EP2203900B1 - Personenkontrollsystem und verfahren zum durchführen einer personenkontrolle - Google Patents

Personenkontrollsystem und verfahren zum durchführen einer personenkontrolle Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2203900B1
EP2203900B1 EP08838824.4A EP08838824A EP2203900B1 EP 2203900 B1 EP2203900 B1 EP 2203900B1 EP 08838824 A EP08838824 A EP 08838824A EP 2203900 B1 EP2203900 B1 EP 2203900B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
control
person
information
data
database
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EP08838824.4A
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German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
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EP2203900A1 (de
Inventor
Jörg RECHNER
Björn BRECHT
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Bundesdruckerei GmbH
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Bundesdruckerei GmbH
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Publication of EP2203900A1 publication Critical patent/EP2203900A1/de
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
    • G07C9/253—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition visually
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/27—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass with central registration
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B15/00—Arrangements or apparatus for collecting fares, tolls or entrance fees at one or more control points

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a control system and to a method for carrying out a person control, in which persons are checked with regard to their identity and, depending on their verified identity and optionally further verification information, a control decision is made, which usually has an entry into and / or exit decides from an area and / or passing a checkpoint of a border.
  • a person's identity document is checked for authenticity. On the basis of the person identifying data in the identity document, an identity check of the person is additionally performed. If both checks are positive, that is, the identity document is verified as genuine and, in addition, a correspondence between the identity of the person in the identity document and the person is determined, a control decision is made permitting the person to pass the boundary. On the other hand, if one of the two checks is negative, the person will not pass the limit.
  • the data identifying the person is preferably also reconciled with verification information including, for example, a wanted list and / or information about deported and / or unwanted persons, and so on.
  • the group of people who may pass a border can also be restricted otherwise. For example, for persons of some nationalities, a visa may be required which is included in the identity document.
  • the identity documents In order to speed up handling of checkpoints of the borders and to accelerate the detection of the person-identifying data in the identity document and to make it largely error-free, the identity documents have been created in which the information identifying the person is at least partially machine-readable, ie can be detected by a control device.
  • a method for providing an identification of an individual comprising: maintaining a database of identification information specific to the look and / or nature of an individual; Providing a unique identifier for each individual to allow access to the individual's identification data in the database; and providing identification means adapted to be carried with the individual and containing the unique identifier.
  • a control point such as a gate of an airport
  • EP 1 318 485 A1 describes a security filtering system comprising a network with means for registering people, computerized means for storing the identities of authorized users associated with the means for registering people, and at least one network having means for verifying authorized users associated with the computerized means for storing.
  • the invention has for its object to provide a control system and a control method, with which a time required for the person control can be reduced without compromising a reliability of the person control.
  • a method for carrying out a person control comprising the steps of: detecting a person's intention to pass; Communicating announcement data indicating the person's intention to pass and the person's identifying data (ID data) to a controller; Matching the person-identifying data (ID data) with verification information of a control database and generating the verification data required for the person control; Transmitting the test data to at least one control body of at least one control body; Acquiring control information of the person and an identity document by means of the control device; Evaluate the control information based on the audit data and generate a control decision and issue the control decision. Passing is the intention of a person to cross a border.
  • announcement data which additionally comprise the person identifying data
  • the verification information may include access lists, wanted lists, etc., for example.
  • test data are generated, which are then required for the actual person control.
  • the exam data includes a result of the Matching with the verification data as well as at least part of the data identifying the person in order to be able to associate the examination data of the person at the checkpoint.
  • the test data are transmitted to at least one control device of a control point of the border that the person wishes to pass.
  • examination data are therefore available which, inter alia, include, for example, information as to whether, on the basis of a comparison of the data identifying the person against the verification information, a passing of the border is permitted or not permitted.
  • This check which is usually time-consuming, can thus be carried out in advance of the actual check.
  • Control information of the person is recorded at the checkpoint by means of the control device.
  • these are information which is gathered from the identity document in order to allow an assignment of the transmitted examination data to the person and to enable a verification of the identity document, ie to enable an examination as to whether the person is the one whose identity information is stored in the identity document are specified.
  • control information information about the person himself is recorded, which makes it possible to identify the person.
  • the control device may for this purpose comprise input means via which the staff of the control point inputs information that is taken from the identity document and / or result from a survey of the person to be controlled and / or include information perceived by the controlling personnel, for example a Result of a passport-facial comparison.
  • the control information is evaluated with the aid of the examination data and a control decision is generated which indicates, for example, whether the person may pass the border or not. This is issued by the control facility.
  • a control system for carrying out personal checks thus comprises at least one intention detection device for detecting a person's intention to pass, a central control device of a control entity which is connected to the intention detection device in terms of information, so that the control instance can be provided with announcement data indicating a person's intention to pass and data identifying the person comprising, a control database associated with the central control device with verification information of the control body, wherein the central control device is adapted for matching the person identifying data against the verification information and generating required for the person control examination data, and at least one control device at least one control point, the information technology with the Central control device is connected to receive the test data, the Kontrol at least one control information acquisition device for acquiring control information Person, an evaluation device for evaluating the control information based on the test data and making a control decision and an output unit for issuing the control decision comprises.
  • the control decision of the control body should be considered as a decision recommendation for the control staff
  • control system it is achieved that the time required to carry out the check of persons at the checkpoint is significantly reduced, since a comparison of the data identifying the person against the check information already after the announcement of the intention to pass before the person arrives at the checkpoint can be made. Since the times which individuals have to wait at the control body of the control body are reduced, the number of control equipment at a control point can be reduced without reducing the control capacity of the control body. Without a reduction in control equipment, the control system is able to control an increased number of persons at a control point.
  • a control system provides that the intention detection device is connected by means of the central control device via a trust device which comprises an ID information database and is designed to: retrieve at least a portion of the person-identifying data from the ID information database and add the advertisement data using detected advertisement data. If the transmission of the announcement data thus takes place via a trust device, it is advantageously provided that it retrieves at least part of the data identifying the person from an ID information database of the trust device and that Adds announcement data.
  • the passport intent in the original advertisement data transmitted from the intent capture device thus only needs to include information that allows the trust device to identify the person who wants to pass a border. The information identifying the person needed to match the verification data may then be retrieved from the trusted entity's database and added to the advertisement data, which is then transmitted to the supervisory authority.
  • the Passierabsicht is detected in a preferred embodiment of the invention by means of a spatially separated from the control device formed electronic communication device, in particular a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a laptop, a computer or similar device.
  • a spatially separated from the control device formed electronic communication device in particular a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a laptop, a computer or similar device.
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • This offers the advantage that a person's intention to pass can be easily detected and sent by the person. In particular, it may be announced in advance of the arrival at the control point, that is to say at a location which is physically remote from the control point.
  • the central control device of the supervisory authority contains a passport control table database containing information about security features of identity documents to be checked, information about the control steps necessary for checking the security features, instructions for control steps to be carried out in the person control depending on a control situation and / or control instructions be stored, by means of which the Controlling device is controlled in the person control and / or configured for the person control, and at least part of the information of the pass control table database (PCT information) is transmitted to the trusted device, and from the trusting device a desired by the control part of the person identifying information is selected from the data stored in the ID information database and inserted into the announcement data, so that only the required part of the data identifying the person is transmitted to the supervisory authority.
  • PCT information pass control table database
  • the central control device is designed to add passport control table data to the examination data.
  • the information relevant to the respective control of the pass control table database is transmitted to the respective control point at which the actual control is carried out. This ensures that a check is carried out at the respective control point in accordance with the centrally established review standard.
  • control device is designed to be controlled and / or configured during the detection and evaluation of the control information by means of the pass control table data transmitted in the test data. In this way, it is possible to centrally control the controls depending on a current threat situation and / or depending on a specific control situation. If the security situation changes, the examination data can be changed centrally and the control of the person at the control point can be controlled and influenced. For example, if there is a normal risk situation, it may be provided that only certain identification features of the person are recorded and evaluated as control information. Likewise, only certain security features of the identity document can be detected and verified.
  • an application module for example, designed as a Java script module, for example, retrieved from the trust device and installed on the mobile phone.
  • information about the checkpoint to be passed and identifying information is needed that, for example, sufficiently identifies the person and / or allows the trusted device to add that information from the ID information database to the advertisement data.
  • control bodies that use a variety and / or complex person identifying information, such as biometric data, such as a fingerprint, multiple fingerprints, an iris pattern of an eye or both eyes of the person, face shape information, etc. in the control, is an input of this information difficult or impossible for the user and above all error prone. Therefore, it is advantageous to have the information identifying the person previously sent to a trust device, which later adds this from a database to the announcement data.
  • further control information acquisition units are coupled to the trusting device, via which further control information can be detected from which the data identifiable by the person can be derived and / or derived.
  • the further control information can, for example, be recorded directly by the person to be checked by means of the further control information acquisition units.
  • control information acquisition units and / or the further control information acquisition units include fingerprint scanners, iris scanners, 3D personal scanners, in particular face scanners, video acquisition units, alphanumeric capture units, speech capture, recognition and / or analysis facilities, and document capture facilities.
  • the document capture devices may be any devices that are capable of capturing data that is stored in an identity document and identifying the person. In particular, they can thus comprise a document scanner, a text recognition unit, RFID readers, chip readers, etc. Since the biometric data stored in chips or RFID devices are protected against unauthorized reading out of identity documents, for example passports, the biometric data are generally acquired by the trust device directly from the person via the further control detection devices. For this purpose, the trusted device will be coupled to a plurality of further control information acquisition units that are spatially distributed at different locations to allow individuals to register with the trust facility and deposit their personal identifying data.
  • the trusting device is a token generator comprises, by means of which upon detection of the person identifying data, a token is generated, via which an assignment of the person identifying data in the ID information database is possible.
  • the token may be, for example, a personal identification number (PIN).
  • PIN personal identification number
  • the supervisory authority In order to ensure that the comparison of the data identifying the person against the verification information at the control instance takes place ahead of the actual control, but as soon as possible to the control, to ensure that the comparison is made against the most recent review data, the supervisory authority intervenes Specify a time window that is adapted to the processing time of the announcement data. In most cases, the time window will be such that the person to be checked is already on the way to the checkpoint when announcing the intention to pass.
  • the at least one checkpoint or a group of checkpoints from a set of checkpoints are automatically determined on the basis of the detected Passiereance and / or information on the transmission of the announcement data and the test data only to the control facilities of these control bodies or the control bodies are transmitted to the group of control bodies.
  • the position of the mobile telephone can be determined from the communication data of the mobile telephone with the mobile telephone network operator. This information can be added to the advertisement data so that the trusting device can determine the nearest local inspection agencies. For example, if the intention to pass is detected by a computer on a ferry, the checkpoint at which the person wishes to pass the border can be determined from the destination port of the ferry.
  • a large controller may further comprise a plurality of central controllers and pass control table databases and check databases with check information, each of which is kept synchronized with each other. As a result, a higher clearance throughput and a redundancy with regard to reliability of one of the central control devices or one of the databases can be achieved.
  • the control decision may be issued in a form that may be used to drive blocking means denying access to an area and / or exit from an area.
  • the output can be effected in particular in the form of a signal which can be processed in terms of information technology.
  • Fully automatic unmanned control equipment can be set up at checkpoints. Where appropriate, a human operator may be employed by the control body to monitor the control equipment.
  • Fig. 1a and 1b is a schematic flow diagram of a method 101 for performing a person control
  • Fig. 2 schematically illustrates a control system 1
  • a person 3 interacts in the described embodiment at three different times t 1 , t 2 and t 3 .
  • a decision as to whether or not the person 3 is allowed to pass a border 5 is made by a supervisory authority 7.
  • the supervisory authority 7 becomes a public authority, for example, the Federal Border police, the Customs or the military, his.
  • the limit is an expiration limit or, for example, the limit Boundary of a sports field or factory premises, it may be another institution responsible for handling persons at this border.
  • This control instance 7 determines the criteria that must be met in order for the person 3 to pass the border 5. At the same boundary 5, these criteria may be different for different people 3 and at different times. It may also play a role from which direction the person 3 approaches the border 5. If the border 5, which is for example a state border, is to be passed at an airport, then the criteria may depend on the country of entry of the person. Likewise, a general threat situation can influence the criteria that the person 3 must meet in order to pass the border 5. All this information is summarized in a so-called Passage Control Table (PCT).
  • PCT Passage Control Table
  • identity documents are stored, which can lead the people who want to pass the border 5, with them.
  • identity documents may be, for example, passports, identity cards, identity cards, driving licenses, company passes, etc.
  • the identity document will be a so-called security document.
  • Security documents are considered to be documents that include one or more security features that are intended to make it difficult or impossible to duplicate and / or falsify information from a simple copy stored in the identity document.
  • the information stored in the identity document usually includes, among other things.
  • identity documents often also include information that identifies the identity document itself, such as a badge number, characteristic security features, etc.
  • the pass-control table PCT is provided with information defining individual check scenarios, for example, depending on the entry country, the security situation and so on. Furthermore, instructions and / or control information are available for the individual security scenarios, by means of which the control devices 13 at controls 15 of the control entity 7 at the border 5 can carry out checks.
  • method step 103 the creation and updating of the PCT is summarized as a method step.
  • the Passier horrinungstabelle PCT is preferably published by the inspection authority in excerpts, for example, to tell the person 3, in which of the Passierszenarien which identity document is to be carried.
  • the person 3 for example, it may be sufficient to carry an identity document when entering from a country A, which does not include any machine-readable biometric data.
  • country A which does not include any machine-readable biometric data.
  • country B On entry from country B, on the other hand, when passing the same border 5, it may be necessary for the identity document 11 to be one comprising machine-readable biometric data of the person.
  • part of the pass control table 9 is thus exported to a trusting device 17, preferably electronically, or made accessible 105.
  • the trusting device 17 is an institution which temporally precedes the person 3 before passing the border 5 at a time t 1 the data identifying this person 3 for the fiduciary administration. This means that the person 3 registers with the trusting device 17, as indicated in method step 107. When registering, those data are recorded 109 that can be evaluated and / or checked during a control of the person at the border 5. This is usually the information that is stored in the identity document 11 by printing technology, holographic, electronic and / or other means.
  • the trust device 17 For reasons of data protection and in particular the maintenance of a forgery security, these data are at least partially encoded in the identity document 11 and / or secured against retrieval of the data. Therefore, it will usually not be possible for the trust device 17 to completely derive the person identifying data from the Identity document 11 read. The complete detection of the information stored in the identity document 11 will be reserved to control detection units 19 of the control devices 13 at the control points 15. However, the trusting device 17 is preferably coupled with further control detection units 21 that can detect the person identifying features and data. As with the control detection units 19, the further control detection units 21 may comprise any possible means capable of detecting the person 3 itself or its features 111, the identity document 11 and / or the information stored therein 113.
  • control detection units 19 and further control detection units 21 optical scanners, 3D scanners, text recognition systems, image recognition systems, holographic readers, bar code readers, fingerprint scanners, video cameras, iris scanners, etc., as well as systems that can be used to collect further information.
  • control detection units 19 and further control detection units 21 optical scanners, 3D scanners, text recognition systems, image recognition systems, holographic readers, bar code readers, fingerprint scanners, video cameras, iris scanners, etc., as well as systems that can be used to collect further information.
  • These other systems may include, for example, a terminal with a keyboard and / or a mouse, a trackball, a joystick, or the like, as well as speech acquisition and recognition and / or analysis units.
  • a part of the data identifying the person is thus acquired from the ID document 11, in which, for example, the data of a machine-readable zone (MRZ) is detected by means of a corresponding reading device.
  • MMRZ machine-readable zone
  • one or more fingerprints are detected, an iris scan of one or both eyes is performed, a facial structure is captured by a 3D face scanner, and / or individual person identifying information, such as a name, a first name, a maiden name, a birthplace, a date of birth , a nationality, a sex, a skin color, an eye color, etc. entered and / or detected via an input device.
  • a token is generated during the registration 115.
  • the token becomes the person This can be done, for example, in an electronic form by means of a transmission by email and / or SMS or the like to a communication device of the person 3.
  • the information identifying the person is stored with the token in an ID information database 25 119.
  • Such a registration is carried out by the person at the time t 1 with the trusting device 17. If no information required for a single pass, such as a visa, is needed to pass the boundary 5, this registration is executed once and can be used for any number of passages of the boundary 5 and / or other boundaries.
  • the person 3 announces this passing intention of the inspection authority 7 at the time t 2 121 (announcing), which after the time t 1 and before an inspection at the control point 15 at the time t 3 is located.
  • the person 3 uses an intention detection device 27.
  • This is preferably designed as a communication device associated with the person 3.
  • the intention detection device 27 can be, for example, a mobile telephone, a personal digital assistant PDA, a personal computer, but also communication devices that are not directly associated with the person 3, a public telephone, a public computer, a fax machine, a special telephone Terminal for announcing border passport intentions, etc.
  • the intent detection device 27 is designed as a mobile telephone, for example, the person 3 may preferentially retrieve a detection module embodied, for example, in Java script, from the trust device 17. Executing this module on the mobile telephone initiates the person 3, to enter the information needed to complete the Passier intent.
  • the intention detection module is preferably formulated by the trusting device 17 to use the PCT data transmitted to the trusted device 17 to fully acquire 125 the information needed to pass a boundary. If the person 3 is registered with the trusting device 17, only a few have to do so Person 3 identifying data, such as the token can be specified. For example, for a specific purpose of passage, it may be necessary and sufficient to indicate the state from which the entry is to be made, the control point 15 at which the border 5 is to pass, and the token, above the person 3 identifying data in the ID information database 25 can be found.
  • Announcement data which include the intention to pass on and the data identifying the person, here the token, are transmitted 127 to the monitoring unit 7 by the mobile telephone.
  • the transmission takes place, for example, via a mobile telephone operator 29, which is represented schematically here by means of stylized receiving antennas, and the trusting device 17 , which is connected in terms of information technology with a central control device 31 of the control entity 7.
  • an advertisement data evaluation unit 33 of the trusting device 17 which may be formed by a process-controlled computer, evaluates the announcement data from 129, analyzes the token and adds the data associated with the token, identifying the person 3, which originates from the ID In this case, preferably only the data identifying the person 3 are inserted into the advertisement data which, according to the PCT data transmitted to the trusted device 17, is required by the control entity 7 in order to pass the data Border 5 prepare. As a result, the amount of data transmitted to the control unit 7 announcement data is meaningfully limited.
  • the central control unit 31 evaluates the announcement data taking into account the data contained in the pass control table PCT 135.
  • the data identifying the person is compared with, among other things, verification information, which includes search information, for example Verification information is stored in a control database 32. For example, if the person 3 is listed as a wanted person in a wanted list, this matching would make it clear that this person is being sought by a government agency.
  • test data is generated 139, which is transmitted to the control devices 13 of the control point 15 141.
  • the test data includes all the information needed for a control at the border 5.
  • the PCT data is added to the pass control table for the check data needed to control the controllers and / or to assist in proper control at the checkpoint.
  • the examination data will further comprise a result of the comparison against the verification data as well as at least part of the data identifying the person in order to be able to assign the examination data to the person 3 at the control point 15.
  • the person 3 is checked at the checkpoint 15 before passing the border 5.
  • the person 3 and, as a rule, also the identity document 11 acquire features 143 as control information by means of the control information acquisition units 19.
  • the acquisition is carried out via the control information acquisition units 19 of the control device 13, preferably automated and / or controlled on the basis of the PCT data transmitted with the examination data , These determine which characteristics of the person and how they are to be recorded and which features of the identity document 11 are to be recorded and how they are to be verified. Individual acquisition steps and / or control and verification steps may require assistance from a control personnel (not shown).
  • a correspondence of a personal identity between the data identifying the person and the person 3 transmitted by the trusting device 17 can take place on the basis of a passport picture displayed on an output device whose data has been transmitted from the trusting device 17 to the control entity 7.
  • the identity comparison between this transmitted passport photo and the person and possibly additionally a passport image in the identity document 11 can be carried out by such a control personnel and a result of this identity verification by means of a keyboard, a switch and / or any other detection device, for example, a speech recognition device detected become.
  • the acquired control information is then evaluated 145 together with the test data and any PCT data contained therein to derive a control decision.
  • the control decision is made by an evaluation device 35 and output via an output unit 37 147.
  • the output of the control decision can also be made by, for example, an electronic signal is output, which releases a mechanical locking device (not shown), so that the person 3 can pass the limit 5, provided that the control decision with regard to a passport approval has been positive. Otherwise, the person 3 is issued the negative control decision acoustically, visually or otherwise.
  • control decision of the control facility shall be regarded as a control recommendation or a decision recommendation for the control staff.
  • the passing decision is taken in such a case the control personnel.
  • the described method and the described control system 1 offer the advantage that the time, which at time t 3 for the actual control of the person 3 at the Control point 15 can be significantly reduced, since a comparison of the person identifying data with the verification information and obtaining the possibly necessary PCT data indicating how to verify and / or read the security features of the identity document 11, already timed be transmitted or take place before the inspection of the control body 15 or control device 13.
  • the system required by the invention can reduce the time required for the control of the individual persons and thus control a larger number of persons in the same period of time. Otherwise, with the same number of controlled persons, the number of required control devices can be reduced.
  • the specific control point in the announcement data, ie when detecting the Passierabsicht, the specific control point does not need to be detected, but this on the basis of the information generated when transmitting the announcement data from the trust device 17 and / or the Control instance 7 are determined automatically. If a mobile telephone is used as the intention detection device, the location of the person 3 can be deduced on the basis of the transmission mast, via which the announcement data are acquired. Since an announcement must take place at a certain time window before the actual control at the border 5, the control point 15 or the group of control points 15 can be determined from the position of the person 3 at the time t 2 of the announcement and from geographical information about the control points 15 the person 3 is likely to move to pass the border 5.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
EP08838824.4A 2007-10-17 2008-10-15 Personenkontrollsystem und verfahren zum durchführen einer personenkontrolle Active EP2203900B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102007050024A DE102007050024A1 (de) 2007-10-17 2007-10-17 Personenkontrollsystem und Verfahren zum Durchführen einer Personenkontrolle
PCT/EP2008/008990 WO2009049918A1 (de) 2007-10-17 2008-10-15 Personenkontrollsystem und verfahren zum durchführen einer personenkontrolle

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EP2203900A1 EP2203900A1 (de) 2010-07-07
EP2203900B1 true EP2203900B1 (de) 2018-04-04

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US (1) US9035746B2 (ja)
EP (1) EP2203900B1 (ja)
JP (1) JP2011501281A (ja)
CN (1) CN101828203B (ja)
AU (1) AU2008314052B2 (ja)
DE (1) DE102007050024A1 (ja)
WO (1) WO2009049918A1 (ja)

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US9035746B2 (en) 2015-05-19
CN101828203B (zh) 2013-11-06
CN101828203A (zh) 2010-09-08
EP2203900A1 (de) 2010-07-07
AU2008314052B2 (en) 2013-07-25
AU2008314052A1 (en) 2009-04-23
WO2009049918A1 (de) 2009-04-23
DE102007050024A1 (de) 2009-04-23
US20100289614A1 (en) 2010-11-18

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