EP1300316A1 - Vehicle configuration - Google Patents
Vehicle configuration Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1300316A1 EP1300316A1 EP02090277A EP02090277A EP1300316A1 EP 1300316 A1 EP1300316 A1 EP 1300316A1 EP 02090277 A EP02090277 A EP 02090277A EP 02090277 A EP02090277 A EP 02090277A EP 1300316 A1 EP1300316 A1 EP 1300316A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- position data
- signal
- safe
- technically
- secure
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 5
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 abstract description 4
- 230000002411 adverse Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002596 correlated effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002093 peripheral effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
- B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
- B61L25/021—Measuring and recording of train speed
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
- B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
- B61L25/026—Relative localisation, e.g. using odometer
Definitions
- the invention relates to a vehicle configuration according to the Preamble of the claim.
- ETCS European train control system
- the ETCS is based on a modular system consisting of different train protection elements, via standardized interfaces feature.
- train protection elements include punctiform ones Train control, linear train control and one central path and speed measuring device for control purposes. All of these facilities require current position data as input parameter, the Position data acquisition of the linear train control as signaling safe according to the Cenelec standard and that of central path and speed measuring device as signaling are not safe to classify.
- the punctiform Train control must be designed to be signal-safe.
- the invention has for its object a vehicle configuration Specify generic type, which with regard to the Position data acquisition and data processing simplified is, the additional train protection component to be installed, especially punctiform train control, should provide safe output data.
- the position data for the punctiform train control are quasi through Verification of the signal-technically not safe, but highly precise Position data of the central path and speed measuring device by means of the signal-safe, but less accurate position data of the linear train control won.
- the punctiform train control is required therefore no separate sensors for position data acquisition more. Instead, the location data of other facilities shared.
- For merging the position data is a data bus, especially a multifunctional vehicle bus provided.
- This multifunctional vehicle bus connects the train protection components among themselves and with others Components of the control technology, whereby a uniform interface architecture is usable. By using the multifunctional vehicle bus is a very quick and easy Transfer of position data from various sources to the Data processing components of punctiform train control possible.
- Expensive cable connections can be caused by the bus structure omitted.
- the position data enable safe classified data bus provided with a cyclical code security appendix and periodically enough over the data bus the punctiform train control transmitted. This decodes the data according to the same code security procedure and uses the signal-safe position data as reference values to assess whether the same way, however not transmitted without code security secure position data of the central path and speed measuring device for the processing of punctiform Train control may be used. It will assumed that if the maximum difference is undershot between the two position data of different sources the more precise position data of the central path and speed measuring device can be considered safe enough because they are relatively close to the reference values. Otherwise, the reference data itself is considered to be processed Input data of punctiform train control used.
- the invention is explained in more detail below with reference to an exemplary embodiment shown in the figures.
- the single figure schematically illustrates the use of position data x 1 and x 2 from different sources for an additional device.
- the source for the position data x 1 is part of a line control system LZB, while the position data x 2 originate from the central path and speed measuring device ZWG, which is in itself intended for control purposes.
- the position data x 1, which is reliably determined in terms of signal technology, is coded COD and transmitted to a multifunctional vehicle bus MVB.
- the position data x 2, which is not secure in terms of signal technology, but is more precise, is fed directly into the multifunctional vehicle bus MVB. After reading out the LZB position data x 1 , these are decoded DEC.
- the LZB position data x 1 which is secure in terms of signal technology, can be transmitted via the multifunctional vehicle bus MVB, which is not secure in terms of signal technology.
- the LZB position data x 1 and the ZWG position data x 2 are fed to a comparator V which compares the absolute difference
- the point-like train control ZUB can be assessed as safe in terms of signaling.
- the position value x 2 which is not inherently safe in terms of signal technology, can be classified as safe enough if x 2 is very close to x 1 .
- the permissible maximum difference ⁇ max between the two values x 1 and x 2 is determined accordingly.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Vehicle Body Suspensions (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Die Erfindung betrifft eine Fahrzeugkonfiguration gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Patentanspruches. Für die Steuerung und Überwachung von Schienenfahrzeugen werden, insbesondere im grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr, sehr unterschiedliche Systeme eingesetzt. Europaweit wird deshalb intensiv am Aufbau eines einheitlichen Zugsicherungs- und Steuerungssystems, dem ETCS (european train control system) gearbeitet. Das ETCS beruht auf einen Baukastensystem, bestehend aus verschiedenen Zugsicherungselementen, die über standardisierte Schnittstellen verfügen. Zu diesen Zugsicherungselementen gehören punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung, linienförmige Zugbeeinflussung und eine zentrale Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung für steuerungstechnische Zwecke. Alle diese Einrichtungen benötigen als Eingangsparameter aktuelle Positionsdaten, wobei die Positionsdatenerfassung der linienförmigen Zugbeeinflussung als nach Cenelec-Norm signaltechnisch sicher und die der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung als signaltechnisch nicht sicher einzustufen sind. Die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung muss signaltechnisch sicher ausgelegt sein. In einer aus der DE 37 07 497 A1 bekannten Fahrzeugkonfiguration sind für signaltechnisch sichere und nicht sicherere Fahrzeugeinrichtungen zur Ermittlung von Geschwindigkeiten und Positionsdaten jeweils eigene Einrichtungen, nämlich Linienzugbeeinflussung und Radimpulsgber, vorgesehen. Nachteilig ist dabei vor allem die Installation mehrere Fahrzeugkomponenten zur Erarbeitung gleicher Informationen. Außerdem sind diese peripheren Komponenten mit den dazugehörigen Schnittstellen und Datenleitungen nicht gerade aufwandsarm zu installieren und zu betreiben. The invention relates to a vehicle configuration according to the Preamble of the claim. For control and monitoring of rail vehicles, especially in cross-border Traffic, very different systems used. Europe-wide is therefore intensively building up a standardized train protection and control system, the ETCS (European train control system) worked. The ETCS is based on a modular system consisting of different train protection elements, via standardized interfaces feature. These train protection elements include punctiform ones Train control, linear train control and one central path and speed measuring device for control purposes. All of these facilities require current position data as input parameter, the Position data acquisition of the linear train control as signaling safe according to the Cenelec standard and that of central path and speed measuring device as signaling are not safe to classify. The punctiform Train control must be designed to be signal-safe. In a vehicle configuration known from DE 37 07 497 A1 are for signal-safe and non-safe In-vehicle equipment for determining speeds and position data each have their own facilities, namely line control and Radimpulsgber provided. adversely is primarily the installation of several vehicle components to develop the same information. Moreover are these peripheral components with the associated ones Interfaces and data lines are not exactly effortless install and operate.
Aus der DE 195 32 104 C1 ist ein Verfahren zur Positionsdatenerfassung bekannt, bei dem drei mittels unterschiedlicher Messverfahren gewonnene Positionsdaten miteinander korreliert werden. Sicherheitstechnische Aspekte finden dabei keine Berücksichtigung.DE 195 32 104 C1 describes a method for position data acquisition known, in which three by means of different Position data obtained correlated with each other become. Safety-related aspects are not taken into account.
Der Erfindung liegt die Aufgabe zugrunde, eine Fahrzeugkonfiguration gattungsgemäßer Art anzugeben, die hinsichtlich der Positionsdatenerfassung und der Datenverarbeitung vereinfacht ist, wobei die zusätzlich zu installierende Zugsicherungskomponente, insbesondere eine punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung, signaltechnisch sichere Ausgabedaten liefern soll.The invention has for its object a vehicle configuration Specify generic type, which with regard to the Position data acquisition and data processing simplified is, the additional train protection component to be installed, especially punctiform train control, should provide safe output data.
Die Aufgabe wird erfindungsgemäß mit den kennzeichnenden Merkmalen des Patentanspruchs gelöst. Die Positionsdaten für die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung werden dabei quasi durch Verifizierung der signaltechnisch nicht sicheren, aber hochgenauen Positionsdaten der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung mittels der signaltechnisch sicheren, aber weniger genauen Positionsdaten der linienförmigen Zugbeeinflussung gewonnen. Die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung benötigt somit keine eigene Sensorik für die Positionsdatenerfassung mehr. Stattdessen werden die Positionsdaten anderer Einrichtungen mitbenutzt. Zur Zusammenführung der Positionsdaten ist ein Datenbus, insbesondere ein multifunctional vehicle bus vorgesehen. Dieser multifunctional vehicle bus verbindet die Zugsicherungskompomenten untereinander und mit anderen Komponenten der Leittechnik, wobei eine einheitliche Schnittstellenarchitektur verwendbar ist. Durch Nutzung des multifunctional vehicle bus ist eine sehr schnelle und einfache Übertragung der Positionsdaten verschiedener Quellen zu den Datenverarbeitungskomponenten der punktförmigen Zugbeeinflussung möglich. Teure Kabelverbindungen können durch die Busstruktur entfallen. Um die signaltechnisch sichere Übertragung der signaltechnisch sicheren Positionsdaten der linienförmigen Zugbeeinflussung auf dem signaltechnisch als nicht sicher eingestuften Datenbus zu ermöglichen, werden die Positionsdaten mit einem zyklischen Code-Sicherungsanhang versehen und über den Datenbus hinreichend häufig periodisch an die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung übertragen. Diese dekodiert die Daten nach dem gleichen Code-Sicherungsverfahren und nutzt die signaltechnisch sicheren Positionsdaten als Referenzwerte zur Beurteilung, ob die auf dem gleichen Wege, jedoch ohne Code-Sicherung übertragenen signalstechnisch nicht sicheren Positionsdaten der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung für die Verarbeitungsprozesse der punktförmigen Zugbeeinflussung verwendet werden dürfen. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass bei Unterschreitung einer Maximaldifferenz zwischen den beiden Positionsdaten verschiedener Quellen die genaueren Positionsdaten der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung als sicher genug gelten können, da sie relativ nahe zu den Referenzwerten liegen. Anderenfalls werden die Referenzdaten selbst als die zu verarbeitenden Eingangsdaten der punktförmigen Zugbeeinflussung verwendet.The object is achieved with the characteristic Features of the claim solved. The position data for the punctiform train control are quasi through Verification of the signal-technically not safe, but highly precise Position data of the central path and speed measuring device by means of the signal-safe, but less accurate position data of the linear train control won. The punctiform train control is required therefore no separate sensors for position data acquisition more. Instead, the location data of other facilities shared. For merging the position data is a data bus, especially a multifunctional vehicle bus provided. This multifunctional vehicle bus connects the train protection components among themselves and with others Components of the control technology, whereby a uniform interface architecture is usable. By using the multifunctional vehicle bus is a very quick and easy Transfer of position data from various sources to the Data processing components of punctiform train control possible. Expensive cable connections can be caused by the bus structure omitted. To ensure secure transmission the signal-technically safe position data of the linear Train control on the signaling as not The position data enable safe classified data bus provided with a cyclical code security appendix and periodically enough over the data bus the punctiform train control transmitted. This decodes the data according to the same code security procedure and uses the signal-safe position data as reference values to assess whether the same way, however not transmitted without code security secure position data of the central path and speed measuring device for the processing of punctiform Train control may be used. It will assumed that if the maximum difference is undershot between the two position data of different sources the more precise position data of the central path and speed measuring device can be considered safe enough because they are relatively close to the reference values. Otherwise, the reference data itself is considered to be processed Input data of punctiform train control used.
Die Erfindung wird nachfolgend anhand eines figürlich dargestellten Ausführungsbeispiels näher erläutert. Die einzige Figur veranschaulicht schematisch die Nutzung von Positionsdaten x1 und x2 verschiedener Quellen für eine zusätzliche Einrichtung. Die Quelle für die Positionsdaten x1 ist Bestandteil einer Linienzugbeeinflussung LZB, während die Positionsdaten x2 von der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung ZWG, die an sich für steuerungstechnische Zwecke bestimmt ist, stammen. Die signaltechnisch sicher ermittelten Positionsdaten x1 werden codiert COD und auf einen multifunctional vehicle bus MVB übertragen. Die signaltechnisch nicht sicheren, aber genaueren Positionsdaten x2 werden direkt in den multifunctional vehicle bus MVB eingespeist. Nach dem Auslesen der LZB-Positionsdaten x1 werden diese decodiert DEC. Auf diese Weise lassen sich die signaltechnisch sicheren LZB-Positionsdaten x1 über den signaltechnisch nicht sicheren multifunctional vehicle bus MVB übertragen. Die LZB-Positionsdaten x1 und die ZWG-Positionsdaten x2 werden einem Vergleicher V zugeführt, der die von Vorzeichen unabhängige Absolutdifferenz |x1 - x2 mit einer zulässigen Maximaldifferenz Δmax vergleicht. Falls die Maximaldifferenz Δmax unterschritten ist, wird der sehr genaue, aber signaltechnisch nicht sichere Positionswert x2 als Eingangsgröße für die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung ZUB verwendet. Anderenfalls wird aus Sicherheitsgründen der signaltechnisch sichere Positionswert x1 verwendet. Auf diese Weise ist die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung ZUB in jedem Fall als signaltechnisch sicher zu bewerten. Der an sich signaltechnisch nicht sichere Positionswert x2 kann als sicher genug eingestuft werden, wenn x2 sehr nahe bei x1 liegt. Die zulässige Maximaldifferenz Δmax zwischen beiden Werten x1 und x2 wird entsprechend festgelegt.The invention is explained in more detail below with reference to an exemplary embodiment shown in the figures. The single figure schematically illustrates the use of position data x 1 and x 2 from different sources for an additional device. The source for the position data x 1 is part of a line control system LZB, while the position data x 2 originate from the central path and speed measuring device ZWG, which is in itself intended for control purposes. The position data x 1, which is reliably determined in terms of signal technology, is coded COD and transmitted to a multifunctional vehicle bus MVB. The position data x 2, which is not secure in terms of signal technology, but is more precise, is fed directly into the multifunctional vehicle bus MVB. After reading out the LZB position data x 1 , these are decoded DEC. In this way, the LZB position data x 1 , which is secure in terms of signal technology, can be transmitted via the multifunctional vehicle bus MVB, which is not secure in terms of signal technology. The LZB position data x 1 and the ZWG position data x 2 are fed to a comparator V which compares the absolute difference | x 1 -x 2 , which is independent of the sign, with a permissible maximum difference Δ max . If the maximum difference Δ max is undershot, the very precise position signal x 2 , which is not reliable in terms of signal technology, is used as the input variable for the point-like train control ZUB. Otherwise, for safety reasons, the signal-safe position value x 1 is used. In this way, the point-like train control ZUB can be assessed as safe in terms of signaling. The position value x 2 , which is not inherently safe in terms of signal technology, can be classified as safe enough if x 2 is very close to x 1 . The permissible maximum difference Δ max between the two values x 1 and x 2 is determined accordingly.
Claims (1)
dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Positionsdaten (x1 und x2) der ersten und der zweiten Einrichtung (LZB, ZWG) einem signaltechnisch nicht sicheren Übertragungsweg (MVB) zugeführt sind, wobei die signaltechnisch sicheren Positionsdaten (x1) zur signaltechnisch sicheren Übertragung mit einer Kodierung (COD) versehen sind, dass die von der ersten und der zweiten Einrichtung (LZB, ZWG) generierten Positionsdaten (x1 und x2) der zusätzlichen Einrichtung (ZUB) zugeführt sind, dass Mittel zur Dekodierung (DEC) der signaltechnisch sicheren Positionsdaten (x1) und Vergleichsmittel (V) zum Vergleich einer aus zeitgleich ermittelten dekodierten signaltechnisch sicheren und signaltechnisch nicht sicherer Positionsdaten (x1 und x2) gebildeten Absolutdifferenz (|x1 - x2|) mit einer Maximaldifferenz ((Δmax) vorgesehen sind, wobei unterhalb der Maximaldifferenz (Δmax) die signaltechnisch nicht sicheren Positionsdaten (x2) der zusätzlichen Einrichtung (ZUB) als die zu verarbeitenden Eingangsdaten zugeführt sind, sonst die dekordierten, signaltechnisch sicheren Positionsdaten (x1).Vehicle configuration for an additional device (ZUB) that processes position data, the vehicle configuration comprising a first device (LZB) with position data acquisition that is secure in terms of signaling technology and a second device (ZWG) with more precise position data acquisition that is not secure in terms of signaling technology for control purposes,
characterized in that the position data (x 1 and x 2 ) of the first and the second device (LZB, ZWG) are fed to a transmission path (MVB) that is not signal-safe, the signal-safe position data (x 1 ) for signal-safe transmission with a Coding (COD) are provided that the position data (x 1 and x 2 ) generated by the first and the second device (LZB, ZWG) are fed to the additional device (ZUB), that means for decoding (DEC) the signal-technically safe position data (x 1 ) and comparison means (V) are provided for comparing an absolute difference (| x 1 - x 2 |) formed from simultaneously determined decoded signal-technically safe and signal-technically unsafe position data (x 1 and x 2 ) with a maximum difference ((Δ max ) are, below the maximum difference (Δ max ) the position data (x 2 ) of the additional device (ZUB) that is not technically safe as the vera input data are supplied, otherwise the decoded, signal-technically safe position data (x 1 ).
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| DE10139319A DE10139319C2 (en) | 2001-08-09 | 2001-08-09 | vehicle configuration |
| DE10139319 | 2001-08-09 |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| EP1300316A1 true EP1300316A1 (en) | 2003-04-09 |
| EP1300316B1 EP1300316B1 (en) | 2007-01-24 |
Family
ID=7695029
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP02090277A Expired - Lifetime EP1300316B1 (en) | 2001-08-09 | 2002-07-24 | Vehicle configuration |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP1300316B1 (en) |
| AT (1) | ATE352466T1 (en) |
| DE (2) | DE10139319C2 (en) |
| DK (1) | DK1300316T3 (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102013201594A1 (en) | 2013-01-31 | 2014-09-11 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and device for evaluating the accuracy of speed values, in particular of a rail vehicle |
Families Citing this family (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102012217426A1 (en) | 2012-09-26 | 2014-04-17 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method for obtaining on-vehicle position data for rail vehicle, involves detecting supply points by sensors of track electric circuits, and using detected supply points for calibration of odometrischer systems |
| DE102013224672A1 (en) | 2013-12-02 | 2015-06-03 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle |
| DE102014225683A1 (en) | 2014-12-12 | 2016-06-16 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method for position data acquisition and related rail vehicle |
| DE102015201041A1 (en) | 2015-01-22 | 2015-12-24 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle |
| DE102015205175A1 (en) | 2015-03-23 | 2016-09-29 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle |
| DE102015211084A1 (en) | 2015-06-17 | 2016-07-14 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and device for determining the position of a rail vehicle |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP0593910A1 (en) * | 1992-10-17 | 1994-04-27 | Alcatel SEL Aktiengesellschaft | Train control system using line conductors with improved vehicle location |
| DE4423673C1 (en) * | 1994-06-23 | 1996-01-18 | Siemens Ag | Decentralised information system for transport network |
| DE19950395A1 (en) * | 1999-10-12 | 2001-06-07 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Railway vehicle location method for track network, involves determining the relative position of the railway vehicle from sensor data continuously detected in the railway vehicle |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE3707497A1 (en) * | 1986-03-10 | 1987-09-17 | Siemens Ag | Device for conveying information |
| DE19532104C1 (en) * | 1995-08-30 | 1997-01-16 | Daimler Benz Ag | Method and device for determining the position of at least one location of a track-guided vehicle |
-
2001
- 2001-08-09 DE DE10139319A patent/DE10139319C2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2002
- 2002-07-24 DK DK02090277T patent/DK1300316T3/en active
- 2002-07-24 EP EP02090277A patent/EP1300316B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2002-07-24 AT AT02090277T patent/ATE352466T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2002-07-24 DE DE50209331T patent/DE50209331D1/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP0593910A1 (en) * | 1992-10-17 | 1994-04-27 | Alcatel SEL Aktiengesellschaft | Train control system using line conductors with improved vehicle location |
| DE4423673C1 (en) * | 1994-06-23 | 1996-01-18 | Siemens Ag | Decentralised information system for transport network |
| DE19950395A1 (en) * | 1999-10-12 | 2001-06-07 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Railway vehicle location method for track network, involves determining the relative position of the railway vehicle from sensor data continuously detected in the railway vehicle |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE102013201594A1 (en) | 2013-01-31 | 2014-09-11 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and device for evaluating the accuracy of speed values, in particular of a rail vehicle |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| DK1300316T3 (en) | 2007-05-07 |
| ATE352466T1 (en) | 2007-02-15 |
| DE10139319C2 (en) | 2003-09-04 |
| EP1300316B1 (en) | 2007-01-24 |
| DE50209331D1 (en) | 2007-03-15 |
| DE10139319A1 (en) | 2003-05-22 |
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