WO2004068419A1 - Ein sicherheitssystem - Google Patents
Ein sicherheitssystem Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2004068419A1 WO2004068419A1 PCT/DE2003/003611 DE0303611W WO2004068419A1 WO 2004068419 A1 WO2004068419 A1 WO 2004068419A1 DE 0303611 W DE0303611 W DE 0303611W WO 2004068419 A1 WO2004068419 A1 WO 2004068419A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- base station
- receiver
- security system
- signal level
- key
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B1/00—Details of transmission systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04B3/00 - H04B13/00; Details of transmission systems not characterised by the medium used for transmission
- H04B1/59—Responders; Transponders
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B1/00—Details of transmission systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04B3/00 - H04B13/00; Details of transmission systems not characterised by the medium used for transmission
- H04B1/38—Transceivers, i.e. devices in which transmitter and receiver form a structural unit and in which at least one part is used for functions of transmitting and receiving
- H04B1/40—Circuits
- H04B1/54—Circuits using the same frequency for two directions of communication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B1/00—Details of transmission systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04B3/00 - H04B13/00; Details of transmission systems not characterised by the medium used for transmission
- H04B1/60—Supervising unattended repeaters
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a safety system, in particular a passive safety system for vehicles.
- remote electronic keys that include a transmitter that transmits authentication data to an in-vehicle receiver when a key's transponder is energized when the key is within a predetermined one Area of the receiver.
- the communication protocol activated between the transmitter and the receiver uses a high-frequency interface to carry the transmitted data and all the data that are sent from the vehicle to the key.
- the radio frequency (HF) interface has a limited range to ensure that the
- Communication connection is interrupted when a person in possession of the key moves away from the immediate vicinity of the vehicle.
- Passive security systems are easily exposed to attacks by unauthorized persons who use eavesdropping devices that are brought close to the vehicle and the key. Such devices are used to excite the key, to receive the transmissions transmitted by the key and to transmit the transmissions to the vehicle.
- the eavesdropper which often includes one or more relay locations, typically includes a receiver and an amplifier within the range of the key to transmit the intercepted signal to one
- the specifications of Australian patent applications 793933 and 42419/99 and 76313/01 describe security systems which use unique access protocols for communication between the key and the vehicle which can be used in addition to the transmission of authentication data to detect attacks from a relay point or to prevent.
- the access protocol is the communication protocol that is executed when the key is activated or triggered by the vehicle for cormination.
- the access log includes a number of tests that are used to aid in the detection of the relay location, such as the two-tone test and the transmission signal deviation test described in the specifications.
- the two-tone test in particular is based on the detection of third order distortion products generated by the relay point and is dependent on the linearity of the amplifiers and mixers used in the relay point. However, since highly linear amplifiers and mixers are now available, it is difficult to detect third order distortion products generated by the relay point. It is therefore desirable to present another technique that detects or aids in the detection of a relay point attack.
- the present invention provides a security system including an electronic key having a transmitter and a secured object having a base station having a receiver, the transmitter and the receiver being designed to communicate with each other to exchange authentication data, characterized in that the base station regularly monitors the natural radio frequency (RF) signal level received by the receiver; and that the base station detects disturbances in the natural RF signal level in order to enable detection of a relay point.
- RF radio frequency
- the present invention also presents a communication method performed by a security system, including an electronic key having a transmitter and a secured object with a base station having a receiver, the method including the transmission of authentication data from the transmitter to the recipient , characterized in that the base station: monitors the natural radio frequency (RF) signal level received by the receiver; and
- RF radio frequency
- FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a relay point attack
- FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of a preferred embodiment of a security system and a relay point
- Figure 3 is a block diagram of the security system
- Figure 4 is a flowchart of a control process of a base station of the security system.
- a secured object such as A vehicle 1, as shown in FIG. 1, is equipped with a passive security system, which allows an authorized user 2, who carries a key 4, to access and use the vehicle 1 if the key 4 is in a predetermined area of the vehicle 1 located.
- a relay point attack can be undertaken to gain access to the vehicle without the authorization of the authorized user, using eavesdropping devices that include one or more relay points 16.
- the user 2 of the vehicle 1 can be in possession of the key, and a first relay point 16 can be used to excite the key and to initiate a transmission on the part of the key according to the access protocol.
- the signals of the key are transmitted to a further relay point 16, which is kept ready by an attacker in the vicinity of the vehicle.
- the second relay point 16 in turn transmits the signals further to the vehicle 1. This establishes a communication link between the key and the vehicle 1, even though the owner is not in the predetermined area of the vehicle, which is normally required to call up the access protocol.
- the passive security system as shown in FIGS. 2 and 3, comprises an electronic key 4 with a transmitter 6 and a transmitting antenna 7, a base station 8 with a receiver 10 and receiving antenna 12.
- the base station 8 is. housed in a secured object, such as vehicle 1, and controls access to the secured location and / or to start the vehicle. If the key 4 is moved to the antenna 12 of the receiver 10 within a certain range, the receiver 10 excites or is triggered to transponder the key 4, thereby causing the transmitter 6 to begin transmitting to the receiver 10 , The data are transmitted using RF signals, which are a communication link between the key 4 and the Establish base station 8.
- the data transmitted between the key 4 and the base station 8 are determined by a communication access protocol, which the key 4 and the base station 8 follow, and which includes the transmission of authentication data from the key 4 to the receiver 10. Access to the secured area and / or to starting the vehicle is only permitted by the base station 8 if the transmitted authentication data match the authentication data stored by the base station 8.
- the key 4 and the base station 8 comprise a number of security features, e.g. those described in the access protocol specifications.
- the components of the key 4 and the base station 8 are the same as described in the access protocol specifications, except that a microcontroller 40 of the base station 8 is designed to carry out a control process as described below with reference to FIG. 4. This can be achieved by setting the control software of the microcontroller 40 and / or installing an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) as part of the microcontroller 40 in order to carry out at least part of the control process.
- ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
- the key 4 includes a microcontroller 35, which includes the control software for controlling the key components as part of the communication protocol.
- the microcontroller 35 controls the transmitter 6, which includes a first oscillator 30 for generating a first fundamental 60 and a second oscillator 32 for generating a second fundamental 62.
- the frequency signals generated are combined by a combiner (antenna switch) or summing amplifier 34 for transmission by the UHF transmission antenna 7.
- the microcontroller 35 is also connected to control the oscillators 30 and 32 so that it can cause a frequency offset or a frequency deviation based on the data to be transmitted.
- the microcontroller 35 is also suitable for receiving control data from the base station 8 via a low-frequency receiver 9 and an antenna 31.
- the key 4 includes transponder circuitry 9 to energize or trigger the key 4 when it is within a predetermined range of the base station 8. Within this range, an excitation signal can be generated on the part of the vehicle when a certain event occurs, such as lifting the door handle or the like. As soon as the key 4 is energized or activated, the communication protocol 4. for the access authorization of the vehicle is started.
- the base station 8 comprises a microcontroller 40, which has control software and which controls the operation of the components of the base station 8. These parts include a UHF receiver 36 connected to the receiving antenna 12 to provide an output of the data received for the microcontroller 40.
- An analog / digital converter 38 is used to convert the analog output signals of the receiver 36 into a digital form for the microcontroller 40.
- These signals include an RSSI (input signal strength indicator) output which provides spectral signature data for the microcontroller 40.
- Intermediate frequency signals generated by the receiver 36 are passed to a filter 43 and then passed back to the receiver 36 to filter out the data contained in the signals.
- the filters 43 are switched intermediate frequency filters with bandwidths that are set by the microcontroller 40 in accordance with the access protocol.
- the base station 8 also has a low frequency transmitter 37 and an antenna 39 for transmitting data from the microcontroller 40 to the key 4.
- the low frequency transmitter 37, the antennas 39 and 31 and the low frequency receiver 9 are designed so that a low frequency communication connection only is produced if the key 4 and the base station 8 are housed together within the secured area, for example inside the vehicle.
- the transmitting antenna 39 can be designed, for example, in the form of a coil, which is accommodated in an ignition system, so that a connection is only made to the antenna 31 when the key 4 is inserted into the ignition switch of the ignition system.
- the low frequency channel connection is used to send synchronization information from the base station to the key 4 so that it can be used the next time the key 4 is energized.
- the synchronization control data is used to set the times for the different parts or components of the messages transmitted in the access authorization protocol.
- the access protocol uses a number of techniques to detect a relay point attack, in particular the fault on the part of a relay point 16 that may be present. These techniques include a two-tone test based on the Levels of the third order intermodulation distortion products received by the base station 10 and associated with the transmission of the fundamental tones of the oscillators 30 and 32 are based. These techniques also include timing, performance, and frequency drifts that are used in the transmission of authentication data and are part of the communication access protocol. A number of checks are performed by the microcontroller 40 based on the data received as part of the access protocol. Is a condition of the test are met, a safety flag for the positive test in the microcontroller 40 • is set.
- the status of the flags present in the microcontroller is used to determine whether a relay point 16 is present and, in particular, whether access to the vehicle is to be granted.
- base station 8 performs another continuous test, hereinafter referred to as "noise test".
- the noise test is based on the detection of disturbances or abrupt changes in the extent of high-frequency noise in the natural environment of the base station 8 of the vehicle 1. All relay stations 16 that use high-frequency amplification, regardless of the linearity of their amplifiers, will not only amplify the signals that are in the Access protocol are of interest, but also any RF noise within the pass band of the relay 16. The amount of gain depends on the overall gain of the connection made by a relay, and the higher the gain of the connection, the higher the likelihood of detection.
- the pass band of the base station 8 has a sufficient bandwidth so that it can be divided into a number of channels.
- the minimum pass bandwidth of each relay point 16 will normally be greater than or equal to that of base station 8.
- the amount of noise in the pass band of the relay is increased. This can be recognized by the fact that the base station 8 monitors any change in the DC noise level in the entire pass band.
- the base station 8 is able to carry out the noise test using the control process shown in FIG. 4.
- the process begins at step 41 if the Base station 8 has detected that the engine of the vehicle has been switched off and the user has left the vehicle in a regular manner, either by locking the vehicle or by removing the key from the vicinity of the vehicle.
- the microcontroller 40 deletes all of its security flags for the detection of the relay point attack, and in step 42 a timer T is set to 0. The timer T continuously measures the elapsed time in seconds.
- the microcontroller samples the RSSI (input signal strength indicator) output of the UHF receiver 36 (via the A / D converter 38) to obtain data samples across its entire pass band for the received signals on a number of frequency channels.
- RSSI input signal strength indicator
- microcontroller 40 collects a number of data samples x [n], e.g. 20, for each frequency channel and these are used in step 45 to acquire an average x [n].
- the mean value x [n] is stored as a frequency bin value for each channel in a corresponding buffer of the microcontroller 40.
- the buffers are set to a size that enables a selected record of averages to be maintained.
- the noise test is carried out at step 46.
- the noise test can be very simple and consists of determining whether a selected number of frequency bins have a bin value that is above a predetermined threshold. For example, if the current data x [n] is above a predetermined threshold for 13 of the 16 bins, then the noise test may be considered to have met its conditions. Alternatively, the noise test conditions can also be regarded as fulfilled if a number of past x [n] samples have exceeded the threshold value.
- the noise test is preferably only considered to be satisfactory if a number of channels exceed the threshold and a number of further samples collected for those channels confirm that the threshold value has actually been exceeded. The additional samples are taken to reduce the likelihood of false detection. It is believed that a legitimate disruptor, which does not use a relay station, would not occupy an entire pass band for a relay station and would therefore only interfere with one or two of the frequency channels.
- the level of the threshold is dynamic. It is determined by sampling the RF environment immediately after the engine has been switched off and the vehicle has been left in a regular manner, according to step 41. If the threshold value has been set on the basis of this RF environment sample, according to Step 41 reset all frequency bins. Another alternative method of performing the noise test is based on the
- the RF noise is considered white noise and is therefore distributed according to a Gaussian probability density function (PDF).
- PDF Gaussian probability density function
- the microcontroller 40 performs a probability density function, where A is the increase in the DC level of the white Gaussian noise.
- Probability density function p determines (based on the sample data) the probability that a certain signal level A has been reached. This probability density function executed by the microcontroller 40 is:
- N the number of samples taken for a frequency channel
- x the sample data
- A the signal level of the white Gaussian noise.
- Microcontroller sets the probability p to a fixed value, then a value of A for this probability is set using the probability density function (PDF).
- PDF probability density function
- the probability can be high enough to minimize false detection. For example, a p of 0.9 indicates that the level A has been reached with a high probability, whereas a p of 0.5 means a far lower security.
- PDF probability density function
- the value A obtained from the probability density function (PDF) is used as a dynamic threshold value compared to a measured value for A, which is obtained directly from the sample data.
- the measured value for A can be an average over all samples in the frequency bins or an average over some frequency bins. If the measured value for A exceeds the threshold value for A defined by the probability density function (PDF), then the noise test conditions are considered to be fulfilled.
- the sample data can be used to obtain a value for A, and then the sample data and value for A can be used in the probability density function (PDF) performed by the microcontroller 40 to obtain measurement values for p at different time intervals produce. For each measured value of p that is determined by the microcontroller 40 in step 46, this is then compared with a defined threshold value for p, for example 0.7; and if the measurement for p exceeds the threshold, the noise test conditions are considered to be met.
- PDF probability density function
- PDF probability density function
- step 48 it is determined whether the noise test conditions have been met. If so, the noise safety flag is set at step 50. Steps 42 through 48 should all be done within milliseconds.
- step 52 it is determined whether T has reached a sampling time of y seconds, for example 10 seconds. If not, the control process loops, continuously looking for a trigger signal to initiate communication with key 4 at step 54.
- the trigger signal can be an initiation signal that is caused by lifting one of the door handles or activation of a door handle actuator, or a signal that is generated when the ignition is activated to start the engine. If no trigger signal is received, the control process tries to determine if y seconds have passed by checking the value of T at step 52. If a trigger signal is received, the microcontroller 40 executes its part of the access protocol at step 56.
- step 52 If the timer T has reached y seconds in step 52, a continuous loop is excited and steps 40 to 48 are carried out, so that a further set of binary values is available for the buffer memory of the controller 40. Accordingly, the base station 8 samples the noise levels over the pass band every y seconds.
- part of the protocol ultimately consists in determining whether access to or use of the vehicle 1 should be granted or approved.
- the security flags are checked and the status of the noise flags is used to determine whether a relay 16 is present and is being used in a relay attack. Access can be refused if the noise flag is set or if one or more of the security flags are set. For example, access may only be denied if three of the flags are set.
- the noise test carried out by the base station offers significant advantages in that it is dynamically self-adapting to the HF environment in the vicinity of the receiving antenna 12 of the vehicle.
- the detection technique is tolerant of faults that do not come from a relay point.
- the fixed frequency bin values can also be used to define a preferred channel for data communication with the key 4.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US10/541,276 US20060255909A1 (en) | 2003-01-14 | 2003-10-30 | Security system |
EP03776824A EP1595231A1 (de) | 2003-01-14 | 2003-10-30 | Ein sicherheitssystem |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10301146.3A DE10301146B4 (de) | 2003-01-14 | 2003-01-14 | Ein Sicherheitssystem |
DE10301146.3 | 2003-01-14 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2004068419A1 true WO2004068419A1 (de) | 2004-08-12 |
Family
ID=32519964
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/DE2003/003611 WO2004068419A1 (de) | 2003-01-14 | 2003-10-30 | Ein sicherheitssystem |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20060255909A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1595231A1 (de) |
KR (1) | KR20050092411A (de) |
CN (1) | CN1692378A (de) |
DE (1) | DE10301146B4 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2004068419A1 (de) |
Cited By (1)
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EP3037306A4 (de) * | 2013-08-23 | 2017-04-26 | Dae Dong Co. Ltd. | Verfahren zur verhinderung eines relaisangriffs auf intelligente fahrzeugschlüsselsysteme |
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JP4311326B2 (ja) * | 2004-10-04 | 2009-08-12 | 株式会社デンソー | 遠隔操作用車載装置 |
DE102004062506B4 (de) * | 2004-12-24 | 2019-05-09 | Daimler Ag | Kommunikationsverfahren und zugehöriges Fahrzeugsicherungssystem |
JP4670777B2 (ja) * | 2006-09-06 | 2011-04-13 | 株式会社デンソー | 車両制御システム |
US7791457B2 (en) * | 2006-12-15 | 2010-09-07 | Lear Corporation | Method and apparatus for an anti-theft system against radio relay attack in passive keyless entry/start systems |
JP4394132B2 (ja) * | 2007-03-19 | 2010-01-06 | 株式会社日本自動車部品総合研究所 | 電子キーシステム |
FR2961371B1 (fr) * | 2010-06-15 | 2013-02-15 | Commissariat Energie Atomique | Procede de securisation d'une communication sans fil, dispositif recepteur et systeme de communication mettant en oeuvre ce procede |
DE102011110031A1 (de) | 2011-08-12 | 2013-02-14 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Betätigung einer Funktion eines Fahrzeugs sowie entsprechenden Funkschlüssel |
EP2839442A1 (de) * | 2011-10-07 | 2015-02-25 | ASSA ABLOY Czech & Slovakia s.r.o., odstepny závod FAB Vehicle Security | Lösungen für relaisangriffe auf passives, schlüsselloses entry-and-go |
DE102012018188A1 (de) * | 2012-09-10 | 2014-03-13 | Udo Hagemann | Gerät zum spurlosen Öffnen und Starten von Fahrzeugen für sogenannten "Keyless Go" oder "Keyless Entry" Systeme. Es verlängert mittels Funkübertragung die Reichweite des Keyless Fahrzeugschlüssels auf bis zu 500 Meter. |
CA2889008C (en) | 2012-10-23 | 2021-01-19 | Spectrum Brands, Inc. | Electronic lock having software based automatic multi-wireless profile detection and setting |
EP2912638B1 (de) | 2012-10-26 | 2020-06-17 | Spectrum Brands, Inc. | Verfahren zum aktualisieren eines oder mehrerer einstellungen eines elektronischen schlosses mit einem mobilen gerät |
US10240365B2 (en) * | 2012-12-12 | 2019-03-26 | Spectrum Brands, Inc. | Electronic lock system having proximity mobile device |
US10249088B2 (en) * | 2014-11-20 | 2019-04-02 | Honda Motor Co., Ltd. | System and method for remote virtual reality control of movable vehicle partitions |
RU2596262C1 (ru) * | 2015-05-20 | 2016-09-10 | Общество с ограниченной ответственностью "Цезарь Сателлит Северо-Запад" | Система защиты от удлинителя сигнала штатного ключа от автомобиля |
US9613475B2 (en) * | 2015-05-27 | 2017-04-04 | Nxp B.V. | Communications with interaction detection |
DE102016111276A1 (de) | 2016-06-20 | 2017-12-21 | Huf Hülsbeck & Fürst Gmbh & Co. Kg | Verfahren zur Kontrolle des Zugriffs auf ein Kraftfahrzeug |
FR3054510B1 (fr) * | 2016-07-29 | 2019-04-19 | Continental Automotive France | Procede de defense contre une action de relais attaque sur une activation a distance d'une fonction presente dans un vehicule automobile |
DE102016215901A1 (de) * | 2016-08-24 | 2018-03-01 | Audi Ag | Funkschlüssel-Schließvorrichtung für ein Kraftfahrzeug, Kraftfahrzeug und Verfahren zum Betreiben der Schließvorrichtung |
DE102017200379A1 (de) | 2017-01-11 | 2018-07-12 | Ford Global Technologies, Llc | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Sichern eines Systems für passive Entriegelung eines Fahrzeugsystems gegen Relaisstellenangriffe |
DE102017200378B4 (de) | 2017-01-11 | 2020-08-06 | Ford Global Technologies, Llc | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Sichern eines Systems für passive Entriegelung eines Fahrzeugsystems gegen Relaisstellenangriffe |
US10783731B2 (en) | 2018-04-27 | 2020-09-22 | Spectrum Brands, Inc. | Wireless tag-based lock actuation systems and methods |
JP2020072444A (ja) * | 2018-11-02 | 2020-05-07 | 株式会社オートネットワーク技術研究所 | 通信装置 |
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2003
- 2003-01-14 DE DE10301146.3A patent/DE10301146B4/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2003-10-30 EP EP03776824A patent/EP1595231A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2003-10-30 US US10/541,276 patent/US20060255909A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2003-10-30 CN CNA2003801004029A patent/CN1692378A/zh active Pending
- 2003-10-30 WO PCT/DE2003/003611 patent/WO2004068419A1/de active Application Filing
- 2003-10-30 KR KR1020057013053A patent/KR20050092411A/ko not_active Application Discontinuation
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WO2000005696A2 (de) * | 1998-07-20 | 2000-02-03 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Passives zugangssystem für fahrzeuge |
WO2002017238A1 (de) * | 2000-08-25 | 2002-02-28 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Ein sicherheitssystem |
WO2002049888A1 (en) * | 2000-12-20 | 2002-06-27 | Hi-Key Limited | A method and apparatus for receiving an amplitude modulated radiosignal |
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Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP3037306A4 (de) * | 2013-08-23 | 2017-04-26 | Dae Dong Co. Ltd. | Verfahren zur verhinderung eines relaisangriffs auf intelligente fahrzeugschlüsselsysteme |
US10308221B2 (en) | 2013-08-23 | 2019-06-04 | Seoyon Electronics Co., Ltd. | Method for preventing relay attack on vehicle smart key system |
Also Published As
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DE10301146A1 (de) | 2004-07-22 |
CN1692378A (zh) | 2005-11-02 |
KR20050092411A (ko) | 2005-09-21 |
EP1595231A1 (de) | 2005-11-16 |
US20060255909A1 (en) | 2006-11-16 |
DE10301146B4 (de) | 2014-07-10 |
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