WO2001057807A1 - Procede d"authentification d"une etiquette - Google Patents

Procede d"authentification d"une etiquette Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001057807A1
WO2001057807A1 PCT/US2000/014191 US0014191W WO0157807A1 WO 2001057807 A1 WO2001057807 A1 WO 2001057807A1 US 0014191 W US0014191 W US 0014191W WO 0157807 A1 WO0157807 A1 WO 0157807A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
tag
data set
stored
security block
address
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2000/014191
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Robert W. Baldwin
Chester Piotrowski
Paul A. Sevcik
Original Assignee
3M Innovative Properties Company
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 3M Innovative Properties Company filed Critical 3M Innovative Properties Company
Priority to EP00936230A priority Critical patent/EP1257974A1/fr
Priority to CA002399092A priority patent/CA2399092A1/fr
Priority to KR1020027010069A priority patent/KR20020074494A/ko
Priority to JP2001556986A priority patent/JP2003524242A/ja
Priority to AU51576/00A priority patent/AU5157600A/en
Priority to BR0017090-9A priority patent/BR0017090A/pt
Priority to MXPA02007518A priority patent/MXPA02007518A/es
Publication of WO2001057807A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001057807A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F17/00—Digital computing or data processing equipment or methods, specially adapted for specific functions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/28—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806—Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method of authenticating a device, tag, label, or similar item, and in one embodiment to a method of cryptographically verifying a tag of a matched component system so that hardware that is part of the matched component system will only interrogate tags that are authenticated as part of the matched component system.
  • Encryption has been used for many years to make information secure against the efforts of those who should not have access to that information.
  • Information is first encoded by a first authorized user, and then decoded by a second authorized user to obtain access to the information.
  • An example of simple encryption would be to equate a unique number with each letter of the alphabet, and then to represent the information of interest using those numbers, instead of letters. A person who knows the encryption algorithm (the substitution of a unique number for each letter) could then decode the information to obtain access to it. This type of simple encryption is easily broken however, and thus is not very secure.
  • the patent literature includes a number of references related to the uses of encryption for tracking manufactured articles, or for performing article authentication.
  • Tags or labels containing information about an article can be provided as part of a matched component system along with the hardware used to read, scan, or interrogate those tags or labels.
  • Examples of such systems include bar code labels (or printing equipment) and scanners, and radio frequency identification (RFLD) tags and RFLD interrogators.
  • RFLD radio frequency identification
  • One reason to encourage the use of matched component systems is to enable the system to avoid interrogating tags belonging to another system. Thus, error messages may be reduced, and it may be possible to use two or more systems to identify various materials in the same location. Another reason is related to the product or system warranties.
  • a system provider may warrant the operation of the system if a tag interrogator is used in conjunction with authentic tags, but not otherwise. Specifically, a system provider may warrant the operation of an RFLD system when that provider sells the RFLD tags, and also sells the equipment used to write information to, and/or read information from, those tags.
  • the authentication method described herein enables a system or user to authenticate, for example, radio frequency identification (RFLD) tags by providing an
  • RFID tag having a stored security block that is cryptographically related to the tag address, obtaining the tag address from the tag, applying a cryptographic transformation to at least the tag address and a private data set to obtain a security block, and then comparing that security block to the stored security block. If the two security blocks match, then the tag can be presumed to be authentic. Alternatively, the stored security block can be cryptographically transformed using at least a private data set to obtain a tag address, and that tag address can then be compared with the stored tag address. If the two tag addresses match, then the tag can be presumed to be authentic. Also described is an RFID tag for use with the present invention. The invention finds particularly useful application in the interrogation by portable or stationary RFID interrogators of RFID tags placed in library materials, such as books.
  • Figure 1 is a process diagram illustrating one embodiment of the inventive method for providing a tag with a security block that is a cryptographic transformation of the tag address;
  • Figure 2 is a process diagram illustrating one embodiment of the inventive method for authenticating a tag by field encryption and comparison
  • Figure 3 is a process diagram illustrating one embodiment of the inventive method for authenticating a tag by field decryption and comparison; and Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of an RFLD tag in accordance with the present invention.
  • a preferred method of authenticating an RFLD tag involves the following steps. First, a tag address that identifies the tag is obtained from the memory of the tag. Second, the tag address and a private data set, and optionally a public data set, are cryptographically transformed to provide a security block that is stored in the memory of the tag. Third, when it is desired to authenticate the tag, the tag address is again obtained and, along with the data set(s) is cryptographically transformed to provide a security block that is compared with the stored security block. Or, alternatively, the security block is cryptographically transformed, using the inverse of the original transformation, including appropriate data set(s), to obtain a tag address that is compared to the stored tag address.
  • RFLD tag 10 generally includes an antenna 12 connected to a memory device 14 such as an integrated circuit (IC).
  • the tag may include a power source, such as a battery or capacitor, or may be powered solely by the RFLD interrogator such that it receives both energy and information in the form of radio waves from the RFLD interrogator.
  • the tag may be provided with adhesive (typically pressure sensitive adhesive) so that it may be adhered to, for example, a library book. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that Figure 4 represents only one of the many embodiments of geometry and antenna design suitable for use in an RFID tag.
  • a commercial example of a suitable RFLD tag is one available from the Texas Instruments.
  • the Tag-it brand RFLD tag includes a first memory storage area that stores unalterable data (referred to as “permanent tag memory”), such as unique unalterable data identifying that specific tag (referred to herein as the "tag address”), and a second memory storage area that stores variable information provided by a user (referred to herein as "variable tag memory”).
  • Current Tag-it brand RFLD tags include 256 bits of variable tag memory, although more memory is likely to become available on that and other RFID tags in the future.
  • the Tag-it brand RFLD tag operates at a 13.56 MHz communication frequency, although tags and interrogators that operate at other frequencies may be used instead.
  • Tag-it brand RFLD tag systems may also be used with Windows- compatible software available from Texas Instruments to simplify the use of Tag-it brand RFLD tags and equipment.
  • the tag address is stored in the permanent tag memory. It is also preferred that this tag address be unique to insure that it is possible to identify and address a specific tag during use. This tag address might, for example, be 32 bits long, allowing over 4 billion unique addresses. Typically this tag address is programmed into the tag during manufacture and "factory locked" so that it cannot be changed later.
  • a tag address may include information stored in both the permanent tag memory and the variable tag memory, described below.
  • Variable tag memory may be used to store information about the manufacturer of the tag or the tag itself (such as when and where the tag was made), and/or about the article to which the tag is attached or to be attached. For example, where the RFLD tag will be attached to a library book or other material, the title, author, call number, checkout status, and usage statistics associated with that book may be stored in the variable tag memory. Other information that may be stored in the variable tag memory includes the name of the library that owns the book or material, the specific library branch from which it was borrowed, the appropriate location (such as the specific shelf location) for the book or material, type of item (book, CD, video tape), and the like.
  • variable tag memory may be locked, so that it cannot be inadvertently modified.
  • the data on a tag associated with an item belonging to a library can thereby be protected from accidental modification by an RFID-based airline baggage handling system or other RFID writer.
  • the locking procedure differs among RFLD tag suppliers. In the case of the Texas Instruments Tag- it brand RFLD tags, the smallest block of variable memory that can be locked in this manner is 32 bits, which may be used to store certain cryptographically transformed information in the manner described herein.
  • RFLD tags used in one embodiment of the invention are both readable and programmable. That is, the RFLD tag can be read or interrogated by an interrogation source to obtain some or all of the information stored in the variable tag memory of the tag for use or manipulation by a user, and can also be programmed (written) with information provided by a system or user.
  • Suitable RFLD interrogation sources and RFID writers are commercially available from Texas Instruments of Dallas, Texas under the designation "Commander 320.”
  • certain information is cryptographically transformed and written into a portion of the available variable tag memory by an RFLD writer, and in use the tag is interrogated by an RFID reader that determines whether the tag is authentic, as described in greater detail below.
  • RFID readers preferably can interrogate multiple RFLD tags virtually simultaneously (the Commander 320 brand interrogation source currently is able to interrogate 30 RFID tags per second), though this feature is not required.
  • Tag address is obtained from the tag, cryptographically transformed as described below, and the resulting security block is then stored on the tag.
  • Figure 1 One exemplary process for providing a tag having a stored security block in accordance with the present invention is shown in Figure 1.
  • Step 100 is to read or interrogate the tag to obtain the tag address 102.
  • the tag address is then concatenated with at least one data set, and preferably two data sets. If one data set is used, then that data set should be a private data set 106 that is not generally available to the public, but is stored in and used by the interrogation source.
  • one data set may be private and the other a public data set 104, as represented in Figure 1.
  • the tag address and the data set(s) could be interleaved or otherwise scrambled (instead of being concatenated) if desired, though this is not believed to add significantly to the security or reliability of the system.
  • the public and private data sets may consist of any string of characters and/or numbers, and can be human readable strings that are represented as binary data using standard methods such as ASCII, UTF-8 or Unicode.
  • the public data set may be widely distributed or not, as desired. In other words, the public and private data sets are simply two data sets, which may have different levels of secrecy imposed on them by the user.
  • the data set(s), and particularly the private data set is preferably a string of random characters and/or numbers, so that it is difficult or impossible to reverse engineer the data set from the cryptographically transformed information.
  • a random or substantially random process may be used, such as a random number generator.
  • the public or private data set may be subsumed within software used to create and authenticate the tags.
  • the software in general, will consist of machine language instructions, which are not readily intelligible to people and cannot be deciphered except by highly specialized individuals expending a great deal of time.
  • the data set(s) will preferably be sufficiently difficult to locate within that software that it may be considered for all practical purposes to be private even when the software itself is widely distributed.
  • the form of the public or private data sets may also be chosen to facilitate legal protection under copyright, trade secret or other law, so that any unauthorized user of the data set(s) would also be infringing on a legally protected right.
  • tag address may be of any desired length and content
  • the tag address may have, for example, 32 bits of information
  • the public data set may have at least 32 bytes of information
  • the private data set may have at least 32 bytes of information.
  • An exemplary tag address could be the hexadecimal value 0x012345678, and exemplary public data set may be the ASCII string "3M Radio Frequency Identification Systems," and an exemplary private data set may be
  • the tag address 102 and private data set 106, and optionally the public data set 104, are then fed into a cryptographic transformation algorithm 108, such as a cryptographic hash algorithm, which transforms the data and outputs a message digest 110 of, for example, 160 bits in length.
  • Cryptographic transformations encompass both conventional reversible encryption such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES, which is also referred to as the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) by ANSI, and as the DEA-1 by the ISO), and other related techniques such as the use of a one-way cryptographic hash such as the Secure Hash Algorithm 1, or SHAl. Examples of both types of algorithms along with detailed source code in the C programming language are including in the book Applied Cryptography. Protocols.
  • DES-CBC-MAC and DES-DMAC may be used as the cryptographic transformation method of the present invention
  • cryptographic hash algorithms such as SHAl, MD5, and RTPEMD-160 are preferred because they provide a relatively high level of security against attempts to reverse-engineer the private data set when the message digest and the public data set are known, and also because they are readily available, easy to implement, and free of significant governmental restrictions on use.
  • the source code associated with the SHAl described in the Applied Cryptography reference cited above is currently available on computer disc from Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems, 7115 W. North Ave., Suite 16, Oak Park, LL 60302-1002.
  • a specified portion of the message digest may be designated and stored in (written to) the variable tag memory of the RFLD tag.
  • This portion of the message digest is security block 112.
  • a lockable unit or block of the variable tag memory perhaps 32 bits, may determine the appropriate size of the security block of information from among the message digest which should be designated and stored in the variable tag memory. It may also or instead be desirable to store the message digest or the security block in the permanent tag memory, which would normally be done by or for the manufacturer of the tag.
  • the output of the cryptographic transformation (such as SHAl) will be referred to as the "message digest,” and the entirety or portion of the message digest that is stored on the RFLD tag will be referred to as the “security block.”
  • the security block 112 may be created by designating at least part of the message digest, and then written to the RFID tag in the manner described above as shown at 114.
  • the tag may be used for authentication in the field. Authentication may be performed in several different manners, 'two of which are described below. The first involves following the same process used to encrypt the tag, and then comparing the result (the security block) with the stored security block to determine whether they are the same. If the two security blocks are the same, then the tag is authentic. If they are different, then the tag is not authentic. This is referred to as "field encryption and comparison.”
  • the second authentication process described below involves essentially the reverse. That is, the authentication process begins by obtaining the stored security block from the memory of the tag, performing an encryption transformation in reverse using the private data set and, if needed, the public data set, to obtain a tag address. The tag address is then compared with the stored tag address. If the two tag addresses are the same, then the tag is authentic. If they are different, then the tag is not authentic. This is referred to as "field decryption and comparison.” In order to use this second authentication process, the security block should comprise the entire message digest.
  • Figure 2 illustrates the field encryption and comparison process steps used to determine whether a certain tag is authentic.
  • the user in the field follows the same method as shown in Figure 1, and then compares the resulting value with the stored security block to determine whether the tag is authentic.
  • steps 200 through 212 are the same as their counterparts in Figure 1. That is, the tag address is obtained 200; the tag address 202, the private data set 206, and optionally the public data set 204 are provided to the cryptographic transformation algorithm 208 that provides a message digest 210, from which a security block is created 212.
  • the RFID reader obtains the stored security block from the tag, as shown at 214, and compares the results (shown as 216) of the security block 212 with the stored security block obtained from the tag at 214. If the two security blocks are the same, then the tag is authentic. If the two messages do not match, then the user could conclude that the item is not authentic, and take any appropriate action. Such action could, for example, include terminating processing of the item to which the tag was affixed.
  • Figure 3 illustrates the field decryption and comparison process steps used to determine whether a certain tag is authentic. As shown in Figure 3, the security block
  • the tag 300 (which in this embodiment should be identical to the message digest) is obtained from the tag 300; the security block 302, the private data set 306, and optionally the public data set 304 are provided to the cryptographic transformation algorithm 308 that provides the tag address 310.
  • the RFLD reader then obtains the stored tag address from the tag 312, and compares the results (shown as 314) of the tag address 310 with the stored tag address at 312. If the two tag addresses are the same, then the tag is authentic. If the two tag addresses are not the same, the tag is not authentic.
  • the cryptographic transformation can be a reversible block cipher, stream cipher, or other suitable process.
  • the cryptographic transformation 308 could be the inverse of the cryptographic transformation used to create the security block stored on the RFLD tag.
  • the cryptographic transformation could be a block cipher such as DES running in encrypt mode (to encrypt the security block) and decrypt mode (to field decrypt the security block), where the key to the block cipher would be a function of the public and private data sets.
  • the data set(s) could be passed through a cryptographic hash function to produce a 160-bit message digest and a predetermined subset of these bits would be selected to create the 56-bit key for the DES block cipher.
  • the key could be a concatenation or other predetermined arrangement of the bits that make up the data set(s).
  • the role of the tag address and security block can be reversed. This reversal can be useful when the tag address and security block are stored such that one is more difficult to change than the other. If the tag manufacturer writes the tag address and the application vendor writes the security block, then reversing the roles of the tag address and security block may be useful in some circumstances.
  • This Example is a representation of an arbitrary tag address, public data set, and private data set that could be used in conjunction with the method of the present invention.
  • a tag address expressed in hexadecimal, could be 0x12345678. This address would be concatenated with an ASCII-string public data set "Copyright (c) 2000, 3M IPC. All Rights Reserved", which in hexadecimal notation is "0x43 0x6f
  • This concatenated data would further be concatenated with a hexadecimal private data set "OxeO 0x34 0xc7 OxfO 0xf9 0xf7 0x37 0x26 0xf6 0x19 0x53 0x15 Oxl 1 0x64 0xe5 0x30 0x45 0x4b 0xe3 Oxbf 0x6a Oxca Oxdc 0x6e Oxbe 0xb4 0x84 Oxe3 Oxbl 0x2d 0x77 0x38", which could be generated by computer using a pseudo-random number generator.
  • the full concatenated string would be processed using the SHAl cryptographic hash algorithm, and the resulting message digest, expressed in hexadecimal, would be 0x3385275891ceb2e69cdc4a56031276413d6d702d. From that one could select the low-order nibble (4 bits) of each of the first eight (8) bytes of the message digest (shown as 'the underlined characters in the preceding message digest) which would then be concatenated to provide a security block, expressed in hexadecimal, of 0x35781 e26 that could be stored on an RFLD tag by an RFLD writer. The tag could then be authenticated by using the field encryption and comparison process described above to determine whether the tag was authentic.
  • the authentication method described herein finds particularly useful application in the authentication of RFLD tags used with library materials such as books.
  • a portable (handheld, for example) RFID interrogator may be used to interrogate the RFID tags and, if the tags are authentic, to obtain other information from the RFLD tag that is useful to library staff members.
  • Stationary RFLD interrogators such as patron self-service devices, staff work stations, and stations at which library materials having only optical bar codes are converted to have RFLD tags, may also use the authentication method of the present invention.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
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  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
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  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
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  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)

Abstract

L"invention porte sur un procédé d"authentification d"étiquettes d"identification radiofréquence (IDRF), par exemple. Ce procédé consiste à produire une étiquette IDRF qui comporte un bloc de sécurité mémorisé qui est en relation cryptographique avec l"adresse de l"étiquette; extraire l"adresse de l"étiquette, transformer de manière cryptographique l"adresse de l"étiquette et un ensemble de données privées pour obtenir un bloc de sécurité et comparer ensuite ce bloc au bloc de sécurité mémorisé. Si les deux blocs correspondent, on présume alors que l"étiquette est authentique. En variante, le bloc de sécurité mémorisé peut être transformé de manière cryptographique au moyen d"au moins un ensemble de données privées afin d"obtenir une adresse d"étiquette, cette adresse pouvant ensuite être comparée à l"adresse mémorisée. Si les deux adresses correspondent, on présume alors que l"étiquette est authentique.
PCT/US2000/014191 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 Procede d"authentification d"une etiquette WO2001057807A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (7)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP00936230A EP1257974A1 (fr) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 Procede d'authentification d'une etiquette
CA002399092A CA2399092A1 (fr) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 Procede d'authentification d'une etiquette
KR1020027010069A KR20020074494A (ko) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 태그의 인증 방법
JP2001556986A JP2003524242A (ja) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 タグを認証する方法
AU51576/00A AU5157600A (en) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 Method of authenticating a tag
BR0017090-9A BR0017090A (pt) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 Processo de proporcionar uma etiqueta de rfid de um bloco de segurança, processo de sua autenticação e respectiva etiqueta de rfid
MXPA02007518A MXPA02007518A (es) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 Metodo para autenticar una etiqueta.

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US49890200A 2000-02-04 2000-02-04
US09/498,902 2000-02-04

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001057807A1 true WO2001057807A1 (fr) 2001-08-09

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2000/014191 WO2001057807A1 (fr) 2000-02-04 2000-05-23 Procede d"authentification d"une etiquette

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Country Link
EP (1) EP1257974A1 (fr)
JP (1) JP2003524242A (fr)
KR (1) KR20020074494A (fr)
CN (1) CN1433558A (fr)
AR (1) AR029034A1 (fr)
AU (1) AU5157600A (fr)
BR (1) BR0017090A (fr)
CA (1) CA2399092A1 (fr)
MX (1) MXPA02007518A (fr)
WO (1) WO2001057807A1 (fr)

Cited By (23)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2003050757A1 (fr) * 2001-12-11 2003-06-19 Tagsys Australia Pty Ltd Systemes d'etiquetage de donnees securises
WO2004042624A1 (fr) * 2002-11-08 2004-05-21 Atme S.R.O. Procede d'enregistrement et/ou de protection de marchandises et systeme de mise en oeuvre de ce procede
US6758405B2 (en) 2001-12-19 2004-07-06 3M Innovative Properties Company Article with retroreflective and radio frequency-responsive features
WO2004086290A1 (fr) * 2003-03-26 2004-10-07 Supersensor (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) Authentification de transpondeurs radiofrequence
US6816075B2 (en) 2001-02-21 2004-11-09 3M Innovative Properties Company Evidence and property tracking for law enforcement
WO2005029764A1 (fr) * 2003-09-22 2005-03-31 Nokia Corporation Procede et terminal electronique permettant le cryptage du type d'une etiquette d'identification par radiofrequence (idrf)
US6894615B2 (en) 2001-10-09 2005-05-17 3M Innovative Properties Company Article with retroreflective and radio frequency-responsive features
DE102004059391A1 (de) * 2004-12-09 2006-06-14 Eberwein, Jörg Krypto-Wireless-Tag
US7113095B2 (en) 2000-05-22 2006-09-26 Avery Dennison Corp. Trackable files and systems for using the same
GB2431545A (en) * 2005-10-24 2007-04-25 Chien Yaw Wong RFID tag and reader with improved security
KR100760044B1 (ko) 2006-04-27 2007-09-18 고려대학교 산학협력단 자체 재암호화 프로토콜을 이용하는 태그 리드 시스템 및그 방법
JP2009038816A (ja) * 2003-09-26 2009-02-19 Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> タグプライバシー保護方法、タグ装置、更新装置、更新依頼装置、それらのプログラム及びこれらのプログラムを格納した記録媒体
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EP1840844A3 (fr) * 2006-02-17 2009-03-25 Datamars SA Système sécurisé d'identification de fréquence radio
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US8179262B2 (en) 2006-12-11 2012-05-15 Brother Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Article management system, RFID tag, and apparatus for communicating with RFID tag
DE102012109446A1 (de) * 2012-10-04 2014-04-10 Eckhard Rüter System zur fälschungssicheren Codierung von elektronischen Brieftaubenringen
DE102012109446B4 (de) * 2012-10-04 2016-09-08 Eckhard Rüter System zur fälschungssicheren Codierung von elektronischen Brieftaubenringen
US9225519B1 (en) 2015-03-02 2015-12-29 Federico Fraccaroli Method, system, and apparatus for enabling secure functionalities
US11213773B2 (en) 2017-03-06 2022-01-04 Cummins Filtration Ip, Inc. Genuine filter recognition with filter monitoring system
WO2019209362A1 (fr) * 2018-04-25 2019-10-31 Eagile Incorporated Procédé et appareil d'authentification rfid

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JP2003524242A (ja) 2003-08-12
KR20020074494A (ko) 2002-09-30
CA2399092A1 (fr) 2001-08-09
AU5157600A (en) 2001-08-14
AR029034A1 (es) 2003-06-04
EP1257974A1 (fr) 2002-11-20
BR0017090A (pt) 2003-02-25
CN1433558A (zh) 2003-07-30

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