EP2758745B1 - Chambre de simulation ainsi que procédé pour le déclenchement contrôlé de charges explosives contenues dans des marchandises - Google Patents
Chambre de simulation ainsi que procédé pour le déclenchement contrôlé de charges explosives contenues dans des marchandises Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP2758745B1 EP2758745B1 EP12775633.6A EP12775633A EP2758745B1 EP 2758745 B1 EP2758745 B1 EP 2758745B1 EP 12775633 A EP12775633 A EP 12775633A EP 2758745 B1 EP2758745 B1 EP 2758745B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- mobile radio
- mobile
- freight
- chamber
- mobile terminal
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
- 238000004088 simulation Methods 0.000 title claims description 54
- 239000002360 explosive Substances 0.000 title claims description 50
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 21
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims description 63
- 238000004880 explosion Methods 0.000 claims description 49
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 claims 2
- 230000001939 inductive effect Effects 0.000 claims 2
- 238000013500 data storage Methods 0.000 claims 1
- 238000005474 detonation Methods 0.000 description 8
- 238000013270 controlled release Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000005855 radiation Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000005422 blasting Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000002775 capsule Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004146 energy storage Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007613 environmental effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000002594 fluoroscopy Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000007789 gas Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012423 maintenance Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000037452 priming Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002285 radioactive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000009781 safety test method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008685 targeting Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010998 test method Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
- F42D—BLASTING
- F42D5/00—Safety arrangements
- F42D5/02—Locating undetonated charges
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
- F42B—EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, e.g. FOR BLASTING, FIREWORKS, AMMUNITION
- F42B33/00—Manufacture of ammunition; Dismantling of ammunition; Apparatus therefor
- F42B33/06—Dismantling fuzes, cartridges, projectiles, missiles, rockets or bombs
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
- F42D—BLASTING
- F42D5/00—Safety arrangements
- F42D5/04—Rendering explosive charges harmless, e.g. destroying ammunition; Rendering detonation of explosive charges harmless
Definitions
- the invention relates to a simulation chamber for the controlled release of explosives contained in cargo under simulated conditions according to the preamble of claim 1.
- the invention further relates to a method for the controlled release of explosives contained in freight in such a simulation chamber according to the preamble of claim 2.
- Real-time conditions are specified in the explosion chamber, which correspond to the actual ambient conditions or the expected environmental conditions on the intended flight route. If there is a detonable explosive device in the cargo to be investigated, the detonator of which responds to the conditions simulated in the explosion chamber, the detonator is triggered and detonated in the explosion chamber.
- the cargo to be examined is usually destroyed. However, it can be prevented in this way that the cargo containing the explosive charge enters the aircraft and detonated during the flight or landing.
- the known simulation chambers are capable of detecting explosives contained in a cargo, their detonators on barometric signals (positive or negative pressure), acoustic signals (such as sound waves in the frequency range of 1-20kHz, the top of a detectable sound pressure) or electromagnetic signals (such as radio signals in the frequency range between 120 kHz and 1GHz) respond.
- barometric signals positive or negative pressure
- acoustic signals such as sound waves in the frequency range of 1-20kHz, the top of a detectable sound pressure
- electromagnetic signals such as radio signals in the frequency range between 120 kHz and 1GHz
- a method is known with which a controlled release of mobile-triggered explosive devices can be made via a mobile station in a secure location.
- trigger signals are sent from a stationary wireless terminal to mobile stations, which are arranged within a detonation zone of an explosive device and can trigger the explosive device. If there is a mobile station within the detonation zone that is set up to trigger the explosive device, it will be prematurely and safely detonated at a safe location, thereby preventing it from doing damage to another location.
- the object of the invention is to further develop a generic simulation chamber and the generic method for the controlled release of explosives contained in cargo so that it is also possible to detect explosive charges which are not detectable with the previously known examination and test methods.
- the mobile detonator could not be detected by the usual testing methods, such as X-ray checks, since the cargo package contained no conventional mobile phone (which might possibly have been detected by X-ray inspection), but because only the electronics Board of a conventional mobile station has been installed in the electronic unit of the printer, so that this board could not be recognized as a mobile station and thus not as mobile detonator for the built-in explosive device.
- the freight package would also have a check in a generic simulation chamber easily happened because the conventional simulation chambers are not able to detect explosives with mobilfunkgentierbaren detonators and to detonate.
- the invention provides for the detection of such explosive devices activatable by a mobile radio terminal, a mobile radio test device with which a mobile terminal contained in the cargo is detectable when the cargo is placed in a closed explosion chamber, are specified in the real-time conditions that comply with ambient conditions of the Cargoes on its intended transport route.
- a “mobile terminal” is understood to be any electronic device or component that is able to fulfill at least the essential functions of a mobile device and, in particular, can log into a mobile network in order to receive and / or transmit signals there.
- a mobile radio terminal is understood to be an electronic device or component which can log into a mobile radio network in order to receive signals and serve as a receiver for the ignition command of an explosive device and if necessary be able to transmit an ignition signal to an explosive device. This may be e.g. to trade a GSM module without a display and without a keyboard.
- the mobile radio test device is located in the simulation chamber and sends a test signal to the interior of the blast chamber, the test signal having sufficient signal strength to be received by a conventional mobile radio terminal located in the cargo being inspected.
- the of the Mobilfunktest adopted in the explosion chamber sent mobile radio signals (test signals) simulate mobile base stations. Appropriately, such mobile radio signals are simulated by mobile base stations, which are sent at the intended destination of the cargo or an intermediate destination of a local local mobile base station and are receivable from conventional mobile terminals.
- the mobile radio signals transmitted by the mobile radio test device into the explosion chamber correspond to such (downlink) mobile radio signals that are transmitted in particular by public mobile radio networks on the intended transport path of the freight and in particular at the destination and / or at intermediate destinations and can be received by a mobile radio terminal.
- all mobile networks are simulated in this way, which are available at the destination of the cargo and expediently also at all intermediate destinations and there emit mobile radio signals via mobile phone base stations.
- the mobile radio test device is preferably set up in such a way that it sends a test signal (mobile radio signal) to the explosion chamber which causes a mobile radio terminal located inside the explosion chamber to emit a signal that can be received by the mobile radio test device.
- a test signal mobile radio signal
- each mobile radio terminal which is located in the interior of the explosion chamber, preferably causes a corresponding uplink signal to be sent, which can be received by the mobile radio test device.
- the mobile radio test device is designed and set up in such a way that it sends an "update" signal into the explosion chamber, which causes and preferably every mobile radio terminal contained in the freight to carry out a so-called “location update”.
- This "location update” enables the mobile terminal to access a mobile radio network which is simulated by the mobile radio test facility and which corresponds to a mobile radio network available at the destination or at an intermediate destination of the freight.
- access to the simulated by the mobile radio network mobile network access to the simulated by the mobile radio network mobile network, the network components and / or - settings of the or each mobile terminal for or on the simulated by the mobile radio network mobile network updated.
- the user location predetermined for the mobile station is changed in a data store or directory (in GSM networks, for example, the "Home Location Register” (HLR) of the mobile station) such that a simulated user location is set.
- HLR Home Location Register
- the fake of a changed user location can also be done by sending a message to the "HomeAgent" of the terminal.
- the simulated user location is the intended destination of the cargo and / or an intermediate destination located on the intended cargo route.
- the mobile radio test facility is set up in such a way that it detects a "location update" which is carried out or at least initiated by a mobile radio terminal located inside the explosion chamber. If the mobile radio test device determines that at least one mobile radio terminal located inside the explosion chamber has performed or at least initiated a location update, this is expediently stored in a database or displayed on a screen.
- the mobile radio test device can preferably also be set up in such a way that it issues a warning signal if the performance of a "location update" has been detected by a mobile radio terminal located in the freight.
- the display on a screen or the delivery of a warning signal indicates that at least one mobile radio terminal, which is located in the interior of the explosion chamber, has logged into a mobile network simulated by the mobile radio test facility.
- the mobile radio test facility is then able and expediently set up to record the identification data of such a mobile radio terminal, which has logged into a simulated mobile radio network, and to store it appropriately in a database or a test protocol. In this way it is possible, each mobile station, which is located in the simulation chamber and at the same time in one of the Mobile radio test facility has logged simulated mobile network to uniquely identify.
- the "International Mobile Subscriber Identity” (IMSI) and / or the “International Mobile Station Equipment Identity” (IMEI) of the relevant mobile terminal are read out by the mobile radio test facility and appropriately stored in the database or the test protocol. Also stored on the SIM card of the mobile station identification data can be read out and stored for this purpose by the mobile radio test facility.
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- IMEI International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
- the mobile station can communicate with the mobile station (s) concerned, i. Replace mobile radio signals.
- the mobile radio test facility is preferably set up so that it can read the mobile number (call number) of each mobile radio terminal via this communication path, which is in a communication connection with the mobile radio test facility. After reading the mobile phone numbers (phone number), the mobile radio test device using these mobile numbers can call all mobile terminals, which have logged into a simulated by the mobile phone test facility mobile network.
- a mobile radio terminal concerned is designed as a detonator for a mobile-radio-activated explosive device
- the explosive device is detonated by the mobile radio device in a call of the mobile station in question and the freight packet in which the explosive device with the associated mobile radio terminal is located is destroyed.
- the mobile radio test facility is set up in such a way that it reads out the identification data of the mobile radio terminal (in particular the data stored on the SIM card) before a possible detonation of an explosive device and stores it in a database or a test protocol. Furthermore, the mobile radio test facility is appropriately set up so that it can detect the position of each mobile radio terminal in the interior of the explosion chamber by means of a transit time measurement, which has logged into at least one mobile radio network simulated by the mobile radio test facility.
- a relevant mobile station which serves as an igniter for the detonated explosive device was designed to identify and if necessary assign a user and / or a freight package that was part of the examined cargo.
- an ignition signal can, for example, an integrated "wake-up", a call signal ("ringing") from the signal generator (Beeper) or from the earpiece with the help of brazed wires removed and with a simple amplifier (transistor) using the batteries of the mobile device to an electrical Priming capsule can be adapted.
- these signals are also available on the expansion plug-in device of the mobile station.
- Some mobile devices also turn on the lights during a call.
- Their operating voltage can also be used as retrofit signal via retrofitted connecting wires.
- Such modifications of mobile radio terminals are poor or not recognizable in the X-ray image, which is why conventional fluoroscopy could not detect a mobile radio terminal designed as an igniter for an explosive device and contained in an airfreight package.
- IL ORANGE public mobile radio network preselection
- the Israeli mobile network operator is stored as the only approved mobile network on the SIM card of the mobile station.
- the mobile station is then switched on arbitrary ways, e.g. brought to Germany and, together with the explosive device, which contains an explosive charge and a primer, hidden in an airfreight piece.
- the energy storage (battery) of the mobile station Prior to the closure of the airfreight package, the energy storage (battery) of the mobile station is charged (which allows for many conventional mobile terminals standby times of more than 2 weeks). The mobile station is then turned on and entered the valid PIN number. The cargo is then handed over to a freight forwarder and passes through the usual stations and security controls until it is on the plane to its destination, provided all controls are passed.
- SMS short message
- the relevant mobile station will receive the permanently emitted identifier of the shared mobile network "IL ORANGE" and register there immediately. After logging in, it will take about 2 minutes for the mobile station configured as detonator for the explosive device to automatically receive a call from the local mobile network of the destination in order to transmit the short message or the mailbox content. This call then ignites the explosive device in the air or on the ground.
- the mailbox could also transmit a code containing the blast command.
- the mobile station is active and has logged into one of the locally available mobile networks via the automatic network selection mode, or at least has listened to the local cell broadcast messages and otherwise behaves passively (Manual network prefix, a foreign, locally unavailable network is selected).
- a trained as a detonator mobile radio terminal is detectable only if it succeeds to cause its transmitting part to deliver one or more BURST signals.
- the targeting of the device interference radiation (emissions of the receiver) is not possible because it is extremely low and above all only for a few milliseconds. Therefore, the invention proposes the simulation of mobile radio base stations (BST) with matching flight path suitable properties and identifiers to detect a designed as a detonator mobile station in a simulation chamber and trigger an explosive charge contained in the cargo in an explosion chamber, thereby preventing in that the explosive device enters an aircraft.
- BST mobile radio base stations
- FIG. 1 a simulation chamber according to the invention is shown schematically. This comprises an explosion chamber 1 with an explosion-proof housing 1 a, in which the cargo 2 to be examined is brought.
- the explosion chamber 1 is closed for this purpose with a gate.
- a Mobilfunktest issued 4 is arranged in the control cabinet 3 .
- the mobile radio test device 4 is connected via radio-frequency cable 5 with antennas 6, which are located within the explosion chamber 1.
- an EMF filter is arranged in the high-frequency connection between the mobile radio test device 4 and the antennas 6, which filters out radio-frequency interference radiation from the environment.
- the mobile radio test device 4 has a transmitting unit and a receiving unit, via which it can transmit or receive mobile radio signals. Via the antenna 6, a mobile radio test signal is sent into the interior of the explosion chamber 1 by the mobile radio test device 4.
- the mobile radio test signals emitted by the mobile radio test device simulate mobile radio signals from base stations of available mobile radio networks. In the following it is assumed that the mobile radio test signals of the mobile radio test facility in this way simulate base stations of GSM mobile radio networks. It is further assumed that the simulation chamber is used to investigate an air cargo to be transported with an aircraft, which is introduced into the explosion chamber 1 for this purpose.
- the planned air freight route, in particular the destination and any intermediate destinations (intermediate landing sites) are known and are stored in a database in the control program of the simulation chamber.
- the names of the intermediate landing places and the destination (3-letter code) are supplied to the mobile radio test facility by an extension of the simulation control program. From a database maintained by telephone remote maintenance, the mobile radio test device searches out the data for the network simulation, such as the network simulation. the country code, the network number, the network operator, the location area code, etc ...
- a network monitor receives the "cell broadcast messages" of the base stations available locally (ie at the location of the simulation chamber), determines the occupancy of the traffic channels and transmits the received data to the control program of the Mobile testing facility.
- the mobile radio test facility recognizes the channel assignment by local base stations and can switch to unoccupied channels.
- the mobile radio test facility After the start of the main simulation process (after closing the gates of the explosion chamber 1), the mobile radio test facility first simulates all local mobile radio networks with modified location code with about 5 to 10 times the field strength (related to the interior of the explosion chamber) and the request for a location update. in order to simulate a change in location for the mobile stations in the cargo to be examined.
- the mobile stations respond to it and perform a "location update", ie they establish a mobile connection with the mobile radio device to log in there.
- Each local area network is simulated in this way for about 3 minutes.
- the receiving part of the mobile radio test facility detects any "location update” attempts by mobile terminals that are in the cargo and automatically causes a signal or alarm, which is displayed for example on a screen on the control cabinet 3.
- all active and functional mobile terminals are located, which are located in the explosion chamber and are released for the local mobile networks and could act as mobile detonator for explosives.
- the flight route includes a stopover
- all local mobile networks available at the intermediate ports are simulated.
- the simulation is performed on a free broadcast channel frequency with the features provided by the database (Country, Network, LAC, Network operator name, etc.).
- each network is expediently provided with a simulation time of at least 5 minutes. This takes into account that a mobile terminal that has not found its home network for a long time, for reasons of power saving, the network search slower.
- the mobile radio test device has established a mobile radio connection with a mobile radio terminal located in the explosion chamber, the mobile radio terminal in the explosion chamber by means of a hand-held antenna in a special Operating mode are targeted, or be called by the mobile radio test facility. If the mobile station in question is designed as an explosive device detonator to ignite the explosive device in the event of a call, this will cause a detonation.
- the IMSI and IMEI of the recorded mobile stations will be identified and made available in a database or a protocol.
- database data such as device type and especially the name and address of the device declarer can be determined.
- the simulation of mobile radio channels on the channels of the local mobile network operators can cause a collision with the mobile network operators, because the commercial mobile networks can be disturbed by the simulation or because of the mobile traffic of these networks intervene. Since the detection method according to the invention takes place only in the closed explosion chamber, however, due to the shielding effect of the explosion chamber, a very limited range of the disturbance can be expected. At best, the fault can still be detected within a maximum range of 50 - 150 m around the explosion chamber, which should be acceptable in practical operation, taking into account the preference of the security concerns against the interests of the network operators.
- the "mobile phone protection area" can be minimized by additional shielding in the explosion chamber, which, however, increases the cost.
- the invention is not limited to the embodiment described.
- mobile radio networks of the second generation GSM networks
- mobile networks of higher generations 2.5G, 3G networks, etc.
- the invention is not limited to the application for safety testing of air freight.
- the inventive simulation of mobile networks in a generic simulation chamber can also be used in combination with other simulation methods, such as the simulation of under- and / or over-pressure, the simulation of sound waves and / or electromagnetic waves, the emission of gases or radioactive radiation or a location or position simulation via a GPS system, based on the planned transport route the cargo is simulated by means of a GPS transmitter possible locations that are simulated to any GPS receivers contained in the cargo.
- the location or position simulation via a GPS system can also be carried out without the inventive mobile radio network simulation and independently of the other simulation methods.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Manufacturing & Machinery (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Claims (12)
- Chambre de simulation servant au déclenchement contrôlé de charges explosives contenues dans des marchandises dans des conditions de simulation, avec une chambre d'explosion (1) fermée de manière hermétique, dans laquelle les marchandises (2) sont introduites et dans laquelle des conditions en temps réel, qui coïncident avec des conditions extérieures des marchandises sur un trajet de transport prévu, sont spécifiées, caractérisée en ce qu'est prévu un dispositif de test radio mobile (4), qui est mis au point pour envoyer des signaux radio mobiles ainsi qu'un signal de mise à jour dans la chambre d'explosion (1), dans laquelle les signaux radio mobiles simulent des stations de base radio mobiles de réseaux radio mobiles et le signal de mise à jour amène un terminal radio mobile contenu dans les marchandises (2) à mettre en oeuvre une « location update ».
- Procédé servant au déclenchement contrôlé de charges explosives contenues dans des marchandises (2) dans des conditions de simulation, dans lequel les marchandises sont introduites dans une chambre d'explosion (1) fermée de manière hermétique, dans laquelle des conditions en temps réel, qui coïncident avec des conditions extérieures des marchandises sur un trajet de transport prévu, sont spécifiées, caractérisé en ce que des signaux radio mobiles ainsi qu'un signal de mise à jour sont envoyés dans la chambre d'explosion (1) avec un dispositif de test radio mobile (4), dans lequel les signaux radio mobiles simulent des stations de base radio mobiles de réseaux radio mobiles et le signal de mise à jour amène un terminal radio mobile contenu dans les marchandises (2) à mettre en oeuvre une « location update ».
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que les signaux radio mobiles envoyés par le dispositif de test radio mobile (4) dans la chambre d'explosion (1) simulent des signaux radio mobiles du type, qui sont envoyés par des stations de base radio mobiles locales au lieu de destination finale des marchandises (2) et/ou à des destinations intermédiaires des marchandises (2).
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 3, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de test radio mobile (4) envoie au moins un signal radio mobile dans la chambre d'explosion (1), lequel correspond à un signal downlink d'un réseau radio mobile local sur le lieu de destination finale ou à une destination intermédiaire des marchandises.
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que le signal radio mobile envoyé par le dispositif de test radio mobile (4) dans la chambre d'explosion (1) amène un ou chaque terminal radio mobile contenu dans les marchandises (2) à retourner le signal uplink au dispositif de test radio mobile (4).
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon la revendication 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que la « location update » mise en oeuvre dans le terminal radio mobile donne au terminal radio mobile accès à un réseau radio mobile, qui est simulé par le dispositif test radio mobile (4), les composants et/ou réglages de réseau du terminal radio mobile étant à cet effet mis à jour pour le réseau radio mobile simulé par le dispositif de test radio mobile (4).
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que dans le cas de la « location update » mise en oeuvre dans le terminal radio mobile dans une mémoire ou un index de données, en particulier dans le « Home Location Register » (HLO) du terminal radio mobile et/ou par l'envoi d'un message à son « HomeAgent », l'emplacement d'utilisateur spécifié au terminal radio mobile est modifié de telle sorte qu'un emplacement d'utilisateur fictif est réglé, lequel correspond à un emplacement du terminal radio mobile sur le lieu de destination finale des marchandises (2) et/ou à une destination intermédiaire des marchandises (2).
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif de test radio mobile (4) détecte la mise en oeuvre d'une « location update » par un terminal radio mobile se trouvant dans les marchandises et l'enregistre dans une base de données et/ou l'affiche sur un écran et/ou délivre un signal d'avertissement quand la mise en oeuvre d'une « location update » a été détectée par un terminal radio mobile se trouvant dans les marchandises.
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que dans le cas d'une détection d'un terminal radio mobile se trouvant dans les marchandises, ce dernier est ciblé et/ou appelé par le dispositif de test radio mobile (4).
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que lors d'une détection d'un terminal radio mobile se trouvant dans les marchandises, une définition de la position du terminal radio mobile détecté est mise en oeuvre par le dispositif de test radio mobile au moyen d'une mesure de période.
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que dans le cas d'une détection d'un terminal mobile radio se trouvant dans les marchandises, ses données d'identification, en particulier son « International Mobile Subscriber Identity » (IMSI) et/ou son « International Mobile Station Equipment Identity » (IMEI), sont lues par le dispositif de test radio mobile (4) et/ou sont mémorisées dans une base de données ou dans un protocole de contrôle.
- Chambre de simulation ou procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que les signaux envoyés par le dispositif de test radio mobile (4) dans la chambre d'explosion (1) sont protégés par la chambre d'explosion (1), et l'intensité de signal à l'extérieur de la chambre d'explosion (1) est inférieure à une valeur limite maximale, qui est choisie de telle sorte que les réseaux radio mobiles locaux ne sont pas influencés ou perturbés à l'emplacement de la chambre de simulation.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102011113826A DE102011113826B3 (de) | 2011-09-21 | 2011-09-21 | Simulationskammer sowie Verfahren zum kontrollierten Auslösen von in Frachtgut enthaltenen Sprengsätzen |
PCT/EP2012/068397 WO2013041549A1 (fr) | 2011-09-21 | 2012-09-19 | Chambre de simulation ainsi que procédé pour le déclenchement contrôlé de charges explosives contenues dans des marchandises |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP2758745A1 EP2758745A1 (fr) | 2014-07-30 |
EP2758745B1 true EP2758745B1 (fr) | 2017-08-02 |
Family
ID=46875393
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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EP12775633.6A Active EP2758745B1 (fr) | 2011-09-21 | 2012-09-19 | Chambre de simulation ainsi que procédé pour le déclenchement contrôlé de charges explosives contenues dans des marchandises |
Country Status (6)
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US (1) | US9335139B2 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP2758745B1 (fr) |
CA (1) | CA2856131A1 (fr) |
DE (1) | DE102011113826B3 (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2643893T3 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2013041549A1 (fr) |
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CN104986463A (zh) * | 2015-07-09 | 2015-10-21 | 梁荣 | 一种防爆防核防生化存储运输球 |
CN107079372B (zh) * | 2015-08-20 | 2021-01-29 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种网络终端设备进行通信的方法及装置 |
CN106288998B (zh) * | 2016-08-08 | 2017-09-29 | 杨博 | 一种排爆训练装置 |
US10374731B2 (en) * | 2017-10-31 | 2019-08-06 | Rohde & Schwarz Gmbh & Co. Kg | Over-the-air measurements system as well as method for testing the over-the-air characteristics of a device under test |
RU2765480C1 (ru) * | 2021-04-22 | 2022-01-31 | Задорожный Артем Анатольевич | Способ радиоэлектронного подавления радиолиний |
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GB2230698B (en) | 1989-04-28 | 1992-01-22 | Marconi Co Ltd | Explosive-screening apparatus and method |
US5274356A (en) * | 1991-04-09 | 1993-12-28 | Taricco Todd L | Methods and apparatus for the inspection of air cargo for bombs |
US5198612A (en) * | 1991-04-15 | 1993-03-30 | Tracor Aerospace, Inc. | In-flight electronic countermeasure payload simulator |
DE4115713C1 (en) * | 1991-05-14 | 1992-02-13 | Apparatebau Salzkotten Gmbh, 4796 Salzkotten, De | Air freight chamber for explosive materials - is cylindrical with plate-shaped sealing door on rail and roller guide, held fast by slides and centrally locked |
US7130624B1 (en) * | 2003-11-12 | 2006-10-31 | Jackson Richard H | System and method for destabilizing improvised explosive devices |
US7337686B2 (en) * | 2004-09-10 | 2008-03-04 | Qylur Security Systems, Inc. | Multi-threat detection system |
US7536170B2 (en) | 2005-09-22 | 2009-05-19 | Alcatel-Lucent Usa Inc. | Stationary forced premature detonation of improvised explosive devices via wireless phone signaling |
US7784389B2 (en) * | 2006-03-20 | 2010-08-31 | Technology Patents, Llc | Anti-terrorist system |
US20080083320A1 (en) * | 2006-10-05 | 2008-04-10 | Chang Tony S | System, Method, and Apparatus for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) |
-
2011
- 2011-09-21 DE DE102011113826A patent/DE102011113826B3/de active Active
-
2012
- 2012-09-19 WO PCT/EP2012/068397 patent/WO2013041549A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2012-09-19 ES ES12775633.6T patent/ES2643893T3/es active Active
- 2012-09-19 EP EP12775633.6A patent/EP2758745B1/fr active Active
- 2012-09-19 CA CA2856131A patent/CA2856131A1/fr not_active Abandoned
- 2012-09-19 US US14/345,697 patent/US9335139B2/en active Active
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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None * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US9335139B2 (en) | 2016-05-10 |
ES2643893T3 (es) | 2017-11-27 |
WO2013041549A1 (fr) | 2013-03-28 |
CA2856131A1 (fr) | 2013-03-28 |
DE102011113826B3 (de) | 2012-10-11 |
US20140245879A1 (en) | 2014-09-04 |
EP2758745A1 (fr) | 2014-07-30 |
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