WO2013050154A1 - Mikroprozessorsystem mit gesicherter laufzeitumgebung - Google Patents

Mikroprozessorsystem mit gesicherter laufzeitumgebung Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013050154A1
WO2013050154A1 PCT/EP2012/004159 EP2012004159W WO2013050154A1 WO 2013050154 A1 WO2013050154 A1 WO 2013050154A1 EP 2012004159 W EP2012004159 W EP 2012004159W WO 2013050154 A1 WO2013050154 A1 WO 2013050154A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
runtime environment
driver
operating system
secure
application
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2012/004159
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Stephan Spitz
Markus Köhler
Ullrich Martini
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Giesecke+Devrient GmbH
Original Assignee
Giesecke+Devrient GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Giesecke+Devrient GmbH filed Critical Giesecke+Devrient GmbH
Priority to EP12777857.9A priority Critical patent/EP2764464B1/de
Priority to KR1020147006558A priority patent/KR101843730B1/ko
Priority to CN201280049509.4A priority patent/CN103858131B/zh
Priority to US14/346,811 priority patent/US9875366B2/en
Priority to JP2014533790A priority patent/JP2014533395A/ja
Priority to BR112014006543-8A priority patent/BR112014006543B1/pt
Publication of WO2013050154A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013050154A1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
    • G06F21/53—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
    • G06F9/54—Interprogram communication

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a mobile terminal implementable or implemented microprocessor system with a secure runtime environment.
  • a microprocessor system comprises a microprocessor and one or more volatile and nonvolatile memories, in a functional view particularly at least one operating system memory in which an operating system is stored, one or more application memories in which executable applications are stored by the microprocessor under the control of the operating system, and a Main memory in which data to be processed by the microprocessor can be stored.
  • the operating system generates and maintains a runtime environment during its operation in which the applications are executable on the microprocessor system.
  • the microprocessor system is typically on a chip, e.g. Semiconductor chip, implemented, possibly also on several connected chips.
  • a mobile terminal is understood to mean a mobile telephone, smartphone, PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) or similar terminal.
  • a second secure or trusted runtime environment called “Trustzone” or “Trusted World” or “Secure World” is controlled by a security operating system
  • the normal operating system may be, for example, a common operating system such as Android, Windows Phone, Symbian or the like.
  • a security operating system for chips to be implemented in mobile terminals is manufactured and sold under the trade name MOBICORE.
  • safety-critical applications and some peripheral functions are protected by the safety operating system
  • the security operating system comprises a cryptographic key, the authentication key Kauth, by means of which the security operating system can identify itself to a background system.
  • the authentication key Kauth is provided in addition to operating a secure communication channel between the chip or mobile terminal and the background system.
  • the background system is, for example, a known per se background system of a mobile network.
  • Accesses of the normal operating system from the insecure runtime environment into the secure runtime environment take place exclusively via a security system implemented within the unprivileged runtime environment but controlled by the security operating system OS-level security drivers, such as Mobicore drivers.
  • the security driver may, for example, relinquish tasks of the normal operating system to the security operating system and provide results provided by the security operating system Forward tasks to the normal operating system.
  • the security driver provides a secure communication channel between the normal operating system and the security operating system, which is completely sufficient for the exchange of smaller amounts of data.
  • An application (trustlet) or peripheral function implemented in the secure runtime environment can only be accessed by the security operating system. Direct access to the trustlet from the
  • Some communication operations of the peripheral structures with the operating system or via the operating system are safety-critical, e.g. those that use secret data, such as the secret number PIN are processed, or where security-related commands are processed, e.g. a command to confirm or initiate a payment transaction.
  • security-critical communication processes e.g. a secure connection of the peripheral structures would be desirable in order to prevent spying on data or manipulating commands.
  • Applications for a variety of purposes such as payment transactions (banking, payment) or ticket sales for means of transport (ticketing) or loyalty schemes are widely implemented, at least in part, under control of the security operating system executable in the secure execution environment. At least parts of the application are additionally or only under the control of the normal operating system, executable in the unsafe execution environment, implemented, in particular parts of the application, which are directed to an interaction with a user or a user interface of the mobile terminal. If communication between parts of the application is required in the secure and insecure runtime environment, this is done at the operating system level via the security driver, which makes the communication slow.
  • the invention is based on the object to provide an implementable in a mobile terminal or implemented microprocessor system with a secure runtime environment, which allows a safe and at the same time efficient communication between the uncertain running time environment and the secure runtime environment.
  • the inventive microprocessor system according to independent claim 1 is implementable or implemented in a mobile terminal and comprises:
  • a security operating system adapted to create and maintain a secure runtime environment
  • an operating system interface between the normal operating system and the security operating system which is set up to control communication between the non-secure runtime environment and the secured runtime environment at operating system level.
  • the microprocessor system is characterized by at least a filter interface, which is set up to control communication between the non-secure runtime environment and the secure runtime environment at a level different from the operating system level.
  • the filter interface enables accelerated and thus secure communication, as it allows them to communicate alongside the communication channel.
  • a further secure communication channel is provided, which can be used for a more direct communication than communication via the detour of the operating system. Therefore, according to claim 1, a microprocessor system is provided which enables secure and at the same time efficient communication between the non-secure runtime environment and the secure runtime environment.
  • the filter interface has a first unsafe part filter interface set up to run in the insecure runtime environment and a second secure part filter interface set up to run in the secure runtime environment. This allows the filter interface to mediate between the secure and the insecure runtime environment.
  • a hardware filter interface is provided as the filter interface, which is set up to control communication between the insecure runtime environment and the secure runtime environment at the hardware level. The secure communication between the secure and the insecure runtime environment can therefore be effected directly and at hardware level and therefore accelerated.
  • the hardware-level control is optionally done as a control by directly driving hardware components such as hardware.
  • Peripheral structures such as display, SIM card, etc. (see below), or optionally as a control via a bus system, for example via an I2C bus.
  • the microprocessor system optionally further has: at least one controllable by the normal operating system, in the insecure runtime environment running driver for a peripheral structure of the mobile terminal, and a controllable by the security operating system, run in the secure runtime environment - preferably reduced - driver for the peripheral structure, preferably has only a subset of the functionalities that the driver that can run in the insecure runtime environment has.
  • the hardware filter interface is hereby set up to control communications between the driver that is executable in the insecure runtime environment for a peripheral structure and the preferably reduced driver for the peripheral structure which is capable of running in the secure runtime environment at the hardware level ,
  • the hardware filter interface thus enables a direct communication of driver parts implemented under the normal operating system with driver parts implemented under the safety operating system via the hardware filter interface.
  • an NFC interface (NFC interface), an involved in establishing a connection to the mobile network radio interface layer RIL, used for authentication and encryption security element SE (eg SIM card or USIM card or Secure MicroSD card or embedded Embedded Secure Element), a display, in particular a touch-screen display, a PIN verification routine that verifies the personal identification number (PIN) entered via the keyboard, dial-in routines for dial-in from the mobile network different networks such as the Internet (IP) or virtual private networks (VPN), buffer memory (eg frame buffer).
  • NFC interface NFC interface
  • RIL mobile network radio interface layer
  • SE eg SIM card or USIM card or Secure MicroSD card or embedded Embedded Secure Element
  • PIN verification routine that verifies the personal identification number (PIN) entered via the keyboard
  • dial-in routines for dial-in from the mobile network different networks such as the Internet (IP) or virtual private networks (VPN), buffer memory (eg frame buffer).
  • IP Internet
  • VPN virtual private networks
  • a common hardware interface is provided for all peripheral structures, the accesses between the insecure and the secure hardware-level runtime environment exclusively between those belonging to the same peripheral structure Enables drivers and prevents accesses between hardware drivers belonging to different peripheral structures. Due to the fact that the direct hardware level accesses are reserved only for the drivers corresponding to one another for the same peripheral structure, an improper access of malicious software, for example a Tojaner or the like, to the driver is averted.
  • Accesses between drivers belonging to different peripheral structures could at most take place via the security driver at the operating system level, if these accesses are permissible in accordance with a check by the security driver.
  • the security driver would e.g. Detect and hold malicious software.
  • the hardware filter interface is set up to check (for example in the non-secure runtime environment) access to security relevance directed to the driver for a peripheral structure and access to the reduced one in the event that the access is recognized as security-relevant Routing drivers in the secure runtime environment and, in the event that the access is detected as non-security sensitive, directing access to the driver in the insecure runtime environment.
  • the driver for a peripheral structure which can be run in the secure runtime environment is reduced to the extent that it merely functions includes on-premises, which are necessary for the processing of security-relevant accesses.
  • the driver for a peripheral structure which is capable of running in the non-secure runtime environment preferably comprises all the functionalities of the driver.
  • an application filter interface is provided as the filter interface, which is set up to control communication between the non-secure runtime environment and the secure runtime environment at the application level.
  • the application filter interface provides a direct, secure, application-level communication channel that allows for faster communication than the OS level and OS-level security driver.
  • the microprocessor system further optionally has at least one application that is at least partially controllable by the normal operating system and executable in the unsafe runtime environment, and at least partially controllable by the security operating system and executable in the secure runtime environment.
  • the application filter interface is set up to control communications between the at least partial application executable in the insecure runtime environment and the at least partially executable application in the secure runtime environment at the application level.
  • the application can, for example, be a banking or payment
  • At least safety-relevant functionalities of the application are optionally under the safety operating system implemented.
  • Additional non-security features are optionally additionally or exclusively under the normal operation 'system implemented.
  • drivers where the driver will be mostly implemented under the normal operating system in most cases, in applications such as banking applications most of the time most of the driver will be implemented under the security operating system.
  • a common application filter interface is provided for all applications, the accesses between the insecure and the secure runtime environment on application level exclusively between the parts belonging to the same application in the uncertain or secure runtime environment allows and access between parts belonging to different applications at the application level prevented. Due to the fact that the direct application level accesses are reserved only for the mutually corresponding parts of the same application, an abusive access of a malware, for example a Tojaner or the like, is averted to the application.
  • Application accesses between different applications across the border between the secure and the non-secure runtime environment can only take place at the operating system level via the security driver.
  • the application filter interface is set up to check (for example in the insecure runtime environment) accesses directed to the application with regard to security relevance, and in the event that the access is regarded as secure. relevant to security, to direct the access to the at least partially application in the secure runtime environment, and in the case that the access is detected as non-security relevant to direct the access to the at least partially application in the unsafe running time environment.
  • the application filter interface may be provided alternatively or in addition to the hardware filter interface.
  • the application filter interface and the hardware filter interface are both provided and set up for interaction.
  • the filter interface is coupled to a user output device, for example a loudspeaker, vibration alarm or the like of a mobile terminal (eg mobile phone) in such a way that on the occasion of any access via the filter interface from the insecure runtime environment to the secure runtime environment and / or from the secure runtime environment to the insecure runtime environment, over the boundary between the secure and insecure runtime environment, by the user output device issuing a user message perceptible to a user of the microprocessor.
  • a user output device for example a loudspeaker, vibration alarm or the like of a mobile terminal (eg mobile phone) in such a way that on the occasion of any access via the filter interface from the insecure runtime environment to the secure runtime environment and / or from the secure runtime environment to the insecure runtime environment, over the boundary between the secure and insecure runtime environment, by the user output device issuing a user message perceptible to a user of the microprocessor.
  • the user output may be a melody output by the mobile terminal.
  • user accesses differentiated for the user are output for accesses across the boundary between secure and insecure runtime environments, on the one hand from the non-secure runtime environment to the secure runtime environment and on the other hand from the secure runtime environment to the insecure runtime environment. For example, different tunes are output depending on the direction of access, from the insecure runtime environment to the secure runtime environment, or from the secure runtime environment to the insecure runtime environment.
  • the user message is always operated during operation of the microprocessor within the secure runtime environment.
  • the user message issued on the occasion of an access from the insecure runtime environment to the secure runtime environment is output immediately after the access in order to inform the user that the operation now actually takes place in the secure runtime environment.
  • the user message is output immediately before the access in order to warn the user that the secure runtime environment is immediately left.
  • a user message can be issued after the program run has actually left the secured runtime environment.
  • a user message can be issued before the secured runtime environment is entered by the program sequence.
  • FIG. 1 shows a microprocessor system with an application filter interface, according to an embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 2 shows a microprocessor system with a hardware filter interface, according to an embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 3 shows a microprocessor system with an application filter interface and a hardware filter interface, according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows a microprocessor system with an ARM architecture, with an insecure runtime environment 100 and a secure runtime environment 200, and with an application filter interface TLC (trustlet) implemented in part in the insecure runtime environment 100 and the secure runtime environment 200 Connector), according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • the non-secure runtime environment 100 is controlled by a normal operating system HLOS.
  • the secure runtime environment 200 is controlled by a MobiCore security operating system. Accesses between the non-secure runtime environment 100 and the secure runtime environment 200 at the operating system level are made via a security driver MobiCore driver.
  • the insecure runtime environment 100 the remaining part APP-N of the application APP, for example payment application, is implemented.
  • the application filter interface TLC Trustlet Connector
  • the application filter interface TLC enables direct access between the part APP-S of the application APP and the security application system MobiCore, which is executable in the secure running environment environment 200 the part APP-N of the application APP implemented under the normal operating system HLOS, executable in the insecure running time environment 100, directly at the application level.
  • a driver for a peripheral structure PER for example a touch-screen display, is implemented in a conventional manner under the normal operating system HLOS according to FIG. 1 and can communicate with the secure runtime environment 200 at most via the security driver MobiCore driver.
  • a novel reduced driver PER-S implemented under the MobiCore security operating system can only be reached from the non-secure runtime environment 100 via the MobiCore driver.
  • the peripheral driver PER communicates with the normal operating system HLOS via an I2C bus system controlled by the Linux I2C driver.
  • the reduced peripheral driver PER-S communicates with the security operating system MobiCore via an I2C bus system implemented in the secure runtime environment 200, controlled by the local I2C driver.
  • FIG. 2 shows a microprocessor system with a hardware filter interface, namely the virtual I2C driver, according to an embodiment of the invention. Parts with the same name as in Fig. 1 correspond to the parts of Fig. 1, unless otherwise described here.
  • a driver for a peripheral structure PER for example a touch-screen display
  • a new peripheral type driver PER-S for the peripheral structure is implemented under the MobiCore security operating system.
  • the virtual I2C driver implemented in each case in the insecure runtime environment 100 and the secure runtime environment 200 (exemplary hardware filter system).
  • the peripheral driver PER communicates with the normal operating system HLOS via the Linux I2C driver.
  • the reduced peripheral driver PER-S communicates with the security operating system MobiCore via the local I2C driver there.
  • the hardware filter interface namely the virtual I2C driver, provides a secure communication channel between the Linux I2C driver of the bus system under HLOS and the I2C driver of the bus system under MobiCore, at a hardware level closer to the level of the peripheral - Driver is considered the operating system level.
  • the parts APP-N, APP-S of the application APP can only communicate with one another at the operating system level, namely via the MobiCore driver.
  • FIG. 3 shows a microprocessor system with an application filter interface TLC and a hardware filter interface of virtual I2C drivers, according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 3 represents a combination of the embodiments of FIGS. 1 and 2.
  • the application filter interface TLC and the hardware filter interface of virtual I2C drivers work together.
  • the hardware filter interface (virtual I2C driver) communicates via the bus system Linux I2C driver with the peripheral driver PER.
  • the hardware filter interface (virtual I2C driver) communicates with the application filter interface TLC and thus changes from the hardware filter interface. ware level to the application level.
  • the application filter interface TLC finally communicates in the secure runtime environment 200 at the application level with the reduced peripheral driver PER-S.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
PCT/EP2012/004159 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 Mikroprozessorsystem mit gesicherter laufzeitumgebung Ceased WO2013050154A1 (de)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP12777857.9A EP2764464B1 (de) 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 Mikroprozessorsystem mit gesicherter laufzeitumgebung
KR1020147006558A KR101843730B1 (ko) 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 보안 런타임 환경을 갖는 마이크로 프로세서 시스템
CN201280049509.4A CN103858131B (zh) 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 带有安全运行时环境的微控制器系统
US14/346,811 US9875366B2 (en) 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 Microprocessor system with secured runtime environment
JP2014533790A JP2014533395A (ja) 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 保証されたランタイム環境を有するマイクロプロセッサ・システム
BR112014006543-8A BR112014006543B1 (pt) 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 sistema de microprocessador com ambiente de tempo de execução seguro

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102011115135A DE102011115135A1 (de) 2011-10-07 2011-10-07 Mikroprozessorsystem mit gesicherter Laufzeitumgebung
DE102011115135.8 2011-10-07

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WO2013050154A1 true WO2013050154A1 (de) 2013-04-11

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PCT/EP2012/004159 Ceased WO2013050154A1 (de) 2011-10-07 2012-10-04 Mikroprozessorsystem mit gesicherter laufzeitumgebung

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US (1) US9875366B2 (https=)
EP (1) EP2764464B1 (https=)
JP (1) JP2014533395A (https=)
KR (1) KR101843730B1 (https=)
CN (1) CN103858131B (https=)
BR (1) BR112014006543B1 (https=)
DE (1) DE102011115135A1 (https=)
WO (1) WO2013050154A1 (https=)

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US9875366B2 (en) 2018-01-23
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