EP0174016A2 - Identifikationskarte und dazugehöriges Beglaubigungssystem - Google Patents

Identifikationskarte und dazugehöriges Beglaubigungssystem Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0174016A2
EP0174016A2 EP85111152A EP85111152A EP0174016A2 EP 0174016 A2 EP0174016 A2 EP 0174016A2 EP 85111152 A EP85111152 A EP 85111152A EP 85111152 A EP85111152 A EP 85111152A EP 0174016 A2 EP0174016 A2 EP 0174016A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
card
data
encrypted data
identification
secret
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP85111152A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0174016B1 (de
EP0174016A3 (en
Inventor
Shigeyuki Kawana
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Casio Computer Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Casio Computer Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Casio Computer Co Ltd filed Critical Casio Computer Co Ltd
Publication of EP0174016A2 publication Critical patent/EP0174016A2/de
Publication of EP0174016A3 publication Critical patent/EP0174016A3/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0174016B1 publication Critical patent/EP0174016B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G06Q20/3415—Cards acting autonomously as pay-media
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/385—Payment protocols; Details thereof using an alias or single-use codes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4012—Verifying personal identification numbers [PIN]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4093—Monitoring of device authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10—TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC
    • Y10S—TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y10S283/00—Printed matter
    • Y10S283/904—Credit card

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an identification card and an authentication system for authenticating a card holder and the identification card itself.
  • a store clerk checks whether or not a card user or customer is the authorized card holder, i.e., whether or not the card is being misused by the current card user.
  • the card user is authenticated as the legal card holder, the selected item is sold with the identification card.
  • the card user is authenticated with a key code in the following manner.
  • an illegal user c&.. easily read out the key code from the magnetic strip by using a special magnetic reader or the like.
  • Authentication reliability with respect to the card holder is very low.
  • An IC card storing a key code has recently been developed and the key code cannot be externally read out from the IC card.
  • it is difficult to read out the key code from this type of IC card the card itself can be counterfeited and the legal card holder cannot be positively identified. It is difficult to confirm that the IC card was issued in accordance with proper procedures.
  • method (b) has high reliability for authenticating the card itself.
  • the key code may be intercepted, thus failing to guarantee security (safety) of the key code.
  • the present invention has been made in consideration of the above situation, and has as its object to provide an identification card and an authentication system therefor, wherein a card holder and the card itself can be properly authenticated.
  • a device is arranged in an identification card to encrypt input data entered by a card holder in accordance with a specific encryption algorithm.
  • the data encrypted by the device is discriminated to determine whether or not it is a data obtained by an authentic encryption algorithm approved by a card issuer such as a credit card company. Authenticity of the card holder and the identification card itself can thus be confirmed.
  • an identification card 1 has the same outer dimensions as a normal credit card.
  • the card 1 has a measure of 54 mm x 85 mm x 0.8 mm to comply with the ISO standards.
  • a data input keyboard 2 and a liquid crystal display unit 3 are formed on the surface of the card 1.
  • An LSI (not shown) is incorporated in the card 1.
  • a card holder's name, an account number and the like are embossed on the plastic lower surface of the card 1.
  • a paper like cell is incorporated in the body of the card 1.
  • the keyboard 2 has a ten-key pad and function keys in the same manner as a conventional compact calculator.
  • the keyboard 2 also has an collation function (CF) key 2a, a date (D) set key 2b, a time (T) set key 2c, a time/date selector (T/D) key 2d and the like.
  • CF collation function
  • Fig. 2 is a block diagram of the identification card 1.
  • Data entered at a keyboard unit 2 is supplied to an arithmetic operation memory unit 7 through an input control unit 5 and a system bus line 6 under the control of a control unit 4 constituted by a microprocessor.
  • the input data is written in a register 8 for temporarily storing a personal identification number (PIN') as secret data and a total amount (AMT) as transaction data.
  • PIN' personal identification number
  • AMT total amount
  • the arithmetic operation memory unit 7 is used when the identification card 1 performs a calculator function.
  • the unit 7 stores data written therein and performs various types of arithmetic processing.
  • the arithmetic operation data is displayed on a display unit 3 through the bus line 6 and the display control unit 9.
  • the bus line 6 is connected to a time measuring circuit 10 for measuring the current date and time, a PIN register 11, a coincidence unit 12, a sales approval number (SAN) calculation processing unit 13 and a system program memory unit 14 for storing a program for controlling the entire system.
  • a time measuring circuit 10 for measuring the current date and time
  • a PIN register 11 for measuring the current date and time
  • a coincidence unit 12 for detecting coincidence
  • a sales approval number (SAN) calculation processing unit 13 for storing a program for controlling the entire system.
  • SAN sales approval number
  • the register 11 stores a PIN which is arbitrarily selected by a card holder upon issuance of the card and registered by the credit card company.
  • the unit 12 compares the content of the register 11 with the PIN' stored in the register 8 and supplies a detection signal Cl to the unit 4.
  • the unit 4 generates an identification enable signal C2 in response to the signal Cl.
  • the unit 13 Upon reception of the signal C2 from the unit 4, the unit 13 starts operation by using the contents (PIN' and AMT) of the register 8 and the content (DATE) of the circuit 10 in accordance with the encryption algorithm specified by the credit card company and calculates specific encrypted data SAN.
  • the unit 13 has an algorithm program memory 13a for storing the encryption algorithm and a calculation register 13b.
  • an interface unit 20 converts data supplied through a communication line 21 such as a telephone line and sends the converted data onto a system bus line 22. At the same time, the data appearing on the bus line 22 is sent onto the line 21.
  • the bus line 22 is connected to a time measuring circuit 23, a system program memory unit 24 for storing a program for controlling the overall system and a control unit 25 for controlling the respective units in accordance with the program stored in the unit 24 in the same manner as in the identification card 1 of Fig. 2.
  • the arrangement shown in Fig. 3 further has a SAN calculation processing unit 26 for encrypting the input data in accordance with the encryption algorithm (varying in different credit companies) specified by the given credit card company.
  • the bus line 22 is also connected to a register 27 for temporarily storing data representing a total amount (AMT) which is externally supplied through the unit 20, and a card identification code representing a primary account number (PAN), and a register 28 for storing SAN calculated by the identification card 1.
  • AMT total amount
  • PAN primary account number
  • the line bus 22 is further connected to a memory table 29 for storing account numbers (PAN1, PAN2,%) of the respective customers and personal identification numbers (PIN1, PIN2, etc corresponding to the PANs and a register 30 for storing the SAN' calculated by the unit 26 in the computer 40.
  • the data (SAN and SAN') stored in the registers 28 and 30 are compared with each other by a coincidence unit 31.
  • the unit 31 supplies a detection signal C3 to the unit 25.
  • Fig. 4 shows authentication procedures which consist of operation procedures by a card holder, a clerk of a point of sales (POS) such as a store, and the computer 40 installed in the center such as a credit card company.
  • POS point of sales
  • a card holder brings a desired item to a cashier counter of the store and takes out his identification card. He enters his PIN' registered with the credit card company and contained in the card without being monitored by the cashier (Tl) and depresses the CF key 2a.
  • the entered data PIN' is supplied to the unit 12 and is compared with the data PIN stored in the register 11.
  • the unit 4 writes the coinciding PIN' in the register 8 and causes the unit 3 to display the "OK" message.
  • the card holder shows the indentification card 1 displaying "OK" to the clerk and after confirmation as legal card holder enters the total amount (AMT) of the desired item. He then depresses the CF key 2a again.
  • the unit 4 writes the AMT in the register 8 and supplies the signal C2 to the unit 13.
  • step T3 the unit 13 performs a predetermined calculation by using three data (i.e., PIN', AMT and DATE supplied from the circuit 10) in accordance with the specific encryption algorithm.
  • three data i.e., PIN', AMT and DATE supplied from the circuit 10.
  • step Sl the data PIN', AMT and DATE are fetched by the unit 13. It should be noted that the data PIN' represents a 12-digit numeric value. Processing of the input data PIN' is started.
  • step S2 products of the first and 12th digits, the second and llth digits, the third and 10th digits, the fourth and ninth digits, the fifth and eighth digits, and sixth and seventh digits of the data PIN' are calculated by the unit 13.
  • step S3 the six products calculated in step S2 are added to each other.
  • step S4 values of the last four figures (i.e., lowest four digits) of the data PIN' are added to the sum obtained in step S3.
  • step S5 the sum is stored as data X in the X register 13b in the unit 13.
  • the unit 4 checks in step S6 whether or not the value of the lowest digit of the current date (DATE) is an even value. If YES in step S6, the DATE is divided by 2 in step S7. The quotient is stored as data Z of the DATE in the Z register in the register 13b in step S8. In step S9, the AMT is stored in the Y register. A calculation is performed in accordance with the contents of the X, Y and Z registers in step 10 as follows:
  • step Sll the following calculation is performed to obtain data SAN:
  • the data SAN is displayed on the unit 3 in step S12.
  • step S6 If NO in step S6, the flow advances to step S13 of Fig. 5 B .
  • the data DATE is divided by 4, and a resultant remainder is omitted in step S14.
  • the quotient in step S14 is stored as data Z in the Z register (step S15).
  • the AMT is doubled in step S16, and the product is stored as data Y in the Y register in step S17.
  • step S18 The following calculation is performed in step S18:
  • step S19 The following calculation is further performed in accordance with the above calculation result in step S19 :
  • the data SAN is displayed on the unit 3 (step S20).
  • the unit 13 calculates the encrypted data SAN, and the calculated result is displayed on the unit 3.
  • the card holder shows the card 1 displaying the data SAN to the cashier (step T4) and requests authentication of the card.
  • step T5 the cashier confirms the credit card company of the card 1 shown by the customer and contacts the issuing credit card company with a telephone set installed in the terminal through the line 21.
  • the cashier sends to the computer 40 the data SAN displayed on.the card 1, the account number (PAN) as the card identification (i.e., card holder identification) code which varies in accordance with the card holder and embossed on the lower surface of the card 1, and the total amount AMT.
  • PAN account number
  • the data (i.e., SAN, PAN and AMT) received through the unit 20 are written in the registers 28 and 27 in the computer 40.
  • the memory table 29 is accessed in accordance with the received data PAN, and the data PIN corresponding to the input PAN is read out from the table 29 (step T6).
  • the unit 25 in the computer 40 supplies a calculation start instruction signal C4 to the unit 26 which is then started.
  • the unit 26 calculates data SAN' by using the three data (PIN, AMT and DATE) in accordance with the same encryption algorithm as that in the identification card (step T7).
  • the data calculated in this manner is written in the register 30 and at the same time compared by the unit 31 with the data SAN transmitted from the store.
  • the signal C3 from the unit 31 is supplied to the unit 25.
  • the message data corresponding to the detection result i.e., the "OK" message upon coincidence between the data stored in the registers 28 and 30, or the "NO” message upon noncoincidence between the data stored in the registers 28 and 30 is sent back to the store through the line 21 and the unit 20.
  • the cashier Upon reception of the response, i.e., the message data from the center, the cashier decides whether or not a transaction should be made for the current customer (step T9).
  • the response is the "OK" message and the S A N calculated by the card 1 coincides with the SAN' calculated by the computer 40, it is confirmed that:
  • the cashier When the cashier receives the "OK" message, he confirms that the card user is the legal card holder and that the card 1 itself is authenticated. The cashier can confidently proceed with the current transaction.
  • a customer purchases an item in a given store by using the card 1, he can operate the keys on the card by himself, so that the card 1 calculates desired encrypted data (SAN: Sales Approval Number).
  • the customer shows the desired encrypted data to the cashier to confirm card identification (i.e., that the card user is the legal card holder and the card was duly issued by the credit card company or the like).
  • the encrypted data can be calculated by the card.
  • a special device need not be installed in the store to identify the card. Only a telephone set is required.
  • the encrypted data is calculated by using three input data (i.e., PIN, AMT and DATE) in accordance with the encryption algorithm.
  • the SAN calculation input data is not limited to the three data described above.
  • a sales item serial number (slip number) or the like may be entered to calculate specific encrypted data.
  • the encryption algorithm shown in Figs. 5A and 5B is an example for calculating encrypted data. The algorithm varies in accordance with different credit card companies.
  • the identification card has a keyboard and a liquid crystal display (LCD) unit and serves as a normal card as well as a calculator.
  • a terminal connected to an external device may be arranged in place of the keyboard and the LCD unit.
  • the card communicates with the external device (e.g., a device having a connector, a keyboard and a display) through the terminal of the card.
  • the card may be powered through the terminal thereof.
  • the issuer's center such as the credit card company is directly called by the telephone set.
  • a POS terminal on-line connected to the host computer of the center may be installed in a store, and data communication can be performed through the POS terminal.
  • the card authentication system is the host computer installed in a center such as a credit card company.
  • the authentication system may be installed in the store, and the card holder and the card itself can be authenticated in the store.
  • the identification card is used in a store for the purchase of various items.
  • card holder or card authentication is required for a transaction made by a card, e.g., for mail order and ATM (Automatic Teller Machine) transactions or transactions utilizing automatic vending machines, the card holder and the card itself can be properly authenticated by using the identification card and the authentication system of the present invention.
  • the encryption algorithm approved by the credit card company is stored in the identification card, and upon sale of a desired item predetermined input data is encrypted in accordance with this encryption algorithm.
  • the encrypted data is transmitted from the identification card to the host system of the credit card company through the proper means.
  • the credit card company can check if the encrypted data is calculated in accordance with the authentic encryption algorithm, thereby determining that a transaction is made with an identification card approved by the credit card company.
  • specific encryption of the predetermined data is performed within the identification card, and the authentication system installed in the credit card company or the store encrypts the predetermined data specified by the identification card and checks whether or not the data encrypted by the identification card coincides with that of the authentication system. As a result, the identification card and the holder are properly authenticated.

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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Cash Registers Or Receiving Machines (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
EP85111152A 1984-09-07 1985-09-04 Identifikationskarte und dazugehöriges Beglaubigungssystem Expired - Lifetime EP0174016B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP187406/84 1984-09-07
JP18740684A JPH0670818B2 (ja) 1984-09-07 1984-09-07 照合カード及びその認証方法

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0174016A2 true EP0174016A2 (de) 1986-03-12
EP0174016A3 EP0174016A3 (en) 1988-09-07
EP0174016B1 EP0174016B1 (de) 1992-01-15

Family

ID=16205469

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP85111152A Expired - Lifetime EP0174016B1 (de) 1984-09-07 1985-09-04 Identifikationskarte und dazugehöriges Beglaubigungssystem

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US4697072A (de)
EP (1) EP0174016B1 (de)
JP (1) JPH0670818B2 (de)
DE (1) DE3585188D1 (de)
FR (1) FR2570207B1 (de)

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EP0197535A2 (de) * 1985-04-09 1986-10-15 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Anordnung zum Eingeben von Daten
GB2189741A (en) * 1986-03-15 1987-11-04 Reginald Charles David Vint Security cards
EP0246823A2 (de) * 1986-05-22 1987-11-25 Racal-Guardata Financial Systems Limited Einrichtungen und Verfahren zur Datenkommunikation
EP0247450A2 (de) * 1986-05-16 1987-12-02 Carl Heinz Hinz Identifikations-System
EP0247623A2 (de) * 1984-03-19 1987-12-02 Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. Überweisungssystem mit Chipkarte
EP0257648A2 (de) * 1986-08-29 1988-03-02 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Tragbarer Datenträger
GB2201125A (en) * 1987-02-16 1988-08-24 De La Rue Syst Verification device
EP0316689A2 (de) * 1987-11-13 1989-05-24 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Tragbarer elektronischer Apparat
FR2634300A1 (en) * 1988-07-14 1990-01-19 Unisys Corp System controlled by a keyboard such as a payment window
AT389776B (en) * 1985-10-29 1990-01-25 Voest Alpine Ag Chip card
WO1990007756A1 (en) * 1988-12-29 1990-07-12 Unisys Corporation Keyboard operated system
FR2646263A1 (fr) * 1989-04-24 1990-10-26 Levin Laurent Dispositif de paiement par carte bancaire comportant un systeme electronique d'authentification de la carte et de reconnaissance du porteur
WO1992014222A1 (en) * 1991-01-31 1992-08-20 Robert Alan Reid Tait Non-contacting transaction system
US5550358A (en) * 1991-01-31 1996-08-27 Tait; Robert A. R. Non-contacting transaction system
FR2771533A1 (fr) * 1997-11-21 1999-05-28 Taib Thierry Baillie Carte de securite pour paiement securise par carte de credit
AU706073B1 (en) * 1991-10-29 1999-06-10 Commonwealth Of Australia, The Communications security and trusted path method and means
FR2835078A1 (fr) * 2002-10-16 2003-07-25 Thierry Baillietaieb Systeme de securisation des transactions pour les paiements securises par carte
WO2003096287A1 (en) * 2002-05-10 2003-11-20 Quizid Technologies Ltd. An authentication token
US6836548B1 (en) 1991-10-29 2004-12-28 The Commonwealth Of Australia Communications security and trusted path method and means
GB2449410A (en) * 1992-10-30 2008-11-26 Commw Of Australia Communications security and trusted path method and means
US7865738B2 (en) 2002-05-10 2011-01-04 Prism Technologies Llc Authentication token

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US4926480A (en) * 1983-08-22 1990-05-15 David Chaum Card-computer moderated systems
US5140517A (en) * 1984-03-19 1992-08-18 Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. IC card with keyboard for prestoring transaction data
JPS62251963A (ja) * 1986-04-25 1987-11-02 Casio Comput Co Ltd Ｉｃカ−ドの認証方式
US4814591A (en) * 1987-04-13 1989-03-21 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Portable medium
US4868376A (en) * 1987-05-15 1989-09-19 Smartcard International Inc. Intelligent portable interactive personal data system
FR2618002B1 (fr) * 1987-07-10 1991-07-05 Schlumberger Ind Sa Procede et systeme d'authentification de cartes a memoire electronique
JP2615454B2 (ja) * 1987-09-18 1997-05-28 松下電器産業株式会社 暗証番号照合装置
JPS6488764A (en) * 1987-09-30 1989-04-03 Toshiba Corp Portable electronic equipment
EP0330404B1 (de) * 1988-02-20 1994-11-30 Fujitsu Limited Chipkarten
US5060263A (en) * 1988-03-09 1991-10-22 Enigma Logic, Inc. Computer access control system and method
US5180902A (en) * 1988-04-21 1993-01-19 David Schick Self verifying transaction card with disabling capability
JPH022475A (ja) * 1988-06-15 1990-01-08 Omron Tateisi Electron Co Ｉｃカード
JPH0758502B2 (ja) * 1988-06-30 1995-06-21 三菱電機株式会社 Ｉｃカード
US4942606A (en) * 1989-02-07 1990-07-17 Compaq Computer Corporation Computer with improved keyboard password functions
US5237609A (en) * 1989-03-31 1993-08-17 Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha Portable secure semiconductor memory device
US6926200B1 (en) 1989-09-06 2005-08-09 Fujitsu Limited Electronic cashless system
US6003767A (en) 1989-09-06 1999-12-21 Fujitsu Limited Cashless medium for an electronic cashless system
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EP0257648A2 (de) * 1986-08-29 1988-03-02 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Tragbarer Datenträger
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EP0316689A2 (de) * 1987-11-13 1989-05-24 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Tragbarer elektronischer Apparat
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FR2646263A1 (fr) * 1989-04-24 1990-10-26 Levin Laurent Dispositif de paiement par carte bancaire comportant un systeme electronique d'authentification de la carte et de reconnaissance du porteur
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GB2449410B (en) * 1992-10-30 2009-04-08 Commw Of Australia Communications trusted path means
GB2449410A (en) * 1992-10-30 2008-11-26 Commw Of Australia Communications security and trusted path method and means
WO2000074008A1 (fr) * 1997-11-21 2000-12-07 Thierry Taieb Baillie Systeme de tele-paiement securise par signature numerique pour carte de paiement
FR2771533A1 (fr) * 1997-11-21 1999-05-28 Taib Thierry Baillie Carte de securite pour paiement securise par carte de credit
WO2003096287A1 (en) * 2002-05-10 2003-11-20 Quizid Technologies Ltd. An authentication token
US7865738B2 (en) 2002-05-10 2011-01-04 Prism Technologies Llc Authentication token
US8375212B2 (en) 2002-05-10 2013-02-12 Prism Technologies Llc Method for personalizing an authentication token
US8688990B2 (en) 2002-05-10 2014-04-01 Prism Technologies Llc Method for personalizing an authentication token
US9794066B2 (en) 2002-05-10 2017-10-17 Prism Technologies, Llc Method for personalizing an authentication token
US10009176B2 (en) 2002-05-10 2018-06-26 Prism Technologies Llc Method for personalizing an authentication token
FR2835078A1 (fr) * 2002-10-16 2003-07-25 Thierry Baillietaieb Systeme de securisation des transactions pour les paiements securises par carte

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FR2570207B1 (fr) 1991-04-19
DE3585188D1 (de) 1992-02-27
EP0174016B1 (de) 1992-01-15
JPS6167192A (ja) 1986-04-07
FR2570207A1 (fr) 1986-03-14
JPH0670818B2 (ja) 1994-09-07
EP0174016A3 (en) 1988-09-07
US4697072A (en) 1987-09-29

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