EP1923658B1 - Method for testing the interactive capability between an aircraft and an unmanned attachable armed missile - Google Patents

Description

TECHNICAL AREA

The present invention relates to a method for checking the ability to interact between an aircraft and an armed, unmanned missile which can be coupled thereto, in accordance with the preamble of patent claim 1.

Such armed missiles and their interfaces to the aircraft as well as the weapon control functions in the aircraft are becoming increasingly complex and "intelligent". This increases the likelihood of malfunction in any one of the functional elements of the unit from an aircraft and an armed missile coupled to it, thus resulting in the need to operate the system of aircraft, armed missile, prior to launching an armed missile-launched aircraft and to reliably detect this connecting interface. As a result, the loss of the armed missile can be avoided by emergency shedding, a non-fulfillment of the mission to be flown and also collateral damage by an armed or missile that does not function or does not fully function.

STATE OF THE ART

In the DE 10 2004 042 990 and the not pre-published German patent application 10 2006 041 140.4 Methods and devices are described which allow the inspection of armed missiles during production prior to delivery to a customer or prior to operational deployment.

The US 5,414,347 A discloses a method for checking a weapon station interface on an aircraft. In this procedure, only the weapon station of the aircraft is checked; A systematic review of the functioning of a missile to be attached to this weapon station as well as a functional test after attaching the missile to the weapon station as a systematic consecutive procedure is not known from this citation.

Even the not previously published DE 10 2005 058 546 and DE 10 2006 041 140 , the US-A 5,614,896 and the EP 0 309 133 disclose apparatus and methods for testing a weapon station of an aircraft.

The US 5,721,680 A discloses a method for testing the operational readiness of a rocket. It states that it is customary to test the rocket's functionality during the manufacturing process, after removal from a depot and when mounting it on the launcher, the latter statement leaving open whether this test is prior to attachment to the launcher or before the launcher actual launch takes place when the rocket is already connected to the launcher. A systematic review of both the rocket and the launcher both separately prior to mounting the rocket on the launcher and a subsequent joint test after mounting the rocket on the launcher is not known from this citation.

These known methods and devices each represent only isolated solutions, which reveal either a check of the armed missile or a review of the weapon station of an aircraft carrying this missile. But even if these known test procedures are carried out on the aircraft or on the missile and discover no malfunction, it can Interaction between the aircraft and the armed missile lead to unwanted malfunction.

PRESENTATION OF THE INVENTION

The object of the present invention is therefore to specify a generic method which can increase the functional reliability of an aircraft unit and armed, unmanned missile which can be coupled thereto and thereby minimize functional failures and collateral damage.

This object is achieved by the method of claim 1.

1. a) Überprüfen der Funktionsfähigkeit des bewaffneten Flugkörpers mittels einer Waffen-Testvorrichtung;
2. b) Überprüfen der Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs mit einer Waffenstations-Testvorrichtung vor oder nach Schritt a);
3. c) Anbringen des bewaffneten Flugkörpers an der Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs unter mechanischer und elektrischer Kopplung des Flugkörpers mit dem Luftfahrzeug;
4. d) Aktivierung des bewaffneten Flugkörpers durch das Luftfahrzeug bis zum Erreichen eines Bereitschaftsstatus' des bewaffneten Flugkörpers und
5. e) Überprüfen der einzelnen Aktivierungsaktionen des Schritts d);

wobei dann, wenn zumindest eine der Überprüfungen nicht erfolgreich verlaufen ist, ein Fehlersignal ausgegeben wird.In this case, the method comprises for the systematic checking of the ability to interact between an aircraft and an armed, unmanned missile which can be coupled thereto in a coherent sequence, wherein the aircraft is provided with a weapon station which has mechanical and electrical coupling means which are connected to corresponding mechanical and electrical coupling means of the aircraft Missile are connectable, the following steps:

1. a) Checking the functioning of the armed missile by means of a weapons test device;
2. b) checking the weapon station of the aircraft with a weapon station testing device before or after step a);
3. c) attaching the armed missile to the weapon station of the aircraft with mechanical and electrical coupling of the missile to the aircraft;
4. (d) Activation of the armed missile by the aircraft until it reaches a readiness status of the armed missile and
5. e) checking the individual activation actions of step d);

wherein if at least one of the checks has failed, an error signal is output.

This solution according to the invention provides a method in which the armed missile, the aircraft and the interaction between the aircraft and the armed missile, ie the interface between the two, are checked systematically and in a coherent sequence. This systemic approach to carrying out a review makes it possible to verify the overall system of aircraft, armed missile and interface immediately before the aircraft is launched. This makes it possible to make a much more reliable statement about the functionality of the overall system intended for use. It is not only important that a review of the aircraft, armed missile and interface itself takes place, but that in concrete terms an intended for use unit of aircraft, armed missile and interface of the inventive review is subjected. This check should be made as soon as possible before take-off of the aircraft. The order of steps a) and b) can also be reversed.

1. c1) Konfiguration des bewaffneten Flugkörpers für einen Kommunikations-Analyse-Test mit dem Luftfahrzeug durch Einbringen eines Identifikationsmittels in den bewaffneten Flugkörper;
2. c2) Durchführen eines Kommunikations-Analyse-Tests zwischen dem bewaffneten Flugkörper und dem Luftfahrzeug;
3. c3) Konfiguration des bewaffneten Flugkörpers für den Einsatzbetrieb, indem das Identifikationsmittel aus dem bewaffneten Flugkörper wieder entfernt wird.

It is particularly advantageous if, after carrying out process step c), the following steps are additionally carried out:

1. c1) configuring the armed missile for a communication analysis test with the aircraft by introducing an identification means into the armed missile;
2. c2) performing a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft;
3. c3) configuration of the armed missile for use by removing the identification means from the armed missile.

By means of the identification means, the status of individual operating mode lines can be changed, whereby the missile can sense the desired mode. A simple identification means can be formed, for example, from a short-circuit plug, which is connected to the missile.

1. d1) Konfiguration des bewaffneten Flugkörpers für einen Kommunikations-Analyse-Test mit dem Luftfahrzeug durch Einbringen eines Identifikations-Mittels in den bewaffneten Flugkörper;
2. d2) Durchführen eines Kommunikations-Analyse-Tests zwischen dem bewaffneten Flugkörper und dem Luftfahrzeug.

In the event that an error signal is generated in method step d), the following additional steps are preferably carried out after carrying out method step d):

1. d1) configuring the armed missile for a communication analysis test with the aircraft by introducing an identification means into the armed missile;
2. d2) Perform a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft.

1. a1) Überprüfung der Luftfahrzeugschnittstelle des bewaffneten Flugkörpers auf korrekte Funktionsweise;
2. a2) Überprüfung der elektronischen Baugruppen des bewaffneten Flugkörpers auf Fehlerfreiheit;
3. a3) Überprüfung der im bewaffneten Flugkörper vorgesehenen Aktuatoren auf Bewegungsfähigkeit;
4. a4) Überprüfung der Sensoren des bewaffneten Flugkörpers sowie deren Funktionen auf korrekte Funktionsweise.

It is particularly preferred if in process step a) at least the following functional tests of the armed missile are carried out:

1. a1) checking the aircraft interface of the armed missile for correct operation;
2. a2) checking the electronic assemblies of the armed missile for accuracy;
3. a3) checking the mobility of the actuators in the armed missile;
4. a4) Checking the armed missile sensors and their functions for correct functioning.

It is particularly advantageous if during the inspection of the armed missile in steps a1) to a4) occurring sporadic, non-fatal errors stored by type and number in a memory of the armed missile and after completion of the entire review via a maintenance interface of the armed missile.

This non-fatal error mismatch allows for quick and accurate error analysis for faster troubleshooting after verification.

Preferably, during the inspection of the missile in steps a1) to a4), the duration of individual technical processes in the armed missile is measured and stored in a memory in the missile and output after completion of the entire review via the maintenance interface.

This recording of the duration of individual technical processes allows a state analysis even if no fatal error has occurred. Based on the data collected and stored, a decision can be taken after the verification has been carried out to determine whether the overall system of aircraft and armed missile is still operational.

It is also advantageous if, in the case of an error message during the inspection of the armed missile, that complete assembly that has caused the error message is output via the maintenance interface.

The information obtained thereby makes it possible to identify and repair as quickly as possible the module which caused the error message.

1. b1) Überprüfung der Adressleitungen des Datenbusses auf korrekte Codierung;
2. b2) Test der Leitungen, mit denen das Luftfahrzeug den bewaffneten Flugkörper mit Energie versorgt, auf zumindest korrekte Spannung, Frequenz und Phase;
3. b3) Test der Zündleitungen, mit denen das Luftfahrzeug irreversible Funktionen des bewaffneten Flugkörpers auslöst, auf korrekten Status;
4. b4) Test der Interlock-Leitung der Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs auf korrekten Status;
5. b5) Test des Datenbusses der Waffenstation und der Waffensteuerung des Luftfahrzeugs auf korrekte Kommunikations-Übertragung und auf korrekte Kommunikations-Inhalte, indem das Waffenstations-Testgerät an die Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs angeschlossen ist und den bewaffneten Flugkörper simuliert.

Preferably, in process step b) at least the following tests are carried out:

1. b1) checking the address lines of the data bus for correct coding;
2. b2) test the lines used by the aircraft to power the armed missile to at least the correct voltage, frequency and phase;
3. b3) checking the ignition cables with which the aircraft triggers irreversible functions of the armed missile to the correct status;
4. b4) test the interlock management of the aircraft's weapon station for correct status;
5. b5) Test the Weapon Station's data bus and weapon control for proper communication transmission and communication content by connecting the Weapons Station Tester to the weapon station of the aircraft and simulating the armed missile.

The interlock conduit of the weapon station of the aircraft is a discrete conduit, which is returned from the aircraft to the missile and which is split when the missile is separated from the aircraft. This allows the aircraft to detect whether the missile has been decoupled properly from the aircraft, ie, a "release" of the missile took place, or whether the missile has not been disconnected or not completely disconnected, so that there is a so-called "hangfire". The interlock cables are part of the relevant standard MIL-STD-1760 and are classified as safety-critical.

• Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf Übertragung mit korrekten Zyklen;
• Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf korrekte Reihenfolge;
• Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf korrekte InformationsÜbertragung;
• Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf plausiblen Inhalt;
• Überprüfung der Datenbus-Botschaften auf korrekte Identität des Luftfahrzeugs;
• Überprüfung der Zündsteuer-Leitung auf deaktivierten Zustand;
• Überprüfung der Zündenergie-Leitung auf deaktivierten Zustand.

A particularly preferred performance of a communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft is characterized in that in step c2) or in step d2) the armed missile during the communication analysis test between the armed missile and the aircraft at least the following tests performs:

• Checking the data bus messages for transmission with correct cycles;
• Checking the data bus messages for correct order;
• Checking the data bus messages for correct information transfer;
• Checking the data bus messages for plausible content;
• Checking the data bus messages for correct identity of the aircraft;
• Checking the ignition control line for deactivated state;
• Check the ignition energy line for deactivated state.

Preferably, in the event of a failure of the communication analysis test, the error circumstances causing the error are output via the armed missile maintenance interface. As a result, the operating personnel are provided with data that allows fast troubleshooting.

If the sporadic, non-fatal errors detected during the communication analysis test are stored in the armed missile according to type and number and are output as a report after completion of the check via the armed missile maintenance interface, then this can also be used for reliable fault analysis and contribute to faster repair of the affected component advantageous.

• absolute Häufigkeit jeder Datenbus-Botschaft;
• Anzahl der als fehlerhaft erkannten Botschaften je Datenbus-Botschafts-Typ,
• errechneter Ist-Zyklus jeder Datenbus-Botschaft, wobei jeder Ist-Zyklus einem spezifizierten Soll-Zyklus gegenübergestellt wird.

It is also advantageous if, at the end of the communication analysis test, at least the following data bus analysis information is output as a report via the maintenance interface of the armed missile:

• absolute frequency of each data bus message;
• Number of messages detected as faulty per data bus message type,
• calculated actual cycle of each data bus message, each actual cycle being compared to a specified target cycle.

• aktueller Status des Navigations-Systems des Luftfahrzeugs;
• aktuelle Position, Geschwindigkeit und Eulerwinkel des Luftfahrzeugs;
• Genauigkeits-Maß für die Navigations-Daten des Luftfahrzeugs.

It is also advantageous if, at the end of the communication analysis test, at least the following aircraft navigation data are output as a report by means of the maintenance interface of the armed missile:

• current status of the navigation system of the aircraft;
• current position, speed and Euler angle of the aircraft;
• Accuracy measure for the navigation data of the aircraft.

This report allows to check the aircraft navigation for plausibility and the correct supply of the armed missile with navigation data.

It is also particularly advantageous if the communication analysis test is a mode of operation of the armed missile operational software that can be selected by means of an identification means. As a result, the communication analysis test is integrated into the armed missile and is thus always available without additional testing facilities.

The missile software has various modes of operation, namely, operational operation for use of the missile, a special test operation during missile manufacture, and a special test operation during missile utilization. The communication analysis test is a variant of the special test operation during use. It is selected by means of an identification means designed, for example, as a short-circuit plug.

Preferred embodiments of the invention with additional design details and other advantages are described and explained in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Fig. 1

einen schematischen Testaufbau für den Test des bewaffneten Flugkörpers gemäß Schritt a);

Fig. 2

einen schematischen Testaufbau für den Test der Waffenstation des Luftfahrzeugs gemäß Schritt b);

Fig. 3

einen schematischen Testaufbau für den Kommunikations-Analyse-Test;

Fig. 4

ein Flussdiagramm zur schematischen Darstellung des erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrensablaufs;

Fig. 5

eine detaillierte schematische Darstellung des Verfahrensablaufs in einer vorteilhaften Ausgestaltung; und

Fig. 6

ein Beispiel eines Verfahrensablaufs mit einer Fehlermeldung.

It shows:

Fig. 1

a schematic test setup for the test of the armed missile according to step a);

Fig. 2

a schematic test setup for the test of the weapon station of the aircraft according to step b);

Fig. 3

a schematic test setup for the communication analysis test;

Fig. 4

a flowchart for schematically illustrating the process sequence according to the invention;

Fig. 5

a detailed schematic representation of the process flow in an advantageous embodiment; and

Fig. 6

an example of a procedure with an error message.

PRESENTATION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

Fig. 1 schematically shows the test setup for the test of an armed missile 1 by means of an external weapons test device.

The missile 1 has a fuselage 10, wings 11, rudder flaps 12, 13, at least one engine, of which in the Fig. 1 only the right air inflow channel 14 is shown, and at its front end an infrared homing head 15 on. In the front fuselage area 16, a test unit (TLP) is provided in the interior of the fuselage, which can be connected to the weapon test device 100 provided outside the missile 1 via a maintenance interface 16 'located behind a fuselage flap. The missile is provided inside the fuselage with one or more warheads (for example Vorhohlladung or Penetrator). At the top of the hull two suspension devices 17, 17 'are attached with which the missile 1 can be attached to a carrier aircraft, for example, at the local bomb pylon. Another interface 18 is provided at the top of the missile 1, via which the missile is in use connected to the aircraft carrying it (umbilical interface) and which is used in the present method for data exchange with the weapon test apparatus 100. Finally, the missile 1 is connected via an antenna line 60 to an external satellite navigation antenna 6, which supplies the missile-own on-board computer with satellite navigation data.

The weapon test apparatus 100 is connected to the umbilical interface 18 of the missile 1 via a first connection cable 102, the so-called "umbilical cable". Through this connection, the weapon tester can then communicate and interact with the missile 1 in the same manner (for example, via Milbus or MIL-STD 1760 discrete lines) as with a carrier aircraft.

Furthermore, the weapon test apparatus 100 is connected to the maintenance interface 16 'of the missile 1 via a second connection cable 104, the so-called "maintenance cable".

For power supply, the weapon test apparatus 100 is connected to an external power supply device 108 via a power supply cable 106. This power supply device can supply the weapon test apparatus 100 with the usual 3x115V 400 Hz power supply in suitable carrier aircraft.

With this in Fig. 1 As shown in the experimental setup, the functioning of the armed missile 1 is performed by means of the weapon test apparatus 100 in the manner described below.

Fig. 2 shows a schematic test setup for the test of a weapon station of an aircraft. 2

A weapon station device 20 is provided on the underside 21 of the aircraft 2 either on the fuselage or on one of the wings of the aircraft 2. In the example shown, a left weapon station 20 'and a right weapon station 20 "are shown schematically, which are mounted below the fuselage of the aircraft 2.

Each of the weapon stations 20 ', 20 "is connected to a weapon station tester 200 or 210 via a respectively assigned umbilical cable 202 or 212. The respective umbilical cable 202, 212 is for this purpose to a corresponding (not shown) interface of the associated weapon station 20 ', 20 "connected and electrically connected to this.

The two weapon station test devices 200, 210 are each supplied from the aircraft 2 via a power supply cable 204, 214 with an on-board voltage; this on-board voltage is for example 28 V. Furthermore, the two weapon station test equipment 200, 210 via a respective data cable 206, 216 connected to an external computer 220, such as a notebook, for data exchange. The computer 220 may be electrically connected by a power supply cable 222 to a conventional power grid.

With the in Fig. 2 The test setup shown verifies the weapon station 20, 20 'of the aircraft 2 by means of the weapon station test device 200, 210. The implementation of this test will be described in more detail below.

Fig. 3 shows a schematic test setup for the communication analysis test between the missile 1 and the aircraft 2.

The missile 1 is suspended by means of the suspension devices 17, 17 'at the weapon station 20' of the aircraft 2, as in Fig. 3 is shown schematically. The umbilical interface 18 of the missile 1 is connected via an aircraft-internal Umbilical cable 22 with the (not shown) on-board electronics of the aircraft 2, which has a weapon control computer.

The missile 1 is provided with an identification means, which is formed for example by a suitable short-circuit plug, which is inserted into a corresponding electrical socket and together with this forms a plug connection, in which by plugging the plug into the socket at least one Connection between two contacts of the socket is made. The short-circuit plug forming the identification means can be situated, for example, in the area of the maintenance interface 16 'and thus also accessible by opening the hull which covers it.

Furthermore, a visualization means 300 is connected to the maintenance interface 16 'of the missile 1 by means of a maintenance cable 302. The Visualization means may be formed for example by a monitor or a computer.

By means of in Fig. 3 schematically test construction is the implementation of a communication analysis test between the aircraft 2 and the missile 1 possible, wherein the implementation of the test will be discussed in detail below.

Fig. 4 shows a flowchart for schematically illustrating the method sequence according to the invention.

First, with the in Fig. 1 The test setup shown in step 400, the test of the armed missile in the figures also designated as a weapon 1. Here, the functioning of the armed missile 1 is checked by means of the weapons test apparatus 100, as for example in the not previously published German patent application DE 10 2006 041 140.4 is described.

If a so-called fatal error occurs in this test, that is, a fault that makes the use of the missile impossible or at least so impaired that a mission success must be questioned, the test is failed as a failure and it will be a " NOGO "signal is output through the weapon test apparatus 100. The test of the missile can be done in several steps. For example, initially for a first component of the missile a power-on test, in which the component tests its basic functions independently, followed by a triggered self-test of the component follows in a next step, which is commanded by the on-board computer of the missile and in which activates the complete test spectrum of the isolated component becomes. In a third step, a continuous test of the corresponding component carried out under a simulation of an existing carrier aircraft and a mission software loaded into the computer of the missile then takes place, in particular the Functionality of possibly present in the component sensors, detectors or actuators is checked. At the same time, tests of component groups and function chains are carried out.

At the end of these three tests, a decision is made as to whether a fatal error has occurred in one of the tests, that is, an error that renders the missile unusable. If this is the case, then a "NOGO" signal is transmitted together with a complete error image of this component just tested, which has led to the "NOGO". The result of the tests is output via the weapon test apparatus 100. This complete error image essentially contains a complete log of the individual tests carried out with their respective results and the error cause of the component reported as defective, including all relevant information from a possibly defective component as well as from the environment of this defective component. This "NOGO" check can also be carried out continuously in all three steps.

Furthermore, sporadic, non-fatal errors that have been recorded during the test are output to the weapon test apparatus 100 during the test, so that a person evaluating the test result can obtain an image of the condition of the missile from this sporadic, non-fatal error data 1, even though these mistakes did not contribute to the "NOGO" decision. The evaluating person can then draw conclusions about the condition of the missile, so that on the basis of this data certain maintenance or repair work on the missile can be made. Furthermore, during the test run, technical times of individual processes taking place in the missile 1 or in its control computer are measured, logged and output to the external weapon test device 100. Even from these technical times, a person analyzing the test result can draw conclusions about the condition of the missile and thus arrange maintenance work in good time.

If, after this test of the armed missile, it has been determined in step 402 whether the test was successful, the test of the weapon station of the aircraft is subsequently carried out in step 404.

In this test, a first operator occupying the space of the weapon system officer in the cockpit executes the appropriate commands required to launch and discharge the armed missile 1 from the aircraft 2. A second operator on the ground observes on the screen of the computer 220 the corresponding signals at the associated weapon stations 20 ', 20 "which are caused in response to the operations performed by the first operator, and the first person in the cockpit observes the corresponding ones Cockpit displays and verifies that these ads work in the correct manner for the operating case.

If a fatal error occurs during this test of the weapon station of the aircraft, this also leads to a "NOGO" decision. However, if it is determined in this decision step 406 that no error has occurred, in step 408 the missile 1 is attached to the associated weapon station 20 ', 20 "of the aircraft 2 and mechanically and electrically connected to the aircraft 2.

Subsequently, in step 410, an operational run-up of the armed missile 1 takes place at the weapon station 20 'or 20 "of the aircraft 2. The individual components of the armed missile 1 are activated by the aircraft 2 and certain automatic checks are performed.

During this run-up of the armed missile 1 on the aircraft 2, which lasts until the armed missile reaches a standby status, the individual activation actions are monitored by means of the visualization means 300 for the occurrence of fatal flaws. Kick in this If a fatal error becomes apparent during observation and test step 412, this results in a "NOGO" decision. However, if the test is smooth and error-free, a "GO" decision is made in step 412 to release the armed missile 1 and aircraft 2 units for deployment.

Fig. 5 shows a development of the above in connection with the Fig. 4 described method, wherein the steps 500 to 508 correspond to the corresponding lower by the value 100 steps 400 to 408.

After the armed missile 1 is attached to the aircraft 2 in step 508 and the mechanical and electrical connections between the aircraft 2 and the armed missile 1 are established, the armed missile 1 is then deployed in step 510 by placing the identification means in the armed missile 1 Configured communication analysis test with the aircraft.

Subsequently, in step 512, a communication analysis test is performed between the armed missile 1 and the aircraft 2. In this communication analysis test, it is checked whether the information channels used in the operational deployment of the unit of aircraft 2 and armed missile 1 are functional and whether the communication that takes place via these channels runs correctly.

If an error is detected in this communication analysis test, it is decided in step 514 to branch to step 515 in which an error image and a report of the error analysis are output via the visualization means 300.

If, on the other hand, it is determined in step 514 that no error has occurred in the communication analysis test of step 512, then in step 516 the armed missile 1 is configured for operational operation by removing the identification means from the armed missile 1 again.

Subsequently, in steps 518 and 520, steps 410 and 412 of the example are performed Fig. 4 the operational launch of the armed missile at the weapon station of the aircraft and the appropriate decision as to whether or not errors occurred during that run-up.

Fig. 6 shows a flowchart of a further modification of the method according to Fig. 4 , wherein the method steps 600 to 612 the reduced by the value of 200 method steps 400 to 412 of the example Fig. 4 correspond.

If it is determined in decision step 612 that an error has occurred during the operational start-up of the armed missile 1 at the weapon station 20 ', 20 "of the aircraft 2, then the test does not take place - as in the example of FIG Fig. 4 - concluded with a "NOGO" decision, but it is configured in step 613, the armed missile 1 for a communication analysis test by the identification means is introduced into the armed missile 1. It then follows in step 615 a communication analysis test between the armed missile 1 and the aircraft 2 that complies with the communication analysis test 512 of the method example Fig. 5 equivalent.

If it is decided in the subsequent decision step 617 that the communication analysis test has been carried out without error in step 615, a report about the communication analysis performed in step 615 is output via the visualization means 300 in step 618.

On the other hand, if it is decided in step 617 that an error has occurred in the communication analysis test of step 615, the communication analysis report is output via the visualization means 300 in step 619 together with an error image of the occurred error.

Reference signs in the claims, the description and the drawings are only for the better understanding of the invention and are not intended to limit the scope.

LIST OF REFERENCE NUMBERS

1

Flugkörper

2

Luftfahrzeug

6

Satellitennavigationsantenne

10

Rumpf

11

Tragflächen

12

Ruderklappen

13

Ruderklappen

14

rechter Lufteinströmkanal

15

Infrarot-Zielsuchkopf

16

vorderer Rumpfbereich

16'

Wartungsschnittstelle

17

Aufhängevorrichtung

17'

Aufhängevorrichtung

18

Umbilical-Schnittstelle

20

Waffenstationseinrichtung

20'

linke Waffenstation

20"

rechte Waffenstation

21

Unterseite des Luftfahrzeugs

22

Umbilical-Kabel

60

Antennenleitung

100

Waffentestvorrichtung

102

Verbindungskabel

104

Verbindungskabel

106

Stromversorgungskabel

108

Stromversorgungseinrichtung

200

Waffenstations-Testgerät

202

Umbilical-Kabel

204

Stromversorgungskabel

206

Datenkabel

210

Waffenstations-Testgerät

212

Umbilical-Kabel

214

Stromversorgungskabel

216

Datenkabel

220

externer Computer

222

Stromversorgungskabel

300

Visualisierungsmittel

302

Wartungskabel

They denote:

1

missile

2

aircraft

6

Satellite navigation antenna

10

hull

11

wings

12

rudders

13

rudders

14

right air inlet channel

15

Infrared homing head

16

front hull area

16 '

Service Interface

17

suspension

17 '

suspension

18

Umbilical Interface

20

Weapons station equipment

20 '

left weapon station

20 "

right weapon station

21

Bottom of the aircraft

22

Umbilical cable

60

aerial cable

100

Weapon test device

102

connection cable

104

connection cable

106

Power cable

108

Power supply means

200

Weapon station tester

202

Umbilical cable

204

Power cable

206

data cable

210

Weapon station tester

212

Umbilical cable

214

Power cable

216

data cable

220

external computer

222

Power cable

300

visualization means

302

maintenance cable

Claims (15)

1. Method of systematic testing of the interaction capability between an aircraft and an armed, unmanned airborne vehicle that can be coupled to it, in a coherent sequence, wherein the aircraft is provided with a weapon station, which comprises mechanical and electrical coupling means, which can be connected to corresponding mechanical and electrical coupling means of the airborne vehicle,
   characterized by the steps,

   a) Check the serviceability of the armed airborne vehicle by means of a weapon test device;

   b) Check the weapon station of the aircraft using a weapon station test device before or after step a);

   c) Attach the armed airborne vehicle to the weapon station of the aircraft by mechanical and electrical coupling of the airborne vehicle to the aircraft;

   d) Activate the armed airborne vehicle from the aircraft until the armed airborne vehicle reaches the ready status

   e) Check the individual activation actions of step d) ;

   wherein a fault signal is output if at least one of the tests is unsuccessful.
2. Method according to Claim 1,
   characterized
   in that after carrying out step c) of the method, the following steps are additionally carried out:

   c1) Configure the armed airborne vehicle for a communisations analysis test with the aircraft by introducing identification means into the armed airborne vehicle;

   c2) Carry out a communisations analysis test between the armed airborne vehicle and the aircraft;

   c3) Configure the armed airborne vehicle for operational use, wherein the identification means is removed from the armed airborne vehicle.
3. Method according to Claim 1,
   characterized
   in that in the event that an error signal is generated in step d) of the method, the following additional steps are carried out after carrying out step d) of the method:

   d1) Configure the armed airborne vehicle for a communications analysis test with the aircraft by introducing an identification means into the armed airborne vehicle;

   d2) Carry out a communications analysis test between the armed airborne vehicle and the aircraft.
4. Method according to Claim 1,
   characterized
   in that in step a) of the method, at least the following functional tests of the armed airborne vehicle are carried out:

   a1) Check the aircraft interface of the armed airborne vehicle for correct operation:

   a2) Check the electronic assemblies in the armed airborne vehicle for serviceability;

   a3) Check the actuators provided in the armed airborne vehicle for movement capability:

   a4) Check the sensors of the armed airborne vehicle and their functions for correct operation.
5. Method according to Claim 4,
   characterized

   - in that during the testing of the armed airborne vehicle in steps a1) to a4), sporadic, non-fatal faults that occur are stored according to type and number in a memory of the armed airborne vehicle and are output via a maintenance interface of the armed airborne vehicle following completion of the entire testing.
6. Method according to Claim 4 or 5,
   characterized

   - in that during the testing of the armed airborne vehicle in steps a1) to a4) the time duration of the individual technical processes in the armed airborne vehicle is measured and stored in a memory in the armed airborne vehicle and is output via the maintenance interface following completion of the entire testing.
7. Method according to Claim 4, 5 or 6,
   characterized

   - in that in the event of a fault message during the testing of the armed airborne vehicle, the complete fault map associated with that assembly which has caused the fault message is output via the maintenance interface.
8. Method according to Claim 1,
   characterized
   in that in step b) of the method, at least the following tests are carried out:

   b1) Check the address lines of the data bus for correct coding;

   b2) Test the lines with which the aircraft supplies the armed airborne vehicle with power, at least for correct voltage, frequency and phase;

   b3) Test the initiation lines with which the aircraft triggers irreversible functions of the armed airborne vehicle for correct status;

   b4) Test the interlock line of the weapon station of the aircraft for correct status;

   b5) Test the data bus of the weapon station and the weapon control system of the aircraft for correct communications transmission and for correct communications contents, wherein the weapons station test device is connected to the weapon station of the aircraft and simulates the armed airborne vehicle.
9. Method according to Claim 2,
   characterized
   in that the armed airborne vehicle carries out at least the following steps in step c2) of the method, between the armed airborne vehicle and the aircraft, during the communications analysis test:

   - Check the data bus messages for transmission with correct cycles;

   - Check the data bus messages for correct sequence;

   - Check the data bus messages for correct information transmission;

   - Check the data bus messages for plausible content;

   - Check the data bus messages for correct identity of the aircraft;

   - Check the initiation control line for the deactivated state;

   - Check the initiation power line for the deactivated state.
10. Method according to Claim 3,
    characterized
    in that in step d2) of the method the armed airborne vehicle carries out at least the following tests during the communications analysis test between the armed airborne vehicle and the aircraft:

    - Check the data bus messages for transmission with correct cycles;

    - Check the data bus messages for correct sequence;

    - Check the data bus messages for correct information transmission;

    - Check the data bus messages for plausible content;

    - Check the data bus messages for correct identity of the aircraft;

    - Check the initiation control line for the deactivated state;

    - Check the initiation power line for the deactivated state.
11. Method according to Claim 9 or 10,
    characterized
    in that in the event of a fault in the communications analysis tests, the fault situations causing the fault are output via the maintenance interface of the armed airborne vehicle.
12. Method according to Claim 9 or 10,
    characterized
    in that the sporadic, non-fatal faults detected during the communications analysis tests are stored according to type and number in the armed airborne vehicle and are output as a report via the maintenance interface of the armed airborne vehicle following completion of the checks.
13. Method according to Claim 9 or 10,
    characterized
    in that, following completion of the communications analysis tests, at least the following data bus analysis information is output as a report via the maintenance interface of the armed airborne vehicle:

    - The absolute frequency of occurrence of each data bus message;

    - The number of the messages of each data bus message type detected as faulty,

    - The calculated actual cycle of each data bus message, wherein each actual cycle is compared with a specified nominal cycle.
14. Method according to Claim 9 or 10,
    characterized
    in that following completion of the communications analysis tests, at least the following aircraft navigation data is output as a report via the maintenance interface of the armed airborne vehicle:

    - The current status of the navigation system of the aircraft;

    - The current position, speed and Euler angle of the aircraft;

    - A measure of the accuracy of the navigation data of the aircraft.
15. Method according to Claim 9 or 10,
    characterized
    in that the communications analysis test is an operating mode of the operational software of the armed airborne vehicle that is selectable by an identification means.

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