EP3504688A1 - Dispositif de fermeture à clé radio pour un véhicule automobile, véhicule automobile et procédé permettant de faire fonctionner le dispositif de fermeture - Google Patents

Dispositif de fermeture à clé radio pour un véhicule automobile, véhicule automobile et procédé permettant de faire fonctionner le dispositif de fermeture

Info

Publication number
EP3504688A1
EP3504688A1 EP17732434.0A EP17732434A EP3504688A1 EP 3504688 A1 EP3504688 A1 EP 3504688A1 EP 17732434 A EP17732434 A EP 17732434A EP 3504688 A1 EP3504688 A1 EP 3504688A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signal
motor vehicle
radio
closing device
time interval
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP17732434.0A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Tobias GEIER
Frank Müller
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Audi AG
Original Assignee
Audi AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Audi AG filed Critical Audi AG
Publication of EP3504688A1 publication Critical patent/EP3504688A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
    • H04K3/28—Countermeasures against jamming with jamming and anti-jamming mechanisms both included in a same device or system, e.g. wherein anti-jamming includes prevention of undesired self-jamming resulting from jamming
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/42—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming frequency or wavelength
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
    • H04K3/82—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection
    • H04K3/825—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection by jamming
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00388—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks code verification carried out according to the challenge/response method
    • G07C2009/00396—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks code verification carried out according to the challenge/response method starting with prompting the keyless data carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/16—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for telephony
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/18—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for wireless local area networks or WLAN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/22—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for communication related to vehicles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/43—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming power, signal-to-noise ratio or geographic coverage area
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/45—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by including monitoring of the target or target signal, e.g. in reactive jammers or follower jammers for example by means of an alternation of jamming phases and monitoring phases, called "look-through mode"
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
    • H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal

Definitions

  • Radio key closing device for a motor vehicle, motor vehicle and method for operating the closing device
  • the invention relates to a locking device for a motor vehicle, by means of which the motor vehicle can be unlocked using a so-called remote control key.
  • the invention also includes the motor vehicle with the locking device and a method for operating the locking device.
  • a locking device which can be unlocked by means of a radio key, can provide that a transmitting device searches for or stimulates the radio key in the vicinity of the motor vehicle by means of a request signal and then authorizes it using a response signal of the radio key. With the request signal and / or the response signal predetermined data and / secrets are exchanged via a radio interface. Due to the limited transmission ranges of the request signal and of the response signal as well as by an optional location of the radio key, the use of the radio key is forced to a predetermined surrounding area adjacent to the motor vehicle. Outside the surrounding area, the radio key is ineffective.
  • the request signal of the locking device in the vicinity of the motor vehicle is detected and extended to a greater distance than the said surrounding area provides.
  • a theft device can be used, which provides a vehicle-related part and a key-close part.
  • the request signal of the locking device is received and transmitted by means of radio communication, for example via a WLAN connection (WLAN - Wireless Local Area Network) or a mobile radio connection, to the part close to the key. This then sends out the request signal in the original frequency range again. So will the surrounding area increases beyond the originally defined boundary of the surrounding area.
  • this response signal is transmitted again from the key part close to the theft device via the said radio communication to the vehicle-related part, where it is radiated back to the motor vehicle in the original frequency range of the response signal.
  • the motor vehicle can thereby react in the same way as if the radio key had been operated directly in the surrounding area itself.
  • access and start of the motor vehicle is also possible if the radio key is located outside the surrounding area, eg in a residential building.
  • a theft device which can be operated in the manner described is known, for example, from DE 10 2014 010 668 A1.
  • the radio key and the locking device in this case transmit their signals at a level at which a signal change takes place in a special pattern.
  • a locking device can detect a radio link between the said vehicle-near and the key-near part of a theft device and then the motor vehicle does not release. For this purpose, it is checked whether a signal received outside a useful frequency band is permanently present or whether it is a manipulated code signal.
  • the invention has for its object to complicate the use of a theft device for the described range extension (relay attack).
  • the invention provides a closing device for a motor vehicle.
  • the closing device has a sensor de autism, which is adapted to emit depending on a predetermined Ausittleereignis a request signal in an environment of the motor vehicle.
  • a trigger event for example, the operation of a door handle of the motor vehicle and / or the approach of a person to the motor vehicle can be detected or detected.
  • the request signal may be a radio signal, which is in particular a so-called LF signal (LF - low frequency), which is emitted in a frequency range of less than one megahertz, in particular less than 500 kilohertz. If there is a vehicle key in the area, it may send a response signal in response to the request signal.
  • LF signal LF - low frequency
  • the locking device accordingly has a receiving device, which is set up to receive or receive the response signal of the remote control key from the surroundings within a predetermined time interval from the time the request signal is transmitted in a predetermined frequency range.
  • the response signal is a so-called RF signal (RF high frequency) which is transmitted in a frequency range which is above one megahertz, in particular above 100 megahertz.
  • RF signal RF high frequency
  • a frequency bandwidth of the response signal is known.
  • a control device is set up to unlock at least one lap of the locking device if the response signal is received within the said time interval.
  • the time interval may have a length or duration in a range of 0.1 second to 5 seconds.
  • the control device no longer responds to a then arriving response signal.
  • the at least one key of the locking device is unlocked only upon receipt of the response signal within the time interval.
  • the locking device has an evaluation module which is set up to emit, ie, for example, an interference radio signal by means of the transmission device before and / or during, but at least after the transmission of the request signal within or during the said time interval Noise and / or a predetermined signal pattern.
  • the interference signal is emitted at at least one frequency which is outside the said frequency range for the response signal.
  • the evaluation device does not disturb the response signal of the radio key itself by means of the interference signal. Instead, at least one radio frequency is generated at the at least one radio frequency outside the frequency range of the response signal.
  • the interfering radio signal is characterized in that it is transmitted in order to interrupt or disturb the radio traffic already present at the at least one radio frequency.
  • the evaluation module is in particular configured to generate or transmit the interfering radio signal in response to an activation signal of the control device or directly or indirectly as a function of the triggering event.
  • the attempt is thwarted to provide within the said time interval, the response signal from a remote radio key to the motor vehicle.
  • the forwarding of the request signal and / or the feedback of the response signal can be disturbed by means of the interference radio signal.
  • the radio communication between the vehicle-related part and the part of the theft-related part of the theft device is disturbed and / or interrupted by means of the interference signal.
  • the invention also includes optional developments, by the characteristics of which additional benefits.
  • the evaluation module is set up to set the at least one radio frequency of the interference radio signal such that a radio frequency of a WLAN standard and / or a mobile radio standard (for example, GSM, LTE, UMTS) is included or included.
  • a WLAN communication and / or mobile radio communication is disturbed by means of the interference signal.
  • a relay attack that is disguised as WLAN communication and / or mobile radio communication can also be disturbed.
  • a reinitialization of a mobile radio connection and / or WLAN connection is preferably effected. This causes only a brief interruption, for example, a voice connection or data transmission in a smartphone. Additionally or alternatively, it can be provided to reduce a signal-to-noise ratio of a mobile radio connection and / or WLAN connection in a predetermined area around the motor vehicle by at least a factor of 2 by means of the interference radio signal. This is also called jamming. In other words, the transmitting device is operated as a so-called mobile phone jammer.
  • Even less disturbance of a voice connection and / or data connection eg of a smartphone is caused by the interference radio signal in that the evaluation module is set up to pulsate the interference signal. witness. This can be done in such a way that although the forwarding of the request signal and / or response signal is delayed or disturbed, but, for example, a telephone connection (voice connection) only short-term dropouts and noise (eg cracking), which is a continuation of a communication for the Allow users, for example, a smartphone.
  • the receiving device is set up before and / or during the time interval for radio communication at which the motor vehicle itself is not involved in detecting outside the frequency range of the response signal and generating the interference signal only if such radio communication has been detected.
  • a transmitter is detected in the vicinity of the motor vehicle whose transmission power is, for example, greater than a predetermined threshold value. Then it can be assumed that this transmitter is located close to the motor vehicle and possibly used for the forwarding of the request signal of the locking device.
  • the transmitting device is adapted to set a transmission strength of the interference signal, for example, a transmission power and / or transmitter amplitude, such that a transmission range of the interfering radio signal is at most three times as large, in particular at most twice as large as a transmission range of the request signal of the transmitting device.
  • the range can be measured, for example, by comparing the signal strength of the interference signal and the request signal. With a range that is twice as large, for example, the transmission power of the interference signal at a given distance is twice as large as that of the request signal.
  • the said motor vehicle according to the invention results from providing the locking device according to the invention in a motor vehicle.
  • the Motor vehicle according to the invention is preferably designed as a motor vehicle, in particular as a passenger car.
  • the request device is sent by the transmitting device of the locking device in response to the predetermined triggering event in the environment of the motor vehicle and checked by means of the receiving device of the closing device, whether within a predetermined time interval from the sending of the request signal in a predetermined frequency range, a response signal Radio key is received from the environment.
  • a response signal Radio key is received from the environment.
  • the response signal is received, at least one lock of the closing device is unlocked by the control device of the closing device.
  • the interfering radio signal is transmitted by the evaluation module by means of the transmitting device as a function of the triggering event during the time interval at at least one radio frequency lying outside said frequency range.
  • the transmitting device used and the receiving device used may each be devices known from the prior art.
  • a transmitter other than the transmitter used for the request signal can be used to generate the interference signal.
  • a different receiver may be used than it is provided for receiving a response signal.
  • the invention also includes developments of the method according to the invention having features as they have already been described in connection with the developments of the locking device according to the invention. For this reason, the corresponding further developments of the method according to the invention are not described again here.
  • FIG. Shows a schematic representation of an embodiment of the motor vehicle according to the invention during a relay attack.
  • the figure shows a motor vehicle 10, which may be, for example, a motor vehicle, in particular a passenger car or truck.
  • a theft device 12 and a remote control key 13 are shown in an environment 11 of the motor vehicle 10.
  • the theft device 12 may have a vehicle-related part 14 and a part 15 close to the wrench.
  • the two parts 14.1 5 are connected via a radio communication 16 with each other.
  • the motor vehicle 10 may have a closing device 17 by means of which an electrically and / or pneumatically adjustable ski 18 of a vehicle door 19 can be unlocked. By means of the closing device 17 also several locks can be controlled in the manner described.
  • the locking device 17 makes it possible to unlock the motor vehicle 10 by means of the wireless key 13 by radio.
  • the closing device 17 in the illustrated motor vehicle 10 may comprise a control device 20, an evaluation module 21 and a transceiver device 22, which is divided in the motor vehicle 10 in such a way that communication or data exchange with the radio key 13, a first transceiver part 23 is provided on the control device 20.
  • a second transceiver section 24 may be provided, e.g. can also be coupled to an infotainment system (information-entertainment system) of the motor vehicle 10.
  • the control device 20 can detect a triggering event 25, for example the actuation of a door latch of the vehicle door 19 and can then issue a request signal 26 as a radio signal to the environment 11 in response to the detected triggering event 25 by means of the transceiver part 23. If the owner of the motor vehicle 10 with the remote key 13 is not received in the environment 1 1, but, for example, the radio key 13 is located, for example, in a residential building, the remote key 13 is located outside the transmission range of the request signal 26 and thus does not respond to the request signal 26th By means of the theft device 12, however, the described relay attack can be carried out. For this purpose, the request signal 26 is received by the vehicle-related part 14 and transmitted via the radio communication 16 to the key-near part 15, which may be placed, for example, in front of said residential building.
  • the request signal 26 can be reproduced, so that a reproduced request signal 26 'is received, which is received by the radio key 13.
  • the radio key 13 responds to the reproduced request signal 26 'in the way it would do to the request signal 26 even in the environment 1 1.
  • the radio key 13 accordingly generates a response signal 27 which, however, can not be received by the transceiver part 23 due to the great distance to the radio key 13. Instead, the response signal 27 is received by the key-near part 15 and transmitted via the radio communication 16 to the vehicle-related part 14.
  • the near-vehicle portion 14 may generate a reproduced response signal 27 'which is received by the transceiver portion 23 of the shutter 17 and recognized in the same manner as the response signal 27 itself.
  • the control device 20 actuates or activates or unlocks the lock 18 only if after the transmission of the request signal 26 the response signal 27 or the reproduced response signal 27 'is received by the transceiver part 23 within a predetermined time interval.
  • the theft device 12 does not manage to generate within the time interval 28 the reproduced response signal 27 '.
  • the control device 20 can output a start signal or activation signal 29 to the evaluation module 21.
  • the evaluation module 21 can emit an interference signal 30 via an antenna arrangement 31 by means of the transceiver part 24.
  • the interference signal 30 may be designed such that it interferes with the radio communication 16. As a result, the communication between the parts 14, 15 of the theft device 12 disturbed or at least least delayed because data must be repeatedly transmitted over the radio communication 16, for example.
  • the interference signal 30 can be generated as a function of whether the radio communication 16 is detected by means of the transceiver part 24.
  • the interference signal 30 may be tuned to a frequency of the radio communication 16 so that the frequency of the radio communication 16 coincides with the frequency of the interference signal 30.
  • the antenna arrangement 31 it is also possible to carry out a direction finding for detecting a position of the vehicle-related part 14 on the basis of the radio signals of the radio communication 16 and then radiate the radio interference signal 30 in a ready-made manner.
  • the environment 11 can be scanned or checked for active frequency channels of a radio communication 16.
  • this can be interpreted as an active attack scenario of a theft device 12.
  • an interference radio signal 30 can then be generated, for example, as a pulse or pulse for preventing a timely transmission of the request signal and / or the response signal 27.
  • an attack scenario which provides a range extension (relay attack) of the vehicle radio signals, can be detected and fended off.
  • the scanning of the radio communication 16 and the emission of a pulse of an interference signal 30 can be carried out by means of the built in the motor vehicle 10 sen- / receiving device (transceiver part 24), with which also a mobile radio connection and / or a WLAN connection in the Motor vehicle 10 can be provided.
  • the evaluation module 21 can be designed, for example, as a control unit and, based on the measured values of the radio communication 16, decide on which frequency or frequencies and / or with soft signal strength or intensity and / or direction the pulse of the interference signal 30 is emitted.
  • the evaluation module 21 is used in the written manner by the control device 20 by means of the activation signal 29 triggered or activated. This ensures that only at the time of time-critical communication during the time interval 28, a suppression or disruption or interruption of range extension of a theft device 12 takes place.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un dispositif de fermeture (17) pour un véhicule automobile (10). Ledit dispositif comprend : un système d'émission (22) qui est agencé pour émettre, en fonction d'un événement de déclenchement prédéfini (25), un signal de demande (26) dans un environnement (11) du véhicule automobile (10) ; un système de réception (22) qui est agencé pour recevoir depuis l'environnement (13), un signal de réponse (27) d'une clé radio (13) au cours d'un intervalle de temps prédéfini (28) à partir de l'émission du signal de demande (26) dans une plage de fréquences prédéfinies ; et un système de commande (20) qui est agencé pour déverrouiller, en cas de réception du signal de réponse (27) au cours de l'intervalle de temps (28), au moins une serrure (18) du dispositif de fermeture (17). Selon la présente invention, un module d'évaluation (21) est agencé pour émettre un signal radio de brouillage (30) au moyen d'un système d'émission (22) après l'émission du signal de demande (26) au cours de l'intervalle de temps (28) à au moins une fréquence radio située en dehors de la plage de fréquences (30).
EP17732434.0A 2016-08-24 2017-06-23 Dispositif de fermeture à clé radio pour un véhicule automobile, véhicule automobile et procédé permettant de faire fonctionner le dispositif de fermeture Withdrawn EP3504688A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102016215901.1A DE102016215901A1 (de) 2016-08-24 2016-08-24 Funkschlüssel-Schließvorrichtung für ein Kraftfahrzeug, Kraftfahrzeug und Verfahren zum Betreiben der Schließvorrichtung
PCT/EP2017/065549 WO2018036689A1 (fr) 2016-08-24 2017-06-23 Dispositif de fermeture à clé radio pour un véhicule automobile, véhicule automobile et procédé permettant de faire fonctionner le dispositif de fermeture

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3504688A1 true EP3504688A1 (fr) 2019-07-03

Family

ID=59152907

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP17732434.0A Withdrawn EP3504688A1 (fr) 2016-08-24 2017-06-23 Dispositif de fermeture à clé radio pour un véhicule automobile, véhicule automobile et procédé permettant de faire fonctionner le dispositif de fermeture

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US10388095B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP3504688A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN109690636A (fr)
DE (1) DE102016215901A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2018036689A1 (fr)

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FR3054510B1 (fr) * 2016-07-29 2019-04-19 Continental Automotive France Procede de defense contre une action de relais attaque sur une activation a distance d'une fonction presente dans un vehicule automobile
KR102689221B1 (ko) * 2017-02-13 2024-07-30 삼성전자 주식회사 차량용 스마트 키 인증 방법 및 장치
DE102017211321A1 (de) * 2017-07-04 2019-01-10 Ford Global Technologies, Llc Diebstahlsicherung für ein Fahrzeug
DE102017011879A1 (de) * 2017-12-21 2019-06-27 Metirionic Gmbh Funkfeld basierte Authentifizierung von Knoten innerhalb einer Funkverbindung
IL260726B (en) 2018-07-22 2021-09-30 D Fend Solutions Ad Ltd Intervention in time-shared two-way communication

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US20190180542A1 (en) 2019-06-13
CN109690636A (zh) 2019-04-26
US10388095B2 (en) 2019-08-20
WO2018036689A1 (fr) 2018-03-01

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