WO2004064314A1 - 信号処理システム - Google Patents
信号処理システム Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2004064314A1 WO2004064314A1 PCT/JP2003/016937 JP0316937W WO2004064314A1 WO 2004064314 A1 WO2004064314 A1 WO 2004064314A1 JP 0316937 W JP0316937 W JP 0316937W WO 2004064314 A1 WO2004064314 A1 WO 2004064314A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- information
- key
- recording medium
- content
- encryption
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
- G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
- G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
- G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
- G11B20/00217—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source
- G11B20/00253—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is stored on the record carrier
- G11B20/00362—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is stored on the record carrier the key being obtained from a media key block [MKB]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
- G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
- G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
- G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
- G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
- G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
- G11B20/00485—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier
- G11B20/00492—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted
- G11B20/00528—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted wherein each title is encrypted with a separate encryption key for each title, e.g. title key for movie, song or data file
Definitions
- the present invention provides, for example, a signal processing system, a recording method, and a method for recording bright encrypted content on a disk medium by a drive connected to a personal computer, and reproducing the encrypted content from the disk medium.
- DVD-Video uses CSS (Content Scrambling System) as copy protection technology. CSS is only approved for DVD-R ⁇ M media, and the use of CSS in recordable DVD such as DVD-R, DVD-RW, DVD + R.DVD + RW is prohibited by the CSS contract. Have been. Therefore, copying the contents of a DVD-Video that is copyright protected by the CSS method onto a recordable DVD in whole (bit-by-bit copy) is not an approved act under the CSS contract. However, a situation occurred in which the CSS encryption method was broken. A software called "D e CSS" has been distributed on the Internet, which allows you to easily copy the contents of DVD-Video to a hard disk by decrypting CSS.
- CSS Content Scrambling System
- DVD-R0M copyright protection technology such as DVD-Audio is CPPM (Content Protection for Pre-Recorded Media), and copyright protection technology for recordable DVDs and memory cards CP RM (Content Protection for Recordable Media) has been proposed.
- CPPM Content Protection for Pre-Recorded Media
- CP RM Content Protection for Recordable Media
- PC personal computer
- the PC and the drive are connected by a standard interface, so that data that needs to be kept secret at the standard interface is known. Or data may be falsified.
- Application software May be reverse engineered and confidential information may be stolen or tampered with. Such danger rarely occurs in the case of an electronic device in which a recording / reproducing device is integrally formed.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a mutual authentication method, a program, a recording medium, a signal processing system, a playback device, and an information processing device that can ensure the security of a copyright protection technology even in a PC environment. Disclosure of the invention
- a first aspect of the present invention provides a reproducing apparatus for reading information from a recording medium having information unique to the recording medium in advance, and a reproducing apparatus configured to perform mutual authentication connection via a transmission unit.
- a signal processing system comprising:
- the playback device is a device that is configured to generate the playback device.
- a final encryption key generation unit that generates a content information encryption key based on the intermediate key information
- a first transmission unit that transmits the intermediate key information to the information processing device via the transmission unit
- a second transmission unit that transmits the content information encryption key to the information processing device via the transmission unit
- the information processing device includes
- a content information encryption unit for encrypting content information with a content information encryption key
- An intermediate key information encryption unit that encrypts the intermediate key information using key information unique to the recording medium generated based on information unique to the recording medium;
- a recording unit that records the encrypted content information and the encrypted intermediate key information on a recording medium.
- a reproducing apparatus for reading information from a recording medium having information unique to the recording medium in advance, and an information processing apparatus to which the reproducing apparatus is mutually authenticated and connected via a transmission unit, are provided on a recording medium.
- the playback device is a device that is configured to generate the playback device.
- the information processing device includes
- a reproducing apparatus for reading information from a recording medium having information unique to the recording medium in advance, and an information processing apparatus to which the reproducing apparatus is mutually authenticated and connected via a transmission unit, are provided on the recording medium.
- a reproducing apparatus for reading information from a recording medium provided in advance with information unique to the recording medium, and an information processing apparatus to which the reproducing apparatus is mutually authenticated and connected via a transmission unit include: A recording medium storing a program for recording information,
- a reproducing apparatus which reads information from a recording medium provided with information unique to the recording medium in advance, and is connected to the information processing apparatus via a transmission unit.
- a final encryption key generation unit for generating an information encryption key
- a first transmission unit for transmitting the intermediate key information to the information processing device via the transmission unit; and a second transmission unit for transmitting the content information encryption key to the information processing device via the transmission unit. And a transmission unit of
- a content information encryption unit that encrypts content information using a content information encryption key, and intermediate key information that encrypts intermediate key information using recording medium-specific key information generated based on recording medium-specific information
- This is a playback device that is mutually authenticated and connected to an information processing device that includes an encryption unit and a recording unit that records the encrypted content information and the encrypted intermediate key information on a recording medium.
- a sixth aspect of the present invention is an information processing device connected via a transmission unit to a reproducing device that reads information from a recording medium that has information unique to the recording medium in advance,
- a final encryption key generation unit that generates a content information encryption key based on the intermediate key information, a first transmission unit that sends the intermediate key information to the information processing device via a transmission unit, and transmits a content information encryption key
- a playback device having a second transmission unit for sending to the information processing device via the transmission unit and a mutual authentication connection via the transmission unit;
- a content information encryption unit for encrypting content information with a content information encryption key
- An intermediate key information encryption unit that encrypts the intermediate key information using key information unique to the recording medium generated based on information unique to the recording medium;
- a recording unit that records the encrypted content information and the encrypted intermediate key information on a recording medium.
- a first information for invalidating an unauthorized electronic device At least one of a recording unit that records encrypted data on a recording medium on which different identification data is recorded and a reproducing unit that reproduces the encrypted data recorded on the recording medium
- a storage unit for storing fourth information unique to the electronic device or application software, which is given only to a valid electronic device or application software, and
- a revoke processing unit that determines whether the stored fourth information is information specific to a valid electronic device or application software from the first information and the fourth information,
- the fourth information is individually determined from the first information, the fourth information, the second information, and the identification data.
- a transmission unit that transmits the intermediate key information to a final encryption key generation unit of the information processing device via a transmission unit.
- an electronic device or application software specific fourth information provided only to a legitimate electronic device or application software, and invalidating an unauthorized electronic device. Is encrypted on a recording medium on which the first information, the second information that is different for each content, the third information that can be defined for the encryption unit ⁇ , and the identification data that is different for each stamper are recorded.
- An authentication unit for performing authentication with a recording / reproducing device that performs at least one of recording data and reproducing encrypted data recorded on a recording medium;
- a key information decryption unit that receives unique intermediate key information for each recording medium and decrypts the intermediate key information
- the third information received from the recording / reproducing device, and the decrypted intermediate key information A data processing device comprising: a final encryption key generation unit that generates a final encryption key from the encryption key; and an encryption / decryption unit that performs at least one of encryption using the final encryption key and decryption using the final encryption key.
- the content key is generated on the playback device side, and the content is encrypted with the content key on the information processing device side. Since the reproduction device generates the key information for copyright protection in this way, it is possible to generate a content key with a hardware configuration, and it is possible to improve tamper resistance. Also, since the playback device generates a random number and uses the random number as an intermediate key, the playback device can generate a true random number or a random number close to it by hardware, such as an LSI, and replace the generated random number with a fixed value. Can be difficult. As described above, according to the present invention, the application software installed in the information processing apparatus does not need to have all the secret information related to the copyright protection technology. As a result, the software can be resistant to analysis by reverse-swaging, and the security of copyright protection technology can be ensured.
- the recording / reproducing apparatus has a device key as information unique to the electronic apparatus, so that the recording / reproducing apparatus itself can be revoked.
- random number information required for calculating a content key in the information processing device can be generated by, for example, an LSI in the recording / reproducing device, so that the random number information is generated by software in the PC. It is possible to generate random numbers that are genuine or close to genuine random numbers. Therefore, the possibility that random numbers are replaced with fixed values can be reduced.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram for explaining a system including a recorder, a player, and a DVD medium proposed earlier.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram for explaining a PC-based DVD media recording / reproducing system.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram for explaining a processing procedure of the DV drive 4 and the host 5 in the system of FIG.
- FIG. 4 is a flow chart for explaining an authentication operation in the system of FIG.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing a configuration for mutual authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart for explaining a procedure of processing of a drive authentication operation in one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart for explaining a procedure of a host authentication operation process according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing an example of a configuration of a recorder in which a drive and a host are combined according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram for explaining a communication procedure of an example of the recorder.
- FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of a player combining a drive and a host according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram for explaining a communication procedure of an example of a player.
- FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of a recorder combining a drive and a host according to another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 13 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of a player combining a drive and a host according to another embodiment of the present invention.
- Recording medium Media such as a disk, playback device: drive, information processing device: host, transmission means: drive-host interface, signal processing system: drive for playing media and host-drive This is a system connected via an interface.
- First transmission means means for transmitting information from the drive to the host using a common key cryptosystem using the session key as a common key.
- Second transmission means conversely, driving information using the session key as a common key from the host. Means to send to the side.
- Content information Information recorded on media or information to be recorded is defined as content information.
- Information specific to recording medium Media ID.
- Random number generating means for generating random numbers a random number generator (RNG).
- Key information unique to the recording medium Media key, Intermediate key information: Title # 1.
- Content information encryption key Content key (The content key used during recording is used as the content information encryption key, and the content key used during playback is used as the content information decryption key.)
- reference numeral 1 indicates a recordable DVD medium such as a DVD-R / RW, a DVD-RAM, etc. conforming to the CPRM standard, for example.
- Reference code indicates a recorder conforming to, for example, the CPRM standard.
- Reference 3 Indicates a player conforming to the CPRM standard, for example.
- Recorder 2 and Player 3 are devices or application software.
- the media ID 11 is recorded in an area called BCA (Burst Cutting Area) or NB CA (Narrow Burst Cutting Area) of the read-in area on the innermost side of the DVD medium 1. ing.
- a media key block (hereinafter abbreviated to MKB as appropriate) 1 2 is recorded in advance in the embossed or pre-recorded data zone of the lead-in area.
- the media ID 11 is a different number for each media unit, for example, for each disc, and is composed of a media manufacturer code and a serial number. Media ID 11 is required when converting a media key into a unique key that is different for each media.
- the media key block MKB is a key ring for deriving the media key and revoking (invalidating) the device.
- the encrypted content 13 encrypted with the content is recorded.
- C2 (Cryptomeria Ciphering) is used as the encryption method.
- an encryption title 14 and a CCI (Copy Control Information) 15 are recorded on the DVD medium 1.
- the encrypted title key 14 is encrypted title key information
- the title key information is key information added to the title II.
- CCI is copy control information such as copy no more, copy once, and copy bee.
- Recorder 2 is a component of device key 21, process MKB 22, C 2 __G 23, random number generator 24, C 2 — E 25, C 2 — G 26 and C 2 __E CBC 27 Having.
- Player 3 has a device key 31
- the process has the components MKB32, C2-G33, C2-D35, C2-G36 and C2-DCBC37.
- C2—G23 and 33 are blocks that compute the media unique key from the media ID and media key, respectively.
- C2_G26 and C36 are blocks for calculating a content key from the CCI and the title key, respectively.
- the device keys 21 and 31 are identification numbers issued by individual device managers or application software vendors.
- the device key is the information specific to the electronic device or application-only available to the authorized electronic device or application-the software from the license administrator.
- the MKB 12 reproduced from the DVD media 1 and the device key 21 are calculated in the process MKB 2 to determine whether or not the revocation has been performed.
- the player 3 calculates the MKB 1 and the device key 31 in the process MKB 32 to determine whether or not the revocation has been performed.
- a media key is calculated from MKB 12 and the device keys 21 and 31. If the device key of the recorder 2 or the player 3 is not included in the MKB 12 and the calculated result matches a predetermined value, for example, a value of zero, the recorder 2 or the player 3 having the device key is activated. It is determined that it is not valid. That is, such recorder 2 or player 3 is revoked.
- C 2_G 23 and 33 are processes for calculating a media unique key by calculating a media key and a media ID, respectively.
- Random Number Generator (RNG) 24 is a title Used for key generation.
- the title key from the random number generator 24 is input to C 2 —E 25 and the title key is encrypted with the media unique key.
- the encrypted title is recorded on DVD media 1.
- the encrypted title key 14 and the media unique key reproduced from the DVD medium 1 are supplied to the C2_D 35, and the encrypted title key is decrypted with the media unique key to obtain a title key.
- C C I and the title key are supplied to C 2_G 6, and the content key is derived.
- the content key is supplied to C2—ECCB27, and the content is encrypted using the content key as a key.
- the encrypted content 13 is recorded on the DVD medium 1.
- C C I and the title key are supplied to C 2_G 36, and the content key is derived.
- the content key is supplied to C2—ECCB37, and the encrypted content 13 reproduced from the DVD media 1 is decrypted using the content key as a key.
- the recording procedure by the recorder 2 in the configuration of FIG. 1 will be described.
- the recorder 2 reads the MKB 12 from the DVD medium 1, calculates the device key 21 and the MKB 12 by the process MKB 12, and calculates the media key. If the calculation result indicates a predetermined value, it is determined that the device key 21 (the device or application of the recorder 2) has been revoked by the MKB. Recorder 2 interrupts the subsequent processing and prohibits recording on DVD media 1. If the value of the media key is other than the predetermined value, the processing is continued.
- the recorder 2 reads the media ID 11 from the DVD media 1, inputs the media ID along with the media to C2_G23, and calculates a different media unique key for each media. Generated by random number generator 24 The encrypted title key is encrypted with C2_E25 and recorded on DVD media 1 as encrypted title key 14. The CCI information of the title key and the content is calculated by C2_G26 to derive the content key. The content is encrypted with the content key using C2—ECBC 27 and recorded on the DVD medium 1 as encrypted content 13 together with the CCI 15.
- the playback procedure by the player 3 will be described. First, read MKB1 2 from DVD media 1.
- the device keys 31 and MKB 12 are calculated, and revocation is confirmed. If the device key 31 1, that is, the device or application of the player 3 is not revoked, the media unique key is calculated using the media ID, and the read encrypted title key 14 and A title key is calculated from the media unique key.
- the title key and CCI15 are input to C21-G36 to derive the content key.
- the content key is input to C2-DCCB 37, and the encrypted content 13 reproduced from the DVD medium 1 is subjected to C2-DCCB37 operation using the content key as a key. As a result, the encrypted content 13 is decrypted.
- FIG. 1 The configuration shown in FIG. 1 described above is configured as a recording / reproducing device.
- This invention implements a content protection process for DVD media 1 Applied when handling under C environment.
- FIG. 2 the roles of the PC and drive in the current system are shown.
- reference numeral 4 denotes a DVD drive as a recording / reproducing device for recording and reproducing the DVD media 1 compliant with the above-mentioned CPRM standard.
- Reference numeral 5 indicates a host as a data processing device, for example, PC.
- the host 5 is a device or application software that can record content on the DVD medium 1, can handle contents that can be reproduced from the DVD medium 1, and is connected to the DVD drive 4 and can exchange data.
- the host 5 is configured by installing the application software on the PC.
- the drive 4 and the host 5 are connected via the interface 4a.
- the interface 4a is AT API (AT Attachment with Packet Interface), SCSI (Small Computer System Interface), USB (Universal Serial Bus), IEEE (Institute of Elec trical and Electronics Engineers) 13 9 4 etc. is there.
- a media ID 11 a media ID 11
- a media key block 12 a media key block 12
- an ACC Authentication Control Code
- the DVD drive 4 reads the AC C 16 from the DVD medium 1.
- the AC C 16 read from the DVD medium 1 is input to an AKE (Authentication and Key Exchange) 41 of the DVD drive 4 and transferred to the host 5.
- the host 5 inputs the received AC C to AK 51.
- AKEs 41 and 51 exchange random number data, and share a value that is different from the exchanged random number and the value of AC C for each authentication operation.
- a common session key (called a bus key in the configuration of FIG. 2) is generated.
- the bus key is supplied to MAC (Message Authentication Code) calculation blocks 42 and 52, respectively.
- the MAC operation blocks 42 and 52 are processes for calculating the MAC of the media ID and the media key block 12 using the bus keys obtained by the AKEs 41 and 51 as parameters. Used by host 5 to verify the integrity of the MKB and the media ID.
- the MACs calculated by the MACs 42 and 52 are compared in a comparison 53 of the host 5, and it is determined whether or not the values match. If these MAC values match, the integrity of the MKB and media ID has been confirmed. Switch SW1 is controlled by the comparison output.
- the switch SW 1 performs ⁇ N / ⁇ FF on a signal path between a recording or reproducing path of the DVD media 1 of the DVD drive 4 and an encryption / decryption module 54 of the host 5. It is shown as Although the switch SW1 is shown as performing ON / OFF of the signal path, the processing of the host 5 continues when the signal is ON and the host 5 is switched when the signal is OFF. Is stopped.
- the encryption / decryption module 54 calculates the content key from the media unique key, the encryption title key, and the CCI, and encrypts the content into the encrypted content 13 using the content key as a key or the content key as a key. This is an operation block for decrypting the encrypted content 13.
- the media unique key calculation block 55 is a calculation block for calculating a media unique key from the MKB 12, media ID, and device key 56. As with the recorder or player shown in Fig. 1, A media key is calculated from the bicycle key and MKB12. A media unique key is calculated from the media key and the media ID 11. If the media key reaches a predetermined value, it is determined that the electronic device or the absorption software is not valid and revoked. Therefore, the media unique key operation block 55 also has a function as a revocation processing unit for performing revocation.
- switch SW 1 If the integrity is confirmed by comparison 53 during recording, switch SW 1 is turned on. An encryption / decryption module 13, an encryption key 14, and a CCI 15 are supplied from the encryption / decryption module 54 to the drive 4 via the switch SW 1, and are respectively recorded on the DVD media 1. You. During playback, if the integrity is confirmed by comparison 53, switch SW1 is turned on. The encrypted content 13, the encrypted title 14, and the CCI 15 reproduced from the DVD media 1 are supplied to the encryption / decryption module 54 of the host 5 through the switch SW 1 and encrypted. The content is decrypted.
- Fig. 3 shows the signal transfer procedure between DVD media 1, DVD drive 4 and host 5 in the system using DVD media under the current PC environment shown in Fig. 2. Is shown. The host 5 sends a command to the DVD drive 4, and the DVD drive 4 performs an operation in response to the command.
- the AC C on the DVD medium 1 is sought and read in response to a request from the host 5 (step S 1).
- the read AC C is input to the AKE 41 and transferred to the host 5, and the received AC C is input to the AKE 51 in the host 5.
- AK E 4 1 and 5 1 exchange random number data, and Then, a bus key as a session key having a different value every time the authentication operation is performed is generated from the value of ACC16 and the value of ACC16, and the DVD drive 4 and the host 5 share the bus key. If the mutual authentication is not established, the process is interrupted.
- the authentication operation is always performed when a disk is detected after 0 N of power supply or when a disk is replaced.
- the authentication operation may be performed when the recording operation is performed by pressing the record button, or when the reproduction operation is performed by pressing the play button. As an example, authentication is performed when a record or play button is pressed.
- step S3 the host 5 requests the DVD drive 4 to read the MKB (media keep mouth) pack # 0 from the DVD media 1.
- MKB media keep mouth pack # 0
- the host 5 requests the DVD drive 4 to read the MKB (media keep mouth) pack # 0 from the DVD media 1.
- MKB media keep mouth pack # 0 from the DVD media 1.
- 16 sectors from pack 0 to pack 15 are repeated 12 times and recorded in the lead-in area. Error correction coding is performed in pack units.
- the DV drive 4 goes to read the MKB pack # 0 in step S4, and reads the pack # 0 in step S5.
- the DVD drive 4 returns the modified MKB to the host 5 (step S6).
- When reading the MKB calculate the MAC value with the bus key as a parameter and transfer the data to the host 5 with the MAC value added to the MKB.
- the request for the remaining MKB packs other than pack # 0, the read operation of DVD drive 4, and the transfer operation of the modified MKB pack are performed until the MKB pack is exhausted, for example, pack # 15 is read and host 5 Repeated by steps S7 and S8 until transferred to.
- Host 5 requests a media ID from DVD drive 4.
- DVD drive 4 goes to read the media ID recorded on DVD media 1, and in step S11 the media ID is read .
- the DVD drive 4 calculates the MAC value using the bus key as a parameter.
- the DVD drive 4 adds the MAC value m1 to the read media ID and transfers the data to the host 5.
- Host 5 calculates the MAC value again from the MKB 12 and the media ID 11 received from the DV drive 4 using the bus key as a parameter, and compares the calculated MAC value with the MAC value received from the DVD drive 4 5 Compare with 3. If they match, it is determined that the correct MKB and media ID have been received, switch SW1 is set to ON, and the process proceeds. Conversely, if they do not match, it is determined that the MKB and the media ID have been tampered with, and the switch SW1 is set to ⁇ FF, and the processing is interrupted.
- step S13 the host 5 requests the encrypted content from the DVD drive 4, and in step S14, the DVD drive 4 reads the encrypted content.
- step S13 the read encrypted content is read.
- Content is forwarded to host 5.
- a media unique key is calculated by the device key 56, the MKB 12 and the media ID 11.
- the media unique key is supplied to the encryption / decryption module 54, and the content key is obtained from the encryption title 14 and the CCI 15.
- the encrypted content read from the DVD medium 1 is decrypted using the content key as a key.
- D VD media 1 recorded content is encrypted.
- step ST 1 is a step in which the MAC calculation value obtained in the MAC operation block 42 as the parameter of the bus key and the MAC key in the MAC operation block 53 as the parameter of the bus key are obtained. This is a step of comparing with the calculated MAC value. If they match, switch SW1 is set to ⁇ N in step ST2. If they do not match, switch SW1 is set to 0FF in step ST3, and the process stops.
- the same bus key generation method as that of CSS which is a copyright protection technology for DVD-Video is adopted.
- the content of the CSS authentication method is information that should be confidential in nature, it can be operated by free software that has already been analyzed and has not obtained the license of DVD_CCA, a CSS license management organization that is available to general users. It is possible.
- content protection processing is performed on the host side, that is, revocation judgment, media key acquisition, media unique key derivation, content key derivation from title key generation / derivation, and content encryption / decryption. Since this is a process on the host side, the reliability as copyright protection technology is decreasing.
- the drive has a configuration related to the derivation of a title key in content protection processing in a PC environment, and transmits the title key and the content key to the PC through mutual authentication with the PC. It is.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing the configuration of mutual authentication according to one embodiment.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing the flow of processing on the drive side.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the flow of processing on the host side. It is a flowchart shown.
- reference numeral 101 denotes a medium, for example, an optical disk
- reference numeral 102 denotes a drive of the medium
- reference numeral 103 denotes a drive 102 and a drive-to-host interface 104.
- Media 101 is the DVD media described above. Information similar to the key is recorded in advance.
- the medium 101 is not limited to a recordable medium, but may be a read-only medium. Host
- the 103 sends a predetermined command to the drive 102 and controls its operation.
- the commands used include the commands described in Non-Patent Document 2 described above and commands extended from the commands, the READ command for reading the contents as sector data from the media 101, and the media 101. This is a WRITE command to write the contents as sector data.
- the drive 102 has a drive device key 121, and the host 103 has a host device key 131.
- the device key 11 is arranged inside an LSI (Large Scale Integrated Circuit), and is securely stored so that it cannot be read from the outside.
- the device key 13 1 may be stored securely in the software program, or may be stored in hardware as hardware.
- drive 102 In order for drive 102 to be a legitimate drive that handles media 101, as in one embodiment, it requires confidential information on copyright protection technology such as a device key, so a regular license is required. This has the effect of preventing the creation of a clone drive that would impersonate a genuine product without receiving it.
- the drive 102 is provided with a process MKB 122 for inputting the MKB and the device key 121 and determining whether the device key of the drive has been revoked. ing.
- the host 103 is provided with the process MKB 132. If revocation is not performed, the process MKBs 122 and 132 output media keys K m, respectively. After the revocation judgment processing is performed and the media key Km is obtained, the authentication processing is performed.
- Reference numerals 123, 124 and 125 denote MAC operation blocks for calculating a MAC value using the media key Km as a parameter, respectively.
- Reference numerals 1, 2, 1 2 and 1 2 indicate a random number generator (RNG). Random number generator 1 1 6 generates random number Ral, random number generator 1 2 7 generates random number Ra2, random number generator 1
- the random number generators 12 26, 127, and 128 are, for example, random number generators having an LSI configuration, and can generate random numbers closer to true random numbers than a method of generating random numbers by software. it can.
- the random number generator may be a common hardware, but the random numbers Ral, Ra2 and Ra3 are independent of each other.
- a MAC operation block that calculates a MAC value to the host 103 using the media key Km as a parameter and a MAC operation block 1 3 3 1 3 4 and 1 3 5 and random number generators 1 3 6 1 3 7 and 1 3 Eight are provided.
- the random number generator 13 6 generates a random number Rbl
- the random number generator 13 7 generates a random number Rb2
- the random number generator 13 8 generates a random number Rb3. Random number generator 1 3 6, 1 3 7, 1
- a random number is normally generated by software, but if a random number by a hard disk can be used, this may be used.
- the random number generated in the drive 102 and the random number generated in the host 103 are exchanged. That is, the random number Ral and the random number RM are input to the MAC operation blocks 113 and 133, the random number Ra2 and the random number Rb2 are input to the MAC operation blocks 122 and 134, and the random number Ra3 and the random number Rb3 are calculated by the MAC operation. Input to blocks 125 and 135.
- the MAC value calculated by the MAC calculation block 123 of the drive 101 and the MAC value calculated by the MAC calculation block 133 of the host 103 are compared in the comparison 130 in the host 103. Whether the two values are the same Is determined.
- the MAC value here is expressed as eKm (Ral II Rbl).
- e Km () indicates that the data in parentheses is encrypted using the media key Km as a key.
- the symbol Ral II Rbl indicates that two random numbers are combined such that a random number Ral is placed on the left and a random number Rbl is placed on the right.
- the MAC value calculated by the MAC calculation block 13 4 of the host 10 3 and the MAC value calculated by the MAC calculation block 12 4 of the drive 102 are compared in the comparison 1 19 in the drive 102. It is determined whether the two values are the same.
- the MAC value here is expressed as eKm (Rb2 II Ra2). As a result of the comparison, if the two values are determined to be the same, it means that the authentication of the host 103 by the drive 102 has succeeded, and otherwise the authentication has failed.
- step ST20 of FIG. 7 the host 103 issues a command REP0 RT KEY to the drive 10 to request transfer of MKB.
- step ST10 in FIG. 6 the drive 102 reads the MKB112 from the medium 101 and transfers it to the host103.
- step ST11 drive 10 I
- the host 103 calculates the media key Km by the process MKB132 in step ST21 by calculating the media key Km by B12. In the process of this calculation, it is confirmed by itself whether or not the device keys 1 2 1 and 1 3 1 contained therein are to be revoked (step ST 12 in FIG. 6, FIG. 7). Step ST22 in 2).
- step ST23 the random number generators 1336 and 137 are generated for the drive 102 by the command SEND KEY, respectively. Transfer random number Rbl and random number Rb2. If the drive 101 is not to be revoked, the drive 102 receives these random numbers transferred from the host 103 in step ST13.
- the host 103 uses the command REPORT KEY to respond to the drive 102 with the response value by the MAC using the media key Km of the drive 101 as the key and the random number Ral generated by the random number generator 126. Is transferred to the host 103 (step ST24).
- This response value is expressed as eKm (Ral II Rbl).
- e Km () indicates that the data in parentheses is encrypted using the media key Km as the encryption key.
- the symbol Ral ll Rbl indicates that two random numbers are combined such that a random number Ral is placed on the left and a random number Rbl is placed on the right.
- the drive 102 that has received the command REPORT KEY from the host 103 transfers the MAC value eKm (Ral and the random number Ral generated by the MAC operation block 123 to the host 103 in step ST14.
- the host 103 executes its own MAC operation
- the MAC value is calculated, and in comparison 1339, it is checked whether the value matches the value received from the drive 102. If the received MAC value and the calculated MAC value match, the host 103 has successfully authenticated the drive 10. If the result of the comparison in step ST25 is not the same, it means that the authentication of the drive 102 by the host 103 has failed, and a reject process is performed.
- step ST26 the host 103 sends a command REPORT KEY to the drive 102, and the random number generator of the drive 102 Requests transfer of random numbers Ra2 and Ra3 generated by 1 2 4 and 1 2 5 respectively.
- step ST15 the drive 101 transfers these random numbers to the host 103.
- step ST 27 the MAC operation block 13 4 of the host 103 determines the response value eKm (Rb2 II) by the MAC using the media key Km of the host 103 based on the random number received from the drive 102. Ra2) is calculated and transferred to the drive 102 using the command SEND KEY together with the random number Rb3.
- step ST16 when the drive 102 receives the response value eKm (Rb2 II Ra2) and the random number Rb3 from the host 103, the drive 102 calculates the MAC value by itself, and in step ST17, compares 9 is used to check whether the MAC value matches the MAC value received from the host 103. If the received MAC value and the calculated MAC value match, it means that the authentication of the host 103 by the drive 102 was successful.
- the MAC operation block 125 generates a session key eKm (Rb3 ll Ra3), transmits information indicating that the authentication has succeeded to the host 103, and performs authentication. Processing is completed. Session The key is a different value for each authentication operation.
- step ST17 If the result of the comparison in step ST17 is not the same, it means that authentication of host 103 by drive 102 has failed, and error information indicating that authentication has failed in step ST19. Is sent to host 103.
- the host 103 receives information indicating whether or not the authentication was successful from the drive 102 as a response to the sent command SEND KEY, and based on the received information, determines in step ST 28 whether or not the authentication has been completed. Judge. It determines that authentication is complete by receiving information indicating that authentication was successful, and determines that authentication was not completed by receiving information that indicates that authentication failed. If the authentication is completed, in step ST29, the MAC operation block 135 generates a session key eKm (Ra3 II Rb3) (for example, 64 bits long) common to the drive side. If authentication is not completed, a redirect process is performed. In the following description, the session key eKm (Ra3 II Rb3) is referred to as s as appropriate.
- the mutual authentication according to the above-described embodiment has a feature that the drive 102 can have a revocation function and does not require a specific authentication key dedicated to authentication.
- drive 102 confirms the authentication result of host 103 by comparison 12 9, and drive 102 is implemented after receiving a valid license from host 103. It is possible to determine whether or not.
- FIG. 8 shows a configuration of an embodiment of a recorder realized by combining the drive 102 and the host 103 performing the above-described mutual authentication.
- the recorder uses the session key K s generated by the mutual authentication to calculate the media key calculated by the drive 102. Forward to your host 103. Further, a title key is generated by the random number generator 144 of the drive 102.
- a content key is generated from the title key and the CCI 232, the generated content key is securely transferred to the host 103 using the session key Ks, and the host 103 is transmitted to the host 103.
- the content is encrypted using the decrypted content key, and the encrypted content is transferred to drive 102.
- Drive 102 is used for encrypting the content, encrypting the title and ⁇ CCI 232 as the media 10 It is configured to record to 1.
- the reference numeral 115 is assigned to the CCI recorded in the media 101. That is, the drive 102 generates a media unique key and a content key.
- C2_G2141 is a block for calculating a media unique key from a media ID and a media key.
- C 2 _G 2 145 is a block for calculating the content key from the title key and CCI 232.
- a media key is calculated from MKB 112 and device key 111. If the device key 1 1 1 of the drive 101 is not included in the MKB 112 and the calculated result matches a predetermined value, for example, a value of zero, the device key 1 2 1 Drive 102 with is determined to be invalid and drive 102 is revoked
- C2_G141 is a process for calculating the media key and the media ID 111 to derive a media unique key.
- the media unique key is encrypted by the session key K s at the DES encryptor 144. For example, DESCBC mode is used as the encryption method.
- the output of the DES encryptor 14 2 is sent to the DES descriptor 15 1 of the host 103.
- the title key is generated by the random number generator 144 of the drive 101, and the title key from the random number generator 144 is supplied to C2—E153 of the host 103, and the title key is generated. Encrypted by C2 using a media unique key. The encrypted title 1 1 4 is recorded on the media 101.
- the MAC value e Ks (CCI) of the CCI is calculated by the MAC operation block 158 using the session key Ks as a key, and is transferred to the drive 102 together with the CCI232.
- the MAC value e K s (CCI) of the CCI is calculated by the MAC operation block 157 using the session key K s as a key from the CCI 232 received from the host 103, and the host Provided to comparison 159 along with the MAC value received from 103.
- the CCI 232 and the title key received from the host 103 are supplied to the C2_G 145, and the content key is derived.
- Content key is supplied to DES Enk Live 1 4 6
- the content key is encrypted using the session key K s as a key.
- the encrypted content key is transferred to the DES descriptor 156 of the host 103.
- the content key decrypted with the session key K s at the DES decipher box 156 of the host 103 is supplied to C 2 _ECCB 155, and the content is encrypted with the content key as the key.
- the encrypted content 113 is transferred to drive 102 and recorded on media 101 by drive 102.
- FIG. 9 shows a procedure at the time of content recording according to an embodiment of the recorder.
- the MKB on the medium 101 is sought and read (step S61).
- AKE Authentication and Key Exchange
- the above-described revoke processing and the mutual authentication operation between the drive 102 and the host 103 are performed.
- the mutual authentication operation is always performed when the disk is detected after the power is turned ON and when the disk is replaced.
- the authentication operation may be performed when the recording operation is performed by pressing the recording button, or when the reproduction operation is performed by pressing the reproduction button. As an example, when a record or play button is pressed, authentication is performed.
- the rejection process is interrupted, for example. If the mutual authentication is successful, a session key Ks is generated in both the drive 102 and the host 103, and the session key Ks is shared.
- the host 103 requests the drive 102 for a media unique key.
- the drive 102 seeks the media ID of the media 101 (step S64), and Is read from the medium 101 (step S65).
- the drive 102 generates a media unique key by calculating a media key and a media ID.
- the media key is encrypted by the session key Ks, and the encrypted media unique key is transferred to the host 103.
- step S67 the host 103 requests the drive 102 for a title key.
- step S68 the drive 102 transfers the title to the host 103.
- the encrypted media unique key is decrypted by the session key Ks.
- the title key is encrypted with the media unique key, and an encrypted title key is generated.
- step S69 the host 103 sends CCI 232 to the drive 102.
- the MAC value e K s (CCI) calculated as the authentication data of CCI 232 is added and transferred in order to avoid falsification of CCI 232.
- a content key is generated from the evening key and CCI232, and the content key is encrypted with the session key Ks.
- step S 70 when the host 103 requests the drive 10 for a content key, in step S 71, the drive 102 sends the encrypted content key to the host 103.
- step 103 the encrypted content key is decrypted by the session key Ks to obtain a content key. Content is encrypted with the content key.
- step S72 the encryption title key, the encryption content, and the CCI 232 are transferred from the host 103 to the drive 102.
- step S73 drive 1 iw ⁇ ⁇ ? ⁇ ⁇
- O2 causes the encryption title key, encryption content, and CCI232 to be recorded to media 101.
- the recorder having the configuration shown in FIG. 8 described above can generate a true random number or a random number close to it by a drive such as an LSI in the drive 101, which makes it difficult to replace the generated random number with a fixed value. can do.
- a drive such as an LSI in the drive 101
- the implementation of copyright protection can be enhanced.
- FIG. 10 shows the configuration of an embodiment of a player realized by combining the drive 102 and the host 103 that perform the above-described mutual authentication.
- the player transmits the media key calculated by the drive 102 to the host 103 securely using the session key K s generated by mutual authentication, and the host 103 encrypts the key.
- the title key is decrypted using the media unique key
- the content is decrypted using the content key derived from the title key and the CCI 115.
- the drive 102 that constitutes the player has the following components: device key 121, process MKB 122 C2_G14K DES ENCLIV.
- the MKB 122 reproduced from the media 101 and the device key 121 are operated in the process MKB 122 to determine whether or not the revocation has been performed.
- a media key is calculated from the MKB 112 and the device key 121.
- C2_G141 is processing for calculating a media unique key by calculating a media key and a media ID 111.
- Media unique key is encrypted by session key Ks at DES encryptor 1 4 2 ⁇ ⁇ , " ⁇ ⁇ y / ⁇ OO.
- the DESCBC mode is used as the encryption method.
- the output of the DES encryptor 144 is the DES descriptor of the host 103. Sent to.
- the DS unique key is decrypted by the session key at the DS decipherer 151.
- the media unique key and encrypted title key 114 are supplied to C2_D 153, and the encrypted title key is decrypted using the media unique key.
- the decrypted title key and CCI 115 reproduced from the medium 101 are supplied to C2-G154 to derive a content key.
- the encrypted content 113 reproduced from the medium 101 is decrypted by the content key at the C2 descriptor 1505, and the content is obtained.
- FIG. 11 shows a procedure at the time of content reproduction.
- the MKB on the medium 101 is sought and read (step S41). MKB is read for each pack.
- the revocation processing as described above and the mutual authentication operation between the drive 102 and the host 103 are performed.
- the process is interrupted by the redirect process. If the mutual authentication is successful, a session key Ks is generated in both the drive 102 and the host 103, and the session key Ks is shared.
- the host 103 requests a media unique key from the drive 102.
- the drive 102 seeks the medium ID of the medium 101 (step S44), and reads the medium ID from the medium 101 (step S45).
- Drive 1 0 2 ⁇ / r ⁇ i / ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ generates a media unique key by calculating the media key and the media ID.
- the median key is encrypted by the session key Ks, and the encrypted media unique key is transferred to the host 103.
- step S47 the host 103 requests the drive 102 for the encryption title key, the CCI, and the encryption content.
- step S48 the drive 102 reads the encryption title 114, the CCI 115, and the encryption content 113 from the medium 101.
- step S49 the drive 102 reads the encryption title 114, the CCI 115, and the encryption content 113.
- step S50 the drive 101 transfers the encryption title 114, the CCI 115, and the encryption content 113 to the host 103.
- the title key is decrypted, a content key is obtained from the title key and the CCI 115, and the encrypted content is decrypted using the content key as a key.
- the host 103 has a decipher device C 2 _D 153 for decrypting the encrypted title, but the drive 102 has the encrypted title. It may be provided with a decryption function for decrypting one.
- the decrypted title key is securely transferred to C2-G154 of the host 103 for generating the content key.
- a content key generation device C 21 -G may be provided in the drive 102, and the content key may be generated from the decrypted title key and CCI in the drive 102.
- the decrypted content key is securely transferred to C2—DCBC155 of host 103.
- FIG. 12 and 13 Another embodiment of the recorder and the player according to the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. 12 and 13.
- FIG. a media unique key is generated by a drive, and a parameter that is involved in generating a content key is used (a system in which CPRM is extended).
- a parameter A for calculating a media unique key and a parameter B for encryption / decryption are used. These parameters A and B can be all in the case of being on the host side, in the case of being on the drive side, and in the case where they are recorded on the medium and read by the host.
- encryption may be performed and the data may be transmitted securely.
- FIG. 12 shows the configuration of another embodiment of the recorder.
- reference numeral 201 denotes a recordable medium, and medium 201 includes EKB 211, an encrypted disk key Em (Kd) 212, and a disk.
- the ID 2 13 and the unit key generation value Vu 2 14 are recorded.
- EKB 211 is a key ring for distributing a media key Km to each device key. This corresponds to the media keep mouth MKB in the embodiment described above. .
- the media key Km is key information unique to each medium. If the media key is not found in the EKB, it indicates that the device key has been revoked.
- the disc key Kd is key information that differs at least for each content. You.
- the master of the content may be different from the disc ⁇ .
- the encrypted disk key Em (Kd) 212 is an encryption key obtained by encrypting the disk key Kd with the media key Km, and is recorded on the medium 201.
- the encryption disk key Em (Kd) 212 is used in the drive 102 to generate a different embedded key Ke for each individual medium.
- the unit key generation value Vu 214 is a parameter that can be defined for each encryption unit (called an encryption unit). Each encryption unit is composed of multiple sector data.
- the unit key generation value Vu 2 14 is used to generate the unit key Ku as an encryption key for encrypting the content in the host 103.
- the disk ID .213 is an ID different for each stamper. This corresponds to the media ID 111 in one embodiment.
- the member key is different key information for each medium and corresponds to a media unique key in one embodiment.
- the media key Km is obtained by the process EKB 222 on the basis of the device key 22 1 of the drive 102 and the EKB 211 of the medium 201. Based on the media key Km and the encrypted disk key Em (K d) 12 of the media 201, the disk key Kd is decrypted in AES—D 223. Based on the disc keys K d and the disc IDs 2 13, the envelopment rate —K e is obtained in AES_G 2 24.
- the unit key Ku is a key for encrypting the content, and is obtained based on the embedded key ⁇ , the unit key generation value Vu, and the copy control information CCI232.
- the unit key Ku corresponds to the content key in the embodiment described above. I ⁇ i / u I u O / 'J' J * The operation of the recorder of the other embodiment described above will be described according to the processing flow.
- AKE 225 and 227 authentication is performed. If the authentication is successful, a session key Ks is generated. Although omitted in FIG. 1, parameters related to authentication are supplied to at least one of AKEs 225 and 227.
- Drive 102 reads EKB 211 from media 201.
- the EKB 211 from the media 201 and the device key 22 1 are calculated by the process EKB 22 of the drive 102, and the media key K m is calculated. If the result of the operation is 0, for example, the device key is revoked.
- the device key 2 21 of the drive 102 is a unique key given to the drive for each model, for example.
- the drive 102 reads the encrypted disk key E m (K d) 2 12 from the medium 201, and in A ES —D 223, the disk key K d is obtained by the media key K m.
- AES Advanced Encryption Standard
- AES is an encryption method adopted by the US government as a new encryption standard replacing DES.
- the drive 102 reads the disk ID 2 13 from the medium 201, calculates the disk ID and the disk key K d in AES_G 224, and obtains an embedded key Ke. .
- host 103 transfers embedded key Ke to drive 102. Request.
- the key Es is transmitted to the host 103 by the session key Ks.
- Host 103 is an AES disk Decryption is performed according to Lip 1 128 to obtain Ke.
- the AES descriptor 226 and the AES descriptor 228 perform, for example, CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode processing.
- the host 103 processes the content in units of the encryption unit.
- the host 103 reads the unit key generation value Vu 2 14 of the encryption unit from the drive 101.
- the unity Ku is calculated from the member energy K e and the unity generation value Vu 214 and CCI 232.
- CCI232 By using CCI232 to generate unity Ku, the copyright of the content is more strongly protected.
- the host 103 encrypts the content with the unit key Ku in the encryption module 230.
- the encrypted content 113 is transmitted to the drive 102 and recorded on the recordable medium 101.
- the player is an example of reproducing a ROM type medium 210, for example, an R RM disk.
- Content is recorded in advance on the R ⁇ M type medium 210.
- the encryption processing is not required, and the decryption module 231 is used.
- the encrypted content read from the medium 210 is decrypted by the decryption module 231 to obtain AV content.
- the media key Km and the disk key Kd are key information unique to each content.
- Each content consists of one or more encryption units.
- the generated value V e15 is recorded on the media 210.
- the generated value V e 2 15 is the disc manufacturing volume. It is a non-zero value recorded for each stamper in the field (meaning a master disc on which photoresist has been developed or a stamper first created from a master disc). As a physical water mark, it is recorded on the disk by a different means from the normal data recording.
- the membership key Ke corresponds to a media unique key in one embodiment.
- the embedded key generation value V e2 15 for generating the embedded key K e is a kind of media ID.
- the recorder shown in FIG. 13 performs the same processing as the player shown in FIG. First, authentication by AKEs 225 and 227 is performed, and a session key Ks is generated.
- the read EKB 211 and the device key 21 are calculated by the process EKB 222 of the drive 102, and the media key Km is calculated and revoked.
- the disk key Kd is decrypted by the media key Km.
- the embedded key K e is obtained.
- Ke is encrypted by the session key Ks.
- the host 103 performs decryption by the AES decryptor 228 to obtain Ke.
- the host 103 reads the unit key generation value Vu214 and the copy control information CCI of the encryption unit to be read from the drive 102, and reads the unit key in AES_G229. Toki Ku is calculated.
- the sector unit of the encryption unit requested by the host 103 is transferred to the decryption module 13 1 of the host 103 by the unit key of the encryption unit to which the host belongs. Is decrypted.
- electronic devices and the like that are confidential information regarding copyright protection technology are Or information specific to the application software, for example, a device key is installed in the recording / reproducing device, so the application software installed in the DVD processing device must have confidential information on copyright protection technology. Gone.
- the software can withstand the analysis by reverse engineering, and the security of the copyright protection technology can be secured.
- the recording / reproducing device and the data processing device separately have a device key as information unique to the electronic device or the application software, so that the revoking process can be performed for both the recording / reproducing device and the application software. It is possible to do.
- a part of an algorithm relating to the copyright protection technology for example, a calculation of a media unique key is implemented in the recording / reproducing apparatus. Therefore, the application software of the data processing device need only have a part of the algorithm related to the copyright protection technology, so that it can be resistant to analysis by reverse engineering of the software. The security of copyright protection technology can be ensured.
- the title key is a key for each title.
- the random number information it is not necessary that the random number information be different for each title.
- CPRM and CPRM and examples in which CPRM is extended as copyright protection technology have been described.
- the present invention can be applied to copyright protection technology other than CPRM.
- a key distribution structure having a ll structure proposed in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2000-35022 It is applicable to copyright protection technology based on.
- the present invention is applied to a PC-based system, but this does not mean that the present invention is limited only to a configuration in which a PC and a drive are combined.
- the present invention is applied to a moving image or still image camera system in which an optical disk is used as a medium and a drive for driving the medium and a microcomputer for controlling the drive are provided. It is possible to do.
- the content key is generated on the playback device side, the content key is transmitted to the information processing device, and the content is encrypted on the information processing device side by the content key.
- the key information for copyright protection is generated by the playback device, the content key can be generated in a hard disk configuration, and tamper resistance can be improved.
- the playback device since the playback device generates a random number and uses the random number as an intermediate key, the playback device can generate a true random number or a random number close to it, for example, by an LSI, and replace the generated random number with a fixed value. Can be difficult.
- the application software installed in the information processing apparatus does not need to have all the secret information related to the copyright protection technology.
- decryption software such as "D e CSS”.
- the security of the copyright protection technology can be ensured because it is possible to prevent the situation where the decryption is performed as the clear-content in plain text and the copy is not repeated without the copy restriction being applied.
- the device key as information unique to the electronic device is By having it, it becomes possible to revoke the recording / reproducing device itself.
- random number information required for calculating a content key in the information processing device can be generated by, for example, an LSI in the recording / reproducing device. It is possible to generate random numbers close to true or random numbers. Therefore, the risk of random numbers being replaced with fixed values, etc. can be reduced.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
AU2003292648A AU2003292648A1 (en) | 2003-01-15 | 2003-12-26 | Signal processing system, recording method, program, recording medium, reproduction device, and information processing device |
US10/505,174 US7421742B2 (en) | 2003-01-15 | 2003-12-26 | Signal processing system, recording method, program, recording medium, reproduction device and information processing device |
JP2004566301A JP4525350B2 (ja) | 2003-01-15 | 2003-12-26 | 信号処理システム |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2003-006916 | 2003-01-15 | ||
JP2003006916 | 2003-01-15 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2004064314A1 true WO2004064314A1 (ja) | 2004-07-29 |
Family
ID=32709094
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2003/016937 WO2004064314A1 (ja) | 2003-01-15 | 2003-12-26 | 信号処理システム |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7421742B2 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4525350B2 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN100542084C (ja) |
AU (1) | AU2003292648A1 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2004064314A1 (ja) |
Cited By (15)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2006073252A2 (en) * | 2005-01-07 | 2006-07-13 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Apparatus for reproducing data, method thereof and recording medium |
JP2006203812A (ja) * | 2005-01-24 | 2006-08-03 | Toshiba Corp | 著作権管理方法、情報記録再生方法及び装置、並びに情報記録媒体及びその製造方法 |
EP1697938A1 (en) * | 2003-12-24 | 2006-09-06 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Apparatus and method for recording data on and reproducing data from storage medium |
JP2006260320A (ja) * | 2005-03-18 | 2006-09-28 | Hitachi Ltd | コンテンツ受渡しシステム及び端末機 |
JP2006319954A (ja) * | 2005-04-15 | 2006-11-24 | Sony Corp | 情報処理装置、および情報処理方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム |
EP1783949A1 (en) * | 2004-08-26 | 2007-05-09 | Sony Corporation | Information processing device, information recording medium, information processing method, and computer program |
WO2009011049A1 (ja) * | 2007-07-18 | 2009-01-22 | Pioneer Corporation | 情報記録媒体、ドライブ装置、配信課金管理用のサーバ装置、コンテンツサーバ装置、及び仲介装置 |
WO2009011050A1 (ja) * | 2007-07-18 | 2009-01-22 | Pioneer Corporation | 情報記録媒体、並びに情報処理装置及び方法 |
JP2009087497A (ja) * | 2007-10-02 | 2009-04-23 | Sony Corp | 記録システム、情報処理装置、記憶装置、記録方法及びプログラム |
US7668439B2 (en) | 2005-01-07 | 2010-02-23 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Apparatus for reproducing data, method thereof and recording medium |
WO2010082271A1 (ja) * | 2009-01-13 | 2010-07-22 | パナソニック株式会社 | 情報記録装置、情報再生装置及び情報記録媒体 |
JP2012055014A (ja) * | 2005-04-15 | 2012-03-15 | Sony Corp | 情報処理装置、および情報処理方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム |
JP2012213009A (ja) * | 2011-03-31 | 2012-11-01 | Toshiba Corp | 情報処理装置およびプログラム |
JP2015084562A (ja) * | 2014-12-11 | 2015-04-30 | 株式会社東芝 | サーバ装置およびプログラム |
JP2015122799A (ja) * | 2015-02-19 | 2015-07-02 | 株式会社東芝 | サーバ装置、通信方法、およびプログラム |
Families Citing this family (20)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6805134B2 (en) * | 1999-04-26 | 2004-10-19 | R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company | Tobacco processing |
KR100974449B1 (ko) * | 2003-04-24 | 2010-08-10 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | 광디스크의 복사 방지 정보 관리방법 |
KR100974448B1 (ko) * | 2003-04-24 | 2010-08-10 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | 광디스크의 복사 방지 정보 관리방법 |
KR20040092649A (ko) * | 2003-04-24 | 2004-11-04 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | 광디스크의 복사 방지 정보 관리방법 |
JP4081048B2 (ja) * | 2004-06-18 | 2008-04-23 | 株式会社東芝 | コンテンツ保護方法、装置及びプログラム |
JP4383311B2 (ja) * | 2004-10-13 | 2009-12-16 | パナソニック株式会社 | コンテンツ録画装置及びコンテンツ録画装置の制御方法並びにコンテンツ録画装置の記録プログラム |
TWI277870B (en) * | 2004-11-22 | 2007-04-01 | Toshiba Corp | Copyright management method, information recording/reproducing method and device, and information recording medium and method of manufacturing the medium |
JP2006155332A (ja) * | 2004-11-30 | 2006-06-15 | Toshiba Corp | コンテンツ出力装置及びコンテンツ出力方法、コンテンツ取得装置及びコンテンツ取得方法 |
JP4969106B2 (ja) * | 2006-01-05 | 2012-07-04 | ルネサスエレクトロニクス株式会社 | マイクロコントローラ |
US7903812B2 (en) * | 2006-09-07 | 2011-03-08 | International Business Machines Corporation | Detection and handling of encryption key and initialization vector |
KR101310232B1 (ko) * | 2007-04-24 | 2013-09-24 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 버스 키 공유 방법 및 그 장치 |
KR101495535B1 (ko) * | 2007-06-22 | 2015-02-25 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 컨텐츠 디바이스의 폐기 여부를 확인하여 데이터를전송하는 전송 방법과 시스템, 데이터 서버 |
KR101744748B1 (ko) * | 2011-01-05 | 2017-06-09 | 한국전자통신연구원 | 화이트박스 암호 테이블을 이용한 콘텐츠 보호 장치, 콘텐츠 암호화 및 복호화 장치 |
CN103098072B (zh) * | 2011-09-06 | 2016-04-27 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | 记录介质装置以及记录介质装置的控制方法 |
WO2013175641A2 (ja) * | 2012-05-25 | 2013-11-28 | 株式会社東芝 | セキュリティシステム |
US8874917B2 (en) * | 2012-07-26 | 2014-10-28 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Storage system in which fictitious information is prevented |
US8732470B2 (en) * | 2012-07-26 | 2014-05-20 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Storage system in which fictitious information is prevented |
US9276910B2 (en) * | 2013-11-19 | 2016-03-01 | Wayne Fueling Systems Llc | Systems and methods for convenient and secure mobile transactions |
US10783505B2 (en) * | 2014-08-11 | 2020-09-22 | Disney Enterprises Inc. | Systems and methods for providing media content |
WO2017122361A1 (ja) * | 2016-01-15 | 2017-07-20 | 富士通株式会社 | セキュリティ装置および制御方法 |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH09190667A (ja) * | 1996-01-08 | 1997-07-22 | Toshiba Corp | 複製制御方法及び複製制御装置 |
JPH1166706A (ja) * | 1997-08-25 | 1999-03-09 | Toshiba Corp | 光ディスク再生装置及び光ディスク記録再生装置 |
JP2000100069A (ja) * | 1998-09-22 | 2000-04-07 | Toshiba Corp | コピープロテクト方法、及び同方法を適用したデータ処理装置、並びに記録媒体 |
Family Cites Families (15)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE69733986T2 (de) * | 1996-10-31 | 2006-01-26 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Kadoma | Vorrichtung zur verschlüsselten Kommunikation mit beschränkten Schaden bei Bekanntwerden eines Geheimschlüssels |
CN100356475C (zh) * | 1999-02-26 | 2007-12-19 | 日本胜利株式会社 | 信息重放方法 |
US6615192B1 (en) * | 1999-03-12 | 2003-09-02 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Contents copying system, copying method, computer-readable recording medium and disc drive copying contents but not a cipher key via a host computer |
JP2001256113A (ja) * | 2000-03-13 | 2001-09-21 | Toshiba Corp | コンテンツ処理システムおよびコンテンツ保護方法 |
JP2001331106A (ja) * | 2000-03-14 | 2001-11-30 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | 暗号化情報信号、情報記録媒体、情報信号再生装置、および、情報信号記録装置 |
JP4622064B2 (ja) * | 2000-04-06 | 2011-02-02 | ソニー株式会社 | 情報記録装置、情報再生装置、情報記録方法、情報再生方法、および情報記録媒体、並びにプログラム提供媒体 |
EP1416663B1 (en) * | 2000-06-21 | 2008-09-03 | Sony Corporation | Apparatus und method for key renewal in a hierarchical key tree structure. |
US20020123968A1 (en) * | 2000-06-29 | 2002-09-05 | Mutsuyuki Okayama | Copyright protective device and method |
JP4595182B2 (ja) * | 2000-09-07 | 2010-12-08 | ソニー株式会社 | 情報記録装置、情報再生装置、情報記録方法、情報再生方法、および情報記録媒体、並びにプログラム提供媒体 |
AU2002232494A1 (en) * | 2000-12-07 | 2002-06-18 | Sandisk Corporation | System, method, and device for playing back recorded audio, video or other content from non-volatile memory cards, compact disks or other media |
US20020141577A1 (en) * | 2001-03-29 | 2002-10-03 | Ripley Michael S. | Method and system for providing bus encryption based on cryptographic key exchange |
JP4934923B2 (ja) * | 2001-08-09 | 2012-05-23 | ソニー株式会社 | 情報記録装置、情報再生装置、および情報記録方法、情報再生方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム |
JP3688628B2 (ja) * | 2001-11-09 | 2005-08-31 | 株式会社東芝 | 信号処理方法及び装置、信号再生方法及び装置、記録媒体 |
JP3878542B2 (ja) * | 2002-11-29 | 2007-02-07 | 株式会社東芝 | 記録装置 |
EP1574960A4 (en) * | 2002-12-06 | 2008-11-19 | Sony Corp | RECORDING / REPRODUCING DEVICE, DATA PROCESSING DEVICE, AND RECORDING / REPLAYING SYSTEM |
-
2003
- 2003-12-26 CN CNB2003801003505A patent/CN100542084C/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-12-26 WO PCT/JP2003/016937 patent/WO2004064314A1/ja active Application Filing
- 2003-12-26 US US10/505,174 patent/US7421742B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2003-12-26 AU AU2003292648A patent/AU2003292648A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2003-12-26 JP JP2004566301A patent/JP4525350B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH09190667A (ja) * | 1996-01-08 | 1997-07-22 | Toshiba Corp | 複製制御方法及び複製制御装置 |
JPH1166706A (ja) * | 1997-08-25 | 1999-03-09 | Toshiba Corp | 光ディスク再生装置及び光ディスク記録再生装置 |
JP2000100069A (ja) * | 1998-09-22 | 2000-04-07 | Toshiba Corp | コピープロテクト方法、及び同方法を適用したデータ処理装置、並びに記録媒体 |
Cited By (26)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1697938A1 (en) * | 2003-12-24 | 2006-09-06 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Apparatus and method for recording data on and reproducing data from storage medium |
EP1697938A4 (en) * | 2003-12-24 | 2009-09-09 | Samsung Electronics Co Ltd | APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR RECORDING AND REPRODUCING DATA CONTAINED IN A RECORDING MEDIUM |
EP1783949A1 (en) * | 2004-08-26 | 2007-05-09 | Sony Corporation | Information processing device, information recording medium, information processing method, and computer program |
US8863296B2 (en) | 2004-08-26 | 2014-10-14 | Sony Corporation | Information processing apparatus, information recording medium, information processing method, and computer program |
US8327449B2 (en) | 2004-08-26 | 2012-12-04 | Sony Corporation | Information processing apparatus, information recording medium, information processing method, and computer program |
EP1783949A4 (en) * | 2004-08-26 | 2009-07-15 | Sony Corp | INFORMATION PROCESSING DEVICE, INFORMATION RECORDING MEDIUM, INFORMATION PROCESSING METHOD, AND COMPUTER PROGRAM |
US7668439B2 (en) | 2005-01-07 | 2010-02-23 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Apparatus for reproducing data, method thereof and recording medium |
WO2006073252A3 (en) * | 2005-01-07 | 2006-11-02 | Lg Electronics Inc | Apparatus for reproducing data, method thereof and recording medium |
CN101099212B (zh) * | 2005-01-07 | 2010-12-08 | Lg电子株式会社 | 用于再现数据的装置及其方法 |
WO2006073252A2 (en) * | 2005-01-07 | 2006-07-13 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Apparatus for reproducing data, method thereof and recording medium |
JP4607605B2 (ja) * | 2005-01-24 | 2011-01-05 | 株式会社東芝 | 著作権管理方法、情報記録再生方法及び装置、並びに情報記録媒体及びその製造方法 |
JP2006203812A (ja) * | 2005-01-24 | 2006-08-03 | Toshiba Corp | 著作権管理方法、情報記録再生方法及び装置、並びに情報記録媒体及びその製造方法 |
JP2006260320A (ja) * | 2005-03-18 | 2006-09-28 | Hitachi Ltd | コンテンツ受渡しシステム及び端末機 |
JP2012055014A (ja) * | 2005-04-15 | 2012-03-15 | Sony Corp | 情報処理装置、および情報処理方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム |
JP2006319954A (ja) * | 2005-04-15 | 2006-11-24 | Sony Corp | 情報処理装置、および情報処理方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム |
WO2009011050A1 (ja) * | 2007-07-18 | 2009-01-22 | Pioneer Corporation | 情報記録媒体、並びに情報処理装置及び方法 |
WO2009011049A1 (ja) * | 2007-07-18 | 2009-01-22 | Pioneer Corporation | 情報記録媒体、ドライブ装置、配信課金管理用のサーバ装置、コンテンツサーバ装置、及び仲介装置 |
JP4687703B2 (ja) * | 2007-10-02 | 2011-05-25 | ソニー株式会社 | 記録システム、情報処理装置、記憶装置、記録方法及びプログラム |
JP2009087497A (ja) * | 2007-10-02 | 2009-04-23 | Sony Corp | 記録システム、情報処理装置、記憶装置、記録方法及びプログラム |
US8254233B2 (en) | 2009-01-13 | 2012-08-28 | Panasonic Corporation | Information recording device, information reproducing device, and information recording medium |
WO2010082271A1 (ja) * | 2009-01-13 | 2010-07-22 | パナソニック株式会社 | 情報記録装置、情報再生装置及び情報記録媒体 |
JP2012213009A (ja) * | 2011-03-31 | 2012-11-01 | Toshiba Corp | 情報処理装置およびプログラム |
US9025772B2 (en) | 2011-03-31 | 2015-05-05 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Information processing apparatus and program product |
US9467281B2 (en) | 2011-03-31 | 2016-10-11 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Information processing apparatus and program product |
JP2015084562A (ja) * | 2014-12-11 | 2015-04-30 | 株式会社東芝 | サーバ装置およびプログラム |
JP2015122799A (ja) * | 2015-02-19 | 2015-07-02 | 株式会社東芝 | サーバ装置、通信方法、およびプログラム |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20050089165A1 (en) | 2005-04-28 |
JP4525350B2 (ja) | 2010-08-18 |
CN1692599A (zh) | 2005-11-02 |
JPWO2004064314A1 (ja) | 2006-05-18 |
CN100542084C (zh) | 2009-09-16 |
US7421742B2 (en) | 2008-09-02 |
AU2003292648A1 (en) | 2004-08-10 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
JP4525350B2 (ja) | 信号処理システム | |
KR101017002B1 (ko) | 상호 인증 방법, 기록 매체, 신호 처리 시스템, 재생 장치 및 정보 처리 장치 | |
KR100311563B1 (ko) | 카피제어방법및카피제어장치 | |
KR101219618B1 (ko) | 정보 처리 장치, 정보 기록 매체, 컨텐츠 관리 시스템 및 데이터 처리 방법과 프로그램을 기록한 컴퓨터 판독가능한 기록 매체 | |
US7500101B2 (en) | Recording/reproduction device, data processing device, and recording/reproduction system | |
US7224804B2 (en) | Information processing device, information processing method, and program storage medium | |
EP1624608B1 (en) | Content protection system | |
JP3878542B2 (ja) | 記録装置 | |
US20040190868A1 (en) | Recording apparatus and content protection system | |
US20030051151A1 (en) | Information processing apparatus, information processing method and program | |
KR20010109323A (ko) | 데이터 기록 재생기 및 세이브 데이터 처리 방법, 및프로그램 제공 매체 | |
JP2000076141A (ja) | コピ―防止装置および方法 | |
WO2005067198A1 (ja) | 情報処理装置 | |
KR100994772B1 (ko) | 저장 매체의 데이터 복사 및 재생 방법 | |
JPH1065662A (ja) | データ復号方法および装置、認証方法、記録媒体、ディスク製造方法、記録方法、並びに記録装置 | |
JP2004311000A (ja) | 記録装置及び著作権保護システム | |
JP2005050176A (ja) | 情報記録媒体製造管理システム、情報処理装置、および方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム | |
JP4638160B2 (ja) | 著作物保護システム、記録装置、再生装置及び記録媒体 | |
JP4228863B2 (ja) | 記録装置、信号処理システム、記録方法のプログラム並びにプログラムを格納した記録媒体 | |
JP4367166B2 (ja) | ドライブ装置、再生処理装置、情報記録媒体、およびデータ処理方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム | |
JP2007025913A (ja) | 情報処理装置、情報記録媒体製造装置、情報記録媒体、および方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム | |
JP2000242562A (ja) | 記録媒体及び再生装置 | |
JP2006211710A (ja) | コンテンツ管理方法 | |
JP2007515736A (ja) | ディスク解読方法及びシステム | |
JP2009033433A (ja) | デジタルデータ記録/再生方法及び記録再生装置 |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AK | Designated states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BW BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU CZ DE DK DM DZ EC EE EG ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NI NO NZ OM PG PH PL PT RO RU SC SD SE SG SK SL SY TJ TM TN TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VC VN YU ZA ZM ZW |
|
AL | Designated countries for regional patents |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): BW GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT LU MC NL PT RO SE SI SK TR BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2004566301 Country of ref document: JP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 10505174 Country of ref document: US |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 20038A03505 Country of ref document: CN |
|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application | ||
122 | Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase |