよい。本変形例において、セルラ通信網は、現在時刻を示すセルラ通信時刻情報を生成する。セルラ通信時刻情報は、セルラ基地局13から車載器2に送信される。セルラ通信チップ9は、セルラ通信アンテナ8を介して受信したセルラ通信時刻情報をスプーフィング検知部31にほぼリアルタイムで受け渡す。
Claims (8)
- 人工衛星から受信した測位信号に基づいて、車両の現在位置を示す第1位置情報を出力する測位部と、
前記測位信号とは異なる無線信号によって、前記車両の現在位置を示す第2位置情報を取得し、前記第1位置情報に示される位置と前記第2位置情報に示される位置とに基づいてスプーフィングを検知する処理部と
を具備する車載器。 - 請求項1に記載された車載器であって、
前記処理部は、前記車両が走行する道路の路側に設けられる路側装置から前記第2位置情報を取得する
車載器。 - 請求項1に記載された車載器であって、
更に、基地局を介したセルラ通信によって、前記基地局を特定する識別情報を受信するセルラ通信部を具備し、
前記処理部は、前記識別情報に基づいて前記第2位置情報を取得する
車載器。 - 請求項1から3のいずれかに記載された車載器であって、
前記処理部は、前記第1位置情報に示される位置と前記第2位置情報に示される位置との差が所定の基準以上の場合にスプーフィングが行われたと判定する
車載器。 - 人工衛星から受信した測位信号に基づいて、車両の現在位置を示す第1位置情報を出力する工程と、
前記測位信号とは異なる無線信号によって、前記車両の現在位置を示す第2位置情報を取得する工程と、
前記第1位置情報に示される位置と前記第2位置情報に示される位置とに基づいてスプーフィングを検知する工程と
を具備する車載器のスプーフィング検知方法。 - 請求項5に記載されたスプーフィング検知方法であって、
前記第2位置情報は、前記車両が走行する道路の路側に設けられる路側装置から取得される
スプーフィング検知方法。 - 請求項5に記載されたスプーフィング検知方法であって、
更に、基地局を介したセルラ通信によって、前記基地局を特定する識別情報を受信する工程を具備し、
前記第2位置情報を取得する工程において、前記第2位置情報は前記識別情報に基づいて取得される
スプーフィング検知方法。 - 請求項5から7のいずれかに記載されたスプーフィング検知方法であって、
前記スプーフィングを検知する工程は、前記第1位置情報に示される位置と前記第2位置情報に示される位置との差が所定の基準以上の場合にスプーフィングが行われたと判定する工程を含む
スプーフィング検知方法。
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