US20110118902A1 - Method and communication system for safe route control - Google Patents

Method and communication system for safe route control Download PDF

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Publication number
US20110118902A1
US20110118902A1 US13/003,980 US200813003980A US2011118902A1 US 20110118902 A1 US20110118902 A1 US 20110118902A1 US 200813003980 A US200813003980 A US 200813003980A US 2011118902 A1 US2011118902 A1 US 2011118902A1
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United States
Prior art keywords
control unit
ground
vehicle
safety
information
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Abandoned
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US13/003,980
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English (en)
Inventor
Armand Pierre Bohe
Patrice Cortial
Regis Degouge
Jean-Luc Halle
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Siemens SAS
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Siemens SAS
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Publication date
Application filed by Siemens SAS filed Critical Siemens SAS
Publication of US20110118902A1 publication Critical patent/US20110118902A1/en
Assigned to SIEMENS S.A.S. reassignment SIEMENS S.A.S. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: BOHE, ARMAND PIERRE, CORTIAL, PATRICE, DEGOUGE, REGIS, HALLE, JEAN-LUC
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
    • B61L21/04—Electrical locking and release of the route; Electrical repeat locks
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L17/00—Switching systems for classification yards
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L5/00—Local operating mechanisms for points or track-mounted scotch-blocks; Visible or audible signals; Local operating mechanisms for visible or audible signals
    • B61L5/06—Electric devices for operating points or scotch-blocks, e.g. using electromotive driving means

Definitions

  • the present invention concerns a method and a communication system for safe route control according to the pre-characterising clause of claims 1 and 8 .
  • Said safe route control is aimed at, in particular, public transport vehicles moving along a route such as a railway transport unit, an underground train, a tramway, a trolley bus, a bus, etc.
  • CBTC Commission-Based Train Control
  • a safe control logic for the emergency destruction of a route allows for, outside nominal operating modes, the destruction of a route whilst preserving the safety of the system.
  • a safe control logic of said train for the emergency destruction of a route enabled [sic] This logic is based on a static definition of parameters required for its correct operation. These parameters are designed to be compatible with the worst case of trains running on an area known as a “maneuvering” area, on which the risk of collisions is to be taken into account, of a switching manoeuvre under the train, and therefore being rendered unable to run.
  • the safety time delay is thus designed to be long, in order that the worse case (collision, derailment) be avoided regardless of the type or characteristics of the approach of the vehicle, even if the latter was inevitably not able to stop at a boundary of the approach area.
  • this fixed time delay proves to be significantly long even though the safety technology of trains has improved over the years. This causes trains to stop for long periods and therefore holds up the traffic for an excessive amount of time.
  • the principle of the aforementioned control logic is thus based on classic signalling for which the safety of the manual “destruction” of a route (maneuvering area to be destroyed to prevent it from being crossed) rests on the safety time delay and possibly on a signal confirming the presence of a train on the approach area associated with a stop signal (red traffic lights, motor circuit breaker, etc.).
  • the route is destroyed following a possible sequence according to which:
  • Calculation of the safety time delay guarantees that a train approaching the signal which is closing in front of the former will be stopped after said time delay has elapsed.
  • This calculation in order to guarantee the safety of the function, will take into account the longest stopping time of the different types of train running on this area at the maximum authorised speed (the time depends on the maximum potential and kinetic energy of an approaching train and of its braking capacity).
  • one of the aims of the present invention is therefore to reduce the time required for the emergency destruction of the route in the maneuvering area whilst guaranteeing safety.
  • An embodiment of the invention thus described therefore anticipates that following manual emergency control of the destruction of the route issued from a closing signal or from a control unit on the ground, the dynamic parameters of the train are taken into account, or even also transmitted between the train and the ground, in particular, the parameters related to the determination of a physical stopping distance which are encoded using binary code (in the required information) in order to be able to compare it to an acceptable stopping distance or a binary decision module (at the level of the control unit on the ground). If the binary coded distance is less than the acceptable distance, the safety time delay can even be cancelled completely.
  • linear coding can therefore be equally envisaged so as to transmit more gradual signals like metric distances resulting in, in any case, the evaluation of whether the initial safe time delay can be decreased or even cancelled.
  • This aspect thus allows for the fine adjustment of the safety time delay with the intention of reducing it.
  • the coding can also be made more safe (for example by means of calculating the stopping distance with redundancy) and encrypted in order to protect more securely the exchange of information between the train and the ground and therefore to avoid a reduction in the safety time delay in case the information related to the energy balance was calculated incorrectly or transmitted by mistake or even augurs unfavourably.
  • FIG. 1 Communication system for the safe control of the route.
  • FIG. 2 Communication system for the safe control of the route adapted to a CBTC type automatism.
  • FIG. 1 presents a communication system for the safe control of a route traveled by a vehicle A running on an approach area ZA of a maneuvering area ZM for which:
  • FIG. 1 is an example of an embodiment adapted to a communication system within the framework of classic signalling on the ground comprising traffic lights F (visible by the train driver on the approach area ZA) controlled by the control unit on the ground USOL via a control signal C.
  • the control unit on the ground USOL is itself controlled by an operator F who wishes to activate the destruction of the route (or displacement) which is possible on the maneuvering area ZM via a destruction signal D sent to the control unit on the ground USOL.
  • the control unit on the ground USOL activates the closure of the traffic lights F in which case the request for information RI is also sent from the control unit on the ground USOL to the on-board safety control unit USEMB.
  • the safety time delay TS is still, by default, set at its maximum value according to the type of train/worst case situation for required braking.
  • the sending of the request for information RI is activated after identification of a nearing train on the approach area ZA, having taken into account a safe headway which is sufficiently long and which corresponds to the maximum value of the safety time delay TS.
  • the driver or an on-board automatic control therefore takes immediate steps to stop the train.
  • the control unit on the ground USOL is then waiting for information feedback (required information RI) following the request for information RI which was initiated previously.
  • a safety computer linked to a safety control unit USEMB on-board the train A Upon receipt of the request for information RI, a safety computer linked to a safety control unit USEMB on-board the train A, due to its position, assesses its energy and compares it to its braking capacity.
  • the safety computer responds positively to the control unit on the ground USOL by sending the required information IR, in other words for example, a binary 0-1 type message which may be accompanied by its operating domain and authorising or not the reduction or even cancellation of the safety time delay TS.
  • the control unit on the ground USOL Upon receipt of the required information IR, the control unit on the ground USOL checks the 0/1 binary signal, and checks that the operating domain corresponds correctly to the route to be destroyed and that the train A completely guarantees that the stop signal is respected F. Thus, according to the invention, the control unit on the ground USOL therefore authorises the route destruction device D to destroy the route immediately (safety time delay TS not taken into account).
  • the operator F is therefore informed of the destruction of the route via a signal RES emitted by the control unit on the ground USOL.
  • the exchange of the request for information RI and of the required information IR between the control unit on the ground USOL and the on-board safety control unit USEMB is achieved ideally by aerial communication E, for example via radiofrequency.
  • the operator F is informed of the destruction of the route via the signal RES.
  • FIG. 2 presents a communication system for the safe control of a route adapted to a CBTC type automatism H_CBTC interfaced between the control unit on the ground USOL and the on-board safety control unit USEMB.
  • the exchanges of the request for information RI and of the required information IR such as in FIG. 1 are therefore carried out here between the on-board safety control unit USEMB and the automatism H_CBTC which therefore itself commands the control unit on the ground USOL in order to activate a reduction in the safety time delay TS by means of a destruction signal DI.
  • a request for information related to a destruction request from an operator or from the control unit on the ground USOL will be sent to the safety control unit USEMB on-board the train via the automatism H_CBTC through the destruction signal D, then through an “extensive” destruction signal D_CBTC from the control unit on the ground USOL to the automatism H_CBTC.
  • the role of the automatism H_CBTC is that of train driver thus knowing all the dynamic parameters of the train and may also have data available originating from any information source relating to traffic over various areas, to signalling, etc. This is therefore highly advantageous in the case of dynamic traffic management for vehicles without a driver, in particular allowing for more strictly controlled operating areas.
  • the operator F sends a command for the manual destruction of a route to the control unit on the ground USOL.
  • the control unit on the ground USOL immediately closes the stop signal F associated with the route, triggers the manual destruction device for the route via the destruction signal D (the safety time delay TS is initialised at its maximum value) and sends the current route destruction signal to the automated equipment H_CBTC on the ground via the extensive signal D_CBTC in order to be able to send the request for information RI to the on-board safety control unit USEMB.
  • the driver, if present, or the on-board safety control unit USEMB takes immediate steps to stop the train A.
  • the automatism H_CBTC on the ground therefore identifies the train A approaching the stop signal F and, by means of a ground/train link, sends the request for information RI which comprises a request to stop the train A.
  • the automated equipment H_CBTC on the ground then sets about waiting for a response IR to the request for information RI:
  • the safety control unit (also compatibly automated depending on the CBTC type) USEMB on-board the train A, from its location assesses its energy and compares it to its braking capacity. If the train A has the ability to stop, the on-board safety control unit USEMB responds positively to the automated equipment H_CBTC by sending the required information IR back to it, in other words, for example a binary 0-1 type message may be accompanied by its operating domain and may authorise or inhibit the reduction or even cancellation of the safety time delay TS.
  • the automated equipment H_CBTC on the ground verifies that the operating domain corresponds correctly to the route to be destroyed and that the train A ensures that stop signal F is indeed respected.
  • the automated equipment H_CBTC on the ground informs the control unit on the ground USOL whether the signal F has been respected (or not) by the approaching train A by means of a binary destruction signal DI.
  • control unit on the ground USOL thus authorises the route destruction device D to destroy the route immediately (cancellation of the safety time delay TS not taken into account).
  • the operator F is informed of the destruction of the route by the control unit on the ground USOL.
  • the train A responds “negatively” to the request for information RI or does not respond at all (fault related to the train or train not equipped with an automatism or adapted on-board safety control unit USEMB).
  • the control unit on the ground USOL in standby mode, waits, if necessary, until the end of the safety time delay TS to destroy the route. Thus, there may be no risk remaining of reducing the safety time delay TS “prematurely”.
  • the operator F is then informed of the non-destruction of the route by the control unit on the ground USOL.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
US13/003,980 2008-07-14 2008-07-14 Method and communication system for safe route control Abandoned US20110118902A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/FR2008/001025 WO2010007216A1 (fr) 2008-07-14 2008-07-14 Méthode et système de communication pour un contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20110118902A1 true US20110118902A1 (en) 2011-05-19

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US13/003,980 Abandoned US20110118902A1 (en) 2008-07-14 2008-07-14 Method and communication system for safe route control

Country Status (10)

Country Link
US (1) US20110118902A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP2300301B1 (fr)
KR (1) KR20110044202A (fr)
CN (1) CN102089198A (fr)
BR (1) BRPI0822990B1 (fr)
CA (1) CA2730740A1 (fr)
ES (1) ES2637798T3 (fr)
HU (1) HUE033175T2 (fr)
TW (1) TW201009760A (fr)
WO (1) WO2010007216A1 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106384522A (zh) * 2016-09-20 2017-02-08 上海自仪泰雷兹交通自动化系统有限公司 基于plc的有轨电车平交路口信号优先权控制系统
CN106627664A (zh) * 2016-10-31 2017-05-10 中国恩菲工程技术有限公司 用于电动转辙机的拒动检测装置

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR101318850B1 (ko) * 2012-01-04 2013-10-17 현대로템 주식회사 무선통신시스템과 폴백시스템을 이용한 열차제어시스템 및 방법
FR2988064B1 (fr) * 2012-03-15 2014-04-18 Alstom Transport Sa Systeme embarque de generation d'un signal de localisation d'un vehicule ferroviaire
WO2019213779A1 (fr) 2018-05-10 2019-11-14 Miovision Technologies Incorporated Réseau d'échange de données de chaîne de blocs, et procédés et systèmes pour soumettre des données à un tel réseau et effectuer des transactions de données dessus

Citations (3)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3937428A (en) * 1975-02-06 1976-02-10 Westinghouse Air Brake Company Route interlocking control system
US20040068361A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2004-04-08 Bombardier Transportation (Technology) Germany Gmbh Automated manipulation system and method in a transit system
US20040129840A1 (en) * 2002-12-20 2004-07-08 Folkert Horst Remote control system for a locomotive

Family Cites Families (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19641521C1 (de) * 1996-09-30 1998-04-09 Siemens Ag Verfahren zum Beschicken eines Zugbildungsgleises
DE19714388A1 (de) * 1997-03-27 1998-10-01 Siemens Ag Einrichtung zum automatischen Auflösen von Fahrstraßenresten im Bereich von Halteplätzen
DE102004057907A1 (de) * 2004-11-30 2006-06-08 Deutsche Bahn Ag Verfahren bei der Einbindung von Rangiervorgängen bei der Zugsteuerung und Zugsicherung mittels bidirektionaler Funk-Informationsübertragung
GB2429101B (en) * 2005-08-13 2009-06-03 Westinghouse Brake & Signal Train control system

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3937428A (en) * 1975-02-06 1976-02-10 Westinghouse Air Brake Company Route interlocking control system
US20040068361A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2004-04-08 Bombardier Transportation (Technology) Germany Gmbh Automated manipulation system and method in a transit system
US20040129840A1 (en) * 2002-12-20 2004-07-08 Folkert Horst Remote control system for a locomotive

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106384522A (zh) * 2016-09-20 2017-02-08 上海自仪泰雷兹交通自动化系统有限公司 基于plc的有轨电车平交路口信号优先权控制系统
CN106627664A (zh) * 2016-10-31 2017-05-10 中国恩菲工程技术有限公司 用于电动转辙机的拒动检测装置

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CA2730740A1 (fr) 2010-01-21
BRPI0822990A2 (pt) 2019-05-07
TW201009760A (en) 2010-03-01
CN102089198A (zh) 2011-06-08
EP2300301B1 (fr) 2017-05-17
HUE033175T2 (hu) 2017-11-28
WO2010007216A1 (fr) 2010-01-21
KR20110044202A (ko) 2011-04-28
ES2637798T3 (es) 2017-10-17
BRPI0822990B1 (pt) 2019-12-31
EP2300301A1 (fr) 2011-03-30

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AS Assignment

Owner name: SIEMENS S.A.S., FRANCE

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:BOHE, ARMAND PIERRE;CORTIAL, PATRICE;DEGOUGE, REGIS;AND OTHERS;REEL/FRAME:029934/0769

Effective date: 20110104

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- AFTER EXAMINER'S ANSWER OR BOARD OF APPEALS DECISION