WO2015197286A1 - Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise - Google Patents

Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2015197286A1
WO2015197286A1 PCT/EP2015/061697 EP2015061697W WO2015197286A1 WO 2015197286 A1 WO2015197286 A1 WO 2015197286A1 EP 2015061697 W EP2015061697 W EP 2015061697W WO 2015197286 A1 WO2015197286 A1 WO 2015197286A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
identifier
balise
information
rail vehicle
vehicle
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2015/061697
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Uwe Deichmann
Werner Friedrichs
Norbert Geduhn
Udo GOLEBNIAK
Jochen KÄPPEL
Dirk Schulz
Original Assignee
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Aktiengesellschaft filed Critical Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority to EP15725327.9A priority Critical patent/EP3137363B1/fr
Priority to ES15725327T priority patent/ES2773437T3/es
Publication of WO2015197286A1 publication Critical patent/WO2015197286A1/fr
Priority to ZA2016/07726A priority patent/ZA201607726B/en

Links

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal
    • B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
    • B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
    • B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
    • B61L3/121—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using magnetic induction
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for operating a rail vehicle, a method for checking a tag provided by a balise, a method for providing a tag by a balise, an ETCS track equipment and a rail vehicle.
  • ETCS European Train Control System
  • An ETCS vehicle device includes e.g. an ETCS computer (EVC, also referred to as On-Board Unit (OBU)), a Driver Machine Interface (DMI), a pathway meter, a GSM-R transmission facility (including Euroradio), a Baiisen reader and a brake access
  • EMC ETCS computer
  • DMI Driver Machine Interface
  • GSM-R GSM-R transmission facility
  • Baiisen reader and a brake access
  • ETCS Level 1 uses balises as transmission medium.
  • the information conveyed by the balises are line gradients, maximum line speeds and the point at which the vehicle should stop. Together with an ETCS mode, these form the Movement Authority (MA), translated as "permission to move” or “driving license”.
  • MA Movement Authority
  • ETCS modes are also defined.
  • the modes describe the states in which the EVC can be located (see also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ETCS).
  • RBC radio control center
  • the track utilization compared to Level 1 can be increased slightly.
  • the RBC Before the RBC can calculate the information necessary for a driving license (MA), the RBC must know exactly where the train is and in which direction it is traveling. The determination of position and direction is the responsibility of the vehicle computer, which transmits this regularly via GSM-R to the route. For the determination, however, reference points on the route are needed.
  • Eurobaiisen are used, which are installed, for example, in railway sidings and in (for example, irregular) free-distance distances. Between these reference points the position is determined odometrically by means of double radar on the traction vehicle floor and Radimpulsgebern on the traction vehicle axles. Partial acceleration sensors are also used.
  • the information about free track sections is determined via the stationary track release signal from the signal box and transferred to the line center:
  • the section is divided into sections ("blocks") as in conventional safety technology, and the train is allowed to enter the retract next section only if this is not from another Train occupied, but is reported as 'free'.
  • CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
  • the CRC code is suitable for detecting common errors on communication channels. It is disadvantageous here that such CRC codes do not protect against intentional (malicious) manipulation of the data, e.g. in the form of different attacks. For example, the following changes could be made to the telegrams of the balise:
  • balise e.g. "Continue” (Proceed) instead of “Stop” (Stop);
  • the object of the invention is to avoid the disadvantages mentioned above and in particular to provide a possibility for a secure and reliable transmission of the data from the balise to the vehicle computer of a rail vehicle.
  • the information provided is used in particular by e.g.
  • the information contained in the information for the operation of the rail vehicle are complied with.
  • the rail vehicle is controlled based on the information, provided that the identifier could be successfully verified.
  • the successful verification of the identifier comprises, in particular, a verification of the identifier.
  • the authenticity of the balise can thus be ensured. This ensures that the information obtained also comes from the Balise and it is prevented that an attacker - disguised as a balise - unknowingly transmits the information to the rail vehicle.
  • the identifier is not checked by the vehicle computer, if it is determined that no identifier is present or if the identifier has a predetermined value. For example, a check may be omitted if there is no identifier. This can be determined by the identifier having a predetermined value, eg the field in which the identifier is transmitted is empty or has or contains a specific value.
  • the check is only performed if the identifier is recognized as such.
  • the identifier it is possible for the identifier to have an additional value, e.g. in the form of a bit pattern, for example, which is part of the identifier and / or is present in addition to this.
  • the additional value of the identifier can be prefixed or attached.
  • a data field in which the identifier could be transmitted is used for another purpose and if there is no identifier in it, this is recognized and the verification of the identifier can be dispensed with.
  • the information is not used if the verification of the identifier was unsuccessful. Unless the identifier (existing and recognized as such) could not be verified, it is assumed, for example, that the information from the balise is invalid. It can then a suitable action, such as a check of the balise and / or the transfer of the system in a safe state, such as braking or stopping the rail vehicle, initiated.
  • the identifier comprises at least one of the following options:
  • the identifier is transmitted in a block 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG.
  • the identifier is checked by the vehicle computer by determining a further identifier on the basis of the information and by comparing the identifier with the further identifier, the verification of the identifier was successful if the identifier and the other identifier are identical.
  • the identifier is encrypted
  • a further identifier is determined by the vehicle computer on the basis of the information and the decrypted identifier is compared with the further identifier
  • An alternative embodiment is that a symmetric or asymmetric encryption method is used for encryption and decryption.
  • a next refinement is that it is determined by the vehicle computer based on the identifier
  • the identifier can have a value for identification of the identifier, for example in the form of a bit pattern, by means of which it can be determined that it is an identifier.
  • the identifier may have a value for identifying the type of the identifier, so that it can be determined based on which algorithm the identifier can be checked.
  • the value for identifying the identifier and / or the value for identifying the type of identifier may be coded in a bit pattern.
  • the bit pattern can be used, for example, as a header or the like. Be part of the identifier or be transmitted separately from the identifier.
  • An embodiment consists in that upon successful verification of the identifier, the information for operating the
  • the identifier is received in a block 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG.
  • the object is achieved by means of a method for providing an identifier by a balise
  • the at least one balise is arranged such that it provides an identifier and information when driving over a rail vehicle, wherein the identifier is created based on the information was, so that based on the identifier, the authenticity of the balise of the rail vehicle is verifiable.
  • a development consists in that the identifier can be determined by means of a cryptographic hash function and that the identifier can be stored in a block 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG.
  • the object is also achieved by means of a rail vehicle with a vehicle computer which is set up in such a way that
  • the authenticity of the balise is verifiable by the rail vehicle.
  • the vehicle computer mentioned here may in particular be embodied as a processor unit and / or an at least partially hard-wired or logical circuit arrangement which is set up, for example, such that the method can be carried out as described herein.
  • Said vehicle computer can be or include any type of processor or computer or computer with correspondingly necessary peripherals (memory, input / output interfaces, input / output devices, etc.).
  • the vehicle computer may be part of a control unit of the rail vehicle.
  • FIG. 1 shows an exemplary diagram comprising a rail vehicle with a vehicle computer connected to a balise antenna, wherein the rail vehicle moves along a route in the direction of two balises;
  • the rail vehicle (also referred to as "train”) has at least one, in particular at least two cars, wherein the vehicle may be a traction vehicle, a travel car, a freight car or a combination of such parts or functions.
  • the traction unit has a driver's cab (also referred to as an operator station) and can be designed with or without drive.
  • the traction vehicle may in particular be a locomotive. Every car of the
  • Rail vehicle may be equipped with a vehicle computer; If the vehicle computer (possibly with the mobile communication interface) provides an ETCS function, it may also be called an ETCS car.
  • ETCS car In principle, it is possible that only the traction vehicles each have a vehicle computer (possibly with the mobile communication interface) or that individual cars that are not traction vehicles have such vehicle computers (possibly with the mobile communication interface).
  • a so-called packet 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG can be used to transmit a protected message (eg from the balise) to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle.
  • the packet 44 allows the transparent transmission of (any) information.
  • the protected message can thus be transmitted in the packet 44.
  • the protected message is an identifier.
  • the identifier may include at least one of the following options (values or data):
  • the identifier can be determined based on a cryptographic hash function.
  • cryptographic hash functions are the so-called message-digest algorithms, e.g. "MD2" or "MD4" (see, e.g., RFC 1320 of the Network Working Group,
  • the identifier can be embedded in the packet 44 and transmitted as part of the balise telegram together with other information from the balise to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle. Based on the identifier of the vehicle computer can authenticate the balise, ie determine whether the information received from the designated
  • the telegrams can additionally be used against deliberate manipulation of data (in particular so-called “man-in-the-middle” attacks, cf.
  • the identifier may include the value of a hash function.
  • Hash function (also called a scatter function) is an image that maps a large input set (the keys) to a smaller target set (the hash values).
  • the hash function is not necessarily injective.
  • the input quantity may also contain elements with different lengths, whereas the elements of the target quantity have, in particular, a fixed length. A so-called collision occurs when the same hash value is assigned to different input data.
  • the identifier may also include the value of a cryptographic hash function (also referred to as a cryptological hash function) (cf.
  • the identifier comprises a digital signature.
  • a digital signature also known as a digital signature method, is an asymmetric cryptosystem in which a sensor which uses a secret signature key (the private key) to calculate a value for a digital message (ie for any data), which is also called a digital signature. This value allows anyone to check the integrity of the message using the public verification key (the public key) (cf.
  • the telegram of the balise (or a part of the telegram of the balise) can be verified by the vehicle computer based on the public key of the balise.
  • the balise uses its secret signature key, which is preferably stored as secure as possible in the balise and can only be used by the balise itself.
  • a hash value of the telegram or a part of the telegram is stored and transmitted to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle.
  • the vehicle computer now determines a hash value of the telegram or a part of the telegram.
  • Hash value based on the telegram or on a part of the telegram and compares this hash value with the hash value obtained in the packet 44. If both hash values are identical, it is assumed that the telegram was not intentionally manipulated.
  • the hash value of the information to be transmitted is signed by the balise (ie encrypted with the private key of the balise) and stored as an identifier in the packet 44.
  • the information and the identifier are transmitted (eg as a telegram) to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle.
  • the vehicle computer now determines a hash value based on the information and decodes the identifier based on the public key of the balise (this can optionally be transferred from the balise).
  • the hash value determined by the vehicle computer is compared to the hash value created by the beacon. adjusted; if both are identical, then the identifier is successfully verified, the information provided by the balise can be used or further processed accordingly.
  • a mark may be included, for example in the form of a bit combination, which indicates to the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle whether the packet 44 can be used to check or authenticate the message. If this is the case, for example, one of the above-mentioned checks (verifications) can take place. If, on the other hand, the packet 44 is empty or does not have any of the possibly predetermined number of bit combinations, then no check based on the data of the packet 44 takes place. This approach is therefore also compatible with other uses of package 44.
  • each balise authenticate itself.
  • at least one data field may be provided, which is used for the transmission of the identifier, so that the sending balise can be authenticated on the basis of the identifier. If a balise can not be verified then an appropriate action can be taken, including e.g. one of the following: issuing a warning message; Transferring the system and / or at least one rail vehicle to a safe state (e.g., stoppage); Checking and, if necessary, maintaining the balise; Etc.
  • bit combination in the packet 44 may have different values, each of which is associated with a particular type of verification. For example, a given bit combination may indicate that a hash value has been stored in packet 44; it may also be specified by the value of the bit combination which hash function was used to create the hash value. Furthermore, another value of the bit combination may indicate that an electronic signature is stored. chert is or according to which algorithm the electronic signature was generated.
  • FIG. 1 shows an exemplary diagram comprising a rail vehicle 101 with a vehicle computer 102 which is connected to a balise antenna 103.
  • the rail vehicle 101 moves on a route 104 in a direction of travel 105. In the direction of travel 105, the rail vehicle 101 first passes over a balise 106, then a balise 107.
  • balises 106 and 107 are euro balises, with the balise 106 exemplifying a
  • the Transparent Data Beautyse or Controllable Balise for example, is connected by a cable to a trackside electronic unit (LEU, Lineside Electronic Unit).
  • LEU trackside Electronic Unit
  • the LEU transmits the respective telegram to the balise.
  • balise here also includes several successively provided balises a so-called Baiisentik.
  • the balise 106 and / or the balise 107 sets the rail vehicle 101 when crossing the respective balise by means of the balise antenna 103 and the vehicle computer 102
  • (Balisen) telegram having a data field (e.g., in the form of packet 44 described above) in which e.g. the identifier is included.
  • a data field e.g., in the form of packet 44 described above
  • the identifier is included.
  • the data field On the basis of the data field, a check of the integrity or authenticity of the data obtained is possible. In particular, it can thus be ensured that the information is actually received by the balise 106
  • the respective balise 106 or 107 is designed in such a way that access to a secure storage area from the outside is not possible or only with great effort.
  • a private key used to create the signature may be stored. This key is preferably suitable to secure against external access.
  • the balises in the telegram e.g., in the data field or packet 44
  • the rail vehicle can check whether the public key matches the position of the balise.
  • the data of the telegram from the vehicle computer of the rail vehicle further processed.
  • 2 shows an exemplary flow diagram of a communication between the balise 106, 107 and the vehicle computer 102 of the rail vehicle 101.
  • the balise 106, 107 creates the telegram or receives from the LEU the message to be forwarded.
  • the balise generates a hash value by means of a cryptographic hash function (eg MD4) and stores the hash value in the packet 44 of the ETCS implementation according to UNISIG (SUBSET-026-7).
  • the telegram is transmitted from the balise 106, 107 to the vehicle computer 102.
  • the vehicle computer 102 uses the telegram (based on predetermined data of the telegram, eg all data without the packet 44) in a step 204 to determine a hash value by means of a cryptographic hash function which was also used by the balise 106, 107. In a step 205, the vehicle computer 102 compares the determined hash value with that read from the packet 44
  • Hash If both hash values are identical, it is assumed that the data of the telegram have not been corrupted and an action (e.g., control of the rail vehicle 101) is made based on this data. If the two hash values are not identical, then an error message can be generated e.g. the rail vehicle and / or a signal box are displayed. In particular, in this case, the rail vehicle operation can be converted into a safe state and it can then be checked whether the balise 106, 107 is defective or whether a manipulation attempt was present.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne la vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise. Un identifiant est à cet effet fourni par la balise et est transmis, en tant qu'élément du télégramme, par la balise à l'ordinateur de véhicule d'un véhicule sur rails. L'identifiant permet de faire vérifier par l'ordinateur de véhicule l'authenticité de la balise. L'identifiant est de manière avantageuse transmis dans le paquet 44 de l'implémentation du système ETCS selon l'UNISIG. Par ailleurs, une valeur de hachage d'une fonction de hachage cryptographique peut être utilisée en tant qu'identifiant. Le fait de pouvoir déceler des manipulations des télégrammes fournis par la balise est ici un avantage.
PCT/EP2015/061697 2014-06-27 2015-05-27 Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise WO2015197286A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP15725327.9A EP3137363B1 (fr) 2014-06-27 2015-05-27 Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise
ES15725327T ES2773437T3 (es) 2014-06-27 2015-05-27 Verificación de la autenticidad de una baliza
ZA2016/07726A ZA201607726B (en) 2014-06-27 2016-11-09 Checking the authenticity of a balise

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102014212516.2 2014-06-27
DE102014212516.2A DE102014212516A1 (de) 2014-06-27 2014-06-27 Überprüfung der Authentizität einer Balise

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2015197286A1 true WO2015197286A1 (fr) 2015-12-30

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PCT/EP2015/061697 WO2015197286A1 (fr) 2014-06-27 2015-05-27 Vérification de l'authenticité d'une balise

Country Status (5)

Country Link
EP (1) EP3137363B1 (fr)
DE (1) DE102014212516A1 (fr)
ES (1) ES2773437T3 (fr)
WO (1) WO2015197286A1 (fr)
ZA (1) ZA201607726B (fr)

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2018046217A1 (fr) * 2016-09-09 2018-03-15 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé permettant de transmettre une information d'un dispositif côté voie à un véhicule ainsi que dispositifs permettant de mettre en œuvre un tel procédé
RU2683704C1 (ru) * 2018-03-21 2019-04-01 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Устройство безопасного обмена ответственной информацией по каналу связи локомотивными и стационарными устройствами безопасности на железнодорожном транспорте
EP3483032A1 (fr) * 2017-11-09 2019-05-15 Siemens S.A.S. Système et procédé pour protéger une communication entre une balise et un véhicule guidé contre la diaphonie
RU2692362C1 (ru) * 2018-09-20 2019-06-24 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Устройство для обмена данными по каналам радиосвязи
RU2695971C1 (ru) * 2018-09-20 2019-07-29 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Система передачи ответственной информации по защищенным каналам радиосвязи
CN110730742A (zh) * 2017-06-13 2020-01-24 西门子交通有限公司 运行有轨交通系统的方法
RU2722773C1 (ru) * 2019-12-18 2020-06-03 Акционерное общество "Научно-исследовательский и проектно-конструкторский институт информатизации, автоматизации и связи на железнодорожном транспорте" Децентрализованная система передачи ответственной информации по защищенным каналам радиосвязи
CN114162183A (zh) * 2020-09-11 2022-03-11 比亚迪股份有限公司 列车的定位处理方法、装置及列车

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DE102016204630A1 (de) * 2016-03-21 2017-09-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Übertragen von Nachrichten in einem Eisenbahnsystem sowie Eisenbahnsystem
DE102021202528A1 (de) 2021-03-16 2022-09-22 Siemens Mobility GmbH Bahntechnikgerät für eine bahntechnische Anlage und Verfahren zu deren Betrieb

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Cited By (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2018046217A1 (fr) * 2016-09-09 2018-03-15 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé permettant de transmettre une information d'un dispositif côté voie à un véhicule ainsi que dispositifs permettant de mettre en œuvre un tel procédé
CN110730742A (zh) * 2017-06-13 2020-01-24 西门子交通有限公司 运行有轨交通系统的方法
CN110730742B (zh) * 2017-06-13 2022-01-11 西门子交通有限公司 运行有轨交通系统的方法
US11479283B2 (en) 2017-06-13 2022-10-25 Siemens Mobility GmbH Method for operating a track-bound traffic system
EP3483032A1 (fr) * 2017-11-09 2019-05-15 Siemens S.A.S. Système et procédé pour protéger une communication entre une balise et un véhicule guidé contre la diaphonie
WO2019091673A1 (fr) * 2017-11-09 2019-05-16 Siemens Mobility S.A.S. Système et procédé de protection contre la diaphonie d'une communication entre une balise et un véhicule guidé
US11479279B2 (en) 2017-11-09 2022-10-25 Siemens S.A.S System and method for protecting a communication between a balise and a guided vehicle from cross-talk
RU2683704C1 (ru) * 2018-03-21 2019-04-01 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Устройство безопасного обмена ответственной информацией по каналу связи локомотивными и стационарными устройствами безопасности на железнодорожном транспорте
RU2692362C1 (ru) * 2018-09-20 2019-06-24 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Устройство для обмена данными по каналам радиосвязи
RU2695971C1 (ru) * 2018-09-20 2019-07-29 Открытое Акционерное Общество "Российские Железные Дороги" Система передачи ответственной информации по защищенным каналам радиосвязи
RU2722773C1 (ru) * 2019-12-18 2020-06-03 Акционерное общество "Научно-исследовательский и проектно-конструкторский институт информатизации, автоматизации и связи на железнодорожном транспорте" Децентрализованная система передачи ответственной информации по защищенным каналам радиосвязи
CN114162183A (zh) * 2020-09-11 2022-03-11 比亚迪股份有限公司 列车的定位处理方法、装置及列车

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ES2773437T3 (es) 2020-07-13
ZA201607726B (en) 2018-04-25
DE102014212516A1 (de) 2015-12-31
EP3137363A1 (fr) 2017-03-08
EP3137363B1 (fr) 2019-12-04

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