EP1300316B1 - Vehicle configuration - Google Patents

Vehicle configuration Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1300316B1
EP1300316B1 EP02090277A EP02090277A EP1300316B1 EP 1300316 B1 EP1300316 B1 EP 1300316B1 EP 02090277 A EP02090277 A EP 02090277A EP 02090277 A EP02090277 A EP 02090277A EP 1300316 B1 EP1300316 B1 EP 1300316B1
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European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
position data
secure
terms
signal technology
data
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Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
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EP02090277A
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP1300316A1 (en
Inventor
Bernd Mueller
Uwe Rosenkranz
Reinhard Scheunemann
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Siemens AG
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Siemens AG
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Publication of EP1300316A1 publication Critical patent/EP1300316A1/en
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Publication of EP1300316B1 publication Critical patent/EP1300316B1/en
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or vehicle trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or vehicle trains
    • B61L25/021—Measuring and recording of train speed
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or vehicle trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or vehicle trains
    • B61L25/026—Relative localisation, e.g. using odometer

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a vehicle configuration according to the preamble of the claim.
  • Very different systems are used for the control and monitoring of rail vehicles, especially in international traffic. For this reason, intensive efforts are being made throughout Europe to set up a uniform train control system, the ETCS (European Train Control System).
  • the ETCS is based on a modular system consisting of different train protection elements with standardized interfaces. These train protection elements include punctiform train control, linear train control and a central displacement and speed measuring device for control purposes. All of these devices require current position data as input parameters, whereby the position data acquisition of the line-shaped train control is safe as a signal according to the Cenelec standard and that of the central position and speed measuring device is not safe.
  • the point-shaped train control must be designed to be safe signal.
  • the invention has for its object to provide a vehicle configuration of the generic type, which is simplified in terms of position data acquisition and data processing, the addition to be installed train protection component, in particular a punctiform train control, signal-technically secure output data should deliver.
  • the object is achieved with the characterizing features of the claim.
  • the position data for the punctiform train control are thereby obtained quasi by verification of the fail-safe, but highly accurate position data of the central position and speed measuring device by means of the signal-technically safe, but less accurate position data of the linear train control.
  • the point-shaped train control thus no longer requires its own sensors for the position data acquisition. Instead, the location data of other facilities are shared.
  • a data bus in particular a multifunctional vehicle bus is provided. This multifunctional vehicle bus combines the train protection components with each other and with other components of the control technology, whereby a uniform interface architecture can be used.
  • the multifunctional vehicle bus By using the multifunctional vehicle bus, a very fast and easy transfer of the position data of different sources to the data processing components of the punctiform train control is possible. Expensive cable connections can be made through the bus structure omitted.
  • the position data are provided with a cyclic code fuse attachment and transmitted over the data bus sufficiently frequently periodically to the punctual train control. The latter decodes the data according to the same code security procedure and uses the signal-technically secure position data as reference values for assessing whether the position data of the central distance and speed measuring device transmitted in the same way, but without code backup, for the processing processes of the punctiform train control may be used.
  • the invention will be explained in more detail with reference to an embodiment shown figuratively.
  • the single figure illustrates schematically the use of position data x 1 and x 2 of different sources for an additional device.
  • the source for the position data x 1 is part of a thoroughlynzugbeeinpoundung LZB, while the position data x 2 from the central displacement and speed measuring device ZWG, which is intended for control purposes, originate.
  • the signal technology safely determined position data x 1 are coded COD and on a multifunctional vehicle bus MVB transmitted.
  • the signal technically not safe, but more accurate position data x 2 are fed directly into the multifunctional vehicle bus MVB. After reading out the LZB position data x 1 , these are decoded DEC.
  • the fail-safe LZB position data x 1 can be transmitted via the fail-safe multifunctional vehicle bus MVB.
  • the LZB position data x 1 and the ZWG position data x 2 are supplied to a comparator V which compares the sign-independent absolute difference
  • the signal value x 2 which is inherently not safe in terms of signal technology, can be classified as safe enough if x 2 is very close to x 1 .
  • the permissible maximum difference ⁇ max between both values x 1 and x 2 is set accordingly.

Abstract

Position data (x1, x2) from first and second units (LZB, ZWG) are sent to a transmission path (MVB) which is technically-insecure. Technically-secure position data is encoded (COD) to ensure reliable transmission. The position data (x1, x2) generated by the first and second units (LZB, ZWG) respectively, is supplied to the additional device (ZUB), a decoder (DEC) being included for the secure position data (x1). An absolute difference, MOD(x1-x2), is generated. <??>The absolute difference is compared with a maximum difference ( DELTA max) by a comparator (V). Below the maximum difference, the non-secure data (x2) is employed by the additional device (ZUB) for processing. Otherwise, the decoded, secure data (x1) is used.

Description

Die Erfindung betrifft eine Fahrzeugkonfiguration gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Patentanspruches. Für die Steuerung und Überwachung von Schienenfahrzeugen werden, insbesondere im grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr, sehr unterschiedliche Systeme eingesetzt. Europaweit wird deshalb intensiv am Aufbau eines einheitlichen Zugsicherungs- und Steuerungssystems, dem ETCS (european train control system) gearbeitet. Das ETCS beruht auf einen Baukastensystem, bestehend aus verschiedenen Zugsicherungselementen, die über standardisierte Schnittstellen verfügen. Zu diesen Zugsicherungselementen gehören punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung, linienförmige Zugbeeinflussung und eine zentrale Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung für steuerungstechnische Zwecke. Alle diese Einrichtungen benötigen als Eingangsparameter aktuelle Positionsdaten, wobei die Positionsdatenerfassung der linienförmigen Zugbeeinflussung als nach Cenelec-Norm signaltechnisch sicher und die der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung als signaltechnisch nicht sicher einzustufen sind. Die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung muss signaltechnisch sicher ausgelegt sein. In einer aus der DE 37 07 497 A1 bekannten Fahrzeugkonfiguration sind für signaltechnisch sichere und nicht sicherere Fahrzeugeinrichtungen zur Ermittlung von Geschwindigkeiten und Positionsdaten jeweils eigene Einrichtungen, nämlich Linienzugbeeinflussung und Radimpulsgeber, vorgesehen. Nachteilig ist dabei vor allem die Installation mehrere Fahrzeugkomponenten zur Erarbeitung gleicher Informationen. Außerdem sind diese peripheren Komponenten mit den dazugehörigen Schnittstellen und Datenleitungen nicht gerade aufwandsarm zu installieren und zu betreiben.The invention relates to a vehicle configuration according to the preamble of the claim. Very different systems are used for the control and monitoring of rail vehicles, especially in international traffic. For this reason, intensive efforts are being made throughout Europe to set up a uniform train control system, the ETCS (European Train Control System). The ETCS is based on a modular system consisting of different train protection elements with standardized interfaces. These train protection elements include punctiform train control, linear train control and a central displacement and speed measuring device for control purposes. All of these devices require current position data as input parameters, whereby the position data acquisition of the line-shaped train control is safe as a signal according to the Cenelec standard and that of the central position and speed measuring device is not safe. The point-shaped train control must be designed to be safe signal. In a vehicle configuration known from DE 37 07 497 A1, separate devices, namely train control and wheel pulse transmitters, are provided for signal-technically safe and unsafe vehicle devices for determining speeds and position data. The disadvantage is especially the installation of several vehicle components for the preparation of the same information. In addition, these peripheral components with the associated interfaces and data lines are not very easy to install and operate.

Aus der DE 195 32 104 C1 ist ein Verfahren zur Positionsdatenerfassung bekannt, bei dem drei mittels unterschiedlicher Messverfahren gewonnene Positionsdaten miteinander korreliert werden. Sicherheitstechnische Aspekte finden dabei keine Berücksichtigung.From DE 195 32 104 C1 a method for position data acquisition is known in which three position data obtained by means of different measuring methods are correlated with one another. Safety aspects are not considered.

Der Erfindung liegt die Aufgabe zugrunde, eine Fahrzeugkonfiguration gattungsgemäßer Art anzugeben, die hinsichtlich der Positionsdatenerfassung und der Datenverarbeitung vereinfacht ist, wobei die zusätzlich zu installierende Zugsicherungskomponente, insbesondere eine punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung, signaltechnisch sichere Ausgabedaten liefern soll.The invention has for its object to provide a vehicle configuration of the generic type, which is simplified in terms of position data acquisition and data processing, the addition to be installed train protection component, in particular a punctiform train control, signal-technically secure output data should deliver.

Die Aufgabe wird erfindungsgemäß mit den kennzeichnenden Merkmalen des Patentanspruchs gelöst. Die Positionsdaten für die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung werden dabei quasi durch Verifizierung der signaltechnisch nicht sicheren, aber hochgenauen Positionsdaten der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung mittels der signaltechnisch sicheren, aber weniger genauen Positionsdaten der linienförmigen Zugbeeinflussung gewonnen. Die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung benötigt somit keine eigene Sensorik für die Positionsdatenerfassung mehr. Stattdessen werden die Positionsdaten anderer Einrichtungen mitbenutzt. Zur Zusammenführung der Positionsdaten ist ein Datenbus, insbesondere ein multifunctional vehicle bus vorgesehen. Dieser multifunctional vehicle bus verbindet die Zugsicherungskompomenten untereinander und mit anderen Komponenten der Leittechnik, wobei eine einheitliche Schnittstellenarchitektur verwendbar ist. Durch Nutzung des multifunctional vehicle bus ist eine sehr schnelle und einfache Übertragung der Positionsdaten verschiedener Quellen zu den Datenverarbeitungskomponenten der punktförmigen Zugbeeinflussung möglich. Teure Kabelverbindungen können durch die Busstruktur entfallen. Um die signaltechnisch sichere Übertragung der signaltechnisch sicheren Positionsdaten der linienförmigen Zugbeeinflussung auf dem signaltechnisch als nicht sicher eingestuften Datenbus zu ermöglichen, werden die Positionsdaten mit einem zyklischen Code-Sicherungsanhang versehen und über den Datenbus hinreichend häufig periodisch an die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung übertragen. Diese dekodiert die Daten nach dem gleichen Code-Sicherungsverfahren und nutzt die signaltechnisch sicheren Positionsdaten als Referenzwerte zur Beurteilung, ob die auf dem gleichen Wege, jedoch ohne Code-Sicherung übertragenen signaltechnisch nicht sicheren Positionsdaten der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung für die Verarbeitungsprozesse der punktförmigen Zugbeeinflussung verwendet werden dürfen. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass bei Unterschreitung einer Maximaldifferenz zwischen den beiden Positionsdaten verschiedener Quellen die genaueren Positionsdaten der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung als sicher genug gelten können, da sie relativ nahe zu den Referenzwerten liegen. Anderenfalls werden die Referenzdaten selbst als die zu verarbeitenden Eingangsdaten der punktförmigen Zugbeeinflussung verwendet.The object is achieved with the characterizing features of the claim. The position data for the punctiform train control are thereby obtained quasi by verification of the fail-safe, but highly accurate position data of the central position and speed measuring device by means of the signal-technically safe, but less accurate position data of the linear train control. The point-shaped train control thus no longer requires its own sensors for the position data acquisition. Instead, the location data of other facilities are shared. To merge the position data, a data bus, in particular a multifunctional vehicle bus is provided. This multifunctional vehicle bus combines the train protection components with each other and with other components of the control technology, whereby a uniform interface architecture can be used. By using the multifunctional vehicle bus, a very fast and easy transfer of the position data of different sources to the data processing components of the punctiform train control is possible. Expensive cable connections can be made through the bus structure omitted. In order to enable the signal-technically secure transmission of the signal-technically secure position data of the line-shaped train control on the signal technically classified as not secure data bus, the position data are provided with a cyclic code fuse attachment and transmitted over the data bus sufficiently frequently periodically to the punctual train control. The latter decodes the data according to the same code security procedure and uses the signal-technically secure position data as reference values for assessing whether the position data of the central distance and speed measuring device transmitted in the same way, but without code backup, for the processing processes of the punctiform train control may be used. It is assumed that when a maximum difference between the two position data of different sources is undershot, the more accurate position data of the central position and speed measuring device can be considered safe enough, since they are relatively close to the reference values. Otherwise, the reference data itself is used as the input data of the punctual train control.

Die Erfindung wird nachfolgend anhand eines figürlich dargestellten Ausführungsbeispiels näher erläutert. Die einzige Figur veranschaulicht schematisch die Nutzung von Positionsdaten x1 und x2 verschiedener Quellen für eine zusätzliche Einrichtung. Die Quelle für die Positionsdaten x1 ist Bestandteil einer Linienzugbeeinflussung LZB, während die Positionsdaten x2 von der zentralen Weg- und Geschwindigkeitsmesseinrichtung ZWG, die an sich für steuerungstechnische Zwecke bestimmt ist, stammen. Die signaltechnisch sicher ermittelten Positionsdaten x1 werden codiert COD und auf einen multifunctional vehicle bus MVB übertragen. Die signaltechnisch nicht sicheren, aber genaueren Positionsdaten x2 werden direkt in den multifunctional vehicle bus MVB eingespeist. Nach dem Auslesen der LZB-Positionsdaten x1 werden diese decodiert DEC. Auf diese Weise lassen sich die signaltechnisch sicheren LZB-Positionsdaten x1 über den signaltechnisch nicht sicheren multifunctional vehicle bus MVB übertragen. Die LZB-Positionsdaten x1 und die ZWG-Positionsdaten x2 werden einem Vergleicher V zugeführt, der die von Vorzeichen unabhängige Absolutdifferenz |x1 - x2 mit einer zulässigen Maximaldifferenz Δmax vergleicht. Falls die Maximaldifferenz Δmax unterschritten ist, wird der sehr genaue, aber signaltechnisch nicht sichere Positionswert x2 als Eingangsgröße für die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung ZUB verwendet. Anderenfalls wird aus Sicherheitsgründen der signaltechnisch sichere Positionswert x1 verwendet. Auf diese Weise ist die punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung ZUB in jedem Fall als signaltechnisch sicher zu bewerten. Der an sich signaltechnisch nicht sichere Positionswert x2 kann als sicher genug eingestuft werden, wenn x2 sehr nahe bei x1 liegt. Die zulässige Maximaldifferenz Δmax zwischen beiden Werten x1 und x2 wird entsprechend festgelegt.The invention will be explained in more detail with reference to an embodiment shown figuratively. The single figure illustrates schematically the use of position data x 1 and x 2 of different sources for an additional device. The source for the position data x 1 is part of a Linienzugbeeinflussung LZB, while the position data x 2 from the central displacement and speed measuring device ZWG, which is intended for control purposes, originate. The signal technology safely determined position data x 1 are coded COD and on a multifunctional vehicle bus MVB transmitted. The signal technically not safe, but more accurate position data x 2 are fed directly into the multifunctional vehicle bus MVB. After reading out the LZB position data x 1 , these are decoded DEC. In this way, the fail-safe LZB position data x 1 can be transmitted via the fail-safe multifunctional vehicle bus MVB. The LZB position data x 1 and the ZWG position data x 2 are supplied to a comparator V which compares the sign-independent absolute difference | x 1 - x 2 with an allowable maximum difference Δ max . If the maximum difference Δ max is undershot, the very precise, but not technically safe position value x 2 is used as input for the punctiform train control ZUB. Otherwise, for safety reasons, the signal-technically safe position value x 1 is used. In this way, the punctiform train control ZUB is in any case to be evaluated safely as a signal. The signal value x 2 , which is inherently not safe in terms of signal technology, can be classified as safe enough if x 2 is very close to x 1 . The permissible maximum difference Δ max between both values x 1 and x 2 is set accordingly.

Claims (1)

  1. Vehicle configuration for a position-data-processing additional device (ZUB), the vehicle configuration comprising a first device (LZB) with position data detection which is secure in terms of signal technology, and a second device (ZWG) with precise position data detection which is however not secure in terms of signal technology, for control purposes, characterized in that the position data (x1 and x2) of the first and second devices (LZB, ZWG) is fed to a transmission path (MVB) which is not secure in terms of signal technology, the position data (x1) which is secure in terms of signal technology being provided, for the purpose of secure transmission in terms of signal technology, with a code (COD), in that the position data (x1 and x2) which is generated by the first and second devices (LZB, ZWG) is fed to the additional device (ZUB), in that means for decoding (DEC) the position data (x1) which is secure in terms of signal technology and comparison means (V) for comparing an absolute difference (|x1 - x2|) which is formed from simultaneously acquired, decoded position data (x1) which is secure in terms of signal technology and position data (x2) which is not secure in terms of signal technology, with a maximum difference (Δmax), are provided, wherein below the maximum difference (Δmax) the position data (x2) which is not secure in terms of signal technology is fed to the additional device (ZUB) as the input data to be processed and otherwise the decoded position data (x1) which is secure in terms of signal technology is fed to said additional device (ZUB).
EP02090277A 2001-08-09 2002-07-24 Vehicle configuration Expired - Lifetime EP1300316B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10139319A DE10139319C2 (en) 2001-08-09 2001-08-09 vehicle configuration
DE10139319 2001-08-09

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EP1300316A1 EP1300316A1 (en) 2003-04-09
EP1300316B1 true EP1300316B1 (en) 2007-01-24

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AT (1) ATE352466T1 (en)
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DK (1) DK1300316T3 (en)

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102012217426A1 (en) 2012-09-26 2014-04-17 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for obtaining on-vehicle position data for rail vehicle, involves detecting supply points by sensors of track electric circuits, and using detected supply points for calibration of odometrischer systems
DE102013224672A1 (en) 2013-12-02 2015-06-03 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle
DE102015201041A1 (en) 2015-01-22 2015-12-24 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle
DE102014225683A1 (en) 2014-12-12 2016-06-16 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for position data acquisition and related rail vehicle
DE102015211084A1 (en) 2015-06-17 2016-07-14 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for determining the position of a rail vehicle
WO2016150708A1 (en) 2015-03-23 2016-09-29 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for on-board acquisition of position data in a rail vehicle using propagation time calculation

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102013201594A1 (en) 2013-01-31 2014-09-11 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for evaluating the accuracy of speed values, in particular of a rail vehicle

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3707497A1 (en) * 1986-03-10 1987-09-17 Siemens Ag Device for conveying information
DE4235105A1 (en) * 1992-10-17 1994-04-21 Sel Alcatel Ag System for linear train control with improved vehicle location
DE4423673C1 (en) * 1994-06-23 1996-01-18 Siemens Ag Decentralised information system for transport network
DE19532104C1 (en) * 1995-08-30 1997-01-16 Daimler Benz Ag Method and device for determining the position of at least one location of a track-guided vehicle
DE19950395A1 (en) * 1999-10-12 2001-06-07 Daimler Chrysler Ag Railway vehicle location method for track network, involves determining the relative position of the railway vehicle from sensor data continuously detected in the railway vehicle

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102012217426A1 (en) 2012-09-26 2014-04-17 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for obtaining on-vehicle position data for rail vehicle, involves detecting supply points by sensors of track electric circuits, and using detected supply points for calibration of odometrischer systems
DE102013224672A1 (en) 2013-12-02 2015-06-03 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle
WO2015082091A1 (en) 2013-12-02 2015-06-11 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for on-board position data capturing in a rail vehicle
DE102014225683A1 (en) 2014-12-12 2016-06-16 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for position data acquisition and related rail vehicle
DE102015201041A1 (en) 2015-01-22 2015-12-24 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle
WO2016150708A1 (en) 2015-03-23 2016-09-29 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for on-board acquisition of position data in a rail vehicle using propagation time calculation
DE102015205175A1 (en) 2015-03-23 2016-09-29 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for vehicle-side position data acquisition in a rail vehicle
DE102015211084A1 (en) 2015-06-17 2016-07-14 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method and device for determining the position of a rail vehicle

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE10139319C2 (en) 2003-09-04
ATE352466T1 (en) 2007-02-15
EP1300316A1 (en) 2003-04-09
DE10139319A1 (en) 2003-05-22
DK1300316T3 (en) 2007-05-07
DE50209331D1 (en) 2007-03-15

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