JP7114066B2 - Game device and program - Google Patents

Description

The present invention relates to a game device and program capable of analyzing game information.

A game machine such as a slot machine can be set with set values (game set values) from 1 to 6 corresponding to winning probabilities such as big bonuses and regular bonuses.
For example, a game machine with a setting value of 4 to 6 (high setting machine) has a higher winning probability than a game machine with a setting value of 1 to 2 (low setting machine), so there are more balls. .
Such setting of setting values is often performed as a task of a person in charge such as a store manager of an amusement arcade.
However, for example, the setting information (machine number, etc.) of the high setting table that the store manager learned in the business was leaked to a player (accomplice) who conspired, and the profits obtained from the game on the high setting table were illegally exploited. In some cases, there is an act of earning, and such cheating is a problem.
In order to address such a problem, Patent Document 1 discloses that a game machine in which an out (a signal indicating medal insertion) occurs within a specific time period (for example, 5 minutes) from the start of business is a predetermined number of all game machines. A game device is described in which it is determined that there is a possibility of setting leakage when an out occurs from a high setting table despite being less than a value (for example, 50%).

Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2008-279121

However, conventional gaming devices have room for improvement.

In order to solve the above problems, the game device of the present invention is more advantageous when the first game setting value is set as the game setting value than when the second game setting value is set. In a gaming facility where a plurality of gaming machines having a high probability of progressing to a first determination means capable of determining whether or not the gaming machine is installed in the game hall; a second determination means capable of determining a game setting value set in the gaming machine installed in the game hall; and output means capable of outputting predetermined information based on the result of determination by the means and the result of determination by the second determination means.

1 is an overall configuration diagram of a game system; FIG. It is a system diagram showing the flow of information in the gaming system. It is explanatory drawing of the transaction information in the sand with each machine counting function. 3 is a block diagram showing the internal configuration of the hall computer; FIG. It is a data table which shows the transaction history of transaction information. It is a chart showing determination conditions of the game period for each player. FIG. 11 is a chart showing determination conditions for setting leakage; FIG. It is a graph showing the distribution of investment amounts of winning players. (a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each player on December 1, its average, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). (a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each winning player on December 2, its average, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). It is a graph showing the distribution of investment amounts of non-hitting players. (a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each non-hit player on December 3, its average, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). (a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each non-hitting player on December 4, its average, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). (a) is a warning form indicating the total number of abnormalities in December, and (b) is a warning form indicating the number of abnormalities in each month in 2017. FIG. It is a figure which shows an example of warning information. (a) is a data table showing the number of investment balls after each first hit on December 5, its average, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). (a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each high-setting player on December 6, its average, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). (a) shows the "number of players on a high setting", "number of players within the standard", "number of players exceeding the standard", "percentage exceeding the standard", "high setting number", " (b) is a data table showing "the number of players per high setting table", "the number of players on the high setting table", "the number of players with less than 10,000 yen investment" from January to June, This is a data table showing "number of players with investment of 10,000 yen or more", "ratio of investment of 10,000 yen or more", "number of players with high setting", and "number of players per machine with high setting". (a) is the ranking information of the top 10 players by game start time on December 7th, and (b) is the ranking information of the top 10 players by game start time on December 8th. FIG. 10B is a data table showing the maximum minus number of differences for each high-setting player on December 9, its average, abnormal values, etc., and FIG. FIG. 10B is a data table showing the maximum minus number of differences for each high-setting player on December 10, its average, abnormal values, etc., and FIG. (a) is a data table showing investment amounts of low setting machine players on December 1, their averages, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). (a) is a data table showing investment amounts of high-set-table players on December 1, their averages, abnormal values, etc., and (b) is a graph of (a). (a) is a warning form indicating the total number of abnormalities in the low setting table in December, and (b) is a warning form indicating the total number of abnormalities in the high setting table in the same month. FIG. 10 is a chart showing reference values in setting leakage possibility determination based on the ratio of the number of operating units with high settings to the total number of operating units; FIG. (a) is a notification screen indicating a “low” possibility of setting leakage, (b) is a notification screen indicating a “medium” possibility of setting leakage, and (c) is a notification screen indicating a “high” possibility of setting leakage. (d) is a notification screen showing the possibility of setting leakage "very high". FIG. 10 is a chart showing reference values in setting leakage possibility determination based on the ratio of the number of operating machines with high setting (including the number of machines keeping high setting) to the total number of operating machines; FIG. FIG. 10 is a chart showing reference values in setting leakage possibility determination based on the ratio of high-setting keep units to all keep units. FIG.

A preferred embodiment of a game device according to the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.
An example in which the hall computer 50 is applied as a game device will be described below.
However, in place of the hall computer 50, it is possible to display the sandwich 20 with a counting function for each machine, the prize exchange device 60, the counter, the ball server 70, the payment machine 80, the management server for managing member information, the call of the clerk, and the game data. Other game devices such as a call lamp, a game information display device, etc. can also be applied.
The hall computer 50 is a game device capable of collecting various information about a game hall in which a plurality of game machines 10 are installed. A computer 30, an island computer 40, a prize exchange machine 60 that exchanges game media such as game balls or medals (hereinafter, game media may be referred to as "balls") for prizes, and manages the balls owned by players. A game system is configured together with a ball server 70 and a payment machine 80.

The gaming machine 10 includes a pachinko machine 10a, a slot machine 10b, etc. In this embodiment, an example in which the slot machine 10b is mainly applied will be described. However, it is also possible to apply a pachinko machine 10a having a ball payout adjustment function (function capable of adjusting the payout rate by setting), which will be described later.
In the slot machine 10b, when a player inserts game media such as medals and presses a start lever, a plurality of reels displaying predetermined symbols start rotating, and a plurality of stop buttons corresponding to the respective reels are pressed. To provide a game in which rotating reels are stopped by pressing down at an arbitrary timing, and a predetermined number of game media are paid out according to the arrangement of symbols on the stopped reels.
Note that the front door of the gaming machine 10 is provided with a receiving tray for receiving paid out game media (not shown).

The game state of the slot machine 10b includes a normal game state in which game media are spent at a predetermined rate, and a special game state in which an increase in game media can be expected compared to the normal game state and is advantageous to the player.
The special game state includes a big bonus (BB), a regular bonus (RB), etc. (hereinafter also referred to as winning), and if a prize is won after winning an internal prize, a large amount of game media, for example, 100 or more, will be paid out. be
The special game state in the pachinko machine 10a has a probability variation (so-called probability variation).

Such a slot machine 10b is capable of setting six levels of set values (game set values), usually 1 to 6, with different winning probabilities.
A larger set value makes it easier to win, and a smaller value makes it harder to win.
That is, the probability that the game progresses more favorably when a high set value (first game set value) is set as the set value than when a low set value (second game set value) is set. seems to be expensive.
Such a set value is usually set by a person in charge such as a store manager before the opening time of the business, and thereby the daily ball rate is determined for each gaming machine.
Hereinafter, setting values 1 to 2 are set as low setting values, and setting values 4 to 6 are set as high setting values. It will be explained as a setting table.
However, the values of the low setting and the high setting can be arbitrarily determined, for example, setting values 1 to 3 are low setting values and setting values 5 to 6 are high setting values.
The pachinko machine 10a also has a similar setting value, and this can be applied as the game machine of the present invention.

Sand 20 with counting function for each machine (20a for game balls, 20b for medals) counts the game media acquired in the game machine 10 provided correspondingly, pays out the counted game media, and inserts them. Cash and games such as lending game media according to the amount and issuing (also called returning or ejecting) a storage medium (for example, an IC card) that can specify (store) the number of counted game media and the balance of the inserted amount It is configured to be able to execute various operations related to transactions of value media such as media.
For example, the number of acquired game media is counted by inserting the game media from an inlet provided at the bottom of each sandbox 20 with a counting function, and the counted game media are refunded by the player. This is performed by paying out game media from a predetermined payout opening based on the payout operation. Also, the lending of game media according to the amount of money inserted is carried out by paying out the game media from a predetermined payout opening based on the player's lending operation.
Each of these devices has a communication means and is connected for data communication via a predetermined network (for example, a local area network).

In a game arcade equipped with such a game system, a player plays a game according to the following game flow.
First, at the start of the game, the player inserts cash into the sand 20 with a counting function for each machine, and lends out game media by performing a predetermined lending operation. The rented game medium is put into the game machine 10 and the game is started. The game media acquired as a result of the game are thrown into each sandbox 20 with a counting function, and are counted by performing a predetermined counting operation on each sandbox 20 with a counting function. When the counted game media are used again in the game, they can be refunded by performing a predetermined refund operation on each sand 20 with counting function. When the game is finished, a predetermined return operation is performed on each sand 20 with a counting function to return the card on which the counted remaining number of game media and the balance of the inserted cash are recorded.
When the returned card is handed over to the store clerk, the prize exchange machine 60 performs prize exchange processing based on the operation of the store clerk or the like. In this prize exchange process, the remaining number of game media is read from the card via the card reader 60a provided in the prize exchange machine 60, and the payment process for the prize corresponding to this remaining number is executed.

In the game flow as described above, the hall computer 50 receives each game information from the game machine 10 and receives transaction information from the sand 20 with each machine counting function, as shown in FIG.

The game information received from the gaming machine 10 includes "out information" consisting of an out signal capable of calculating the number of inserted game media (number of outs) and a safe signal capable of calculating the number of payouts of game media (safe number). "Safe information", game state that occurs in the gaming machine 10 and is advantageous to the player (for example, "status information" indicating occurrence of a hit such as a big win or bonus (including AT, ART, etc.), 1 game There is "start information" that indicates the execution of
Such game information is transmitted to the hall computer 50 via the network through the machine computer 30 and the island computer 40, along with information (machine number, etc.) that can specify the individual gaming machine 10 and the model. At 50 , the game information for each game machine 10 is sequentially accumulated.

Each sandbox with a counting function 20 counts the game media acquired in the gaming machine 10 provided correspondingly, refunds the counted game media, lends the game media according to the amount of money inserted, and counts the game media. Since it is configured to be able to issue storage media (hereinafter referred to as cards) that can specify the number of media (hereinafter referred to as game media, balls or balls) and the balance of the amount of money inserted, etc. It stores transaction information corresponding to each operation.
Transaction information includes, as shown in FIG. and so on.

(A) "Insert banknote" is information indicating the insertion of banknotes by the player.
(B) "Card insertion" is information indicating card insertion by the player, and from this information, the card insertion, the balance of the inserted amount, the remaining number of balls, and the inserted card can be identified. An ID or the like is specified.
(C) "Card return" is information indicating the player's card return operation. From this information, the card return, the balance of the inserted amount, the number of balls remaining, and the returned card can be identified. A card ID or the like is specified.
(D) "Lending" is information indicating a player's lending operation, and from this information, the amount of lending (number of balls lent out), the balance, etc. are specified.
(E) "Count" is information indicating a counting operation by the player, and from this information, the number of balls counted, the number of remaining balls, and the like are specified.
(F) "Refund" is information indicating a player's withdrawal operation, and from this information, the number of balls withdrawn from the player's possession, the number of remaining balls, and the like are specified.
(G) "Card stack" is information indicating the transport of cards from the card reader/writer provided in each sandbox 20 with counting function to the card storage unit. The remaining number of balls in possession, a card ID that can identify the stacked cards, and the like are specified.
(H) "Card set" is information indicating the transport of cards from the card storage unit to the card reader/writer. A card ID or the like that can identify the card is specified.
In this embodiment, each sandbox 20 with a counting function is provided with a card writer so that information such as the balance of the inserted amount, the number of remaining balls, and the card ID can be written directly to the card. In addition or instead of this, information such as the balance of the inserted amount and the number of remaining balls is associated with the card ID, and the sand 20 with each machine counting function or other gaming devices (for example, the hall computer 50 or the ball server 70) ) may be stored and managed.
Also, although "card insertion" and "card set" are described separately, "card insertion" can also include "card set."
When the game media obtained are counted by a counter installed at the end of an island or the like, a sand that does not have a counting function for each machine may be used. In this case, in the counting machine, information indicating which gaming machine the game medium to be counted was obtained is registered.

The transaction history of such transaction information (simply referred to as transaction information or transaction history; the same shall apply hereinafter) is stored in storage means such as a memory provided in each sandbox 20 with a counter corresponding to the time (hour) when the transaction occurred. The information is stored sequentially with a number attached to it, and is divided into predetermined periods such as every predetermined business day (for example, one business day) and stored.
The transaction history of the stored transaction information is sent to each counter in response to a request from the ball server 70 or the hall computer 50 that manages the player's balls for each occurrence of a transaction or for each divided period. It is transmitted to the ball server 70 together with information capable of identifying the sandwich 20 with the ball, and is stored in storage means such as a memory provided in the ball server 70. - 特許庁Further, in response to a request from the hall computer 50, it is collectively transmitted from the ball server 70 to the hall computer 50 and accumulated as information for each gaming machine 10 together with the game information (see FIG. 2). It should be noted that the transmission timing does not have to be all at once, and can be set to arbitrary timing.
Some sandwiches 20 with counting functions are provided with a camera (not shown) capable of imaging the surroundings of the corresponding game machine 10 (for example, a saucer, etc.). data) can be transmitted to the hall computer 50 via a predetermined network (eg, local area network).

The hall computer 50 is an example of the game device of the present invention. For example, as shown in FIG. A communication unit 52, a storage unit 53 including storage means such as a hard disk, a display unit 54 having display means such as a liquid crystal display device, a control unit 55 (computer) for controlling each of the above units, etc. It is configured as an information processing device to be operated.
The hall computer 50 performs various operations based on programs stored in the storage unit 53 .
For example, in the hall computer 50 , the store clerk can operate the input unit 51 to input the setting values set for each gaming machine 10 . It is stored in the storage unit 53 in association with the number.
In addition, when the setting value information can be transmitted and received between the gaming machine 10 and the hall computer 50, the hall computer 50 automatically associates the setting value received from the gaming machine 10 with the machine number and stores it. can also
Further, the hall computer 50 can aggregate and calculate the following game data based on the game information and transaction information input via the communication unit 52 .

For example, the number of outs (the number of game media used according to the present invention) is counted from the "out information", and the number of safes is counted from the "safe information". Also, a difference number (also referred to as difference number) indicating the difference between the number of outs and the number of safes is calculated. Also, as will be described later, the investment amount can be calculated from the history of "loans" included in the transaction information.
The hall computer 50 stores the game data thus aggregated and calculated in the storage unit 53 for each gaming machine 10 and for each business day (for example, every day).
Such gaming data is aggregated and calculated not only for each gaming machine 10 but also for each group such as each machine, each model, each lending rate, and each gaming hall (shop). can be stored for each
The game data is stored not only for each business day, but also for each different unit of the business period, such as a plurality of business days (for example, one week, one month).

Furthermore, the hall computer 50 specifies one game period in the gaming machine 10 by the control section 55 functioning as a game period specifying means.
Specifically, based on the transaction information received from the sand 20 with each machine counting function, by determining the replacement of the players, the game period, which is the period from the start of the game of one player to the end of the game, is determined by the player. Identify each.
The operation of identifying such a game period will be described with reference to the transaction history of the transaction information shown in FIG.

The transaction history of the transaction information shown in FIG. 5 indicates the transaction history (time zone of “15:19” to “16:19”) in one sand 20 with a counting function for each machine. The display order of the transaction history of the transaction information shown in FIG. 5 is displayed from the earliest transaction time to the latest transaction time from top to bottom.
In addition, there are two types of cards: membership cards that are lent or transferred in advance from the game arcade to players who are registered as members, and general cards that can be used by general players who are not registered as members (so-called visitor cards). , and this transaction history shows a transaction history using a general card. In addition, although not shown, the transaction information can also include a card classification that can identify the type of card used for the transaction.
Based on such transaction history, the control unit 55 identifies the game period for each player.
The game period is specified based on the determination conditions shown in FIGS. 6(a) and 6(b).
FIG. 6(a) shows the determination conditions for determining the replacement of players, and FIG. 6(b) shows the determination conditions for determining whether the players continue to play.

Specifically, the condition a is a replacement condition for a player to "insert a card" indicating that there is no balance and no remaining number of balls. Therefore, it is determined that the players have changed before and after the "card insertion" due to the establishment of such a condition.
For example, in the example shown in FIG. 5, at transaction number 4 (time "15:25"), there is "insert card" indicating no balance (¥0) and no remaining balls (0 balls). It is later determined that the players have changed.

In addition, the condition b is a replacement condition of the players that a card with an ID different from that of the returned card is inserted. The success or failure of this condition is determined from "card return" followed by "card insertion" in the transaction information. In particular, it is determined that the condition is met when the card IDs specified by "card return" and "card insertion" are different. In addition, in "insert card", the condition is satisfied that at least one of the specified balance and the number of remaining balls indicates "present".
By combining such transaction information, it is assumed that the players are replaced during each transaction. In this case, for example, it can be considered that the previous player's game period is up to "card return", and the later player's game period is from "card insertion".

For example, in the example shown in FIG. 5, the card ID (003) identified from "card returned" at transaction number 17 (time "15:48"), followed by transaction number 18 (time "15:50") Since the card ID (004) specified from "card insertion" indicating that there is a balance (¥500) in the game is different, the game period of the player before "card return" is the previous game period, and the player's playing period is after "card insertion". can be considered as the playing period of the player.
When the card IDs specified by "return card" and "insert card" indicating that there is a balance or the number of balls remaining are the same, for example, in the example shown in FIG. Card ID (003) identified from "card return" at "15:45") and card ID (003) identified from "card insertion" at transaction number 15 (time "15:46") following this are the same, it can be determined that the condition f shown in FIG.

Condition c is a condition for changing players by inserting a card after stacking the cards. The success or failure of this condition is determined from "card stack" and subsequent "card insertion" in the transaction information. In particular, it is determined that the condition is established when at least one of the balance specified by "insert card" and the number of remaining balls indicates "present".
By combining such transaction information, the end of the game is specified from the "card stack", and the start of a new game is specified from the "insert card" indicating that there is a balance or the number of balls remaining. It can be determined that the players have been replaced. In this case, for example, it can be considered that the period up to "card stack" is the previous player's game period, and the period from "card insertion" is the subsequent player's game period.

For example, in the example shown in FIG. 5, "card stack" at transaction number 24 (time "15:54"), followed by balance (¥2000) and holding at transaction number 25 (time "16:00") It can be considered that the period from "card insertion" indicating the number of remaining balls (125 balls) to "card stack" is the previous player's playing period, and that from "card insertion" is the later player's playing period.

Condition d is a condition for players to be replaced when bills are inserted after a predetermined period of time (for example, 5 minutes) has elapsed after the cards have been stacked. Success or failure of this condition is determined from "card stack" followed by "insert banknote" in the transaction information. In particular, it is determined that the condition is established when the time from "card stack" to "bills inserted" exceeds a predetermined time.
By such a combination of transaction information, the end of the game is specified from the "card stack", and the start of a new game is specified from the subsequent "insertion of bills" after a predetermined time elapses. It is possible to determine which person has been replaced. In this case, for example, it can be considered that the previous player's game period is up to the "card stack", and the subsequent player's game period is from the "insertion of banknotes". Also, the predetermined time can be a time that can be appropriately set by the manager of the game arcade, such as "five minutes", for example.
For example, in the example shown in FIG. 5, "card stack" at transaction number 31 (time "16:06") and transaction number 32 (time "16:13") after 7 minutes from this "card stack" It can be considered that the previous player's game period is from "insert bill" to "card stack", and the later player's game period is from "insert bill".
When the "card stack" and the subsequent "insertion of banknotes" are stored within a predetermined time (for example, 5 minutes), it is determined that the condition g shown in FIG. can be considered a game.
For example, in the example shown in FIG. 5, a "card stack" at transaction number 36 (time "16:17") and a transaction number 37 (time "16:17") two minutes after this "card stack" (within a predetermined time) : 19”), it is determined whether or not the same player continues to play.

In addition, the condition e is a condition that the counting operation after card return or card stacking is continued by the same player. The success or failure of this condition is determined from "card return" or "card stack" indicating that there is a balance, and "count" following this.
By combining such transaction information, for example, a return operation based on the player's judgment that the need to borrow the card is no longer necessary due to the occurrence of a win can be assumed from a "card return" indicating that there is a balance. From "Stuck", it is assumed that a hit will occur just before the end of the game. Then, the "counting" is assumed to be a counting operation of the acquired game media based on the occurrence of wins.
By combining such a series of transaction information, it can be determined that the same player is playing continuously.
In this case, it is a condition that there is no "insert bill" or "insert card" indicating that there is a balance or the like between "card return" or "card stack" and "counting".

For example, in the example shown in FIG. 5, "card return" indicating that there is a balance (¥500) at transaction number 9 (time "15:35"), followed by "card return" at transaction number 10 (time "15:36") Based on the "count", continuous games by the same player are determined.
Further, the continuous game by the same player is determined from the "card stack" at transaction number 20 (time "15:51") and the "count" at the subsequent transaction number 21 (time "15:53"). be done.

By specifying the game period based on the conditions shown in FIGS. 6A and 6B, in the example shown in FIG. 5, at least six game periods surrounded by thick lines are specified. (transaction numbers 1-5, 6-17, 18-24, 25-28, 29-31, 32-38).
By specifying the game period in this way, it is possible to estimate the number of players who have played games on the gaming machines 10 attached to the sand 20 with each machine counting function. : 19”, it can be estimated that six players played the game.

Thus, the hall computer 50 can specify one game period for each player based on transaction information.
Since the hall computer 50 can specify the game period for each player in this way, for example, based on the transaction information (the number of loans) in the game period, the investment amount in the game period Based on the game information (number of outs), the number of used game media in the relevant game period can be aggregated, and the number of differences in the relevant game period can be calculated based on the number of outs and the number of safes in the game period.
In addition, by determining whether or not a win has occurred within the game period, the corresponding players are divided into players who have experienced a win (hereinafter referred to as "win players") and players who have not experienced a win. (Hereinafter referred to as a non-hitting player).
Specifically, if the state information indicating the win is received even once during the game period, the player during the game period is a winning player, and the state information indicating the win is received once during the game period. If neither is received, it can be determined that the player during that game period is a non-hitting player.

Then, the hall computer 50 of the present embodiment, based on a predetermined program (referred to as a determination program), stores information about setting values set in the gaming machine 10 (for example, the machine number of the high setting machine, the model name, etc., hereinafter referred to as setting information). Judgment that there is a possibility that a game (hereinafter also referred to as fraudulent game) has been played illegally on a high setting platform due to the intervention of leakage of settings (also referred to as leakage of settings) (also referred to as determination of leakage of settings ) and notification based on the judgment result.
Determinations made based on the conditions shown in FIG. 7 will be described below.

[1. Judgment based on the average investment amount for each winning experience]
Determination based on the average investment amount for each winning experience will be described.
In this determination, the player is classified into a winning player and a non-winning player, and based on the difference from the average investment amount for each player, setting leakage determination etc. are performed (see 1 in FIG. 7). It is implemented by the unit 55 operating as calculation means, update means, output means, and the like.
The calculation means calculates an average value of the investment amount information of the players classified into the specific group among the investment amount information corresponding to the investment amount of each player specified by the specifying means.
The "specifying means" is a means for specifying the investment amount for each player. Specifically, it specifies the investment amount for each player based on the transaction information received from the sand 20 with each counter.
The “investment amount” is the investment amount spent from the start to the end of the game period, and can be specified by, for example, the number of “loan” histories. Specifically, when game media are lent out at a lending unit price (e.g., 500 yen) in one “lending”, the lending unit price is multiplied by the number of “rental” histories from the start to the end of the game period. The investment amount can be specified by
The "investment amount information corresponding to the investment amount of each player" is various information corresponding to the investment amount of each player. .
The "specific group" is a group in which players who have a winning experience during the playing period of the player specified by the specific means are classified (a group of winning players) or a group in which players who do not have a winning experience are classified. (a group of non-hitting players).
This "specifying means" is a means for specifying the game period of the player, and specifically, specifies the game period of each player based on the transaction information received from the sand 20 with each counter.
Based on the above, the calculation means calculates the average investment amount in each of the winning player group and the non-winning player group.

The update means updates the reference excess amount information when investment amount information of each player exceeds a predetermined reference when compared with the average investment amount.
The "predetermined standard" is a relative standard based on comparison with the average investment amount, and is a standard value (hereinafter referred to as "abnormal value") for determining whether the investment amount of each player is normal or abnormal.
The abnormal value is set to 2.5 times the average investment amount for each group. However, the magnification and numerical values are not limited to these, and arbitrary magnification and numerical values can be set. In addition, it is also possible to automatically calculate and set appropriate magnifications and numerical values corresponding to the degree of variation in data.
Therefore, if a player's investment amount in each group exceeds the abnormal value in that group, it is determined that there is a certain possibility that the player has played an illegal game based on the leakage of settings, and that there is an abnormality. If the value does not exceed the abnormal value in the group, it is determined that there is no possibility that an illegal game based on the leakage of settings has been played, and that there is no abnormality.

Such an abnormality determination is performed by the same method for each group. This is because the game media used may be different.
Hereinafter, each abnormality determination and the like will be described while referring to the behaviors peculiar to the winning player and the non-winning player.

First, the winning player will be explained.
A player who knows the information of the high setting table plays the game on the high setting table with confidence that the setting is high within the game period. Instead, it is conceivable that the game is played with an excessive expectation that multiple hits will occur.
However, there are cases where the second and subsequent hits do not easily occur even on a high setting table, and therefore the game period is prolonged and the investment amount increases.
For example, after spending a considerable amount of money and winning the first prize, it is not enough to just spend the game media obtained in the first prize in anticipation of a second win, and the game ends after a considerable amount of money is additionally invested. In some cases, although a second win is generated by investing a considerable amount of money, the game is finished after an additional investment of a similar amount in anticipation of the third and subsequent wins.
On the other hand, since a normal player plays a game without knowing whether the gaming machine 10 is a high-setting table or a low-setting table, the player is satisfied with the first hit and ends the game immediately, or experiences the first hit. However, since the game is completed in a relatively short period of time, such as playing the game without expecting too much for the second and subsequent hits, the investment amount is expected to be relatively low and within a certain range. .
That is, in the case as described above, it is expected that the amount invested by a player who plays a fraudulent game based on the leaked setting will clearly be larger than the amount invested by a normal player among the winning players.

FIG. 8 is a graph showing the distribution of investment amounts of winning players.
As shown in FIG. 8, the investment amount of the winning player can be represented by a histogram centered on the average value.
That is, as shown in FIG. 8, the amount invested by a normal player falls within a certain range (normal range) based on the average (average amount of investment). The player's investment amount thus obtained is included in a range (abnormal range) that exceeds a value (abnormal value) far from the average.
Therefore, when the investment amount of a certain winning player exceeds an abnormal value, it can be determined that there is a certain possibility (abnormality) that the player has played an illegal game.
Although FIG. 8 illustrates a symmetrical distribution (normal distribution, etc.) centering on the average, the present invention is not limited to such a distribution mode, and the present invention can be applied even when the distribution mode is asymmetrical in the left and right. can be applied.

A specific example will be described with reference to FIGS. 9 and 10. FIG.
FIG. 9(a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each player on December 1, the average (average investment amount), abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 9(b) is a graph of (a). be.
FIG. 10(a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each player on December 2, the average (average investment amount), abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 10(b) is a graph of (a). be.
The abnormal value is a standard value (predetermined standard of the present invention) for determining normality/abnormality, and is set to a value that is 2.5 times the average investment amount of the winning player. However, the magnification and numerical values are not limited to these, and arbitrary magnification and numerical values can be set. In addition, it is also possible to automatically calculate and set appropriate magnifications and numerical values corresponding to the degree of variation in data.
As shown in FIGS. 9A and 9B, the average investment amount of each winning player on December 1 is ¥12,167, and the investment amount of each winning player is an abnormal value (¥ 30,417), it can be determined that there is no abnormality.
As a result, it can be determined that there is no possibility of fraudulent gaming based on leaked settings on December 1st.
On the other hand, as shown in FIGS. 10(a) and 10(b), the average investment amount of each winning player on December 2nd is ¥19,500. No. 5 investment amount (¥50,000) exceeds the abnormal value (¥48,750). 5 can be determined as "abnormal".
As a result, on December 2, it can be determined that there is a certain possibility that a fraudulent game has been played based on the setting leakage in the gaming machine 10 with the machine number 11 in which the setting value 6 is set (FIG. 10). (a)).

Next, non-hitting players will be described.
Since the high setting table is the game machine 10 in which the probability of winning is high, the player who obtains the information of the high setting table by leakage plays the game on the high setting table with confidence that the winning will occur. can be considered.
However, there are cases in which a hit does not easily occur even at a high setting table, and even in such a case, the game period is prolonged because the player is convinced that the setting is high. is expected.
On the other hand, since ordinary players play games without knowing whether the gaming machine 10 is set at a low setting or a high setting, they are not sure that the game machine 10 is set at a high setting as the above player thinks. The investment amount can be kept relatively low by ending the game if it does not occur easily.
That is, in the above case, it is expected that the amount invested by the non-winning player who plays the illegal game based on the leakage of the setting will be clearly larger than the amount invested by the normal player.

FIG. 11 is a graph showing the distribution of investment amounts of non-hitting players.
As shown in FIG. 11, the investment amount of non-hitting players can be represented by a histogram centered on the average value.
That is, as shown in FIG. 11, the amount invested by a normal player falls within a certain range (normal range) based on the average (average amount of investment). The player's investment amount thus obtained is included in a range (abnormal range) that exceeds a value (abnormal value) far from the average.
Therefore, when the investment amount of a certain non-hitting player exceeds an abnormal value, it can be determined that there is a certain possibility (abnormality) that the player has played an illegal game.
Although FIG. 11 illustrates a distribution that is bilaterally symmetrical about the average (such as a normal distribution), the present invention is not limited to such a distribution mode, and the present invention can be applied even when the distribution is bilaterally asymmetrical. can do.

A specific example will be described with reference to FIGS. 12 and 13. FIG.
FIG. 12(a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each non-winning player on December 3, the average (average investment amount), abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 12(b) is the graph of (a). is.
FIG. 13(a) is a data table showing the investment amount of each non-winning player on December 4th, the average (average investment amount), abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 13(b) is the graph of (a). is.
As shown in FIGS. 12(a) and 12(b), the average investment amount of each non-winning player on December 3 is ¥7,250, and the investment amount of each non-winning player is an abnormal value. (¥18,125), it can be determined that there is no abnormality.
As a result, it can be determined that there is no possibility of fraudulent gaming based on leaked settings on December 3rd.
On the other hand, as shown in FIGS. 13(a) and 13(b), the average investment amount of each non-winning player on December 4th is ¥10,333. No. 2 investment amount (¥30,000) exceeds the abnormal value (¥25,833). 2 can be determined to be "abnormal".
As a result, on December 4, it can be determined that there is a certain possibility that a fraudulent game has been played based on the setting leakage in the gaming machine 10 with the machine number 17 in which the setting value 6 is set (FIG. 13). (a)).

By the way, as described above, since the actions of a winning player and a non-winning player are different, their investment amounts are naturally different.
In other words, the abnormality determination of a winning player targets the investment amount over a relatively long period of time over multiple winnings, while the abnormality determination of a non-winning player is a relatively short period that does not reach the first hit. Since the investment amount in the game is targeted, the investment amount of the winning player is larger than the investment amount of the non-winning player.
Then, since the average investment amount of the winning player and the average investment amount of the non-winning player are different, the reference value (abnormal value) in each abnormality determination should also be set to a different value.
In view of such a point of view, in this determination, the winning player and the non-winning player are classified, the average of the respective investment amounts is obtained, and the abnormality determination is performed based on the average.
As a result, it is possible to improve the determination accuracy as compared with the case where a winning player and a non-winning player are not distinguished.

As described above, the updating means updates the reference excess number information when the investment amount of the player exceeds the abnormal value. Further, in the present embodiment, the "reference excess number information" is the number of times it is determined that there is an "abnormality".
That is, the updating means counts the number of times the player's investment amount is determined to be abnormal (the number of abnormal cases), and updates the abnormal number by adding "1" each time an abnormality is determined. The result of updating the number of abnormalities (total number of cases) is stored in the storage unit 53 .
For example, in the above example of December 1st to 4th, no abnormality is determined on December 1st, and one abnormality (No. 2) is determined on December 2nd, so the total number of cases is "0 is updated from "1" to "1", no abnormality is judged on December 3, and one case (No. 5) is judged on December 4, so the total number of cases is updated from "1" to "2". be.

The output means outputs predetermined information based on the reference excess number information.
The "predetermined information" is various information related to the reference excess number information. Warning information to be output when the rate and transition satisfy a predetermined condition can be exemplified.
Specifically, since the control unit 55 can aggregate the standard excess number information every predetermined period as a tallying means, fraudulent games are performed based on the standard excess number information tallied for each predetermined period. It is possible to output information indicating the possibility that
"Information indicating the possibility of fraudulent play" can be exemplified by the warning form shown in FIG. 14, for example.
The warning form is information obtained by aggregating the number of abnormalities for each day, month, and year. can be done.
As a result, the manager can check the warning form not only from inside the game arcade but also from outside the game arcade.

For example, FIG. 14A shows the date of occurrence of an abnormality, the unit number of the abnormal unit, the model, the setting value, the number of abnormalities (total number of occurrences), and the average setting value of the abnormal unit (setting average) in December 2017. FIG. 14B shows the average number of abnormalities per month and the set value of the abnormal unit (set average) in 2017, and the number of abnormal cases (total number) and the set value in 2017. This is a warning form consisting of averages (set averages).
Looking at the warning form in FIG. 14B, the number of abnormalities, which was about 30 from January to April, rapidly increased to 60 in May, and has been maintained at 60 or more since that month.
Based on such a change in the number of abnormalities, it can be determined that there is a possibility that fraudulent games started in May and that fraudulent games continue to be played after May.
Also, looking at the warning form in FIG. It can be determined that there is a high possibility that
Furthermore, based on the warning form in FIG. 14(a), it is possible to specify the machine number, model, and setting values of the gaming machine 10 (abnormal machine) on which an illegal game may have been played.
As a result, for example, the manager can take measures to prevent subsequent fraudulent play (for example, identifying the fraudulent player based on the monitoring image of the specified gaming machine 10).

Further, it is possible to automatically output setting leakage determination and warning information (notification information) based on the determination.
Specifically, the control unit 55 monitors the ratio of the number of abnormal cases in the current month to the number of abnormal cases in the previous month, and if the ratio exceeds a predetermined reference ratio, it is determined that there is a possibility that illegal gaming has been performed in the current month. Warning information can be output.
For example, in the example of FIG. 14(b), if the standard rate is 1.5, the increase rate from April to May (2.1 = 60 ÷ 29) exceeds the standard rate, so in May It can be determined that there is a possibility that an illegal game has been played.
In this case, for example, as shown in FIG. 15, it is possible to output warning information indicating the possibility of fraudulent play, timing, and breakdown of abnormal machines (machine number, set value, investment amount, etc.). can be done.
From such warning information as well, it is possible to grasp the fact that a fraudulent game has been played and its details (the date of occurrence of the abnormality, the machine number of the abnormal machine, the setting value, etc.).
As described above, according to the hall computer 50 of the present embodiment, it is possible to accurately determine whether a fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of setting information based on the average investment amount for each winning experience.

In this judgment, the investment amount and average investment amount were calculated, and abnormality judgment was performed for each day, month, and year. It is also possible to perform the above-described processing on the divided groups by separating them based on other viewpoints such as each group or each set value.
Also, it is possible to classify by winning/losing instead of classifying by win/non-win.
Also, even if the investment amount is determined to be abnormal, if the game machine 10 determined to be abnormal is a low setting machine, it is difficult to think that the setting value has leaked, so it is not determined to be abnormal. can also
Output information such as a warning form can be sorted by a desired index such as each machine, each island, each model, each time zone, each setting value, etc., and totalized and output.
Also, the data shown in FIGS. 9, 10, 12, and 13 can be output as information indicating the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played.

[2. Judgment based on the standard number of balls used after winning]
Next, the determination based on the number of used balls after the occurrence of a win (after a win) will be described.
Here, the determination based on the number of balls used after the first hit (after the first hit) will be described. However, the determination is not limited to the number of balls used after the first hit, and can be determined based on the number of balls used after the last hit in the game period, for example.
That is, this determination is performed based on the difference from the average number of balls spent until the end of the game after the first hit (see 2 in FIG. 7). It is implemented by operating as update means, output means, and the like.

First, the calculating means calculates an average value of the used game medium number information of the players classified into the specific group among the used game medium number information corresponding to the used game medium number of each player specified by the specifying means. do.
The “specifying means” is means for specifying the number of used game media (number of used balls) for each player. Identify.
"Used game media number information corresponding to the number of used game media for each player" is various information corresponding to the number of used balls for each player. average number of balls used).
A "specific group" here refers to a group of all players. It should be noted that it may be a group of winning players.
As described above, the calculation means calculates the average number of balls used after the first hit for all players.

The reason for focusing on the number of balls used after the first hit is that players who learned the setting information through a leak have characteristic behavior after the first hit, and along with this, the number of balls used after the first hit has a characteristic transition. This is because
For example, a player who obtains information on a high setting table through setting leakage plays a game on the high setting table, believing that the setting is high. Instead, it is conceivable that the game is played with an excessive expectation that multiple hits will occur.
However, there are cases where multiple wins (for example, the second win) do not easily occur even on a high setting table. The game period after the first hit becomes long, and many balls may be spent.
On the other hand, a normal player does not know whether the gaming machine 10 is a high-setting machine or a low-setting machine, and plays the game without much expectation for multiple wins. However, the game is finished in a relatively short game period using a relatively small number of balls, such as finishing the game immediately after being satisfied with this.
For this reason, the number of balls used by a player after the first hit usually falls within a certain range (normal range) centered on the average (average number of balls used after the first win). The number of balls used by a player who knows the table is included in a range (abnormal range) that exceeds a value (abnormal value) far from the average. Although the abnormal value is set to 2.5 times the average number of balls used after the first hit, it is not limited to this multiplying factor and numerical value, and any multiplying factor and numerical value can be set according to the embodiment. In addition, it is also possible to automatically calculate and set appropriate magnifications and numerical values corresponding to the degree of variation in data.
Therefore, when the number of balls used by a certain player after the first hit exceeds an abnormal value, it can be determined that there is a certain possibility (abnormality) that the player has played an illegal game.

A specific example will be described with reference to FIG.
FIG. 16(a) is a data table showing the number of balls used by each winning player after the first hit on December 5, 2017, their average and abnormal values, etc. FIG. 16(b) is a data table of (a) graph.
As shown in FIG. 16(a), among the winning players on December 5, the average number of balls used after the first win was 3,083, and as shown in FIG. 16(b), No. Since the number of used balls after the first hit of 5 exceeds the abnormal value (7,708), it can be determined that there is an abnormality.
As a result, it can be determined that there is a possibility of fraudulent play based on the leakage of settings on December 5th.

The updating means updates the used game media number information of each player to exceed the reference when the used game medium number information exceeds a predetermined standard when compared with the average value (average number of balls used after the first hit). Update number information.
The "predetermined standard" is the "abnormal value" to be compared with the average number of balls used after the first hit.
That is, for each player, it is determined whether or not the number of balls used after the first hit exceeds the abnormal value. ” is determined.
The “reference excess number information” is the number of cases determined as “abnormal” (abnormal number).
That is, the update means counts the number of cases where the number of balls used after the first hit exceeds the abnormal value and is judged to be abnormal, and adds "1" each time an abnormality is judged, and updates it. The result is stored in the storage unit 53 .
For example, in the example of December 5 shown in FIG. Since 5 is determined to be "abnormal", "1" is added as the number of abnormalities in December and updated.

The output means outputs predetermined information based on the reference excess number information.
For example, information that can identify the number of abnormalities and their transition (see Figure 14), information that can identify the possibility that fraudulent games have been played, and information that can identify the timing and details (see Figure 15). It can be output as information indicating the possibility of execution.
Also, the data shown in FIG. 16 can be output as information indicating the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played.
As described above, according to the hole computer 50 of the present embodiment, it is possible to accurately determine whether a fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of setting information based on the reference number of used balls after winning.

In addition, in this judgment, the number of balls used after the first hit, the average number of balls used after the first hit, and the abnormality judgment were processed for each day, month, and year. , for each model, for each time zone, for each setting value, etc., and perform the above-described processing on the divided groups.
Also, even if the number of balls used after the first hit is determined to be abnormal, if the gaming machine 10 determined to be abnormal is a low setting table, it is difficult to think that the set value has leaked, so it is determined to be abnormal. You can also choose not to.
Further, it is also possible to determine an abnormality or a fraudulent game based on the investment amount after winning instead of the number of balls used after winning.
In addition, output information such as a warning form can be sorted by a desired index such as each machine, each island, each model, each set value, or each time period, and then aggregated and output.

[3. Judgment based on average investment amount at high setting level]
Next, the determination based on the average investment amount on the high setting table will be described.
This determination is a setting leak determination performed based on the difference from the investment amount in the high setting table (see 3 in FIG. 7). be implemented.
The calculating means calculates an average investment amount of the players who have selected the high setting table (high setting table players).

The update means updates the reference excess number information (abnormal number) for the high setting table player.
That is, the updating means determines that there is an investment amount exceeding a predetermined standard (abnormal value) when comparing the investment amount of each high setting table player with the average investment amount of the high setting table player calculated by the calculating means. If so, it is determined that there is an abnormality, and the number of abnormalities is updated.
For example, in the example of December 6 shown in FIG. Since 5 is determined to be "abnormal", "1" is added as the number of abnormalities in December and updated.
The abnormal value is set to a value (¥53,333) that is twice the average investment amount (¥27,667) of the high-set-table player.・Can be set to a numerical value. In addition, it is also possible to automatically calculate and set appropriate magnifications and numerical values corresponding to the degree of variation in data.
The output means outputs predetermined information based on the reference excess number information.
For example, information that can identify the number of abnormalities and their transition (see Figure 14), information that can identify the possibility that fraudulent games have been played, and information that can identify the timing and details (see Figure 15). It can be output as information indicating the possibility of execution.
Also, the data shown in FIG. 17 can be output as information indicating the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played.

Further, it is possible to automatically determine the possibility that an illegal game has been played based on the ratio of the number of abnormal players to the total number of players on the high setting table.
FIG. 18(a) shows the "number of players on a high setting table", "number of players within the standard", "number of players exceeding the standard", "percentage exceeding the standard", " This is a data table that associates "high set number of machines" and "number of players per high set machine".
The “number of players at high setting table” is the total number of players who have played games at high setting table.
The “number of players within the standard” is the number of players whose investment amount did not exceed the abnormal value (standard).
The “number of players exceeding the standard” is the number of players whose investment amount and the number of balls used exceeded the abnormal value (standard).
The “standard excess ratio” is the ratio of the “standard excess number of players” to the “high setting table number of players”.
In FIG. 18(a), for example, if the determination condition for fraudulent play is "percentage exceeding standard: exceeding 15%", this determination is made in March (36%), April (38%) and May (20%). Since the conditions are satisfied, it can be determined that there is a possibility that illegal games have been played from March to May.

In addition, it is also possible to determine the possibility of fraudulent play taking into account the number of players per high setting table.
This is because if information on the high setting table is leaked, a small number of players (for example, one player) will occupy the high setting table for a long period of time and play illegal games. While it is thought that the number of players per machine will decrease, on the contrary, if there are many players per high-setting machine, a considerable number of players will be replaced and playing games, so such leakage This is because it is difficult to imagine that
For example, in FIG. 18(a), the number of players per high setting machine in March is 3.7, and the number of players per high setting machine in April is 4.0. The number of players per high setting machine per month is 10.0.
Therefore, if the reference value for judging the number of players per set machine is set to, for example, "5", the number of players per high set machine is large in May. It can be determined that there is no possibility of illegal play.

In the above example, the abnormal value, which is the criterion for determining abnormality, is set to a value (relative value) that is twice the average investment amount of the high-setting-platform player (see FIG. 18(a), etc.). The outlier value can also be set to a predetermined amount (absolute value). The same applies to each determination of 1 to 6 in FIG.
For example, if the abnormal value is 10,000 yen, if the investment amount is 10,000 yen or more among the high setting table players, it is determined that there is an abnormality, and the number of such abnormalities is counted monthly.
FIG. 18(b) shows "the number of players with a high setting", "the number of players with an investment of less than 10,000 yen", "the number of players with an investment of 10,000 yen or more", " 10,000 yen or more investment ratio”, “high set number of machines”, and “number of players per high set machine” are associated with each other.
In FIG. 18(b), for example, if the condition for judging fraudulent gaming is "percentage of investment of 10,000 yen or more: over 15%", then March (36%), April (38%) and May (20%) satisfies this determination condition, it can be determined that there is a possibility that fraudulent games were played during March to May.
However, considering the number of players per high setting table, the number of players per high setting table is large in May, so it is determined that there is no possibility of illegal gaming in May.

As described above, according to the hall computer 50 of the present embodiment, it is possible to accurately determine whether a fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of setting information based on the average investment amount on the high setting table.

In addition, in this judgment, the investment amount and average investment amount of the high setting machine player are calculated, and the abnormality judgment is performed for each day, month, and year. It is also possible to perform the above-described processing on the divided groups based on other viewpoints such as (for each unit number), for each model, for each time period, and for each set value.
In addition, the output information such as the warning form can be sorted by a desired index such as each machine, each island, each model, each set value, each time zone, etc., and totalized and output.
Also, the data shown in FIG. 18 can be output as information indicating the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played.

[4. Judgment based on game start time]
Next, the determination based on the game start time will be explained.
This determination is a setting leakage determination performed based on the ratio of high-setting table players in the top when the players are arranged in order of early game start time (see 4 in FIG. 7), and the control unit 55 It is implemented by operating as an output means or the like described later.
The output means outputs the game start time information in which the players are arranged in order of early game start time for each player specified by the specifying means. are output at the same time.
The 'specifying means' is means for specifying the game start time for each player. A player's game start time (operation start time) is specified.
The "game start time information in which players are arranged in order of early game start time" is, for example, a list of players who will start playing within a predetermined time (for example, 30 minutes) from the opening time (for example, 10:00) of the day. information about the players and the gaming machine 10 who have been in the game, and information about the predetermined number of players and the gaming machine 10 who started playing earlier than the store opening time.
"Information on set value" output together with the game start time information is information (machine number) that can identify the set value set in the game machine 10 or the game machine 10 that set the set value.

As shown in FIG. 19, the output means can output data in which the players are arranged in order of game start time, as well as the machine number and set value information of the gaming machine 10 played by each player.
FIG. 19A shows, on December 7, the game machines 10 that started operating within a predetermined time (30 minutes) from the store opening time (10:00) are extracted and arranged in order of early game start, and each game This is data in which the machine number of the machine 10, the setting value, and the game start time are associated with each other.
FIG. 19(b) shows, on December 8, the top 10 game machines 10 whose opening time is the earliest to start the game are extracted and arranged in order of earliest, and the machine number, set value, and game start of each game machine 10 are displayed. This is data associated with time.

Based on such output information, the control unit 55 can determine the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of settings based on the ratio of high-set-table players in the top ranks.
For example, in each data shown in FIG. Possibility of illegal game can be determined.
Here, it is assumed that the condition for judging fraudulent games is "high setting table ratio: 30% or more".
Then, in the example of FIG. 19(a), No. 2 and No. 6 is a high setting table, and the ratio is 20% (= 2/10) (the condition is not satisfied), so it is determined that there is no possibility of fraudulent gaming being performed on December 7. can do.
On the other hand, in the example of FIG. 19(b), No. 1 to No. 4 is a high setting table, and the ratio is 40% (= 4/10) (satisfies the condition), so it is determined that there is a possibility that fraudulent games were played on December 8 be able to.
As described above, according to the hall computer 50 of the present embodiment, it is possible to accurately determine whether a fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of setting information based on the game start time.
It should be noted that the existence ratio of the high setting table and the low setting table can be taken into account in the above determination.
For example, if the existence ratio of the high setting machine and the low setting machine is 1:9, the player usually selects the gaming machine 10 without knowing the setting. The filling ratio is also 1:9.
In this case, if the filling rate is considerably different from the above rate, setting leakage is suspected.
For example, if the ratio of the high setting tables and the low setting tables being filled after the store opens is 3:7, it can be determined that there is a possibility that an illegal game has been played based on the leakage of the setting information.

[5. Judgment based on maximum negative number of differences]
Next, the determination based on the maximum negative number of differences will be described.
This determination is a setting leakage determination performed by the high setting table player, based on how far the difference number becomes negative (see 5 in FIG. 7). , and output means.
The “difference number (difference number)” is a value indicating the difference obtained by subtracting the number of game media put into the game by the player from the number of game media acquired by the player in the game. is greater than the game media obtained in the game, the value is negative, and when the number of game media to be inserted into the game is less than the game media obtained in the game, the value is positive.
For this reason, the difference number tends to be positive on the high setting table because the ball output rate is high, but if the hit does not easily occur even on the high setting table, the negative value gradually accumulates.

The calculation means calculates an average value of the used game medium number information of the players classified into the specific group among the used game medium number information corresponding to the used game medium number of each player specified by the specifying means.
The “specifying means” is means for specifying the difference number for each player. Specifically, it specifies the difference number for each player based on the out information and the safe information received from the gaming machine 10 .
"Used game media number information corresponding to the number of used game media for each player" is various information corresponding to the difference number for each player. number minus).
A "specific group" here refers to a group of high setting table players.
As described above, the calculation means calculates the maximum difference number minus for each high setting table player.
The reason for focusing on the negative maximum difference is that a player who obtains information on the high setting table through leakage may play the game on the high setting table with confidence that a win will occur within the game period.
However, there are cases where a hit does not easily occur even on a high setting table, and in this case, the maximum difference minus the number of differences may be greatly increased because the player is confident that a win will occur. .
On the other hand, since a normal player plays a game without knowing whether the game machine 10 is a high setting table or a low setting table, even if the difference number is negative, the game is finished before the negative increases significantly. is assumed.
Therefore, the maximum difference number minus of the player who knows the high setting table due to the leakage is included in a range (abnormal range) exceeding a value (abnormal value) far from the average.
Therefore, when the difference number of a certain high-set-table player exceeds an abnormal value, it can be determined that there is a certain possibility (abnormality) that the player has played an illegal game.

A specific example will be described with reference to FIGS. 20 and 21. FIG.
FIG. 20(a) is a data table consisting of the maximum number of differences minus the number of differences among high-setting table players on December 9, 2017, their averages, abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 20(b) is the graph of (a). is.
FIG. 21(a) is a data table consisting of the maximum difference number minus the number of differences among high setting table players on December 10, 2017, its average, abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 21(b) is the graph of (a). is.
The abnormal value is set to a value twice the average minus the maximum difference number of the high setting table players, but it is not limited to this magnification and numerical value, and can be set to an arbitrary magnification and numerical value. In addition, it is also possible to automatically calculate and set appropriate magnifications and numerical values corresponding to the degree of variation in data.

As shown in FIG. 20(a), the average of the maximum difference number minus for the high setting table players on December 9 is "-1,000", and as shown in FIG. 20(b), No. 1 to No. 6 does not exceed the abnormal value (-2,000), it can be determined that there is no abnormality.
As a result, it can be determined that there is no possibility of fraudulent play based on leaked settings on December 9th.
As shown in FIG. 21(a), the average of the maximum difference number minus for the high setting table players on December 10 is "-1,850", and as shown in FIG. 21(b), No. 3 exceeds the abnormal value (-3,700), so No. 3 can be determined to be "abnormal".
As a result, on December 10th, it can be determined that there is a certain possibility that a fraudulent game was played based on the setting leakage in the gaming machine 10 with the machine number 15 in which the setting value 5 was set (see FIG. 21). (a)).

The update means updates the number of used game media of each player to the number of used game media exceeding a predetermined standard when compared with the average of minus the maximum difference of the high setting table players. Update information.
The "predetermined standard" is the above-mentioned "abnormal value" to be compared with the average of the maximum negative difference numbers of the high setting table players.
That is, for each high-setting table player, it is determined whether or not the maximum negative difference number exceeds the abnormal value, and if it exceeds, it is determined as "abnormal", and if it does not exceed, it is determined as "no abnormality". ” is determined.
The 'reference excess number information' is the number of cases determined to be 'abnormal' (abnormal number).
That is, the updating means counts the number of cases determined to be abnormal because the maximum negative difference exceeds the abnormal value, adds "1" each time an abnormality is determined, and stores the update result in the storage unit 53. Remember.
For example, in the example of December 9th to December 10th shown in FIGS. Since 3 is determined to be "abnormal", "1" is added as the number of abnormalities in December and updated.

The output means outputs predetermined information based on the reference excess number information.
The output means, for example, information that can identify the number of abnormalities and its transition (see FIG. 14), information that can identify the possibility that fraudulent games have been played, and the timing and details (see FIG. 15). , can be output as information indicating the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played.
Also, the data shown in FIG. 20 and FIG. 21 can be output as information indicating the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played.
As described above, according to the hall computer 50 of the present embodiment, it is possible to accurately determine whether a fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of the setting information based on the maximum negative number of differences.

In addition, in this judgment, processing such as calculation of the maximum negative difference number and its average, abnormality judgment, etc. was performed for each day, month, and year. It is also possible to perform the above-described processing on the divided groups by separating them based on other viewpoints such as each band or each set value.
In addition, the output information such as the warning form can be sorted by a desired index such as each machine, each island, each model, each set value, each time zone, etc., and totalized and output.
Further, it is also possible to make an abnormality determination based on a value obtained by converting the maximum negative difference number into a monetary amount instead of the maximum negative difference number.

[6. Judgment based on comparison of abnormality rate at low setting level and abnormality rate at high setting level]
Next, the determination based on the comparison between the abnormality rate at the low setting level and the abnormality rate at the high setting level will be described.
This determination is made by comparing the abnormal value occurrence rate at the low setting level and the abnormal value occurrence rate at the high setting level, and judging that the setting leakage occurs when the abnormal value occurrence rate at the high setting level is too high (Fig. 7). 6).
It is considered that there are no players who know the settings when playing on low setting tables. This is because it is unthinkable to leak the information of the low setting table to play the game.
Therefore, it can be considered that the number of occurrences of anomalies that occur in low setting bases is the number of occurrences that occur naturally (the number of spontaneous occurrences).
Then, by using the "spontaneous occurrence number" as a reference, it is possible to determine that there is a possibility of setting leakage when the number of abnormal values occurring at a high setting level is unnatural.

A specific example will be described with reference to FIGS. 22 to 24. FIG.
FIG. 22(a) is a data table showing investment amounts of low-set-table players on December 1, 2017, their averages, abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 22(b) is a graph of (a). .
FIG. 23(a) is a data table showing the amount invested by high-set-table players on December 1, 2017, their average and abnormal values, etc., and FIG. 23(b) is a graph of (a). .
The abnormal value in FIG. 22 is set to a value that is 2.5 times the average investment amount of the low setting machine player, and the abnormal value in FIG. 23 is the average investment amount of the high setting machine player. It is set to double. However, the magnification and numerical values are not limited to these, and arbitrary magnification and numerical values can be set. In addition, it is also possible to automatically calculate and set appropriate magnifications and numerical values corresponding to the degree of variation in data.

As shown in these figures, in this determination, abnormality determination is performed separately for the low setting table player and the high setting table player. It should be noted that each determination method is the same as described in [3. Determination based on average investment amount at high setting table], so the description will be omitted.
24, (a) is a data table showing the total number of abnormalities in the low setting level in December, and (b) is a data table showing the total number of abnormalities in the high setting level in the same month.
Comparing the warning form in FIG. 24(a) with the warning form in FIG. The number of abnormalities is 71, and it can be seen that the rate of occurrence of abnormal values is high at the high setting level.
In other words, the number of abnormalities in the high setting range (71 cases) is more than twice the number of "spontaneous occurrences" (31 cases), which is too many.
Therefore, it can be determined that there is a possibility that illegal games are being played in December.
As described above, according to the warning form in FIG. 24, it is possible to grasp the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of settings. Further, according to this warning form, it is possible to specify the machine number, model, and setting values of the gaming machine 10 (abnormal machine) that may be playing illegally.
As a result, for example, the administrator can take measures to prevent subsequent fraudulent games (eg, identification of fraudulent players based on surveillance images of the identified gaming machine 10, etc.).

Also, in this case, the warning information can be output automatically.
For example, if the number of abnormalities in the high setting level in December exceeds a predetermined reference value compared to the number of abnormalities in the low setting level in the same month, warning information is output indicating that there is a possibility that fraudulent games were played in that month. can do.
For example, in the example of FIG. 24, if the reference value is "2", the number of abnormalities on the high setting level in December is 71, which exceeds the reference value (62 = 31 x 2). It can be determined that there is a possibility that an illegal game has been played.
In this case, for example, it is possible to output warning information indicating the possibility of fraudulent play, timing, and details of abnormal machines (machine number, set value, investment amount, etc.) (see FIG. 15). .
From such warning information as well, it is possible to grasp the fact that a fraudulent game has been played and its details (the date of occurrence of the abnormality, the machine number of the abnormal machine, the setting value, etc.).
As described above, according to the hall computer 50 of the present embodiment, based on the comparison between the abnormality rate of the low setting table and the abnormality rate of the high setting table, it can be determined with high accuracy that the fraudulent game has been played based on the leakage of the setting information. can judge.

In this judgment, the investment amount and the average investment amount were calculated, and the abnormality judgment was performed for each day, month, and year. It is also possible to perform the above-described processing on the divided groups by separating them based on other viewpoints such as each group or each set value.
Output information such as a warning form can be sorted by a desired index such as each machine, each island, each model, each time zone, each setting value, etc., and totalized and output.
Also, the data shown in FIG. 24 can be output as information indicating the possibility that a fraudulent game has been played.

[7. Judgment based on the ratio of high setting operating units]
Next, determination of setting leakage possibility based on the ratio of high setting operating machines will be described.
In the present embodiment, determination is made for each model (for example, model A). In the judgments of "8." and "9." described later, judgments are similarly made for each model.
However, for example, it is possible to make a determination for a specific group (such as a game island) or for all gaming machines 10 instead of "for each model".

Specifically, the determination is made by calculating the ratio of the number of units in operation with high settings to the total number of units in operation of the target model in a specific time period, and determining the possibility of setting leakage based on the calculated ratio.
Any time period during business hours can be set as the "specific time period".
It is preferable that the "specific time zone" is set to a time zone from the opening of the amusement arcade until a predetermined period of time has elapsed.
This is because a player (hereinafter also referred to as a fraudulent player) who has learned of the high setting table due to the setting leakage has a strong tendency to play at the high setting table immediately after the start of business (first thing in the morning).
In addition, it is possible to set a time period before business hours or a predetermined time period on a specific day as the "specific time period".

The hall computer 50 can determine whether or not each gaming machine 10 is an operating table based on game information (out information, etc.) output from the gaming machine 10 (third determining means of the present invention).
Further, the hall computer 50 can determine the operating table (operating table of model A) for each model based on the information (machine number, etc.) output from the gaming machine 10 that can identify the model.
Also, the hall computer 50 stores the game information output from the gaming machine 10 in the storage unit 53 as history information together with the time when the output was performed.
Therefore, the hall computer 50 can identify the machines in operation of the model A in the specific time period based on the history information stored in the storage unit 53, and by totalizing these, the number of machines in the specific time period can be determined. It is possible to obtain the total number of units of A in operation.

The hall computer 50 can determine the setting value set in each gaming machine 10 based on the setting value information stored in the storage unit 53 (second determination means of the present invention).
Therefore, the hall computer 50 can determine whether each gaming machine 10 is a "high setting table" or not, and can determine whether the gaming machine 10 is a "high setting table" and an "operating table". It can be determined as a "high setting operating table".
As a result, the hall computer 50 can specify the "high setting operating units" of the model A in the specific time period, and by summing up these, it is possible to obtain the high setting operating number of the model A in the specific time period. can.

The hall computer 50 determines the "high number of machines A operating in the Calculate the "proportion of the set operating number".
Specifically, "the number of operating machines with high setting of model A in a specific time zone"/"the total number of operating machines of model A in a specific time zone" is calculated.
The higher the ratio of the number of units in operation with high settings to the total number of units in operation of the target model in the specific time period, the higher the possibility of setting leakage for the target model.
For this reason, if the ``proportion of the number of high setting units to the total number of target models in operation during a specific time period'' exceeds a predetermined reference value (for example, 50%), it is determined that the possibility of setting leakage is high for the target model. can do.

However, the reference value is preferably set to a value corresponding to the installation ratio of the high set number of target models actually installed in the game arcade.
This is because, irrespective of the presence or absence of setting leakage, when the installation ratio of the high setting table is high, the possibility of playing on the high setting table inevitably increases.
For example, if there are 20 game machines 10 of model A, of which 16 are high setting machines and 4 are low setting machines, the probability that the high setting machines are selected is 80% (=16 20 units), and the high setting units are more likely to be selected than when the installation ratio of the high setting units is lower than this (for example, 4 high setting units and 16 low setting units).
Therefore, for example, as shown in FIG. 25, it is preferable to set a value obtained by multiplying the "proportion of high setting units to all models" by a predetermined numerical value (1.5 to 4.0) as the reference value.
In addition, as shown in FIG. 25, a plurality of reference values can be provided according to the level of setting leakage possibility (low, medium, high, very high).

As a specific example, there are 20 gaming machines 10 of the model A, and among them, the number of high setting machines is 4 and the number of low setting machines is 16. Determination will be described.
In this case, the "proportion of high setting units to the total number of models" of model A is 20% (=4 units/20 units).
For this reason, if the "percentage of high-setting operating units to all operating units" is less than 30% (= 20% x 1.5), the possibility of setting leakage is "low", 30% (= 20% x 1.5) ) or more and less than 50% (=20%×2.5), the setting leakage possibility is “medium”, 50% (=20%×2.5) or more and 80% (=20%×2.5) 4.0), it can be determined that the set leakage possibility is “high”, and if it is 80% (=20%×4.0) or more, it can be determined that the set leakage possibility is “very high”.
For example, if there are 16 units of model A in operation during a specific time period, and 3 of them are high setting units (high setting operation units), the "proportion of high setting operation units to all operating units" is about Since it is 23% (=3 units/16 units), the possibility of setting leakage for model A is determined to be "low".
In addition, if the total number of operating units of model A in a specific time period is 10, and 4 of them are high-setting units (high-setting operating units), the "proportion of high-setting operating units to all operating units" is 40. % (=4 units/10 units), the possibility of setting leakage for model A is judged to be "medium".
The hall computer 50, as output means, outputs predetermined notification information based on such determination results (determination results based on the determination results by the first determination means and the determination results by the second determination means) (see FIG. 26). ).

FIG. 26 shows an example of a notification screen displaying notification information about the determination result of the model A on the display unit 54. (a) is a notification screen when the possibility of setting leakage is "low", (c) shows a notification screen when the possibility of setting leakage is "high", and (d) shows a notification screen when the possibility of setting leakage is "very high".
As shown in FIG. 26A, when the possibility of setting leakage is "low", characters of "low" are displayed in black.
As shown in FIG. 26(b), when the possibility of setting leakage is "medium", the characters of "medium" are displayed in red characters that stand out more than black characters.
As shown in FIG. 26(c), when the possibility of setting leakage is "high", in addition to displaying the letters "high" in red letters, there is a pattern (jagged pattern) to make the letters stand out more. is displayed.
As shown in FIG. 26(d), when the possibility of setting leakage is "very high", the letters "very high" are displayed in red, and a pattern (such as a jagged pattern) that makes the letters stand out around the letters. In addition to displaying , a symbol (such as an alert symbol) that calls attention is displayed.
As shown in these figures, the higher the possibility of setting leakage, the more attention-grabbing the notification screen can be displayed for notification.
Therefore, the administrator of the amusement arcade or the like can easily grasp the possibility and degree of leakage of settings for the target machine type by simply looking at such a notification screen.

By the way, in amusement arcades, the act of securing the gaming machine 10 in a state in which the player is not playing by placing belongings such as cigarettes and lighters on the receiving tray of the gaming machine 10 (securing a keep stand). ) may be performed.
Here, if a fraudulent person related to the leakage of settings learns the specifications of "7." time zone), it is conceivable to simply secure a high setting table as a keep table and play a game on that high setting table after the elapse of a specific time period.
That is, since the determination of "7." above is targeted to the "operating table" in the "specific time period", immediately after the opening of the business, it is only secured as a keep table and the game is not performed immediately, and after a predetermined time has elapsed By playing a game, it is assumed that the possibility of setting leakage is determined to be "low".
Therefore, in order to deal with fraudulent acts using such "keep table", the judgment method of "8." to "9." was made to increase

[8. Judgment based on the ratio of high setting operation table (including keep table)]
The determination of the possibility of setting leakage based on the ratio of high setting operating tables (including keep tables) will be described.
This determination is made by including the "keep table" in the operation table in "7.".
Specifically, the ratio of the number of units in operation with high setting (including the number of units with high setting kept) to the total number of operating units of the target model (including the number of units kept with high setting) during a specific time period is calculated, and the setting is leaked based on the calculated ratio. perform the possibility judgment.
The reason why the "keep table" is included in the operation table is to deal with the fraudulent act using the above-mentioned keep table.

The hall computer 50 determines whether or not there is a gaming machine 10 (keep stand) secured in a state where no game is played by a player in the gaming arcade (first determination means of the present invention).
The determination as to whether or not there is a keep stand can be made, for example, by the following methods (1) to (3).
(1) Whether or not the hall computer 50 has received the keep table information transmitted from a device such as a terminal or a remote control (hereinafter referred to as a remote control device) possessed by the store clerk.
For example, the hall computer 50 is provided with a remote control receiving section capable of receiving keep table information based on an infrared signal transmitted from a remote control device. Predetermined keep table information can be transmitted to the hall computer 50 from.
Therefore, the hall computer 50 can determine that there is a keep table based on the reception of the keep table information.
(2) Whether or not the image data received from the corresponding game machine 10 (receiving tray, etc.) can be photographed by a camera provided in the game hall, and the player's belongings are included in the image data received from the camera.
For example, the sand 20 with counting function for each machine is provided with a camera capable of imaging the saucer of the corresponding game machine 10, and this camera takes an image of the saucer during a specific time zone.
The sand 20 with each machine counting function transmits image data of the saucer portion imaged by the camera to the hall computer 50 together with the machine number of the corresponding game machine 10 .
The hall computer 50 is provided with an image identifying means in advance, and thereby determines whether or not the player's belongings (cigarettes, lighters, etc.) are included in the imaging data received from the sand 20 with each machine counting function. can be determined.
(3) When a card is inserted in the sand 20 with a counting function for each machine, information (card insertion information) indicating that is output, and whether or not the hall computer 50 receives the information. .
The hall computer 50 can determine that there is a keep table while receiving the card insertion information.

In (1) to (3), the remote control device and the sand 20 with the counting function for each machine transmit the machine number and time of the machine (hereinafter referred to as "keeping time") together with the machine machine information, imaging data, and card insertion information. The hall computer 50 stores the received information in the storage unit 53 as the history information of the keep table.
Therefore, based on the history information stored in the storage unit 53, the hall computer 50 can specify not only whether there is a keep stand for the target model in a specific time period, but also when the target model was kept. can be done.
The hall computer 50 can obtain the number of keep machines of the model A in a specific time period.
The hall computer 50 totals the total number of operating models A in the specific time period and the number of kept models A in the specified time zone, and calculates the total number as the "total number of operating model A in the specified time period (keep number including)”.

The hall computer 50 can determine the setting value set in each gaming machine based on the setting value information stored in the storage unit 53 (first determination means).
Therefore, the hall computer 50, based on the determination result by the first determination means and the determination result by the second determination means, the gaming machine 10 (hereinafter referred to as "high setting "Keep stand") can be determined.
Specifically, among the gaming machines determined by the second determination means to be set with a high set value, the game machines determined by the first determination means to be the keep table are determined to be the high set value keep table. can be done. Of the game machines determined to be the keep table by the first determination means, the game machine determined to have the high setting value set by the second determination means can also be determined to be the high set keep table.
The hall computer 50 can specify the high setting keep level of the model A in the specific time period, and can obtain the number of high setting keep levels of the model A in the specific time period by totalizing these.
The hall computer 50 sums the number of models A kept at high setting in the specific time period and the number of models A operating at high setting in the specific time period, and calculates the total number of machines as "high setting operation of model A in the specific time period." Number of units (including the number of units with high settings kept)”.
Then, the hall computer 50 determines based on "the total number of operating models A in a specific time period (including the number of kept machines)" and "the number of high setting operating models A in a specific time zone (including the number of high setting kept machines)". , the "proportion of the number of high setting operating units (including the high setting keeping number) to the total operating number of model A (including the keeping number)" in the specific time period.
Specifically, "the number of models A operating at high setting in a specific time period (including the number of machines keeping high setting)"/"the total number of machines A operating in a specific time period (including the number of machines kept at high setting)" is calculated.
The higher the ratio of the number of machines operating at high settings (number of machines with high settings kept) to the total number of machines in operation (including the number of machines kept at high settings) in a specific time period, the higher the possibility of leakage of settings for the target machine.
As a result, the "ratio of the high setting number (including the high setting keeping number) to the total operating number of the target model (including the keeping number) in the specific time period" exceeds a predetermined reference value (for example, 50%) In this case, it can be determined that the target model has a high possibility of setting leakage.

As shown in FIG. 27, the reference value in this case can also be set according to the ratio of high setting units to the total number of models and the degree of possibility of setting leakage.
As a specific example, there are 20 game machines of model A, and among them, the number of high setting machines is 4 and the number of low setting machines is 16. Determination will be described.
In this case, the "proportion of high setting units to the total number of models" of model A is 20% (=4 units/20 units).
For this reason, if the "proportion of high setting operating units (including high setting keeping units) to all operating units (including high setting keeping units)" is less than 30%, the possibility of setting leakage is "low", 30% or more, and , if it is less than 50%, the possibility of setting leakage is ``medium''; if it is 50% or more and less than 80%, the possibility of setting leakage is ``high''; be judged.
For example, for model A in a specific time period, if there are 14 total operating units, 2 keeping units, 2 high setting operating units, and 1 high setting keeping unit, then "all operating units (including keep number ) is about 23% (=3 units/16 units).
Also, for model A in a specific time period, if the total number of operating units is 8, the number of keep units is 2, the number of high setting operation units is 2, and the number of high setting keep units is 2, the total number of units in operation (including the number of keep units) ) is 40% (=4 units/10 units).
The hall computer 50 can output predetermined notification information based on the determination result, as in "7." above (see FIG. 26).
In addition, here, the judgment was made based on the "percentage of the number of units in operation with high setting (including the number of units with high setting) to the total number of units in operation (including the number of keep units)", but the number of keep units is not included in the total number of units in operation. can also
That is, the determination can also be made based on the "proportion of the number of operating machines with the high setting (including the number of machines keeping the high setting) to the total number of operating machines".

[9. Judgment based on the ratio of high setting keep stand]
Next, the setting leakage possibility determination based on the ratio of the high setting keep level will be described.
Specifically, the ratio of the number of high setting keep units to the total number of keep units of the target model in a specific time period is calculated, and the possibility of setting leakage is determined based on the calculated ratio.
The purpose of targeting the "keep table" is to deal with the above-mentioned fraudulent use of the keep table.
The reason for using the "specific time zone" is the same reason as in "7." above.

The hall computer 50 can obtain the total number of cars of the model A kept in the specific time zone based on the determination result by the first determination means.
That is, since the first determining means can determine the number of keep units of model A in a specific time period, the total number of keep units of model A in a specific time period is obtained by summing up these determined keep units. be able to.
Further, the hall computer 50 sets the high setting keep table based on the determination result by the first determination means for the gaming machine determined by the second determination means to have the high set value (first game set value) set. can judge.
That is, among the high setting bases determined by the second determining means, the gaming machine determined as the keeping base by the first determining means can be determined as the "high setting keeping base".
Therefore, the hall computer 50 can determine the high setting keep level of the model A in the specific time period, and by totaling these, can obtain the "high setting keep number" of the model A in the specific time period. can.
The hall computer 50 determines the "high setting ratio among the total number of models A kept in the specific time period" based on the "total number of models A kept in the specific time period" and "the number of models A kept in the high setting in the specific time period". Calculate the ratio of the number of cars kept.
Specifically, "the number of models A kept at a high setting in a specific time period"/"the total number of models A kept in a specific time period" is calculated.
The larger the "proportion of the number of high setting keeps to the total number of keep of the target model in the specific time period", the higher the possibility of the setting leakage of the target model.
For this reason, if the "percentage of the number of high setting keep units among the total number of keep units of the target model in a specific time period" exceeds a predetermined reference value (for example, 50%), the possibility of the setting leakage of the target model is high. can judge.

As shown in FIG. 28, the reference value in this case can also be set according to the ratio of high setting units to the entire model and the degree of possibility of setting leakage.
As a specific example, there are 20 game machines of model A, and among them, the number of high setting machines is 4 and the number of low setting machines is 16. Determination will be described.
In this case, the "proportion of high setting units to the total number of models" of model A is 20% (=4 units/20 units).
For this reason, if the ratio of high-setting keep units to all keep units is less than 30%, the possibility of setting leak is ``low'', and if it is 30% or more and less than 50%, the possibility of setting leak is ``medium''. , 50% or more and less than 80%, the possibility of setting leakage is judged to be "high", and when it is 80% or more, the possibility of setting leakage is judged to be "very high".

For example, if the total number of keep units of model A in a specific time period is 8, and 4 units among them are high setting units (high setting keep units), the “ratio of high setting keep units to all keep units” is 50. % (=4 machines/8 machines), so the possibility of setting leakage of model A is determined to be "high".
In addition, if there are 5 machines in total for model A during a specific time period, and 4 of them are high setting machines (high setting operating machines), the "proportion of the number of high setting machines to the total number of keeping machines" is Since it is 90% (=4 units/5 units), the possibility of the setting leakage of the model A is judged to be "very high".
The hall computer 50 can output predetermined notification information based on the determination result, as in "7." above (see FIG. 26).

"10. Judgment based on the initial investment amount of the big winning player"
Determination based on the initial investment amount of the big winning player will be explained.
Specifically, this determination is based on whether or not the initial investment amount (investment amount until the first hit) is abnormal by specifying a player who has played a game at a high setting table and has won more than a set amount. , to determine the possibility of setting leakage.
This is because, when there is setting leakage, there is a high possibility of winning big because the game is played on a high setting table.
Also, since the fraudulent person is sure of winning, he or she will continue to invest even if the period until the first win is long, resulting in a large initial investment amount.
For this reason, the hall computer 50 first extracts from the transaction history the game periods in which the game was played on the high setting table, and extracts the game periods in which the player won more than the set amount from the extracted game periods. do.
"A player has won more than a set amount" means that the player's balls are converted into money at a predetermined exchange rate, and the winning/losing amount obtained by subtracting the investment amount from this amount is the set amount (for example, 50,000 yen). ), an affirmative determination can be made.
Then, the hall computer 50 determines the possibility of setting leakage based on the extracted initial investment amount (referred to as the large win initial investment amount) in the game period.
For example, when the large win initial investment amount is equal to or greater than an abnormal value set in advance by an administrator or the like, it is determined that there is a high possibility that the setting has been leaked, and a notification to that effect can be made.
Outliers can also be calculated based on the distribution of big win initial investment amounts.
For example, it is possible to find the average value of the initial investment amount for big wins in the past, and set 2.5 times the average value as the abnormal value.
Note that the abnormal value and the magnification for obtaining the abnormal value can be any numerical value or magnification.
Also, the strength of the notification can be adjusted according to the number of times or frequency of abnormality determination.
For example, when the number of abnormality determinations exceeds a predetermined number, it is possible to notify that there is a high possibility that the settings have been leaked (see FIGS. 26(c) and (d)).

"11. Judgment based on the difference between the high setting table and the low setting table"
Next, the determination based on the difference between the high setting table and the low setting table will be described.
For example, the ratio of the keep table to the high setting table (first ratio) and the ratio of the keep table to the low setting table (second ratio) are compared, and if the first ratio is higher than the second ratio, It is possible to determine and notify that there is a high possibility of setting leakage.
In "8." and "9." above, the judgment was made based on the ratio of "high setting keep table" to the total number of operating tables and keep tables, but here it is based on the ratio with low setting table to make a decision.
Further, determination and notification can be made based on the difference between the average operation start time of the high setting base and the average operation start time of the low setting base.
For example, the average time of operation start times of the high setting base is calculated, and the average time of operation start time of the low setting base is calculated.
As a result, for example, when the average operation start time of the high setting unit is earlier than the average operation start time of the low setting unit by a predetermined time (reference value) or more, it is determined and notified that there is a high possibility of setting leakage. It can be performed.
In order to deal with fraudulent acts using the keep table, it is also effective to regard the "keep time" of the high setting table and the low setting table as the "operation start time" and perform the same determination.

"12. Judgment based on frequent change of card ID"
Next, the determination based on frequent card ID changes will be described.
In the above "1." to "3.", etc., the game period, which is the period from the start of the game to the end of the game of one player, is specified for each player, and the investment amount of the player specified for each game period Based on the above, it is determined whether or not there is an abnormality related to the leakage of settings.
For this reason, if a fraudulent person who learns of such a specification does not behave as if one game period in which the game was originally played by one fraudulent person is judged as a plurality of game periods in which a game was played by a plurality of players. Therefore, it is assumed that the user tries to avoid the judgment of abnormality.

For example, an unauthorized person inserts 1,000 yen in cash into a sand 20 with a counting function for each machine → stores 1,000 yen in the card (card ID 001) → lends out 500 yen → returns the card (card ID 001) → inserts 1,000 yen in cash. → Store 1,000 yen on the card (card ID 002) → Lend 500 yen → Return the card (card ID 002) → Insert 1,000 yen in cash → Store 1,000 yen on the card (card ID 003) → Insert cash → The hall computer 50 judges that the player has changed each time the cash is inserted by repeating the behavior of lending a small amount of cash and returning the card.
As a result, in the hall computer 50, the investment amount in each game period is calculated to be smaller than the actual investment amount, and as a result, even if the investment amount is actually abnormal, it is not judged to be abnormal. , there is a case where the setting leakage is overlooked.

Therefore, in order to cope with the behavior of such a fraudulent person, when the card ID is frequently changed with a small amount of money, it is determined and notified that there is a possibility of setting leakage.
For example, when the card ID changes more than a predetermined number of times (eg, 10 times) within a predetermined time period (eg, 30 minutes) on a high setting table, an abnormality is determined and notified.
In this case, it is judged to be in a caution-required state, and the corresponding card ID is stored. or notification can be made.
In addition, when a different card ID is detected in a state advantageous to the player such as during probability variation or during a big hit, game information such as investment amounts before and after the change of the card ID can be combined into one.
As a result, for example, in the determination of "1.", the investment amount of the winning player in one game period can be accurately obtained, and the determination accuracy can be improved.
In addition, in the determination of “10.”, the winning/losing amount (winning amount) in one game period can be obtained accurately, and the determination accuracy can be improved.

"13. Judgment based on the detection of a player who is moving on a high setting platform"
Next, the determination based on the detection of the player who is moving on the high setting scale will be described.
This is because there is a high possibility that a player who moves only on the high setting table has obtained information on the high setting table due to setting leakage.
For example, in the case of a member, the hall computer 50 can identify the machine movement history of the member over multiple business days based on the game history and transaction history for multiple business days.
In the case of a non-member, the hall computer 50 can identify the table movement history of the non-member in one business day based on the game history and transaction history in one business day.
As a result, for example, when the rate of movement from a high setting table to a high setting table is equal to or greater than a predetermined value (reference value), when it is determined that only high setting tables are moved, there is a high possibility of setting leakage. can be determined and notified.

"14. Judgment based on the fact that the constant low setting base is changed to the high setting base"
Next, the determination based on the fact that the game machine 10, which has always been at the low setting level, is changed to the high setting level will be described.
For example, for a predetermined period of time (for example, 20 business days), the setting value is monitored for the low setting table on which the low setting value is set, and when the target game machine 10 sets the high setting value, It is possible to determine and notify that caution is required.
The notification can cause the display unit 54 to display notification information including the machine number of the gaming machine 10 and the like.
For this reason, the manager or the like may think that there is a high possibility that the settings have been leaked when a high setting value is set even though the game machine 10 that has been informed should originally be a low setting base. can judge.
The notification can be made not only in the hall computer 50 but also in an external device such as a management server connected to the hall computer 50 via the Internet.
Therefore, a manager or owner outside the store can know the possibility of setting leakage through the external device.

"15. Judgment based on the number of outs per unit time for each player"
Next, the determination based on the unit time amount of the number of outs for each player will be described.
A cheater who finds out about the high setting due to the leakage of the setting should continue playing the game, sparing no rest time such as meals.
On the other hand, general players often play games while taking breaks.
Therefore, it is assumed that the number of outs per unit time of dishonest players is larger than the number of outs of general players per unit time.
Therefore, it is set when the number of outs for each player on the high setting table per unit time is greater than the number of outs for each player for all players per unit time, and such a case is detected a predetermined number of times. Judgment and notification to the effect that there is a high possibility of leakage.
For example, the average value of the number of outs per 30 minutes on the high setting table of model A is a predetermined multiple (for example, 1.5 times) or more than the average value of the number of outs per 30 minutes of all model A, and If such a case is detected a predetermined number of times (for example, five times) or more, it is possible to determine and notify that there is a high possibility of setting leakage.
It should be noted that other game information, such as the number of safes, can be applied without being limited to the number of outs.

<Other Features of Judgment Program>
The determination program is stored in the storage unit 53 of the hall computer 50, and causes the control unit 55 of the hall computer 50 to determine the possibility of setting leakage according to the operation of the input unit 51, and the determination result is displayed on the display unit. 54.
In such a hall computer 50, an account can be provided for each store clerk, and the above operations and browsing can be performed only when authentication such as an ID and password is passed (only in a logged-in state).
As a result, it is possible to restrict the above operation and browsing so that only a specific store clerk can do it.
Also, for example, when the content of the determination program is changed, such as when the reference value for setting leakage determination is changed, history information such as who made the change, when, and how is stored in the storage unit 53. can be done.
Therefore, if a salesclerk changes the reference value for the purpose of complicit in setting leakage, the salesclerk can be identified.
Further, the operation and viewing in the hall computer 50 can be remotely operated and viewed from an external device.
Specifically, based on the remote desktop function installed in the OS of the hall computer 50, by connecting the hall computer 50 and an external device via the Internet, the setting screen and setting history of the determination program in each store can be viewed. , can be made viewable from an external device.
It is also possible to upgrade the version of the determination program from an external device.
For example, it is possible by downloading and installing an update program from an external device to the hall computer 50 .
As a result, even if there are a plurality of arcades to be upgraded, such as affiliated game arcades, the upgrade can be efficiently performed by batch transmission from an external device.

As described above, according to the hall computer 50, which is a game device of the present invention, the possibility of setting leakage can be accurately determined.
For example, in addition to high-level tables that are in operation during a specific period of time within a certain period of time from the start of business, we will also consider high-level tables on which personal belongings are placed (kept) during the specific period of time as operating tables. Therefore, it is possible to effectively prevent fraudulent acts using such a keep stand.
On the other hand, conventional gaming machines cannot prevent fraudulent acts such as playing games on a high setting table after a predetermined time has passed since the start of business.
For example, in the gaming machine disclosed in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2008-279121, if a game is played on a high setting table after a predetermined period of time has passed since the start of business, it will not be determined that there is a possibility of setting leakage. By not playing the game with the belongings placed on the high setting table for a predetermined period of time and playing the game after the predetermined period of time has passed, it is not determined that there is a possibility of the setting leakage even though the setting is leaked. There was fear.
According to the game device of the present invention, all or part of the problems that conventional game devices should be improved can be solved.

Although the preferred embodiments of the gaming device of the present invention have been described above, the gaming device according to the present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments, and various modifications can be made within the scope of the present invention. It goes without saying that there is.
For example, in the above-described embodiment, an example was shown in which the transaction information in the sand 20 with each machine counting function was output to the hall computer 50 via other gaming devices such as the machine computer 30 and the island computer 40. You may output to the computer 50. FIG.
Also, the game machine 10 may be a so-called enclosed type game machine that uses game media in a data format instead of actual game balls or tokens.

Also, the game period can be specified based on game information such as out information and safe information output from the gaming machine 10 instead of the game information (transaction information) output from the sand 20 with each machine counting function.
For example, the game machine is in operation while the out information is being output, and the game machine is not in operation while the out information is not being output. The game period can be specified by regarding the timing as the start time of the game and the timing at which the output of the out information is switched from yes to no as the end time of the game.
Also, the above-mentioned "investment amount" can include the concept of "number of balls used".

10 game machine (10a pachinko machine, 10b slot machine)
20 Sand with counting function for each machine 50 Hall computer (game device)
53 storage unit 54 display unit 55 control unit

Claims (7)

A game hall capable of installing a plurality of gaming machines with a higher probability that a game progresses advantageously when a first game setting value is set as a game setting value than when a second game setting value is set. In the game device capable of collecting game information of the game machine,
a first determination means capable of determining whether or not the gaming machine is secured by a player who is not playing a game in the gaming arcade;
a second determination means capable of determining a game setting value set in a game machine installed in the game arcade;
output means capable of outputting predetermined information based on the determination result by the first determination means and the determination result by the second determination means;
A game device characterized by comprising: A third determination means capable of determining whether or not the game machine is a game machine in which a player is playing a game in the game hall,
The output means is
Predetermined information can be output based on the number of vehicles based on the determination result of the first determination means, the number of vehicles based on the determination result of the second determination means, and the number of vehicles based on the determination result of the third determination means. 2. A game device according to claim 1, characterized in that: The output means is
Predetermined information based on the determination result by the first determination means and the determination result by the first determination means for the gaming machine determined by the second determination means that the first game set value is set 3. The game device according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that it is capable of outputting . The first determination means is
4. A determination is made as to whether or not the gaming machine is secured in a state in which no game is played by a player in the gaming arcade during a specific time period. The game device described in . A third determination means capable of determining whether or not the game machine is a game machine in which a player is playing a game in the game hall,
The third determination means is
5. The gaming machine according to any one of claims 2 to 4, wherein it is determined whether or not the gaming machine is a gaming machine in which a player is playing a game in a specific time zone. Device. 6. The gaming device according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein said predetermined information is information relating to leakage of said game setting values. A game hall capable of installing a plurality of gaming machines with a higher probability that a game progresses advantageously when a first game setting value is set as a game setting value than when a second game setting value is set. , the computer of the game device capable of collecting the game information of the game machine,
a first determination means capable of determining whether or not there is a gaming machine secured by a player who is not playing a game in the gaming arcade;
a second determination means capable of determining a game set value set in a gaming machine installed in the game hall; and based on the determination result of the first determination means and the determination result of the second determination means. and output means capable of outputting predetermined information.

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