EP1081431B1 - Appareil de commande pour installations thermiques - Google Patents

Appareil de commande pour installations thermiques Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1081431B1
EP1081431B1 EP00115606A EP00115606A EP1081431B1 EP 1081431 B1 EP1081431 B1 EP 1081431B1 EP 00115606 A EP00115606 A EP 00115606A EP 00115606 A EP00115606 A EP 00115606A EP 1081431 B1 EP1081431 B1 EP 1081431B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
safety
control device
relay
voltage
relays
Prior art date
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Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP00115606A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1081431A2 (fr
EP1081431A3 (fr
Inventor
Jürgen Klattenhoff
Günter Schmitz
Joachim-Christian Politt
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Gestra GmbH
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Gestra AG
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Publication of EP1081431A3 publication Critical patent/EP1081431A3/fr
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Publication of EP1081431B1 publication Critical patent/EP1081431B1/fr
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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01H—ELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H47/00—Circuit arrangements not adapted to a particular application of the relay and designed to obtain desired operating characteristics or to provide energising current
    • H01H47/002—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits
    • H01H47/004—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits using plural redundant serial connected relay operated contacts in controlled circuit
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F22—STEAM GENERATION
    • F22B—METHODS OF STEAM GENERATION; STEAM BOILERS
    • F22B37/00—Component parts or details of steam boilers
    • F22B37/02—Component parts or details of steam boilers applicable to more than one kind or type of steam boiler
    • F22B37/42—Applications, arrangements, or dispositions of alarm or automatic safety devices
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F22—STEAM GENERATION
    • F22B—METHODS OF STEAM GENERATION; STEAM BOILERS
    • F22B37/00—Component parts or details of steam boilers
    • F22B37/02—Component parts or details of steam boilers applicable to more than one kind or type of steam boiler
    • F22B37/42—Applications, arrangements, or dispositions of alarm or automatic safety devices
    • F22B37/46—Applications, arrangements, or dispositions of alarm or automatic safety devices responsive to low or high water level, e.g. for checking, suppressing, extinguishing combustion in boilers

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a control device specified in the preamble of the main claim type.
  • document FR-A-1 229 825 discloses a control device for controlling the water level in a boiler for the generation of steam.
  • level limiters are to be provided which switch off the heating of the boiler when a lower limit value of the filling level is exceeded, in order to prevent a safety-threatening overheating of the steam boiler.
  • level sensors monitor the level of the boiler to the limit below. With the level sensors control devices are connected, the output side have two series-connected safety relay. These safety relays are integrated into the safety power line for heating the steam boiler. As long as the lower limit is exceeded, the control unit switches the two safety relays to continuity. The safety power line is thus closed and the heating of the boiler released. However, if the lower limit value of the level is undershot, the level sensor sends a correspondingly different signal to the control unit. This unit then switches the safety relays over and interrupts the safety power line. The heating of the boiler is then interrupted.
  • Similar safety requirements namely to break the safety power line when reaching a predetermined limit, can also exist for other operating variables of thermal engineering systems, as for the maximum level, the maximum permissible operating pressure, the maximum permissible operating temperature or the maximum permissible electrical conductivity of the boiler fluid.
  • the safety devices used to meet these requirements must be failsafe (fail-safe).
  • failsafe For this purpose sensors and control units have to be self-monitoring. At predetermined intervals, the mechanical part of the sensors and the electrical part of the sensors and the switching devices must automatically be subjected to a check for proper functioning. If a fault is detected in this case, this leads to an interruption of the safety power line and thus, for example, to switch off the heating of the boiler.
  • very high demands are placed on their mechanical service life, for example 300,000 switching cycles.
  • the safety relays In normal operation, without interference, the safety relays remain in one and the same position for a very long time. Under certain circumstances, this may cause the contacts of the safety relays to weld together in this position. If a fault occurs, the affected safety relay would not interrupt the safety power line despite the corresponding control signal of the control unit. Since two safety relays are connected in series, such a fault on one of them would not pose a safety hazard. The error would remain unrecognized. The same error on the second safety relay would then lead to a critical operating situation.
  • the invention has for its object to provide a control device of the type mentioned, whose safety relays are monitored for safety-related malfunction.
  • the control unit makes a check of the switching capability of the safety relays at predefined times. It is checked whether the safety relays switch from their working position closing the safety power line to the rest position interrupting it with appropriate actuating signals. Only if this is ensured, the safety power line will actually be interrupted if necessary. -
  • the electrical voltage at the normally closed contact of the safety relay to be tested provides information as to whether the safety relay has assumed the rest position. A non-switching, ie a malfunction, is detected and can be corrected. Since the shunt line of the safety relay to be tested during the test is closed, the safety power line remains closed during this time. The operation of the system is therefore not interrupted by the test.
  • the safety relays are switched over and thereby assume their rest position. Due to the features of claim 2 then there is no electrically conductive connection between their normally closed contacts and the safety power line. A reliable interruption of the safety power line is ensured without special requirements for the means by which the voltages at the normally closed contacts of the safety relays are monitored during the test.
  • the design of the shunt lines according to claim 3 ensures that only one of the two shunt lines can be closed. The other one is interrupted. Only together with a closed safety relay, the shunt lines can close the safety current line. If both safety relays are at rest, then the safety power line is reliably interrupted. The position of the scholarschaltglieder is irrelevant. Error in the control of the test switching elements, z. B. due to a defect in the control unit can not affect the interruption.
  • the claim 4 offers the advantage of using the same components for the safety relay and the Ardschaltglieder and thereby reduce the variety of parts can. It can be structurally simple, commercially available relays use. Special relays, such as additional positively driven safety contacts, are not required.
  • the position of the connected to the connecting line of both safety relay test relay is determined. An error of the test relay - it shuts off the bypass lines or switches them to continuity - is detected. The safety relay is tested when the associated shunt line is switched to continuity. An unwanted interruption of the safety power line during the test is thus prevented.
  • the claim 6 has the examination of the interruption of the shunt line after checking the safety relay to the object. The error safety of the control unit is thereby increased.
  • test relay which serves to switch from one shunt line to the other, specifies the claim 7.
  • the electrical voltage of the safety power line and the electrical voltage of the control unit - at least in its functional area, which performs the control and testing functions - usually differ significantly from each other (example: safety power cable 230 V, control unit 5V).
  • a decoupling so a safe electrical isolation between the safety power line and the control and test area of the control unit is achieved in a simple manner.
  • the claim 12 has a test of the electrical control of the safety relay to the object. It is checked whether the drives of the safety relays can be de-energized. This is done without having to switch over the safety relays and interrupt the safety power line. A very short-term test, as it allows the embodiment of claim 13, is of great advantage.
  • control and test functions of the control unit can be realized particularly advantageous according to claim 14.
  • An electronic control unit 1 for a steam boiler 2 points in Fig. 1 a control device 3 and a relay circuit 4.
  • the steam boiler 2 is equipped with a level sensor 5 and with a burner 6 for heating.
  • the burner 6 is connected to an electrical safety current line 7, in which the relay circuit 4 is integrated.
  • the level sensor 5 outputs its level signal to the control device 3. It has a microprocessor 8 for control and test actions to be performed.
  • the relay circuit 4 has two safety relays 9, 10 connected in series in the safety current line 7 (FIG. Fig. 2 ).
  • a first shunt line 11 is the one safety relay 9 and a second shunt line 12 is connected in parallel to the other safety relay 10.
  • Both shunt lines 11, 12 have common line parts 13, 14, in which two test relays 15, 16 are connected in series.
  • Both the two safety relays 9, 10 and the two test relays 15 16 are designed as so-called changer with two switch positions, a rest position and a working position.
  • Each relay 9, 10, 15, 16 has a normally closed contact 17, a working contact 18, a root contact 19, a switching element 20 and an electromechanical drive 21 ( Fig. 3 ).
  • the safety current line 7 is connected to the normally open contacts 18 of the two safety relays 9, 10.
  • the root contacts 19 of both safety relays 9, 10 are connected to each other via a connecting line 22.
  • a voltage sensor 23, 24 is connected, which signals the electrical voltage prevailing there to the control device 3.
  • the root contact 19 of a test relay 15 is electrically connected via the one line part 13 to the connecting line 22 of both safety relays 9, 10.
  • a voltage sensor 25 is connected, which signals the electrical voltage prevailing there to the control device 3.
  • the normally open contact 18 of this test relay 15 is electrically connected to the root contact 19 of the other test relay 16 via the other line part 14.
  • To the line part 14 also connected to the control device 3 voltage sensor 26 is connected.
  • the normally closed contact 17 of the other test relay 16 is connected via the first shunt line 11 to the safety current line 7, and in front of the first safety relay 9.
  • the normally open contact 18 of the other test relay 16 is connected via the second shunt line 12 behind the second safety relay 10 to the safety current line 7.
  • an electrical voltage When applied to the normally closed contacts 17 of the two safety relays 9, 10 or the test relay 15 or on the line part 14, an electrical voltage, it is that of the safety power line 7. This is often the operating voltage of the general power grid, z. B. 230 volts.
  • voltage sensors 23 - 26 which sense this voltage, optocouplers are provided. They first transform the applied voltage into a light signal. From it they then each form an electrical signal with a suitable for the switching device 3 low voltage, eg. B. 5 volts. In this way, there is a decoupling, so a complete electrical separation between the higher and the lower voltage, which is advantageous for the reliability.
  • the relay circuit 4 finally has for the drives 21 of the safety relay 9, 10 and the test relay 15, 16 each have a switching amplifier 27, 28, 29, 30 ( Fig. 2 ) with a series resistor 31 and a transistor 32 ( Fig. 3 ).
  • At each drive 21 is a control voltage, for. B. 5 volts, from a suitable voltage source 33 at.
  • the transistor 32 is driven by the control device 3.
  • it In accordance with the switching signal received by the control device 3, it either establishes an electrical connection between the affected drive 21 and a basic potential 34 or interrupts it.
  • the switching element 20 assumes the rest position, in which it connects the root contact 19 and the normally closed contact 17 in an electrically conductive manner. However, if the connection to the ground potential 34, current flows through the drive 21, and it switches the switching member 20 in the working position. Then the root contact 19 and the working contact 18 are electrically connected to each other.
  • the level 35 of the liquid 36 in the steam boiler 2 must be monitored for whether it falls below a defined lower limit value 37. If the level 35 is above the limit value 37, the control device 3 receives from the level sensor 5 the fill level signal "level sufficient”. Due to appropriate control by the control device 3, both safety relays 9, 10 are switched to their working position. The safety power line 7 is thereby closed. The burner 6 can heat the steam boiler 2 when energy is needed.
  • the level sensor 5 If the level 35 in the boiler 2 falls below the limit value 37, the level sensor 5 gives the level signal liquid deficiency "to the controller 3. It in turn controls the switching amplifier 27, 28 and the drives 21 of the safety relay 9, 10 so that they are de-energized. Both safety relays 9, 10 then assume their rest position and both interrupt the safety power line 7 at the same time. A heating of the steam boiler 2, which could lead to a dangerous operating state if the lower limit value 37 is not reached, ie if there is a lack of liquid, is thereby reliably prevented the control device 3 can give a suitable fill level signal.
  • test relay 15 is in its rest position.
  • the two shunt lines 11, 12 are interrupted. No electricity can flow over them.
  • control unit 1 Periodically, the control unit 1 performs functional tests of the safety relays 9, 10 in order to ensure that in the event of a lack of liquid in the steam boiler 2, the safety-current line 7 is really interrupted. These are two different tests which are controlled by the microprocessor 8 of the control device 3. They are then carried out when the level 35 is above the limit value 37. If it falls below the limit value 37, the tests are suspended.
  • One check relates to the electrical control of the drives 21 of both safety relays 9, 10. It is determined whether the drives 21 can be switched de-energized. For this purpose, the transistors 32 of the switching amplifiers 27, 28 receive a corresponding control signal from the control device 3. The transistors 32 then interrupt the electrical connection of the drives 21 to the ground potential 34 (FIG. Fig. 3 ). The electrical voltages prevailing on the side of the switching amplifiers 27, 28 on the drives 21 of the safety relays 9, 10 are monitored by the control device 3. If the interruption to the ground potential 34 occurred without errors, the monitored voltages rise to the value of the voltage source 33. If, on the other hand, an error occurs in the control of the drives 21 of one or both safety relays 9, 10 and the interruption fails, the respective monitored voltage is at the basic potential 34. If the expected voltage increase does not occur during the test, the control unit 1 outputs a corresponding one error signal.
  • Both safety relays 9, 10 have a predetermined response time. According to their mechanical switching inertia, a certain, minimum period of time elapses after the drive 21 has become de-energized before the affected safety relay 9, 10 would switch to the rest position. The processes in the electrical control are in contrast much faster, the response and action time is there only a fraction of the response time of the safety relay 9, 10. The switching of the transistor 32 and the subsequent voltage increase on the drive 21 is done in a fraction of the response time of the safety relay. 9 10. The required test result is already present in the control device 3 before the tested safety relay 9, 10 switches over. The drive 21 of the safety relay 9, 10 then receives immediately from the control device 3 via the switching amplifier 27, 28 again the signal to occupy the working position. The entire test takes only a fraction of the response time of the safety relays to be tested 9, 10 to complete. They therefore remain during the test of their electrical control in the working position. The safety circuit 7 is thus not interrupted during this test.
  • the second test concerns the mechanical switching capability of the safety relays 9, 10, namely, whether they can switch from the working position to the rest position.
  • the test is carried out only when applied to the safety current line 7, an electrical voltage. This is checked by the control device 3 via the voltage sensor 26.
  • the two safety relays 9, 10 are tested individually.
  • the shunt line 11, 13, 14 parallel to it is initially closed.
  • the test relay 15, 16 are for this purpose so controlled by the control device 3 via the switching amplifier 29, 30, that the test relay 16 assumes the rest position and the test relay 15 switches to the working position.
  • the shunt line 11, 13, 14 is then consistently below the prevailing in the safety current line 7 electrical voltage.
  • the voltage sensor 26 signals the controller 3, the voltage applied.
  • the control device 3 controls the switching amplifier 28 of the safety relay 9 so that its drive 21 is de-energized.
  • the safety relay 9 then switches to its rest position and interrupts the safety power line 7.
  • the normally closed contact of the safety relay 9 is then the voltage of the safety power line 4, which is signaled to the control device 3 via the voltage sensor 24.
  • the switching capability of the safety relay 9 is detected.
  • the control device 3 switches via the switching amplifier 28 and the drive 21, the safety relay 9 in the working position. If the switch has taken place, the voltage sensor 24 of the control device 3 signals a voltage drop at the normally closed contact 17. The switching amplifier 29 of the test relay 15 then emits the signal for switching to the rest position. In the rest position is on the line part 13 at the normally closed contact 17 of the test relay 15 again the voltage of the safety power line 7 at. Via the voltage sensor 25, the control device 3 thus receives the signal that the shunt line 11, 13, 14 is interrupted again. The test of the safety relay 9 is completed successfully.
  • the other shunt line 12, 13, 14 is closed.
  • the test relay 16 is switched over to this by the control device 3 via the switching amplifier 30 and the drive 21 in its working position.
  • the test relay 15 is switched to its working position. With the aid of the voltage sensor 25, this is monitored by the control device 3.
  • Analogously to the test of the safety relay 9 then receives the safety relay 10 from the control device 3 via the switching amplifier 27, the signal to switch to the rest position. After switching has been applied to the normally closed contact 17 of the safety relay 10, the voltage of the safety power line 7 at.
  • the control device 3 receives from the voltage sensor 23 a corresponding signal, whereby the switching capability is detected.
  • the voltage of the safety current line 7 would not be set at its normally closed contact 17.
  • the control device 3 would then output a corresponding error signal and switch the test relay 15 in its rest position.
  • the test relay 15 would not switch to the working position, the voltage of the safety current line 7 would still be present at its normally closed contact 17.
  • the control device 3 would detect this as an error via the voltage sensor 25. She would cancel the further test and give a corresponding error signal.
  • An error signal would also be given if, at the conclusion of the test, the test relay 15 would not switch to the rest position despite a corresponding changeover command from the control device 3, ie the voltage of the safety current line 7 would not reappear at its normally closed contact 17.
  • a switching defect of the test relay 16 would have no unrecognized malfunction of the control unit 1 result. Such a fault would not close the shunt line parallel to the safety relay to be tested, but the other one. In this case, an interruption of the safety power line 7 would occur when switching the relay to be tested in its rest position. The operation of the boiler 2 would thereby disturbed. But it could not enter a dangerous operating condition. The control unit would therefore be failsafe even with such a defect.
  • the switching capability of the test relay 16 can be checked. In the rest position is at the connected to the line part 14 voltage sensor 26, the voltage of the safety power line 7 in front of the safety relay 9, while missing in the working position of the test relay 16.
  • test relay 15 If due to a malfunction of the control device 3, the test relay 15 is switched outside the aforementioned tests in its working position and thus one of the two shunt lines 11, 13, 14 and 12, 13, 14 closed, would not be a security risk. Falls below the limit value 37 of the level sensor 5 is a corresponding level signal to the controller 3, which then causes a switchover of both safety relays 9, 10 in the rest position. As a result, the safety power line 7 is reliably interrupted. The closed shunt line 11, 13, 14 or 12, 13, 14 does not change this.
  • control unit 1 has been described above specifically in connection with the monitoring of the lower limit of the level of a steam boiler, the control unit 1 but can also be used for monitoring the other introductory in the description mentioned physical operating variables of steam boilers and other heat engineering systems are used.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Thermal Sciences (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
  • Control Of Temperature (AREA)
  • Mounting, Exchange, And Manufacturing Of Dies (AREA)
  • Control Of Steam Boilers And Waste-Gas Boilers (AREA)
  • Regulation And Control Of Combustion (AREA)
  • Control Of Resistance Heating (AREA)
  • Emergency Protection Circuit Devices (AREA)
  • Branch Pipes, Bends, And The Like (AREA)
  • Bipolar Transistors (AREA)
  • Control Of Eletrric Generators (AREA)

Claims (14)

  1. Appareil de commande (1) pour la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) d'une installation thermique, comprenant :
    - au moins une connexion pour un capteur surveillant un paramètre d'exploitation physique important pour la sécurité de l'installation,
    - deux relais de sécurité (9, 10) connectés en série pour la connexion de la ligne électrique de sécurité (7), et
    - un dispositif de commande qui commute les deux relais de sécurité (9, 10) en fonction du signal du capteur de telle sorte que si une valeur limite dangereuse du paramètre d'exploitation est atteinte, la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) est coupée,
    caractérisé en ce que
    - un circuit en dérivation (11, 13, 14) connecté en parallèle au premier relais de sécurité (9) relie la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) devant le premier relais de sécurité (9) à une ligne de liaison (22) entre les deux relais de sécurité (9, 10),
    - un circuit en dérivation (12, 13, 14) connecté en parallèle au deuxième relais de sécurité (10) relie la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) derrière le deuxième relais de sécurité (10) à la ligne de liaison (22) entre les deux relais de sécurité (9, 10),
    - dans les circuits en dérivation (11, 12, 13, 14), des éléments de commutation de contrôle (15, 16) sont prévus qui coupent les circuits en dérivation (11, 12, 13, 14) en dehors de périodes de contrôle prévues,
    - les deux relais de sécurité (9, 10) sont réalisés comme des inverseurs avec une position de repos et une position de travail,
    - chaque relais de sécurité (9, 10) présente un contact de repos (17), un contact de travail (18) et un contact de base (19), dans lequel dans la position de repos, le contact de base (19) et le contact de repos (17) sont reliés ensemble électriquement, alors que dans la position de travail, le contact de base (19) et le contact de travail (18) sont reliés ensemble électriquement, et
    - le dispositif de commande (3) présente des moyens de contrôle (8) qui contrôlent pendant des périodes de contrôle prédéfinies la capacité de commutation des relais de sécurité (9, 10), le circuit en dérivation (11, 13, 14 ; 12, 13, 14) respectivement associé au relais de sécurité (9, 10) à contrôler étant fermé à cet effet par l'intermédiaire des éléments de commutation de contrôle (15, 16), le relais de sécurité (9, 10) étant commute dans la position de repos, la tension électrique étant surveillée au contact de repos (17) du relais de sécurité (9, 10) contrôlé, et en cas d'absence de tension cet endroit, un signal d'erreur étant fourni.
  2. Appareil de commande selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que les relais de sécurité (9, 10) sont reliés ensemble au niveau de leurs contacts de base (19) alors que la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) est connectée aux contacts de travail (19).
  3. Appareil de commande selon l'une ou les deux des revendications 1 et 2,
    caractérisé en ce que :
    - deux éléments de commutation de contrôle (15, 16) sont connectés en série,
    - ledit un élément de commutation de contrôle (15) est relié par l'intermédiaire d'une partie de ligne commune (13) des circuits en dérivation (11, 12, 13, 14) à la ligne de liaison (22) des deux relais de sécurité (9, 10), et
    - ledit autre élément de commutation de contrôle (16) est réalisé comme un inverseur et établit sélectivement une liaison entre ledit un élément de commutation de contrôle (15) et ledit circuit en dérivation (11) menant devant le premier relais de sécurité (9) ou entre ledit élément de commutation de contrôle (15) et ledit autre circuit en dérivation (12) menant derrière le deuxième relais de sécurité (10).
  4. Appareil de commande selon la revendication 3, caractérisé en ce que
    - des relais de contrôle (15, 16) réalisés comme des inverseurs avec une position de repos et une position de travail sont prévus comme des éléments de commutation de contrôle, et
    - chaque relais de contrôle (15, 16) présente un contact de repos (17), un contact de travail (18) et un contact de base (19), dans lequel dans la position de repos, le contact de base (19) et le contact de repos (17) sont reliés ensemble électriquement, alors que dans la position de travail, le contact de base (19) et le contact de travail (18) sont reliés ensemble électriquement.
  5. Appareil de commande selon la revendication 4, caractérisé en ce que
    - ledit un relais de contrôle (15) est connecté par son contact de base (19) et son contact de travail (18) à des parties de ligne communes (13, 14) des circuits en dérivation (11, 12, 13, 14), et
    - le dispositif de commande (3), pendant le contrôle des relais de sécurité (9, 10), commute d'abord ledit un relais de contrôle (15) de la position de repos à la position de travail et surveille la tension électrique au niveau de son contact de repos (17), et qu'en cas de présence de tension, un signal d'erreur est fourni.
  6. Appareil de commande selon la revendication 4 ou 5, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de commande (3), à l'issue du contrôle des relais de sécurité (9, 10), commute ledit un relais de contrôle (15) de la position de travail à la position de repos et surveille la tension électrique au niveau de son contact de repos (17), et qu'en cas d'absence de tension, un signal d'erreur est fourni.
  7. Appareil de commande selon l'une ou plusieurs quelconque des revendications 4 à 6, caractérisé en ce que le contact de repos (17) de l'autre relais de contrôle (16) est relié au circuit en dérivation (11) menant devant le premier relais de sécurité (9) et son contact de travail (18) est relié au circuit en dérivation (12) menant derrière le deuxième relais de sécurité (10), alors que son contact de base (19) est relié audit un relais de contrôle (15).
  8. Appareil de commande selon l'une quelconque ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de commande (3) surveille lors du contrôle des relais de sécurité (9, 10) la tension électrique de la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) et procède au contrôle en cas de présence de tension, alors qu'en cas d'absence de tension, le contrôle est arrêté momentanément.
  9. Appareil de commande selon la revendication 8, caractérisé en ce que la tension de la partie de ligne (14) reliant les deux relais de contrôle (15, 16) est surveillée.
  10. Appareil de commande selon l'une quelconque ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que pour la surveillance de la tension de la ligne électrique de sécurité (7), des coupleurs optoélectroniques sont prévus en tant que capteur de tension (26) qui délivrent en cas de présence de tension dans la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) une tension de signal inférieure appropriée pour l'appareil de commande (1).
  11. Appareil de commande selon l'une quelconque ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que pour la surveillance de la tension au niveau des contacts de repos (17) des relais de sécurité (9, 10) et dudit un relais de contrôle (15), des coupleurs optoélectroniques sont prévus en tant que capteurs de tension (23, 24, 25) qui délivrent en cas de présence de tension une tension de signal inférieure appropriée pour l'appareil de contrôle (1).
  12. Appareil de commande (1) pour la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) d'une installation thermique, comprenant
    - au moins une connexion pour un capteur surveillant un paramètre d'exploitation physique important pour la sécurité de l'installation,
    - deux relais de sécurité (9, 10) connectés en série pour la connexion de la ligne électrique de sécurité (7), et
    - un dispositif de commande qui commute les deux relais de sécurité (9, 10) en fonction du signal du capteur de telle sorte que si une valeur limite dangereuse du paramètre d'exploitation est atteinte, la ligne électrique de sécurité (7) est coupée,
    caractérisé en ce que
    - chaque relais de sécurité (9, 10) présente un dispositif d'entrainement électromécanique (21) et un temps de réaction prédéfini,
    - pour commander l'alimentation électrique des dispositifs d'entraînement (21), des amplificateurs de commutation (27, 28) sont prévus dont le temps de réaction et d'action s'élève à une fraction du temps de réaction du relais de sécurité (9, 10), et
    - le dispositif de commande (3) présente des moyens de contrôle (8) qui contrôlent la commande électrique des relais de sécurité (9, 10), à cet effet, l'amplificateur de commutation (27, 28) du dispositif d'entraînement (21) du relais de sécurité (9, 10) à contrôler étant commuté à des instants de contrôle prédéfinis et la variation de tension au niveau du dispositif d'entraînement (21) étant surveillée, à l'issue d'une durée de contrôle prédéfinie, l'amplificateur de commutation (27, 28) étant commuté de nouveau, et en cas de variation de tension suffisante pendant la durée de contrôle, un signal d'erreur étant fourni, dans lequel le contrôle dure une fraction du temps de réaction du relais de sécurité (9, 10).
  13. Appareil de commande selon la revendication 12, caractérisé en ce que
    - les dispositifs d'entrainement (21) des relais de sécurité (9, 10) sont d'une part relies une source de tension (33) de tension prédéfinie et d'autre part à un potentiel de base (34),
    - dans la liaison avec le potentiel de base (34), respectivement un transistor (32) commandé par le dispositif de commande (3) est prévu en tant qu'amplificateur de commutation (27, 28), et
    - pendant la durée de contrôle, le transistor (32) coupe la liaison entre le dispositif d'entraînement (21) et le potentiel de base (34) et la montée de la tension au niveau du dispositif d'entraînement (21) est surveillée, dans lequel une montée de tension insuffisante pendant la durée de contrôle provoque un signal d'erreur.
  14. Appareil de commande selon l'une quelconque ou plusieurs des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de commande (3) présente un microprocesseur (8) en tant que moyens de contrôle pour l'exécution des contrôles et pour la commande.
EP00115606A 1999-08-28 2000-07-20 Appareil de commande pour installations thermiques Expired - Lifetime EP1081431B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19941022 1999-08-28
DE19941022A DE19941022A1 (de) 1999-08-28 1999-08-28 Steuergerät für wärmetechnische Anlagen

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1081431A2 EP1081431A2 (fr) 2001-03-07
EP1081431A3 EP1081431A3 (fr) 2003-01-15
EP1081431B1 true EP1081431B1 (fr) 2008-09-03

Family

ID=7920025

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP00115606A Expired - Lifetime EP1081431B1 (fr) 1999-08-28 2000-07-20 Appareil de commande pour installations thermiques

Country Status (9)

Country Link
US (1) US6507468B1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1081431B1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE407329T1 (fr)
BR (1) BR0003849A (fr)
CZ (1) CZ298673B6 (fr)
DE (2) DE19941022A1 (fr)
HU (1) HU226341B1 (fr)
NO (1) NO334583B1 (fr)
PL (1) PL195007B1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6742913B2 (en) * 2001-01-09 2004-06-01 Daniel J. Deutsch Motion activated decorative light
DE10127233C1 (de) * 2001-05-22 2002-11-28 Pilz Gmbh & Co Sicherheitsschaltmodul und Verfahren zur Prüfung des Abschaltvermögens eines Schaltelements in einem Sicherheitsschaltmodul
JP5319400B2 (ja) * 2009-05-28 2013-10-16 アズビル株式会社 リレー異常検出装置
DE102016101648A1 (de) 2016-01-29 2017-08-03 Fresenius Medical Care Deutschland Gmbh Verfahren zum Regeln einer Heizvorrichtung zum Erwärmen eines Fluids für einen Dialysierflüssigkeitskreislauf, Steuervorrichtung sowie Blutbehandlungsvorrichtung
CN106452111B (zh) * 2016-11-25 2020-06-02 山西全安新技术开发有限公司 一种本安电源的供电方法及本安电源系统

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US2849990A (en) * 1954-12-20 1958-09-02 Railway Steam Res Corp Electrical safety device for steam boilers
FR1229825A (fr) * 1959-03-14 1960-09-09 Dampferzeuger Veb Dispositif pour le contrôle et la régulation du niveau d'un liquide, notamment pour réservoirs de chaudière à vapeur, avec un montage électronique
GB1084518A (en) * 1963-05-09 1967-09-27 Edwin Danks & Company Oldbury Improvements relating to steam boilers
US3910118A (en) 1972-02-02 1975-10-07 Gerdts Gustav F Kg Probe for controlling the level of electrically conductive liquids
US3863110A (en) * 1972-04-21 1975-01-28 Owens Illinois Inc Apparatus and method for controlling a centrifugal compressor
US4054935A (en) * 1976-05-28 1977-10-18 Leon Ginsberg Safety control circuit
JPS5332428A (en) * 1976-09-08 1978-03-27 Hitachi Ltd Safety check circuit of combustion controlling apparatus
DE3709059A1 (de) * 1987-03-19 1988-09-29 Teves Gmbh Alfred Sicherheitsrelaisschaltung zum einschalten elektrischer kraftfahrzeugaggregate
US5287085A (en) * 1992-08-26 1994-02-15 At-A-Glance, Inc. Automatic test and connect electrical power system for anti-lock and conventional brake equipped trailers
DE9310446U1 (de) * 1993-03-08 1994-07-14 Landis & Gyr Business Support Ag, Zug Schaltungsanordnung zum Prüfen von Schalter- bzw. Relaiskontakten
CH688842A5 (de) * 1994-03-14 1998-04-15 Landis & Gyr Tech Innovat Einrichtung zur Ansteuerung des Motors des Gebläses eines Gebläsebrenners.
US5739504A (en) * 1995-07-28 1998-04-14 C. Cowles & Company Control system for boiler and associated burner

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
PL342181A1 (en) 2001-03-12
BR0003849A (pt) 2001-04-03
US6507468B1 (en) 2003-01-14
HU226341B1 (en) 2008-09-29
NO20004267L (no) 2001-03-01
HU0002871D0 (en) 2000-09-28
DE50015338D1 (de) 2008-10-16
HUP0002871A2 (hu) 2001-09-28
HUP0002871A3 (en) 2005-01-28
NO334583B1 (no) 2014-04-14
DE19941022A1 (de) 2001-03-01
CZ298673B6 (cs) 2007-12-19
EP1081431A2 (fr) 2001-03-07
CZ20003128A3 (cs) 2001-04-11
EP1081431A3 (fr) 2003-01-15
NO20004267D0 (no) 2000-08-25
PL195007B1 (pl) 2007-07-31
ATE407329T1 (de) 2008-09-15

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