EP2591552A1 - Interface de données à fonction de détection d'erreurs intégrée à sécurité intrinsèque - Google Patents

Interface de données à fonction de détection d'erreurs intégrée à sécurité intrinsèque

Info

Publication number
EP2591552A1
EP2591552A1 EP11724410.3A EP11724410A EP2591552A1 EP 2591552 A1 EP2591552 A1 EP 2591552A1 EP 11724410 A EP11724410 A EP 11724410A EP 2591552 A1 EP2591552 A1 EP 2591552A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signal
error
output
input signal
circuit
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP11724410.3A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Natalja Kehl
Siegbert Steinlechner
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Robert Bosch GmbH
Original Assignee
Robert Bosch GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Robert Bosch GmbH filed Critical Robert Bosch GmbH
Publication of EP2591552A1 publication Critical patent/EP2591552A1/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H03—ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY
    • H03K—PULSE TECHNIQUE
    • H03K19/00—Logic circuits, i.e. having at least two inputs acting on one output; Inverting circuits
    • H03K19/003—Modifications for increasing the reliability for protection
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H03—ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY
    • H03K—PULSE TECHNIQUE
    • H03K19/00—Logic circuits, i.e. having at least two inputs acting on one output; Inverting circuits
    • H03K19/003—Modifications for increasing the reliability for protection
    • H03K19/00392—Modifications for increasing the reliability for protection by circuit redundancy

Definitions

  • the invention is based on a circuit or a method according to the preamble of the independent claims.
  • the invention relates to the detection of errors or disturbances in digital
  • a conventional two-rail checker has in its basic form two pairs of input signals, each consisting of a signal and its inverted signal, and an output pair for
  • a pair of signals is commonly referred to as a two-rail signal.
  • a two-rail signal is considered valid if its
  • FIG. 2 shows an equivalent circuit diagram of a conventional two-rail checker 20 with a first input two-rail signal a, consisting of a
  • Input signal ai and an input signal a 0 and a second input two-rail signal b, consisting of an input signal bi and a
  • Input signal b 0 and an output two-rail signal y, consisting of an output signal yi and an output signal y 0 .
  • the truth table 10 shows the valid output signals y 0 , yi for each valid input combination of the input signals a 0 , ai, b 0 , bi.
  • the combinations shown in the truth table represent the error-free case, ie based on the output signal pair y can be closed to valid input signal pairs a, b.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates an implementation of a two-rail checker 20.
  • the two-rail checker 20 consists of four AND gates 30, 31, 32, 33 and two OR gates 34 and 35.
  • a test with the four valid input combinations is performed.
  • FIG. 4 shows an error checking circuit 40 with four input signal pairs a, b, c, d.
  • three two-rail checker 20, 20 ', 20 connected in a cascade, and thus combined to form an output pair y.
  • Fig. 5 shows an example of a circuit 50, which consists of several
  • Signal processing blocks 51, 52, 53, 54 consists. An input signal S in is processed in the circuit to an output signal S ou t. everybody
  • Signal processing block 51, 52, 53, 54 is connected to an error detection circuit
  • Each of the error detection circuits 55, 56, 57, 58 has an output pair d, c, b, a.
  • the output signal pairs d, c, b, a are in turn input signal pairs for the error checking circuit 40 and are combined into a single output pair y.
  • Output signal y shows whether there is an error in the circuit 50 or not.
  • the circuit according to the invention with the features of independent claim 1 has the advantage that the intrinsically safe circuit in addition to the function of error detection in error-free case transmits information of an input signal pair via an output signal pair. This opens up the possibility to fulfill with the circuit for error checking an additional function, namely the transmission of information, at the same time to the function of error detection.
  • the information carries a parity of one or more further output signals.
  • the subsequent device can also check whether an error has occurred behind the monitored circuit, which has disturbed the output signals.
  • Such subcircuits can be inexpensively manufactured with a small number of CMOS transistors.
  • Advantageous is the use of a data interface to the secure circuit, wherein an output signal has a word width of several bits, and the output signal pair in the non-error case, another bit supplies.
  • the further information as 1-bit information represents the parity of the multi-bit-wide output signal, since thus in a clocked circuit, an error check of a subsequent register is made possible.
  • Fig. 3 shows an embodiment of a secure circuit for a known
  • Fig. 5 is a multi-level secure circuit with error detection in each
  • FIG. 6 shows a truth table of a two-rail checker according to the invention
  • FIG. 7 shows an equivalent circuit diagram for a two-rail checker according to the invention
  • FIGS. 8-11 show various embodiments of a fused circuit of a two-rail checker according to the invention
  • Fig. 13 is a secure circuit with output register
  • FIG. 7 shows an equivalent circuit diagram of a two-rail checker 70 according to the invention.
  • the two-rail checker 70 according to the invention has a first
  • Input signal pair a consisting of a first input signal a 0 and a second input signal ai
  • an input signal pair b consisting of a third input signal b 0 and a fourth input signal bi
  • an output pair y consisting of a first output signal y 0 and a second output signal yi, up.
  • a truth table 60 of a two-rail checker 70 of the present invention is valid, i.e., valid. error-free, cases shown.
  • the truth table of a two-rail checker according to the invention shows for an input signal pair a and an input signal pair b all valid combinations and the occupancy of the output signal pair y.
  • the truth table 60 shows that the
  • Output pair y reproduced the pair of input signals a. If there is no error, can via the input signal pair a, or one of its two
  • Input signals a 0 or ai an information to the output signal pair y, or to one of its two output signals y 0 or yi, are transmitted. If, for example, the value 0 is desired to be transmitted from the input signal a 0 to the output signal y 0 by the two-rail checker 70 according to the invention, the input signal a 0 is set to 0 and the input signal ai is set to 1. In this case, the input signal a 0 and the input signal ai must be different to give a valid input signal pair a. In the event of an error, the transmitted information is not evaluated because it is not ensured that the information is valid.
  • FIG. 8 shows an embodiment of a circuit 80 according to the invention for a two-rail checker 70 according to the invention, which is also known as
  • the circuit 80 consists of two conventional identical two-rail checkers 81, 82, two Input signal pairs a, b, and an output signal pair y.
  • Signal inputs and signal outputs of the conventional two-rail checkers 81, 82 are specially connected such that, in the error-free case for occupancy of the input signal pairs a, b, the output signal pair y corresponds to the truth table 60.
  • the circuit 80 for a two-rail checker 70 is intrinsically safe, as is a conventional two-rail checker.
  • Fig. 9 shows a further embodiment of an inventive
  • the intrinsically safe circuit 900 for a two-rail checker 70 consists of the AND gates 90, 91, 92, 93, 98, 99 and the OR gates 94, 95, 96, 97.
  • FIG. 10 shows a further embodiment of a device according to the invention
  • the intrinsically safe circuit 1000 for a two-rail checker 70 consists of the AND gates 104, 105, 106, 107, the OR gates 100, 101, 102, 103, 108, 109 and the inverses 1080, 1090 ,
  • Fig. 11 shows a further embodiment of an inventive
  • the circuit consists of the AND gates 110, 111, 112, 113, 118, 119, the OR gates 114, 115, 116, 117 and the inverses 1180, 1190 ,
  • Fig. 14 shows a further embodiment of a device according to the invention
  • the intrinsically safe circuit 1400 for a two-rail checker 70 consists of the AND gates 144, 145, 146, 147 and the OR gates 140, 141, 142, 143, 148, 149.
  • Fig. 15 shows a further embodiment of a device according to the invention
  • the intrinsically safe circuit 1500 for a two-rail checker 70 consists of the AND gates 150, 151, 156, 157, the OR gates 152, 153, 154, 155 and the inverses 158, 159.
  • Fig. 16 shows a further embodiment of a device according to the invention
  • the intrinsically safe circuit 1600 for a two-rail checker according to the invention 70 The circuit consists of the AND gates 162, 163, 164, 165, the OR gates 160, 161, 166, 167 and the inverses 168, 169.
  • Fig. 17 shows a further embodiment of an inventive
  • the circuit consists of the AND gates 170, 171, 176, 177, the OR gates 172, 173, 174, 175 and the inverses 178, 179.
  • Fig. 18 shows a further embodiment of a device according to the invention
  • the circuit consists of the AND gates 182, 183, 184, 185, the OR gates 180, 181, 186, 187 and the inverses 188, 189.
  • FIG. 12 shows a circuit 120 of a cascade, which has two conventional two-rail checkers 121, 121 and a two-rail checker 123 according to the invention, and is used for error checking of four input signal pairs a, b, c, d.
  • the two-rail checkers are combined in such a way that the input signal pair a is transmitted as additional information.
  • Fig. 13 shows a fused circuit 130.
  • the circuit 130 has a
  • Signal processing block 131 is an input signal S in .
  • the input signal S in may consist of several input signals, that is to say any one
  • the signal processing block has an output signal S out and an output signal pair y.
  • the output signal S out may consist of several
  • Output pair y consists of the two output signals y 0 and yi.
  • the output signal S out and the output signal pair y lead into it.
  • the register 132 has as output signal S ou t 'and the
  • the output signal S ou t ' may consist of several
  • Output signal pair y ' consists of the two output signals y 0 ' and yi '. Furthermore, the register is provided with a clock T.
  • the signal processing block 131 uses a two-rail checker according to the invention.
  • the transmitted information in error-free case in the output signal pair y is the parity of the output signal S out .
  • a subsequent circuit can evaluate from the signal S ou t 'and the output signal pair y', whether both the
  • Signal processing block 131 and the register 132 and the connections are working properly. This evaluates the subsequent circuit, z. B. a higher-level control device, first off whether the output signal pair y 'indicates a faulty case. This determines if the signal processing is working properly. Further, the subsequent circuit determines the parity of the output signal S ou t 'and compares the parity with that by the

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Detection And Prevention Of Errors In Transmission (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)
  • Logic Circuits (AREA)
  • Semiconductor Integrated Circuits (AREA)
  • Error Detection And Correction (AREA)
  • Manipulation Of Pulses (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un circuit numérique (80) à sécurité intrinsèque présentant au moins un signal de sortie (y0, y1) et au moins quatre signaux d'entrée (a0, a1, b0, b1) pour identifier une erreur potentielle dans le circuit (80) et/ou dans un de ses signaux d'entrée (a0, a1, b0, b1), au moins quatre signaux d'entrée (a0, a1, b0, b1) formant deux paires de signaux d'entrée (a, b) inversées sur deux voies et au moins deux signaux de sortie (y0, y1) formant une paire de signaux de sortie (y) inversée sur deux voies. Le circuit numérique est caractérisé en ce que la paire de signaux de sortie (y) transmet, en l'absence d'erreur, une information qui est égale à celle d'une paire de signaux d'entrée (a).
EP11724410.3A 2010-07-07 2011-06-01 Interface de données à fonction de détection d'erreurs intégrée à sécurité intrinsèque Ceased EP2591552A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102010031030A DE102010031030B3 (de) 2010-07-07 2010-07-07 Datenschnittstelle mit eigensicherer, integrierter Fehlererkennung
PCT/EP2011/059078 WO2012004065A1 (fr) 2010-07-07 2011-06-01 Interface de données à fonction de détection d'erreurs intégrée à sécurité intrinsèque

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2591552A1 true EP2591552A1 (fr) 2013-05-15

Family

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP11724410.3A Ceased EP2591552A1 (fr) 2010-07-07 2011-06-01 Interface de données à fonction de détection d'erreurs intégrée à sécurité intrinsèque

Country Status (7)

Country Link
US (1) US9083331B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP2591552A1 (fr)
JP (1) JP5638131B2 (fr)
KR (1) KR20130093583A (fr)
CN (1) CN102986141B (fr)
DE (1) DE102010031030B3 (fr)
WO (1) WO2012004065A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8966355B2 (en) 2012-02-15 2015-02-24 Infineon Technologies Ag Apparatus and method for comparing pairs of binary words
ITUB20159502A1 (it) 2015-12-18 2017-06-18 Itt Italia Srl Formulazioni geopolimeriche e metodi associati per la realizzazione di strutture tridimensionali, in particolare nella fabbricazione di pastiglie freno

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2005088467A1 (fr) * 2004-03-03 2005-09-22 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Module de communication de données assurant la résistance aux pannes et une meilleure stabilité

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US3559167A (en) * 1968-07-25 1971-01-26 Ibm Self-checking error checker for two-rail coded data
US3585377A (en) * 1969-06-16 1971-06-15 Ibm Fail-safe decoder circuits
US3634665A (en) * 1969-06-30 1972-01-11 Ibm System use of self-testing checking circuits
US5490155A (en) * 1992-10-02 1996-02-06 Compaq Computer Corp. Error correction system for n bits using error correcting code designed for fewer than n bits
US5506484A (en) 1994-06-10 1996-04-09 Westinghouse Electric Corp. Digital pulse width modulator with integrated test and control
DE10360196A1 (de) * 2003-12-20 2005-07-21 Robert Bosch Gmbh Schaltungsanordnung und Verfahren zur Überwachung eines Adressdecoders
DE102004062825B4 (de) * 2004-12-27 2006-11-23 Infineon Technologies Ag Kryptographische Einheit und Verfahren zum Betreiben einer kryptographischen Einheit

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2005088467A1 (fr) * 2004-03-03 2005-09-22 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Module de communication de données assurant la résistance aux pannes et une meilleure stabilité

Non-Patent Citations (4)

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Title
GAITANIS N ET AL: "Totally Self Checking reconfigurable duplication system with separate internal fault indication", TEST SYMPOSIUM, 1995., PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ASIAN BANGALORE, INDIA 23-24 NOV. 1, LOS ALAMITOS, CA, USA,IEEE COMPUT. SOC, US, 23 November 1995 (1995-11-23), pages 316 - 321, XP010155547, ISBN: 978-0-8186-7129-6, DOI: 10.1109/ATS.1995.485354 *
MOHANRAM K ET AL: "Lowering Power Consumption in Concurrent Checkers via Input Ordering", IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VERY LARGE SCALE INTEGRATION (VLSI) SYSTEMS, IEEE SERVICE CENTER, PISCATAWAY, NJ, USA, vol. 12, no. 11, 1 November 2004 (2004-11-01), pages 1234 - 1243, XP011121243, ISSN: 1063-8210, DOI: 10.1109/TVLSI.2004.836318 *
NIRAJ K JHA: "FAULT DETECTION IN CVS PARITY TREES WITH APPLICATION TO STRONGLY SELF-CHECKING PARITY AND TWO-RAIL CHECKERS", IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS, IEEE, USA, vol. 42, no. 2, 1 February 1993 (1993-02-01), pages 179 - 189, XP000355630, ISSN: 0018-9340, DOI: 10.1109/12.204791 *
See also references of WO2012004065A1 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JP2013534108A (ja) 2013-08-29
KR20130093583A (ko) 2013-08-22
WO2012004065A1 (fr) 2012-01-12
US20130176050A1 (en) 2013-07-11
DE102010031030B3 (de) 2011-11-17
CN102986141A (zh) 2013-03-20
US9083331B2 (en) 2015-07-14
JP5638131B2 (ja) 2014-12-10
CN102986141B (zh) 2016-08-17

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