EP1573683A1 - Systeme de securite pour vehicule - Google Patents

Systeme de securite pour vehicule

Info

Publication number
EP1573683A1
EP1573683A1 EP03778313A EP03778313A EP1573683A1 EP 1573683 A1 EP1573683 A1 EP 1573683A1 EP 03778313 A EP03778313 A EP 03778313A EP 03778313 A EP03778313 A EP 03778313A EP 1573683 A1 EP1573683 A1 EP 1573683A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
vehicle
authentication element
access control
control part
authentication
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP03778313A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Andreas Pohlmann
Markus Ruther
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Mercedes Benz Group AG
Original Assignee
DaimlerChrysler AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by DaimlerChrysler AG filed Critical DaimlerChrysler AG
Publication of EP1573683A1 publication Critical patent/EP1573683A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00365—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks in combination with a wake-up circuit
    • G07C2009/00373—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks in combination with a wake-up circuit whereby the wake-up circuit is situated in the lock
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/06—Involving synchronization or resynchronization between transmitter and receiver; reordering of codes

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a vehicle security system and a method for operating this vehicle security system according to the preamble of claims 1 and 6, respectively.
  • authentication ie an authorization check
  • the effective range is understood to be the range in which the authentication element is located must, so that a triggered access authorization check is actually carried out.
  • a distance detection device in such a keyless go system, e.g. works on the basis of UHF or ultrasonic signals or in the manner of a metal detector and measures the distance between an authentication element and the associated vehicle. After receiving a question code signal transmitted by a transmitter unit arranged on the vehicle when a trigger is actuated, the authentication element only emits a response code signal if the distance detection device determines that the distance of the authentication element from the vehicle is not greater than a predeterminable maximum distance.
  • DE 195 42 441 C2 discloses various vehicle-side antenna units of access authorization and / or driving authorization communication channels for vehicle security systems with handling-free authentication elements in the form of portable transponders that can be carried along, where possible positions of the antennas and their resulting effective range are specified.
  • the transponder can be located and, if necessary, its movement can also be tracked.
  • the access control device comprises one or more handling-free authentication elements which can be carried by the user, a vehicle-side access control part, a wireless access authorization communication channel for access authorization checking processes and a user-addressable trigger element for requesting the generation of a securing or unlocking access control signal for at least one vehicle locking element.
  • the access control part triggers an access authorization check process and this is only carried out successfully if the respective authentication element is in the specified effective range of this communication channel.
  • authentication element localization means are provided for determining whether an authentication element is located on the outside of the vehicle in the effective range of the communication channel when an access authorization-checking communication process is triggered. At least some of the possible, securing or unlocking access control signals are then generated depending on whether a valid authentication element is found on the outside of the vehicle.
  • pulses are sent from different antennas from the vehicle to the authentication element and back to locate an authentication element, for example a key, a chip card or the like. These pulses can be of different frequency and shape.
  • the authentication element or an authentication element determines via these pulses Locating means in the vehicle its position on the vehicle.
  • Locating means in the vehicle its position on the vehicle.
  • the position of the authentication element on / to the vehicle may be incorrectly assessed. For example, it could happen that the authentication element is outside the vehicle, but the jammer has a field strength from which it can be seen that the authentication element must be in the vehicle. This can lead to malfunctions, particularly as a result of the incorrect assessment of whether the authentication element is inside or outside the vehicle. For example, locking may not be possible, although the authentication element is located outside the vehicle, but it is evaluated by the interference signal that the authentication element is located inside the vehicle.
  • this object is achieved by a vehicle security system and a method for operating a vehicle security system having the features of claims 1 and 6, respectively.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a vehicle security system according to the invention
  • FIG. 2 shows a flowchart to explain the function of the vehicle security system according to FIGS. 1 and
  • FIG. 3 shows a representation of an exemplary signal curve when determining an interference field strength according to the invention by means of empty measurement.
  • a keyless go system used for a vehicle security system to locate an authentication element, for example a key or a code or. Chip card
  • pulses from different antennas sent from the vehicle to the authentication element and back.
  • the pulses can be of different frequency and shape.
  • the authentication element on / to the vehicle determines these pulses. Alternatively, this can be done using an authentication element localization means in the vehicle.
  • the vehicle security system shown schematically in FIG. 1 includes an access control device and an electronic immobilizer and is designed as a keyless-go system, ie for the vehicle one or more user-free, handling-free authentication elements 1 are provided, of which representative in FIG 1 is shown and with which the user can prove himself authorized to enter and start the vehicle.
  • an authentication element an admitted code or Serve chip card.
  • a chip card or a functionally equivalent authentication element can be integrated into a mechanical or electronic key if the user is to be able to enter or lock the vehicle in the usual way using such a key system and / or start the engine - respectively. to be able to switch off.
  • Other conventional types of authentication elements can also be used.
  • the .vehicle security system includes a control unit 2 together for an access control device and an electronic immobilizer, alternatively separate control units can also be provided in each case.
  • An antenna unit 3 is connected to the control unit 2 with a plurality of antennas suitably designed and positioned on the vehicle, via which the control unit 2 communicates with the respective authentication element 1 in order to carry out authentication processes.
  • This communication takes place for communication processes relating to vehicle access via a wireless access authorization communication channel 4 and for communication processes relating to the electronic immobilizer via a wireless driving authorization communication channel 5.
  • the two communication channels 4, 5 are preferably combined to form a common communication channel.
  • the authentication element 1 is designed in such a way that it is able to communicate with the control unit 2 for checking both the access authorization and the driving authorization, which in the case of a common communication channel can be an authentication process of the same type.
  • the communication channel (s) can use a frequency band around 433 MHz, for the USA also around 315 MHz, or alternatively around 125 kHz.
  • the frequency band at 433 MHz allows the economical implementation of typical ranges in the range from approx. Im to approx. 30m.
  • the range can be set the magnetic field falling comparatively well.
  • the authentication element 1 preferably communicates bidirectionally via the communication channels 4, 5 with the vehicle-side system part and is preferably battery-free, wherein it takes the required transmission energy from the field emitted by the vehicle-side antenna unit 3.
  • the authentication elements 1 are equipped with batteries to achieve a sufficiently long range. When the battery is empty, the authentication element 1 can then be brought sufficiently close to the vehicle and thereby supplied with external energy.
  • a trigger unit 6 is also connected to the control unit 2, which comprises a plurality of suitable trigger elements which can be addressed by the user and with which the user can request a desired control measure of the access control device or of the electronic immobilizer.
  • the control unit 2 first triggers an authentication process with which the authorization of the requesting user is checked.
  • it is necessary that at least one authentication element 1 authorizing this vehicle is located in the effective range of the communication channel (s) 4, 5, ie within the effective or capture range of one or more antennas of the antenna unit 3 in a keyless go system that the user carries the authentication element 1 with him.
  • the effective range of the access authorization communication channel 4 and that of the driving authorization communication channel 5 are each appropriately selected for this purpose, in particular by suitable design and arrangement of the various antennas of the antenna unit 3.
  • the control unit 2 controls a locking unit 7 with a plurality of vehicle locking elements, in particular a locking element for the vehicle doors and a boot lid, and on the other hand an immobilizer unit 8, which contains suitable adjusting elements in a conventional manner in order to release or block an engine start, such as Corresponding controllable switching elements for switching the ignition on and off and / or for starting the engine.
  • the control unit 2 controls the locking unit 7 or the immobilizer unit 8 as desired if the authentication process is successful.
  • the locking unit 7 can in particular be formed by a conventional central locking system which is switched into its locked or unlocked state by the securing or unlocking access control signal from the control unit 2.
  • a separate actuation of the closing element for the rear lid can be provided in order to be able to open it separately without unlocking the vehicle doors.
  • Authentication element localization means 21 implemented in hardware or software are also provided in the control unit 2, by means of which it can be determined whether an authorizing authentication element 1 is located on the outside of the vehicle in the effective range of the access authorization communication channel 4 when an access authorization-checking communication process is triggered.
  • the exact implementation of these authentication localization means 21 depends on the position of the effective range of the access authorization communication channel 4, which corresponds to the combination of the effective ranges of all associated individual antennas, in particular on whether this effective range also extends noticeably into the vehicle interior or not, as follows explained.
  • the control unit 2 also takes the user Requested control measure relating to vehicle access, also depending on whether it has been determined by the authentication element localization means 21 that there is an authorizing authentication element 1 that is located in the effective range of the access authorization communication channel 4 and therefore has a successful authentication process. is located on the outside of the vehicle and not in the vehicle interior. For this purpose, a field strength of the signal is determined on the access authorization communication channel 4, and if a certain threshold value is exceeded, the authentication element 1 is assessed as being in the passenger compartment, ie the passenger compartment or trunk.
  • the device for empty measurement 9 is designed to prevent incorrect evaluations of the position of the authentication element 1 in relation to the vehicle due to a field strength generated by at least one jammer in the same frequency range.
  • the device for empty measurement 9 measures an existing field strength at the useful frequency of the authentication element 1 at a point in time at which no field is emitted by the vehicle, ie no signal is transmitted from the vehicle on the access authorization communication channel 4.
  • the field strength measured at this time corresponds to an interference field strength generated by one or more possible interference transmitters, ie an interference level by which the communication between authentication element 1 and vehicle on the access authorization communication channel 4 is adversely affected.
  • the device for empty measurement 9 measured interference field strength is then used to evaluate the field strength of pulses from the vehicle measured in "normal operation", by means of which the position of the authentication element 1 to the vehicle is determined.
  • interference field strength is adjusted to distinguish a position of an authentication element 1 on the outside of the vehicle or in the vehicle interior (with low or medium interference field strengths) to a level at which a clear detection is still possible, whereupon this adjusted decision for deciding is transmitted to the control unit with the authentication element localization means 21, or a rejection of the field strengths determined in the case of subsequent communication which is disturbed in this way (in the case of high to very high interference field strengths), ie when a request is subsequently received No signal from the vehicle is transmitted to the access authorization communication channel 4.
  • the control unit 2 sends out pulses via the antenna unit 3 with different antennas arranged at different positions on or in the vehicle via the access authorization communication channel 4 at predetermined time intervals, which are necessary for the authentication element 1 of the keyless go System are determined
  • Step S1 As soon as the authentication element 1 of the keyless go system is within range of these pulses, the authentication element 1 is "woken up", i.e. activated
  • Step S2 After activation in response to such a pulse from the vehicle, synchronization takes place in step S3 between the authentication element 1 and the vehicle. Because of this synchronization, a device for measuring the authentication element 1 empty is known, at which predetermined intervals the vehicle will send out further pulses.
  • step S4 the device for empty measurement 9 carries out an empty measurement by determining an interference level of one or more possible interference transmitters in the same frequency range in a period of time or at a time in which the vehicle is not emitting pulses. Due to the noise level determined, i.e.
  • FIG 3 shows, by way of example, both the transmission signal curve of the pulses from the vehicle and the transmission signal course of the authentication element 1 including the empty measurements shown. Possible alternative or additional points in time for empty measurements are shown in dashed lines in this representation. In general, it should be noted that an empty measurement can be carried out at any time in the transmission protocol, as long as it is only ensured that the vehicle does not emit any pulses at this time, so that only an interference level is recorded.
  • the invention relates to a vehicle security system in the form of a keyless go system and an operating method therefor.
  • a vehicle security system in the form of a keyless go system and an operating method therefor.
  • the device for empty measurement 9 carries out a measurement in periods in which the vehicle-side access control part 2 does not transmit any pulses to the authentication element 1, by means of which the interference level caused by the at least one interference transmitter 10 is determined.
  • the device for empty measurement 9 either transmits an adapted threshold value for a decision as to whether an authentication element 1 is located in the vehicle or on the outside of the vehicle, to the access control part 2 on the vehicle side or subsequent pulses from vehicle-side access control part 2 are not answered.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de sécurité pour véhicule, se présentant sous forme de système de démarrage sans clé et un procédé d'exploitation approprié. Ce système de sécurité pour véhicule permet d'éviter une détection erronée d'une position d'un élément d'authentification (1) à l'intérieur ou hors du véhicule, par des moyens de localisation d'élément d'authentification (21) dans une partie de commande d'accès côté véhicule, en raison d'au moins un brouilleur (10) présent dans l'environnement du véhicule et/ou de l'élément d'authentification (1), à l'aide d'un dispositif de mesurage par zéro (9) dans l'élément d'authentification (1). A cet effet, ledit dispositif de mesurage par zéro (9) effectue une mesure, à des intervalles-temps où la partie de commande d'accès (2) côté véhicule n'émet pas d'impulsions en direction de l'élément d'authentification (1), ladite mesure permettant de déterminer le niveau d'interférences provoquées par le brouilleur (10) (au moins au nombre de un). Selon que ce niveau d'interférences déterminé dépasse ou n'atteint pas une valeur-seuil prédéterminée, soit le dispositif de mesurage par zéro (9) transmet à la partie de commande d'accès (2) côté véhicule, une valeur-seuil adaptée pour une décision, si un élément d'authentification (1) se trouve dans le véhicule ou côté extérieur au véhicule, soit les impulsions subséquentes provenant de la partie de commande d'accès (2) côté véhicule ne reçoivent pas de réponse.
EP03778313A 2002-12-19 2003-11-11 Systeme de securite pour vehicule Withdrawn EP1573683A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10259590A DE10259590A1 (de) 2002-12-19 2002-12-19 Fahrzeugsicherungssystem
DE10259590 2002-12-19
PCT/EP2003/012575 WO2004057542A1 (fr) 2002-12-19 2003-11-11 Systeme de securite pour vehicule

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1573683A1 true EP1573683A1 (fr) 2005-09-14

Family

ID=32403981

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP03778313A Withdrawn EP1573683A1 (fr) 2002-12-19 2003-11-11 Systeme de securite pour vehicule

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US20060176147A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1573683A1 (fr)
JP (1) JP2006510828A (fr)
DE (1) DE10259590A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2004057542A1 (fr)

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FR2897708B1 (fr) * 2006-02-21 2008-06-13 Siemens Vdo Automotive Sas Procede et dispositif de condamnation automatique des portes d'un vehicule
DE102006007961B4 (de) 2006-02-21 2018-03-22 Volkswagen Ag Keyless-Entry/Go-System mit Steuergerät und entsprechendes Verfahren
US9085281B2 (en) * 2007-02-15 2015-07-21 Lear Corporation Keyless entry multi-channel RKE system
KR100971359B1 (ko) 2008-04-04 2010-07-20 콘티넨탈 오토모티브 시스템 주식회사 차량의 인증키 탐지 시스템 및 그 방법
JP5596927B2 (ja) * 2009-02-06 2014-09-24 アルプス電気株式会社 車両用携帯機
FR2986202A1 (fr) * 2012-01-26 2013-08-02 Johnson Contr Automotive Elect Moyen d'authentification portable et systeme de securite de vehicule pour un vehicule automobile
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DE102016203057A1 (de) 2016-02-26 2017-08-31 Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Konzept zur Erkennung einer Manipulation einer Kommunikation zwischen einer fernbedienbaren Verriegelungseinheit und einer dazu korrespondierenden Fernbedienung
DE102016206539B4 (de) * 2016-04-19 2019-05-16 Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur passiven Zugangskontrolle
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE10259590A1 (de) 2004-07-01
JP2006510828A (ja) 2006-03-30
WO2004057542A1 (fr) 2004-07-08
US20060176147A1 (en) 2006-08-10

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