EP3137363B1 - Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise - Google Patents

Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP3137363B1
EP3137363B1 EP15725327.9A EP15725327A EP3137363B1 EP 3137363 B1 EP3137363 B1 EP 3137363B1 EP 15725327 A EP15725327 A EP 15725327A EP 3137363 B1 EP3137363 B1 EP 3137363B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
identifier
balise
rail vehicle
information
checking
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP15725327.9A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP3137363A1 (fr
Inventor
Uwe Deichmann
Werner Friedrichs
Norbert Geduhn
Udo GOLEBNIAK
Jochen KÄPPEL
Dirk Schulz
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Mobility GmbH
Original Assignee
Siemens Mobility GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Mobility GmbH filed Critical Siemens Mobility GmbH
Publication of EP3137363A1 publication Critical patent/EP3137363A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP3137363B1 publication Critical patent/EP3137363B1/fr
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal
    • B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
    • B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
    • B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
    • B61L3/121—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using magnetic induction
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for operating a rail vehicle, a method for checking a tag provided by a balise, a method for providing a tag by a balise, an ETCS track equipment and a rail vehicle.
  • ETCS European Train Control System
  • An ETCS vehicle device includes e.g. an ETCS computer (EVC, also referred to as On-Board Unit (OBU)), a Driver Machine Interface (DMI), a pathway meter, a GSM-R transmission facility (including Euroradio), a Balise reader and a brake access (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/ETCS).
  • EMC On-Board Unit
  • DMI Driver Machine Interface
  • GSM-R transmission facility including Euroradio
  • a Balise reader and a brake access (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/ETCS).
  • ETCS Level 1 uses balises as transmission medium.
  • the information conveyed by the balises are line gradients, maximum line speeds and the point at which the vehicle should stop. Together with an ETCS mode, these form the Movement Authority (MA), translated as "permission to move” or “driving license”.
  • MA Movement Authority
  • the on-board ETCS equipment can continuously monitor compliance with the permitted speed (and direction) and promptly initiate emergency braking.
  • ETCS modes are also defined. The modes describe the states in which the EVC can be located (see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ETCS).
  • the RBC radio control center
  • the RBC must know exactly where the train is and in which direction it is traveling.
  • the determination of position and direction is the responsibility of the vehicle computer, which transmits this regularly via GSM-R to the route.
  • reference points on the route are needed.
  • Eurobalises are used, which are installed, for example, in railway sidings and at (for example, irregular) free-distance distances. Between these reference points, the position is determined odometrically by means of Doppler radar on the traction vehicle floor and Radimpulsgebers on the traction vehicle axles. Partial acceleration sensors are also used.
  • the information on free track sections is determined as in ETCS Level 1 on the stationary track release signal from the interlocking and passed to the line center:
  • the route is - as in conventional security technology - divided into sections ("blocks"), and the train may in the next section retract only if not from another Train occupied, but is reported as 'free'. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Train_Control_System.)
  • CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
  • Such manipulations are attacks on the data provided by the balise, which can not be detected by the CRC code.
  • the manipulated data (with the appropriate CRC codes for it) may be provided by an attacker as the rail vehicle passes over the balise. This is undesirable especially for security-relevant data.
  • the EP 2 022 697 A1 and the EP 0 735 381 A2 Describe systems and procedures in which the balancing identification is checked on board the vehicle.
  • the object of the invention is to avoid the disadvantages mentioned above and in particular to provide a possibility for a secure and reliable transmission of the data from the balise to the vehicle computer of a rail vehicle.
  • information and identifier are transmitted together in a telegram from the balise to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle.
  • the information provided is used in particular by e.g.
  • the information contained in the information for the operation of the rail vehicle are complied with.
  • the rail vehicle is controlled based on the information as long as the identifier could be successfully verified.
  • the successful verification of the identifier comprises, in particular, a verification of the identifier.
  • a verification of the identifier By verifying the identifier can thus authenticity the balise will be ensured. This ensures that the information obtained also comes from the Balise and it is prevented that an attacker - disguised as a balise - unknowingly transmits the information to the rail vehicle.
  • the identifier of the vehicle computer is not checked, if it is determined that no identifier is present or if the identifier has a predetermined value.
  • a check may be omitted if there is no identifier. This can be determined by the identifier having a predetermined value, e.g. the field in which the identifier is transmitted is empty or has a certain value.
  • the check is only performed if the identifier is recognized as such.
  • the identifier it is possible for the identifier to have an additional value, e.g. in the form of a bit pattern, for example, which is part of the identifier and / or is present in addition to this.
  • the additional value of the identifier can be prefixed or attached.
  • a data field in which the identifier could be transmitted is used for another purpose and if there is no identifier in it, this is recognized and the verification of the identifier can be dispensed with.
  • Another development is that the information is not used if the verification of the identifier was unsuccessful.
  • the information from the balise is invalid. It can then a suitable action, such as a check of the balise and / or the transfer of the system in a safe state, such as braking or stopping the rail vehicle, initiated.
  • the identifier is transmitted in a block 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG.
  • An alternative embodiment is that a symmetric or asymmetric encryption method is used for encryption and decryption.
  • a next embodiment is that it is determined on the basis of the identifier of the rail vehicle, which type of verification of the identifier is performed.
  • the identifier can have a value for identification of the identifier, for example in the form of a bit pattern, by means of which it can be determined that it is an identifier.
  • the identifier may have a value for identifying the type of the identifier, so that it can be determined based on which algorithm the identifier can be checked.
  • the value for identifying the identifier and / or the value for identifying the type of identifier may be coded in a bit pattern.
  • the bit pattern can be used, for example, as a header or the like. Be part of the identifier or be transmitted separately from the identifier.
  • One embodiment is that, upon successful verification of the identifier, the information for operating the rail vehicle is used.
  • the identifier is received in a block 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG.
  • a development consists in that the identifier can be determined by means of a cryptographic hash function and that the identifier can be stored in a block 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG.
  • the vehicle computer mentioned here may in particular be embodied as a processor unit and / or an at least partially hard-wired or logical circuit arrangement which is set up, for example, such that the method can be carried out as described herein.
  • Said vehicle computer can be or include any type of processor or computer or computer with correspondingly necessary peripherals (memory, input / output interfaces, input / output devices, etc.).
  • the vehicle computer may be part of a control unit of the rail vehicle.
  • the rail vehicle (also referred to as a "train”) comprises at least one, in particular at least two, wagons, which may be a traction vehicle, a travel wagon, a freight wagon or a combination of such compartments or functions.
  • the traction unit has a driver's cab (also referred to as an operator station) and can be designed with or without drive.
  • the traction vehicle may in particular be a locomotive.
  • Each car of the rail vehicle may be equipped with a vehicle computer; If the vehicle computer (possibly with the mobile communication interface) provides an ETCS function, it may also be called an ETCS car.
  • ETCS car ETCS car.
  • the solution proposed here makes possible, in particular, a secure transmission of safety-relevant information to the rail vehicle, for example from a balise to the rail vehicle.
  • a so-called packet 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG can be used to transmit a protected message (for example from the balise) to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle.
  • a protected message for example from the balise
  • the packet 44 allows the transparent transmission of (any) information.
  • the protected message can thus be transmitted in the packet 44.
  • the identifier may be determined based on a cryptographic hash function.
  • cryptographic hash functions are the so-called message-digest algorithms, e.g. "MD2" or "MD4" (see, for example, RFC 1320 of the Network Working Group, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1320).
  • the identifier may be embedded in the packet 44 and transmitted as part of the balise telegram along with other information from the balise to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle. Based on the identifier of the vehicle computer can authenticate the balise, ie determine whether the information obtained comes from the designated Beautyse.
  • the telegrams can additionally be secured against deliberate manipulation of data (in particular so-called “man-in-the-middle” attacks, cf., for example, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-Middle-Angriff).
  • the identifier may include the value of a hash function.
  • the hash function (also referred to as a scatter function) is an image that maps a large input set (the keys) to a smaller target set (the hash values).
  • the hash function is not necessarily injective.
  • the input quantity may also contain elements with different lengths, whereas the elements of the target quantity have, in particular, a fixed length. A so-called collision occurs when the same hash value is assigned to different input data.
  • the identifier may also include the value of a cryptographic hash function (also referred to as a cryptological hash function) (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptological_Hashfunction).
  • a cryptographic hash function also referred to as a cryptological hash function
  • the one-way function is complexity-theoretically “easy” to calculate, but “difficult” to reverse.
  • One-way functions are also functions for which no in a reasonable amount of time practically practicable inversion is known.
  • the identifier comprises a digital signature.
  • a digital signature also digital signature method, is an asymmetric cryptosystem, in which a transmitter using a secret signature key (the private key) to a digital message (ie to any data) calculated a value, which is also called digital signature. This value allows anyone to verify the integrity of the message using the public verification key (the public key) (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Signature).
  • the telegram of the balise (or a part of the telegram of the balise) can be verified by the vehicle computer based on the public key of the balise.
  • the balise uses its secret signature key, which is preferably stored as securely as possible in the balise and can only be used by the balise itself.
  • a hash value of the telegram or a part of the telegram is stored and transmitted to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle.
  • the vehicle computer now determines a hash value based on the telegram or on a part of the telegram and compares this hash value with the hash value obtained in the packet 44. If both hash values are identical, it is assumed that the telegram was not intentionally manipulated.
  • the hash value of the information to be transmitted is signed by the balise (ie encrypted with the private key of the balise) and stored as an identifier in the packet 44.
  • the information and the identifier are transmitted (eg as a telegram) to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle.
  • the vehicle computer now determines a hash value based on the information and decodes the identifier based on the public key of the balise (this can optionally be transferred from the balise).
  • the hash value determined by the vehicle computer is compared with the hash value created by the balise; if both are identical, then the identifier is successfully verified, the information provided by the balise can be used or further processed accordingly.
  • a mark e.g. in the form of a bit combination which indicates to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle whether the packet 44 can be used for checking or authenticating the telegram. If this is the case, e.g. one of the above-mentioned checks (verifications) done. If, on the other hand, the packet 44 is empty or does not have any of the possibly predetermined number of bit combinations, then no check based on the data of the packet 44 takes place. This approach is therefore also compatible with other uses of the package 44.
  • each balise authenticate itself.
  • at least one data field may be provided, which is used for the transmission of the identifier, so that the sending balise can be authenticated on the basis of the identifier. If a balise can not be verified then an appropriate action can be taken, including e.g. one of the following: issuing a warning message; Transferring the system and / or at least one rail vehicle to a safe state (e.g., stoppage); Checking and, if necessary, maintaining the balise; Etc.
  • bit combination in the packet 44 may have different values, each of which is associated with a particular type of verification.
  • a given bit combination may indicate that a hash value has been stored in packet 44; it may also be predetermined by the value of the bit combination which hash function was used to create the hash value.
  • another value of the bit combination may indicate that stored an electronic signature or according to which algorithm the electronic signature was generated.
  • the use of the packet 44 for the transparent transmission of data that can be used for checking the telegram is to be understood merely as an example. In principle, it is possible to use other or additional data fields in order to transmit relevant information from a transmitter to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle for the check described here.
  • the transmission of the data may, for example, be wireless (e.g., via radio, near field communication, via a telecommunications network, etc.) or wired.
  • FIG. 11 shows an exemplary diagram including a rail vehicle 101 having a vehicle computer 102 connected to a balise antenna 103.
  • the rail vehicle 101 moves on a route 104 in a direction of travel 105.
  • the rail vehicle 101 first passes over a balise 106, then a balise 107.
  • the balises 106 and 107 are, for example, Euro balises, with the balise 106 being a transparent data balise by way of example and the balise 107 being a fixed data balise (see http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurobalise).
  • the Transparent Data Beautyse or Controllable Balise for example, is connected by a cable to a trackside electronic unit (LEU, Lineside Electronic Unit).
  • LEU trackside Electronic Unit
  • the LEU transmits the respective telegram to the balise.
  • balise here also includes several consecutively provided balises a so-called balise group.
  • the balise 106 and / or the balise 107 provides the rail vehicle 101 when crossing the respective balise by means of the balise antenna 103 and the vehicle computer 102 a (balise) telegram having a data field (eg in the form of the above-described package 44) in which eg the identifier is included.
  • a data field eg in the form of the above-described package 44
  • a check of the integrity or authenticity of the data obtained is possible. In particular, it can thus be ensured that the information actually originates from the balise 106 and / or 107 and that these have not been corrupted.
  • the respective balise 106 or 107 is designed so that access to a secure memory area from the outside is not or only with great effort to accomplish.
  • a private key used to create the signature may be stored. This key is preferably suitable to secure against external access.
  • the balise in the telegram also transmits the public key of the balise (also referred to as a public verification key or certificate).
  • the public key of the balise also referred to as a public verification key or certificate.
  • it can be checked by the rail vehicle whether the public key matches the position of the balise.
  • the data of the telegram from the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle further processed.
  • FIG. 11 shows an exemplary flow diagram of a communication between the balise 106, 107 and the vehicle computer 102 of the rail vehicle 101.
  • the balise 106, 107 creates the telegram or receives from the LEU the message to be forwarded.
  • the balise creates a hash value by means of a cryptographic hash function (eg MD4) and stores the hash value in the packet 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG (SUBSET-026-7).
  • the telegram is transmitted from the balise 106, 107 to the vehicle computer 102.
  • the vehicle computer 102 uses the telegram (based on predetermined data of the telegram, eg all data without the packet 44) in a step 204 to determine a hash value by means of a cryptographic hash function which was also used by the balise 106, 107.
  • the vehicle computer 102 compares the determined hash value with the hash value read from the packet 44. If both hash values are identical, then it is assumed that the data of the telegram have not been corrupted and an action (eg control of the rail vehicle 101) based on this data is initiated. If the two hash values are not identical, an error message such as the rail vehicle and / or an interlocking can be displayed. In particular, in this case, the rail vehicle operation can be converted into a safe state and it can then be checked whether the balise 106, 107 is defective or whether there was a manipulation attempt.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Claims (17)

  1. Procédé pour faire fonctionner un véhicule (101) ferroviaire,
    - dans lequel on transmet une information pour le fonctionnement du véhicule (101) ferroviaire et une caractérisation d'une balise (106, 107) à un ordinateur (102) du véhicule (101) ferroviaire,
    - de manière à ce que l'authenticité de la balise (106, 107) soit contrôlée par le véhicule (101) ferroviaire à l'aide de la caractérisation,
    - dans lequel, si le contrôle de la caractérisation est couronné de succès, on utilise l'information pour faire fonctionner le véhicule (101) ferroviaire.
  2. Procédé suivant la revendication 1, dans lequel on n'utilise pas l'information, si le contrôle de la caractérisation n'a pas été couronné de succès.
  3. Procédé suivant la revendication 1, dans lequel on n'utilise pas l'information, si la caractérisation a été détectée et si le contrôle de la caractérisation n'a pas été couronné de succès.
  4. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, dans lequel on fait passer le véhicule ferroviaire dans un état sécurisé, si le contrôle de la caractérisation n'a pas été couronné de succès.
  5. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, dans lequel la caractérisation comprend au moins l'une des possibilités suivantes :
    - données chiffrées ;
    - données non chiffrées ;
    - données, qui ont été déterminées sur la base d'une fonction de Hash, notamment d'une fonction de Hash cryptographique ;
    - données, qui ont été déterminées sur la base d'un algorithme MD4 ;
    - une signature ;
    - un certificat ;
    - une valeur pour l'identification de la caractérisation ;
    - une valeur pour l'identification d'un type de la caractérisation.
  6. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, on transmet la caractérisation dans un bloc 44 de la mise en œuvre ETCS suivant UNISIG.
  7. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes,
    - dans lequel la caractérisation est contrôlée par le véhicule (101) ferroviaire, en déterminant, à l'aide de l'information, une autre caractérisation et en comparant la caractérisation à l'autre caractérisation,
    - dans lequel le contrôle de la caractérisation a été couronné de succès, si la caractérisation et l'autre caractérisation sont identiques.
  8. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 1 à 6,
    - dans lequel on chiffre la caractérisation,
    - dans lequel la caractérisation est déchiffrée par le véhicule (101) ferroviaire,
    - dans lequel il est déterminé par le véhicule (101) ferroviaire une autre caractérisation à l'aide de l'information et la caractérisation déchiffrée est comparée à l'autre caractérisation,
    - dans lequel le contrôle de la caractérisation a été couronné de succès, si la caractérisation déchiffrée et l'autre caractérisation sont identiques.
  9. Procédé suivant la revendication 8, dans lequel on utilise un procédé de chiffrement symétrique ou dissymétrique pour le chiffrement et pour le déchiffrement.
  10. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications précédentes, dans lequel il est déterminé, à l'aide de la caractérisation par le véhicule (101) ferroviaire, le type de contrôle de la caractérisation à effectuer.
  11. Procédé de contrôle d'une caractérisation mise à disposition par une balise (106, 107),
    - dans lequel il est reçu de la balise (106, 107) la caractérisation et une information par un ordinateur (102) d'un véhicule (101) ferroviaire,
    - de sorte qu'à l'aide de la caractérisation, l'authenticité de la balise (106, 107) est contrôlée par l'ordinateur (102) du véhicule.
  12. Procédé suivant la revendication 11, dans lequel, si le contrôle de la caractérisation est couronné de succès, on utilise l'information pour le fonctionnement du véhicule ferroviaire.
  13. Procédé suivant l'une des revendications 11 ou 12, caractérisé en ce que l'on reçoit la caractérisation dans un bloc (44) de la mise en œuvre ETCS suivant UNISIG.
  14. Procédé de mise à dispositif d'une caractérisation par une balise (106, 107),
    - dans lequel on produit une caractérisation sur la base d'une information,
    - dans lequel la caractérisation et l'information sont mises à disposition d'un véhicule (102, 101) ferroviaire, lorsque l'on passe sur la balise (106, 107),
    - de manière à ce qu'à l'aide de la caractérisation, l'authenticité de la balise (106, 107) soit contrôlée par le véhicule (102, 101) ferroviaire.
  15. Equipement de voie ETCS
    - comprenant au moins une balise (106, 107),
    - dans lequel la au moins une balise (106, 107) est conçue de manière à mettre à disposition, lorsqu'il y passe un véhicule (101) ferroviaire, une caractérisation et une information, la caractérisation ayant été produite sur la base de l'information, de manière à ce qu'à l'aide de la caractérisation, l'authenticité de la balise (106, 107) soit contrôlée par le véhicule (101) ferroviaire.
  16. Equipement de voie ETCS suivant la revendication 14, dans lequel la caractérisation est déterminée au moyen d'une fonction de Hash cryptographique, et dans lequel la caractérisation peut être mise en mémoire dans un bloc (44) de la mise en œuvre ETCS suivant UNISIG.
  17. Véhicule (101) ferroviaire ayant un ordinateur (102) de véhicule, conçu de manière à ce que
    - la caractérisation d'une information soit reçue de la balise (106, 107),
    - à l'aide de la caractérisation, l'authenticité de la balise (106, 107) soit contrôlée par le véhicule (101) ferroviaire.
EP15725327.9A 2014-06-27 2015-05-27 Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise Active EP3137363B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102014212516.2A DE102014212516A1 (de) 2014-06-27 2014-06-27 Überprüfung der Authentizität einer Balise
PCT/EP2015/061697 WO2015197286A1 (fr) 2014-06-27 2015-05-27 Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3137363A1 EP3137363A1 (fr) 2017-03-08
EP3137363B1 true EP3137363B1 (fr) 2019-12-04

Family

ID=53269481

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP15725327.9A Active EP3137363B1 (fr) 2014-06-27 2015-05-27 Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise

Country Status (5)

Country Link
EP (1) EP3137363B1 (fr)
DE (1) DE102014212516A1 (fr)
ES (1) ES2773437T3 (fr)
WO (1) WO2015197286A1 (fr)
ZA (1) ZA201607726B (fr)

Families Citing this family (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102016204630A1 (de) * 2016-03-21 2017-09-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Übertragen von Nachrichten in einem Eisenbahnsystem sowie Eisenbahnsystem
DE102016217190A1 (de) * 2016-09-09 2018-03-15 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Übermitteln einer Information von einer streckenseitigen Einrichtung zu einem Fahrzeug sowie Einrichtungen zum Durchführen eines solchen Verfahrens
DE102017209926A1 (de) 2017-06-13 2018-12-13 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Betreiben eines spurgebundenen Verkehrssystems
EP3483032B1 (fr) * 2017-11-09 2020-05-27 Siemens Mobility S.A.S. Système et procédé pour protéger une communication entre une balise et un véhicule guidé contre la diaphonie
RU2683704C1 (ru) * 2018-03-21 2019-04-01 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Устройство безопасного обмена ответственной информацией по каналу связи локомотивными и стационарными устройствами безопасности на железнодорожном транспорте
RU2692362C1 (ru) * 2018-09-20 2019-06-24 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Устройство для обмена данными по каналам радиосвязи
RU2695971C1 (ru) * 2018-09-20 2019-07-29 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Система передачи ответственной информации по защищенным каналам радиосвязи
RU2722773C1 (ru) * 2019-12-18 2020-06-03 Акционерное общество "Научно-исследовательский и проектно-конструкторский институт информатизации, автоматизации и связи на железнодорожном транспорте" Децентрализованная система передачи ответственной информации по защищенным каналам радиосвязи
CN114162183B (zh) * 2020-09-11 2023-03-14 比亚迪股份有限公司 列车的定位处理方法、装置及列车
DE102021202528A1 (de) 2021-03-16 2022-09-22 Siemens Mobility GmbH Bahntechnikgerät für eine bahntechnische Anlage und Verfahren zu deren Betrieb

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0735381B1 (fr) * 1995-03-29 2002-01-09 Siemens Schweiz AG Méthode et système de communication pour transmission des données entre deux stations
US8689300B2 (en) * 2007-01-30 2014-04-01 The Boeing Company Method and system for generating digital fingerprint
EP2022697B1 (fr) * 2007-08-07 2010-02-03 Alstom Ferroviaria S.P.A. Système de communication entre véhicules, particulièrement ferroviaires, et des postes fixes
DE502008003266D1 (de) * 2008-02-11 2011-06-01 Siemens Schweiz Ag Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur sicheren Einstellung von einer Fahrstrasse für ein Schienenfahrzeug
EP2332804B1 (fr) * 2009-12-14 2012-06-27 Siemens Schweiz AG Contrôle de voies de trafic en fonction du sens de la circulation pour systèmes ETCS

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
None *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
ES2773437T3 (es) 2020-07-13
DE102014212516A1 (de) 2015-12-31
EP3137363A1 (fr) 2017-03-08
WO2015197286A1 (fr) 2015-12-30
ZA201607726B (en) 2018-04-25

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP3137363B1 (fr) Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise
EP2658764B1 (fr) Système et procédé de gestion de clés d'un système de protection des trains
DE102014210190A1 (de) Fahrerlaubnis für ein Schienenfahrzeug
EP3445635B1 (fr) Procédé permettant de faire fonctionner un dispositif de localisation et dispositif de localisation
EP3245115B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif pour déterminer une notion de signal pour un véhicule ferroviaire
DE102010026433A1 (de) Steuernetzwerk für ein Schienenfahrzeug
WO2010121906A1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif de commande de systèmes de sécurité ferroviaire
DE102017209926A1 (de) Verfahren zum Betreiben eines spurgebundenen Verkehrssystems
WO2015090932A1 (fr) Équipement de voies avec le etcs
EP3487745A1 (fr) Surveillance d'un véhicule sur rails dans un système de sécurité etcs
WO2019161958A1 (fr) Unité de commande et procédé pour acquérir sans manipulation frauduleuse des données de surveillance d'intégrité pertinentes en termes de sécurité de fonctionnement
EP2819907B1 (fr) Procédé de commande auxiliare d'un élément de voie et système de commande d'exploitation
DE10107571A1 (de) System zur Überprüfung der Vollständigkeit eines Fahrzeugverbundes
EP2088051B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif destinés au réglage sécurisé d'une voie de circulation pour un véhicule sur rail
EP3795451B1 (fr) Procédé de localisation d'un véhicule dans une station destinée à un arrêt du véhicule
WO2018095682A1 (fr) Procédé de fonctionnement d'un système ferroviaire et véhicule d'un système ferroviaire
WO2020007532A1 (fr) Procédé d'échange sécurisé et d'affichage sécurisé de données d'état de composants de sécurité
WO2015090933A1 (fr) Commande de véhicule ferroviaire
EP3221205B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif de blocage et de signalisation d'une section de voie équipée de compteurs d'essieux
DE102016217913A1 (de) Überwachung eines Schienenfahrzeugs
DE102016217900A1 (de) Überwachung eines Schienenfahrzeugs
DE102016217905A1 (de) Überwachung eines Schienenfahrzeugs
EP4124540A1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif permettant de faire fonctionner un arrêt automatique pour un véhicule guidé sur rails

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE

PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20161129

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

AX Request for extension of the european patent

Extension state: BA ME

RAP1 Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred)

Owner name: SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

DAV Request for validation of the european patent (deleted)
DAX Request for extension of the european patent (deleted)
RAP1 Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred)

Owner name: SIEMENS MOBILITY GMBH

GRAP Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: GRANT OF PATENT IS INTENDED

INTG Intention to grant announced

Effective date: 20190801

GRAS Grant fee paid

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3

GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE PATENT HAS BEEN GRANTED

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: NOT ENGLISH

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: EP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: AT

Ref legal event code: REF

Ref document number: 1209033

Country of ref document: AT

Kind code of ref document: T

Effective date: 20191215

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R096

Ref document number: 502015011135

Country of ref document: DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: IE

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: LANGUAGE OF EP DOCUMENT: GERMAN

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: NV

Representative=s name: SIEMENS SCHWEIZ AG, CH

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: NL

Ref legal event code: MP

Effective date: 20191204

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: LT

Ref legal event code: MG4D

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20200305

Ref country code: LT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: FI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: BG

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20200304

Ref country code: LV

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: SE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: NO

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20200304

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: RS

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: HR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: AL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: ES

Ref legal event code: FG2A

Ref document number: 2773437

Country of ref document: ES

Kind code of ref document: T3

Effective date: 20200713

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: NL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: RO

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: CZ

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: EE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: PT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20200429

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IS

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20200404

Ref country code: SM

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: SK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R097

Ref document number: 502015011135

Country of ref document: DE

PLBE No opposition filed within time limit

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

26N No opposition filed

Effective date: 20200907

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: PL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: SI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: MC

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: BE

Ref legal event code: MM

Effective date: 20200531

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: LU

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20200527

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20200527

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: BE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20200531

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: TR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: MT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

Ref country code: CY

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20191204

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FR

Payment date: 20230515

Year of fee payment: 9

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20220620

Year of fee payment: 9

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: AT

Payment date: 20230417

Year of fee payment: 9

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Payment date: 20230605

Year of fee payment: 9

Ref country code: ES

Payment date: 20230823

Year of fee payment: 9

Ref country code: CH

Payment date: 20230808

Year of fee payment: 9